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Abstract
The first Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project was registered in 2004 and, 
as of November 2010, there were over 2500 registered projects, expected to reduce 
about 397 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually, as well as a total of more than 
5000 projects in the CDM pipeline. Although on the face of it, this large number of 
projects makes the CDM appear to be a success story, a closer look at these figures 
tells a different story. These 2500 registered projects (and the over 5000 in the 
pipeline) are concentrated in just a few developing countries, with the vast majority of 
countries hosting just 1 or 2 projects or even no project at all - the distribution of 
projects among developing countries ranges from one country hosting more than 1000 
projects, to some countries hosting several hundred projects and many countries 
hosting none. The unevenness of this distribution is a problem within the CDM 
regime in which, even before the first project was registered, countries have been 
seeking to ensure an “equitable distribution” of projects. Contrary to countries’ desire, 
this distribution appears to be anything but “equitable.” Although various solutions 
have been proposed and initiatives launched, all aimed at addressing this apparent 
problem and promoting a more equitable distribution of projects, it has persisted and a 
solution or range of solutions that would effectively address it has so far proved 
elusive.
This research is aimed at determining whether and how an equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects can be achieved. In particular, it examines whether the 
CDM legal regime can achieve an equitable geographic distribution of projects, or 
whether the issues that contribute to the inequitable distribution are fundamental to 
xxvii
the design of the regime. Because so far, the CDM regime does not provide the 
meaning of equitable geographic distribution or identify the ideal geographic 
distribution of projects, this research starts by providing such a definition, in order to 
determine whether or not a problem actually exists. It also makes recommendations 
on how to achieve a distribution of CDM projects among countries that can be 
regarded as more equitable than the current distribution. 
This thesis answers two main questions: how should CDM projects be distributed
among countries, that is, what is the meaning of equitable geographic distribution of 
CDM projects; and can the CDM regime achieve this distribution? The answer to the 
first question defines equitable geographic distribution and outlines the factors that 
should be considered to help achieve this distribution, which are: greenhouse gas 
emission reduction potential, need (or sustainable development potential) and 
preferential treatment. In searching for a definition of equitable geographic 
distribution, this research examined distributive justice in international law to see if 
there is a guiding principle that can be applied to the CDM, and also to see if the 
CDM matched the definition/application of distributive justice in international law. 
As a product of this, this thesis provides an answer to the question, “what is 
distributive justice in international law?” The answer to the second main question is 
that although the CDM regime can achieve a slightly more equitable geographic 
distribution than is currently the case, a truly equitable geographic distribution cannot 
be achieved under the regime, primarily because of the market nature of the CDM. 
1CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Climate change is “the world’s priority” and “the greatest threat hanging over 
humanity.”1
1.1 Background 
Climate change refers to changes in the earth’s climate that occur as a result of 
various factors including traditionally natural processes such as changes in the output 
of the sun or slow changes in ocean circulation. As used in this research and in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change2 and its Kyoto Protocol,3
climate change refers to a change in the earth’s climate which is anthropogenic, or 
man-made, directly or indirectly caused by human activities, such as fossil fuel 
combustion and land use changes.4
Rising greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere are changing the 
climate and causing global temperature increases beyond levels that can comfortably 
sustain life on earth.5 For example, carbon dioxide (CO2) levels in the atmosphere 
                                               
1 Statement by former Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer at the high-level segment of the Fourteenth 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 14) and the fourth session of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP 4), 11 December 2008, 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/pdf/cop_14_hls_statement_de_boer.pdf, 
www.unfccc.int (23/02/2010).
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York) 9 May 1992, in force 21
March 1994; (1992) 31 ILM 851 (UNFCCC).
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto) 11 
December 1997, in force 16 February 2005; (1998) 37 ILM 32 (Kyoto Protocol).
4 See UNFCCC, Article 1. 
5 See generally on the science and effects of climate change, S. Solomon et al. (eds.), Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
M.L. Parry et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); A.B. Pittock, Climate Change: Turning up the Heat
2have increased by about 30% since pre-industrial times, and are increasing at a rate of 
approximately 0.4% per year.6 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC),7 this rate of increase is unprecedented in at least the last 20,000 
years. This problem of the changing climate has become one of the key issues in the 
international arena. It is seen as one of the greatest dangers faced by this generation, 
and, in fact, by future generations as well.8 It is a global problem that affects all 
countries and people, and is thereby regarded as a “common concern of all 
mankind.”9 Consequently, it needs a global solution and a system that encourages the 
participation of countries, in order to ensure “…the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries…”10
In 1988, the Government of Malta made a proposal to the UN General Assembly for 
consideration of an item titled “Conservation of climate as part of the common 
heritage of mankind.”11 Following this proposal the General Assembly, for the first 
time, considered the issue of climate change, and determined and decided, inter alia,
                                                                                                                                      
(London: Earthscan, 2005); J. Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); and M. Munasinghe and R. Swart, Primer on Climate Change and 
Sustainable Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
6 J.T. Houghton et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 92.
7 The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations 
Environment Programme to inter alia assess available scientific and socio-economic information on 
climate change and its impacts and to provide the relevant advice. It is recognised as the global 
authority on climate change.
8 See for example, the statement by former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer, supra note 1.
9 See UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 44/207, Preamble, paragraph 1; UNGA Resolution 
45/212, Preamble, paragraph 1; UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 1; and Plan of Implementation of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002 (Report of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, Resolution 2, Annex) (Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation), Paragraph 38. 
10 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 6. 
11 UN Doc. A/43/241 (12 September, 1988).
3that necessary and timely action should be taken to deal with climate change within a 
global framework.12
By Resolution 44/207, the General Assembly called for collaborative efforts to 
prepare, as a matter of urgency, a framework convention on climate and associated 
protocols containing concrete commitments.13 This led to the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate 
Change14 which adopted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in May 
1992.15 The objective of the Convention is to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the 
climate system.16
The Convention however does not set binding quantitative targets. Instead, it contains 
general reduction and reporting commitments, and, inter alia, provides that developed 
countries should take appropriate measures to mitigate climate change by limiting 
their GHG emissions and aim to return to their 1990 emission levels by 2000.17 In 
recognition of the inadequacy of these commitments, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted 
                                               
12 UNGA Resolution 43/53 (A/RES/43/53, 6 December 1988), Paragraphs 1 and 2. See generally F.L. 
Kirgis, ‘Standing to challenge human endeavors that could change the climate’ (1990) 84 AJIL 525. 
13 UNGA Resolution 44/207 (A/RES/44/207, 22 December 1989), Paragraph 12.
14 UNGA Resolution 45/212 (A/RES/45/212, 21 December 1990), Preamble, paragraph 8 and 
Paragraph 1. 
15 UN Document A/AC.237/18. See generally B. Dawson and M. Spannagle, The Complete Guide to 
Climate Change (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); P. Birnie et al., International Law and the 
Environment 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 6; F. Yamin and J. Depledge, 
The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Pittock, supra note 5. 
16 UNFCCC, Article 2. As explained above, naturally occurring GHGs in the atmosphere help keep the 
earth warm. Scientific evidence shows that due largely to human interference, the concentrations of 
these GHGs in the atmosphere have increased to such a level that they are no longer beneficial, but 
constitute a threat to the survival of the humans and other life forms of the earth.
17 See UNFCCC, Article 4(2)(a).
4in 1997.18 The Protocol sets legally-binding emission reduction targets for developed 
countries and a timetable for achieving these targets.19 It also established the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), together with other flexibility mechanisms, to help 
in the achievement of its objectives and the objectives of the Convention.20
There were several reasons for the establishment of the CDM. Climate change is 
historically attributable to the developed world21 and the responsibility of developed 
countries to take the lead in addressing climate change was recognised from the start 
of the climate change process.22 At the same time, the General Assembly recognised 
the need for international cooperation and for addressing climate change within a 
                                               
18 See Decision 1/CP.1, ‘The Berlin Mandate: Review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and 
(b), of the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up’
(FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 6 June 1995), Preamble, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
19 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 3 and Annex B. See generally, M. Grubb, The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide 
and Assessment (London: Earthscan, 1999); and Dawson and Spannagle, note 15 above. By setting 
targets for developed countries alone, the Protocol was reflecting the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities. This principle is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3. 
20 See below for a brief discussion of these mechanisms.
21 See UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 3 and UNGA Resolution 44/207, Preamble, paragraph 8. 
22 Paragraph 8 of the Preambles to UNGA Resolutions 44/207 and 45/212. However, although 
developed countries are historically responsible for the climate change problem, several developing 
countries are now catching up with developed countries in terms of their GHG emissions. For example, 
China, categorised as a developing country (non-Annex I party) by the UNFCCC, is now the largest 
GHG emitter, although its per capita emissions are still well below those of developed countries. Other 
developing countries such as India and Brazil are also rapidly developing, and the levels of their GHG 
emissions too are fast increasing. For the GHG emissions of countries, see the World Resources 
Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources 
Institute, 2010). See also Dawson and Spannagle, note 15 above, 390-392; and Birnie et al., note 15
above, 372. There is now therefore a strong push for such developing countries to take on some form of 
mitigation actions. At the 16th Conference of the Parties in December 2010, countries agreed that 
developing countries will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) aimed at achieving a 
deviation in emissions relative to business-as-usual emissions in 2020, and also took note of the 
NAMAs to be implemented by these countries as communicated by them. See Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The 
Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention’ (FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011), Paragraphs 48 and 49. See 
also K. Kulovesi and M. Gutiérrez, ‘Climate change negotiations update: process and prospects for a 
Copenhagen agreed outcome in December 2009’ (2009) 18 RECIEL 229, 236-237.
5global framework, taking account of the needs and development priorities of 
developing countries.23
Secondly, developing countries have growing energy needs and their GHG emissions 
are expected to increase over the years.24 The climate change regime recognises that 
developing countries need access to resources required to achieve sustainable social 
and economic development and that, in order for them to progress towards this goal, 
their energy consumption will need to grow.25 It also acknowledges that the 
achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty are priority 
needs of developing countries.26 Yet clearly, their actions will impact on future 
progress. Consequently there was a need for a mechanism that would serve the two 
purposes of involving developing countries in climate change mitigation efforts and 
also ensuring that they could continue to satisfy their growing energy and other 
sustainable development needs. Moreover, given the expected cost of the emission 
reduction commitments required to be taken on by developed countries, a system was 
also needed that would both provide some flexibility in how these countries would 
meet their commitments and help reduce the costs of meeting the commitments. The 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established to fulfil these objectives.27
                                               
23 UNGA Resolution 44/207, Preamble, paragraph 9 and Paragraph 12, and UNGA Resolution 45/212, 
Preamble, paragraph 1 and Paragraph 8.
24 According to the International Energy Agency, in the absence of new government action (that is, 
following a business as usual pattern), global primary energy demand is set to increase at an annual rate 
of 1.6% between now and 2030, with over 70% of this increase coming from developing countries. 
Fossil fuels (one of the main sources of GHG emissions) will remain the dominant source of energy up 
to 2030, accounting for 83% of this increased demand. See OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook 2007
(Paris: International Energy Agency, 2007), 37 and 38. See also S. Silveira, ‘Promoting bioenergy 
through the clean development mechanism’ (2005) 28 Biomass and Bioenergy 107.
25 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 22. 
26 Ibid, paragraph 21. 
27 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. See generally J. Wersksman, ‘The clean development mechanism: 
unwrapping the “Kyoto surprise”’ (1998) 7 RECIEL 147.
6Under the CDM, project activities can be implemented in developing countries that 
result in fewer GHG emissions than would otherwise have been produced (in the 
absence of the activities). Developing countries profit from the sustainable 
development benefits of these activities and the resulting emission reductions can be 
used by developed countries to contribute to meeting their Protocol commitments, 
which are the twin objectives of the CDM.28 The CDM is one of the three flexibility 
mechanisms established by the Protocol to assist developed countries to meet their 
reduction targets, but it is the only one that involves the participation of developing 
countries.29 The CDM is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
The first CDM project was registered in 2004, and there are now more than 5000 
projects in the CDM pipeline, including over 2500 registered projects.30 Although 
there are currently 123 developing countries that are eligible31 to participate in the 
CDM, only 69 countries do. Of this number, 4 countries (China, India, Brazil and 
Mexico) account for about 75% of the projects in the CDM pipeline. China and India 
alone account for 66% of this number. Looking at this at the regional level, the Asia 
                                               
28 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. On the CDM, see generally Wersksman, note 27 above; UNDP, The 
Clean Development: A User’s Guide (New York: UNDP, 2003); and UNEP, Clean Development 
Mechanism (Roskilde: UNEP, 2003).
29 The other flexibility mechanisms are Joint Implementation, established by Article 6 of the Protocol 
and Emissions Trading, established by Article 17. Participation in both these mechanisms is restricted 
to developed countries. See generally E.J. Bush and L.D.D. Harvey, ‘Joint implementation and the 
ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997) 7 Global 
Environmental Change 265; and S. Soleille, ‘Greenhouse gas emission trading schemes: a new tool for 
the environmental regulator’s kit’ (2006) 3 Energy Policy 1473. 
30 Statistics correct as of October 2010. See ‘Registered projects by host parties’ 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html
www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 24/11/2010); and the CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, UNEP 
Risoe (CDM Pipeline), 1 November 2010. 
These statistics are constantly changing, as every month, many new CDM projects are registered. It 
was therefore necessary to pick a cut-off date for project statistics and the selected cut-off date was 
October 2010. Consequently, generally, the statistics cited are as of October 2010. 
31 This refers to those countries that have fulfilled the CDM participation requirements. This is 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
7and the Pacific region hosts 78% of projects, Latin America and the Caribbean hosts 
19%, and Africa hosts less than 2%.32
In 2001, countries highlighted the need to promote equitable geographic distribution 
of CDM projects, at both the regional and sub-regional levels.33 At the first Meeting 
of the Parties to the Protocol in 2005, countries again identified addressing the issue 
of equitable distribution of projects as one of their roles.34 Most of the subsequent 
meetings of the Parties to the Protocol have dealt with the need to ensure an equitable 
distribution of CDM projects, and various actions have been taken, all aimed at 
achieving this goal.35 However, the goal remains elusive, and the distribution of CDM 
projects, as described above both between countries and between regions, still appears 
to be inequitable. Although the number of registered CDM projects has multiplied, the 
distribution of projects among countries has not changed much and the same four 
countries (India, China, Brazil and Mexico) have been consistently dominating the 
CDM.36
                                               
32 Statistics as of October 2010, obtained from the CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
33 See Decision 17/CP.7, ‘Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol’ (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 January 2002), Preamble, paragraph 6.
34 Decision 3/CMP.1, ‘Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol’ (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006), Annex, Paragraph 
4(c). 
35 See for example Decision 7/CMP.1, ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’ 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006), Paragraph 32, where countries were requested to 
submit their views on the barriers to equitable distribution of CDM projects and options to address 
these barriers, for consideration by the COP. See also for example, Decision 2/CMP.5, ‘Further 
guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’ (FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, 30 March 
2010), Paragraphs 47-50. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the various actions taken within the CDM 
regime to promote equitable distribution, such as the Nairobi Framework and the CDM Bazaar.  
36 As of March 2007, the distribution of projects among the top 4 CDM hosts was: India (33%), China 
(8%, Brazil - 16% and Mexico - 13%. As of January 2008, the distribution was as follows: India: 33%; 
China: 16%; Brazil: 12% and Mexico: 11%. As of July 2010, it was China (40%), India (22%), Brazil 
(7%) and Mexico (5%). As of April 2011, the distribution was: China (44%), India (21%), Brazil (6%) 
and Mexico (4%) (all statistics obtained by the author from the CDM website at the relevant times). 
The significance of these statistics is not so much that it is the same four countries that are the top 
CDM hosts. Much more significant is that although there has been some fluctuation in their percentage 
81.2 Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research is to determine whether an equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects can be achieved within the current CDM regime. This is 
particularly important at this time because the current developed country emission 
reduction commitments will expire in 2012 and the post-2012 regime is now being 
negotiated.37 This affects the CDM because the emission reduction credits generated 
from CDM projects, referred to as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), are used by 
developed countries to contribute to meeting these emission reduction commitments.38
The new developed country commitments for the post-2012 period are now being 
negotiated and countries have agreed that the flexibility mechanisms, which include 
the CDM, should continue to be available to developed countries as means to achieve 
these commitments.39
Further to this, countries are now considering ways to improve the operation of the 
flexibility mechanisms during the post-2012 period. One of the issues being 
considered under the CDM is how to improve the geographic distribution of the 
                                                                                                                                      
shares, they still host by far the majority of all CDM projects – the distribution has not levelled out. 
These four countries were hosting 70% of the 516 registered CDM projects as of March 2007, 72% of 
the 850 projects as of January 2008, 75% of the 2312 registered projects as of August 2010 and 76% of 
the 2970 registered projects as of April 2011. The growth in the number of CDM projects has not led to 
a percentage increase in the number of projects hosted by other countries or a significant increase in the 
number of countries participating in the CDM. Instead, the status quo has mostly been maintained.
37 The GHG emissions reduction commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol (in Annex B) must be 
achieved by the end of the first commitment period which runs from 2008 to 2012 (Protocol, Article 
3(1)). The Protocol does not contain the commitments for subsequent periods, but provides in Article 
3(9) that consideration of these commitments shall be initiated by 2005. During COP 11 in December 
2005, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP) was established. Its aim is to determine what commitments developed countries 
will take on post-2012, and how they will meet those commitments. 
38 See Chapter 2 for a further discussion of this.
39 See Decision 1/CMP.6, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session’
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1, 15 March 2011), Paragraph 6(b). See also Report of the sixth 
meeting of the AWG-KP (FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/8, 4 February 2009), Paragraph 22. 
9CDM, and various options have been proposed and are being discussed in the ongoing 
post-2012 negotiations.40 In addition to efforts to improve the current mechanisms, 
countries are also currently considering the establishment of new market-based 
mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, 
taking account of, inter alia, ensuring voluntary participation of countries, supported 
by the promotion of fair and equitable access for all countries.41 Learning from past 
and current mistakes would be useful in designing a future regime, so as to ensure that 
the regime is properly placed to ensure an equitable distribution of CDM projects. 
This thesis will focus on determining the main reasons for the apparent inequitable 
geographic distribution of projects in the current CDM regime. In order to do this, 
there is first a need to ascertain what an equitable distribution should be. Although 
countries have been addressing the problem of the inequitable geographic distribution 
of projects for many years and have established several initiatives to address the 
problem, the exact nature of the problem has never been defined. There is no 
description of what an equitable distribution should be, so efforts to achieve this goal 
essentially amount to efforts to achieve an uncertain goal. This thesis fills this gap by 
providing a definition of equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects and 
identifying how projects should be distributed among developing countries. It also 
undertakes a critique of the CDM regime to determine if, and identify why, the 
distribution of projects does not fit with this ideal distribution, and then makes
                                               
40 See ‘Draft decision -/CMP.6 Emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms,’ in Draft proposal 
by the Chair to facilitate preparations for Negotiations (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/17, 5 November 2010), 
Chapter III. Paragraphs 8-15 are aimed at achieving equitable distribution of the CDM and improving 
access to it. Some of the other proposed options may also have the effect of helping to broaden the 
distribution of CDM projects, such as the inclusion of co-benefits as criteria for the registration of 
project activities (paragraphs 16-17) and the introduction of discount factors to decrease the CERs 
issued for specific project activity types (paragraphs 18-20). 
41 See Decision 1/CP.16, Paragraph 80. 
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recommendations on how these problems can be addressed so that a more equitable 
geographic distribution of projects can be achieved.
As noted above, the focus of this thesis is on ascertaining whether the CDM regime 
can support an equitable distribution of CDM projects among countries. The focus is 
therefore on equitable geographic distribution, not on other types of distribution, such 
as distribution across sectors within individual countries. Consequently, all references 
in this thesis to “equitable distribution” are references to “equitable geographic 
distribution.” 
1.3 Research Question
The main question this research aims to answer is “can the CDM regime support an 
equitable geographic distribution of projects?”
To answer this question, some sub-questions are also asked and answered, as follows:
 What is the meaning of equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects?
 What criteria should be applied to determine if a geographic distribution is 
equitable and what factors should be considered in efforts to achieve equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects?
 What should an ideal distribution of projects among countries be?
 Does the current distribution of CDM projects meet this ideal geographic 
distribution of projects?
 If the distribution of projects among countries is deemed inequitable, what are 
the main reasons for the inequitable distribution?
11
 Are there any barriers to equitable geographic distribution being addressed 
within the CDM regime, and if so, how?
 What steps can be taken within the CDM regime to address any inequitable 
geographic distribution of projects? and
 Can the CDM regime achieve an equitable geographic distribution of projects?
1.3 Justification of the Research
As highlighted above, the current distribution of CDM projects among countries 
appears to be inequitable. It is however difficult to state conclusively that this is the 
case because the CDM regime does not provide a definition of equitable geographic 
distribution nor does it identify the ideal geographic distribution of projects. The lack 
of a definition makes it difficult for targeted action to be taken within the regime to
address the problem, if one exists. It also makes it difficult to measure progress in 
addressing the problem. Therefore, the first main contribution of this thesis is 
providing a definition of equitable geographic distribution and identifying what such a 
distribution should look like.
Secondly, within the CDM regime, many efforts have been made to address the 
apparent problem of the inequitable distribution of projects among countries. Such 
efforts include capacity building initiatives such as the Nairobi Framework and 
financial initiatives such as fee exemptions.42 To date, these initiatives do not appear 
to have been particularly successful. Although there has been a rapid growth in the 
number of CDM projects, it appears that this growth continues to be experienced only 
                                               
42 See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of these initiatives.
12
by a few countries and the geographic distribution of projects, as described above, is 
still skewed.43 One of the reasons for this could be that the initiatives are not 
addressing the main barriers to equitable distribution. Consequently, the second main 
contribution of this thesis is identifying the key reasons for the apparently inequitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects. 
Finally, this thesis makes recommendations regarding what can be done within the 
CDM regime to achieve a more equitable distribution of projects among countries. 
Specifically, it reaches a conclusion regarding whether or not the CDM, in the way it 
is set up or operates, can achieve a more equitable geographic distribution of CDM 
projects, and if so, how. 
1.4 Methodology and Structure
To answer the research question and conduct this research, grounded theory is used.44
Applying this methodology, the research begins with a problem area45 and a question 
requiring to be answered,46 which determine the investigations to be carried out, in 
this case, the materials and literature to be reviewed. In addition, as the research 
progresses, the questions asked and the materials to be reviewed are revised, 
                                               
43 See note 36 above. 
44 Grounded theory is the generation “of theory from data systematically obtained from social 
research.” B.G. Glaser and A.L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1967), 2. It is theory based on, or derived from, data. Strauss 
and Corbin explained that in grounded theory, the “researcher does not begin a project with 
preconceived theory in mind…rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory 
to emerge from the data.” See A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques 
and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1998), 
12. See also B.G. Glaser, Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions (Mill Valley, California: 
Sociology Press, 1998). 
45 That is, the apparently inequitable geographic distribution of CDM projects, as evidenced by the 
statistics already described above. 
46 Can the CDM regime support an equitable geographic distribution of projects?
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depending on the results of the investigations carried out.47  The main methods used 
to carry out the thesis are literature review and legal analysis.
The steps taken to carry out this research can be divided into three major parts, along 
which the thesis is structured. The first part, consisting of Chapters 1 and 2, contains
the foundation of the study. Chapter 1 contains the Introduction, including the 
background of the study, the purpose of the research, the research question, research 
justification, methodology and structure. Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the 
CDM, explaining what it is, as well as its objectives, operation and structure. This 
chapter also explains why there is a need to achieve equitable distribution of CDM 
projects.
The second part comprises Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 provides a definition of 
equitable geographic distribution, including the criteria for geographic distribution 
and the factors for achieving such a distribution. To do this, it investigates relevant 
aspects of theory and international law, with the aim of determining whether, and the 
extent to which, any of these can contribute to providing a definition of equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects. Firstly, the chapter examines the meaning 
of equity in international law generally. It then examines theories of distributive 
justice, which are philosophical theories that aim to determine how scarce resources 
should be allocated in society in a way that is “just” or “fair.”48 The goal of equitable 
                                               
47 As data is being collected and analysed, it reveals issues that need to be addressed for the research to 
fulfil its aim (for example, in the case of this research, the need to investigate the meaning and 
application of distributive justice in international law), and points the research in the direction of more 
data that needs to be collected or further investigations that need to be made. The process of doing 
grounded theory therefore enables the data to produce the answer to the research problem, rather than 
having a preconceived answer and looking for data to support it. 
48 See J. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 
1996). 
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geographic distribution is similar – distribution of CDM projects among developing 
countries in a manner that is considered equitable.49 Consequently, these theories are 
also investigated to ascertain the extent to which they can be applied to the CDM 
regime to help achieve an equitable distribution of projects. This chapter also includes
an analysis of relevant international regimes which aim at achieving equity in the 
distribution of a resource, benefit or burden. This is done through a review of relevant 
primary and secondary sources of international law, including treaties and decisions 
of international courts and tribunals. The purpose of these investigations is to identify 
the legal characteristics of equitable distribution or distributive justice (both have 
similar goals, but the term “equitable distribution” appears, in this context, to be 
unique to the CDM), in order to establish what equitable distribution in the CDM 
should look like. 
Although there is an abundance of literature on the theories of distributive justice and 
equity in international law, there is very little literature on equitable distribution of 
CDM projects. This author was only able to identify one article whose specific 
purpose was to identify how CDM projects should be distributed among developing 
countries. This article however did not propose a definition of equitable geographic 
distribution.50 In addition, there is also very little literature that sets out to examine 
how distributive justice is achieved in practice (rather than in theory). Most of the 
available literature on distributive justice focuses on the theories of distributive 
justice, but does not examine how distributive justice is attempted or achieved in 
                                               
49 As shown below, justice, fairness and equity are often used as synonyms. See the discussion of 
equity in Section 3.2 below. 
50 See A. Silayan ‘Equitable distribution of CDM projects among developing countries’ (2005) 255 
Hamburg Institute of International Economics Report 1.
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practice, specifically in international law. Nevertheless, there is literature focusing on 
various international regimes, identifying how they have tried to achieve equity in the 
distribution of a resource or benefit. This literature is reviewed and a conclusion is 
drawn about the definition and practice of distributive justice in international law. 
This conclusion, it is hoped, proves a valuable contribution to the general body of 
knowledge on the meaning of equitable distribution or distributive justice in 
international law. Following on from this conclusion, this thesis then ascertains 
whether the definition and practice of distributive justice in international law should 
also be applied to equitable geographic distribution within the CDM regime.
Because of the abundance of literature on the theories of distributive justice and 
equity in international law, it could be tempting, when trying to determine the 
meaning of equitable distribution of CDM projects, to simply borrow from the 
approaches or principles of equity or distributive justice in other regimes and apply 
these to the CDM regime. However, as is shown in Chapter 3, doing this without 
assessing the appropriateness of such approaches or principles for the CDM would not 
help the CDM to achieve its objectives, and in some cases, would actually limit the 
ability of the CDM to do this. Consequently, before concluding that any particular 
approach or principle should be applied to the CDM, this thesis, in Chapter 3, first 
determines its appropriateness for the CDM. 
In addition to determining the meaning of equitable geographic distribution of CDM 
projects, this part of the thesis also sets up the analytical framework that is used to 
undertake the rest of the research. This analytical framework is made up of the criteria 
for equitable geographic distribution (that is, the elements that determine whether a 
16
distribution of projects among countries is equitable) and the factors for achieving 
equitable geographic distribution (that is, those factors that should be used in efforts 
to achieve equitable distribution of projects among countries). These elements and 
factors make up the analytical framework used in undertaking the rest of the research.
Chapter 4 uses this analytical framework to determine how CDM projects should be 
distributed among developing countries, and to ascertain whether the current 
distribution fits with this ideal distribution.
The third part of the thesis comprises Chapters 5-7. In Chapter 5, a critique of the 
legal regime governing the CDM is carried out to determine whether the regime 
promotes, inhibits or is neutral towards an equitable geographic distribution of CDM 
investment. Specifically, this chapter aims to answer the question whether an 
equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects can be achieved within the current 
CDM regime. Here, the barriers to equitable geographic distribution are examined, 
together with the various initiatives that have been adopted to overcome these 
barriers. One particular issue this critique determines is whether the market nature of 
the CDM is a factor affecting the equitable distribution of CDM projects. This critique 
is conducted mainly through a review of the abundant literature identifying the 
barriers to CDM participation and equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects, 
in order to determine the main obstacles to equitable distribution found within the 
CDM regime as implemented. 
Lastly, Chapters 6 and 7 contain the recommendations and conclusions. Chapter 6 
provides some recommendations about how the CDM regime can achieve a more 
equitable distribution of projects among countries, and also concludes on whether or 
17
not the regime can achieve a truly equitable geographic distribution of projects. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis, including the various conclusions reached in 
the previous chapters.
Overall, two principal methods are used by this research: an analysis of primary 
materials and a review of legal literature. The research question is answered through a 
review of relevant primary sources including treaties, other international documents, 
cases and literature relating to the issues of equity, distributive justice and equitable 
geographic distribution, as well as relating to the various international regimes 
examined. 
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CHAPTER TWO
The Clean Development Mechanism
“The clean development mechanism (CDM) is a unique mechanism for global 
collaboration that seeks to mitigate climate change while delivering sustainable 
development to the developing countries that host CDM projects.”1
2.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this Chapter is to present an overview of the clean development 
mechanism (CDM), so as to provide the background for this research. A description 
of the CDM and its operation is provided, together with an explanation of the need to 
have an equitable distribution of projects. The overall aim of the chapter is to 
facilitate understanding of the issues discussed in this research, and of the relevant 
institutions and entities referred to throughout the research.
As explained in Chapter 1, the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 with the ultimate 
objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.2 To achieve 
this objective, the Convention requires all countries, inter alia, to: formulate and 
implement national and regional programmes containing measures to address climate 
change; and promote and cooperate in the development and transfer of technologies 
                                               
1 Comment made by Mr. Kivutha Kibwana, Minister for the Environment and Natural Resources of 
Kenya and President of the CMP at its second session when introducing the agenda item on issues 
relating to the CDM. See Report of COP/MOP 2 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10, 26 January 2007), 
Paragraph 31.
2 See UNFCCC, Article 2. 
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that control, reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions.3 In addition, developed 
countries, to demonstrate that they are taking the lead in addressing climate change, 
are required to adopt policies and measures on climate change mitigation, with the 
aim of returning to their 1990 GHG emission levels.4 However, due to the general 
nature of these commitments, it was recognised that they are inadequate to achieve the 
objective of the Convention, and the process to adopt a protocol containing more 
adequate commitments was launched at the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1)5 in 
1995.6 Pursuant to this, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and contains binding, 
quantitative emission reduction commitments for developed countries, but no 
additional commitments for developing countries.7
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries must ensure that their total emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Protocol do not exceed their allowed 
emission levels.8 The aim is to reduce their overall emissions of these gases by at least 
5% below 1990 levels in the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period (2008 to 2012). 
To help developed countries fulfil these commitments, three “flexibility” mechanisms 
were established, to give these countries some flexibility in how they meet their 
commitments and also to reduce the costs of relevant actions.9 The mechanisms are 
Joint Implementation, emissions trading and the CDM. Participation in Joint 
                                               
3 Ibid, Article 4. 
4 Ibid, Article 4(2).
5 The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme and ultimate decision-making body of the 
Convention, responsible for the governance of the Convention. It is in charge of making decisions 
necessary for the effective implementation of the Convention. See UNFCCC, Article 7. See generally 
Dawson and Spannagle, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 382-384. 
6 See Decision 1/CP.1, Preamble, paragraphs 2 and 3.
7 See Kyoto Protocol, Articles 3 and 10. 
8 Ibid, Article 3(1) and Annex A. The gases in Annex A are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride.
9 Ibid, Articles 6, 12 and 17. See also Grubb, supra note 19; and Yamin and Depledge, supra note 15.
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Implementation and emissions trading is restricted to developed countries, while 
participation in the CDM is open to developed and developing countries.10
Countries that qualify as “developed” and “developing” are Annex I and non-Annex I 
country parties to the UNFCCC, respectively. Annex I countries are those countries 
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC, and comprise industrialised countries and those 
with economies in transition to a market economy. The countries not identified in 
Annex I (non-Annex I countries), are regarded as “developing” countries.11
2.2 The Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM is a project-based mechanism established by Article 12 of the Protocol.12
Under the CDM, project activities can generate emission reduction credits through 
activities implemented in developing countries that result in less GHG emissions than 
would otherwise have been produced. To be registered as a CDM project, a project 
must show that it would result in emission reductions that are additional to any that 
would occur in the absence of the project.13 This is referred to as the additionality test. 
                                               
10 Participation in Joint Implementation and emissions trading is restricted to developed countries that 
have emission reduction targets under the Protocol. See generally on Joint Implementation, K. Illum 
and N.I. Meyer, ‘Joint implementation: methodology and policy considerations’ (2004) 32 Energy 
Policy 1013; and S. Fankhauser, ‘The Investment climate for climate investment: joint implementation 
in transition countries’ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 417. On emissions trading, see M. Evans, ‘Emissions 
trading in transition economies: the link between international and domestic policy’ (2003) 31 Energy 
Policy 879; and J. Robinson et al., Climate Change Law: Emissions Trading in the EU and the UK
(London: Cameron May, 2007). See also Chapter 1, note 29.
11 See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php ‘Parties and observers’ (UNFCCC, 
11/02/2011). See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php ‘List of 
Annex I Parties to the Convention’ and 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php ‘List of non-Annex I 
Parties to the Convention’ (UNFCCC, 11/02/2011), for the lists of Annex I and non-Annex I country 
parties to the UNFCCC. 
12 On the CDM generally, see Wersksman, supra Chapter 1, note 27; J. Goldemberg (ed), Issues and 
Options – The Clean Development Mechanism (New York: UNDP, 1998); UNDP, supra Chapter 1, 
note 28; UNEP, supra Chapter 1, note 28; and M. Lee (ed) CDM Information and Guidebook, 2nd ed. 
(Roskilde: UNEP, 2004).
13 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(5)(c); and Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 37(d) and 43. 
21
In order to prove additionality, it is necessary to establish a baseline, which is the 
scenario that reasonably represents the GHG emissions that would occur (that is, the 
level of emissions that would ordinarily be produced) in the absence of the proposed 
project activity.14 Reductions below this baseline as a result of the CDM project are 
the additional reductions and it is for these additional reductions that emission 
reduction credits are issued.15 The emission reduction credits generated, known as 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs),16 can then be used by developed countries in 
part-compliance17 with their emission reduction or limitation targets under the 
Protocol.18
The two main objectives of the CDM are to contribute to sustainable development in 
developing countries and to contribute to climate change mitigation through the GHG 
emission reductions achieved by CDM projects. Generally, in relation to developing 
countries, the CDM aims to assist developing countries to achieve sustainable 
development19 and also to contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention20
                                               
14 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 44. 
15 Ibid, Paragraph 59. See generally Lee, supra note 12. 
16 The resulting emission reductions have to first be certified by a body known as the Designated 
Operational Entity, and once certified, are issued as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). One CER 
is equal to one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent reduced (such as through an energy efficiency 
project) or removed from the atmosphere (such as through an afforestation project). See Decision 
3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 1. 
17 Developed countries are not permitted to use the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms to meet all their 
emission reduction or limitation targets. They must also implement domestic measures to reduce their 
GHG emissions. This is known as the ‘supplementarity’ rule. See Kyoto Protocol, Articles 6(1)(d), 
12(3)(b) and 17.
18 Ibid, Article 12(3)(b). These emission reduction or limitation targets are set out in Protocol Annex B. 
19 Sustainable development has been defined as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” See Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (UN Document 
A/42/427, 4 August 1987, Annex). This is the most commonly applied definition. See G. Loibl, ‘The 
evolving regime on climate change and sustainable development’ in N. Schrijver and F. Weiss (eds.), 
International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), at 97. See also P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 2nd
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10; and M.C. Segger and A. Khalfan, Sustainable
Development Law: Principles, Practices & Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2.
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through the reduction in their GHG emissions achieved by the CDM projects.21 In 
relation to developed countries, the CDM aims to provide them with cost-effective 
opportunities to comply with their emission reduction commitments.22
As noted above, the Kyoto Protocol does not contain binding emission reduction 
commitments for developing countries, and so for these countries, the CDM is one 
way for them to contribute to the climate change mitigation objective of the 
Convention. In addition to the benefits to the climate change mitigation process, the 
CDM should benefit developing countries by creating a “green” investment flow to 
host developing countries. CDM project activities implemented in developing 
countries represent funding and investment that are additional to the official 
development assistance received by these countries and are also additional to the 
                                                                                                                                      
The concept suggests that economic development should be achieved in an integrated manner with 
environmental protection and has been described as an attempt to reconcile these two (environmental 
protection and human development), recognising that the environment provides the resources needed 
for economic development. See D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 2, 3 and 10; and X. Fuentes, ‘International law-
making in the field of sustainable development: the unequal competition between development and the 
environment’ in Schrijver and Weiss, 7. Therefore, key ideas included in the concept of sustainable 
development are: economic development, including meeting the needs of present and future 
generations; and environmental protection. See for example, Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, 17 October 1995 (UN Doc. A/CONF. 177/20), Annex, Paragraph 36 (Beijing Declaration), 
which states that “...economic development, social development and environmental protection are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development, which is the 
framework for our efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people...” See also Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (A/CONF.151/26, Vol. I, 12 August 1992), reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 876 (Rio 
Declaration), Principle 4. The general objective of the CDM is therefore to promote sustainable 
development as defined under international law. However, under the CDM, it is the prerogative of 
developing countries to ascertain or confirm that specific projects contribute to their sustainable 
development (Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 40(a)). Therefore, for individual CDM projects, 
the objective is to promote sustainable development as defined by individual host countries, as there is 
no standard definition of sustainable development under the CDM. 
20 The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilise GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. See UNFCCC, Article 
2. 
21 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(2).
22 Ibid. 
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financial obligations of developed countries contained in the Convention.23 The 
investment received by these developing countries for CDM projects should assist 
them in achieving some of their sustainable development objectives, including 
economic and environmental goals, by providing, among other things, clean 
technology, greater access to energy, such as through renewable energy projects, 
energy efficiency systems,24 more jobs, capacity building, cleaner air and water,25 and 
more sustainable use of land and other natural resources. The benefit to developed 
countries is the lower marginal abatement cost of reducing emissions in developing 
countries compared to reducing them in developed countries.26
The CDM is therefore a way of involving both developed and developing countries in 
the global efforts to mitigate climate change, while at the same time, contributing to 
the sustainable development of developing countries. The kinds of projects that are 
eligible for CDM registration are not prescribed by the legal regime, but the CDM 
Accreditation Panel has published a list of 15 sectoral scopes from which CDM 
projects can emerge.27 The only type of projects that appears to be completely 
prohibited is nuclear energy projects.28
                                               
23 See Decision 17/CP.7, Preamble, paragraph 7; and Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix B, paragraph 2(f).
24 Which result in lower energy costs, thereby making energy more affordable and accessible, resulting 
in a better standard of living. 
25 Giving rise to better health, greater life expectancy and a stronger and larger work force. 
26 See D. Diakoulaki, ‘A multicriteria approach to identify investment opportunities for the exploitation 
of the clean development mechanism’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 1088, 1088; and T. Brechet and B. 
Lussis ‘The contribution of the clean development mechanism to national climate policies’ (2006) 28 J.
Policy Modeling 981, 982. 
27 See CDM-ACCR-06 ‘List of sectoral scopes’, available online at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/scopelst.pdf (UNFCCC, 06/08/2010). The scopes are: energy industries, 
distribution and demand, manufacturing industries, chemical industry, construction, transport, 
mining/mineral and metal production, fugitive emissions from fuels and production and consumption 
of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, solvents use, waste handling and disposal, afforestation and 
reforestation, and agriculture. 
28 Decision 17/CP. 7, Preamble, paragraph 5 “recognises” that Annex I Parties are to refrain from using 
CERs generated from nuclear facilities to meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments. However, the only 
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2.2.1 CDM Participation Requirements
The legal regime governing the CDM lays down certain participation requirements 
and only those countries that fulfil these requirements can participate in the CDM. 
There are 3 basic requirements that must be fulfilled by both developed and 
developing countries to make them eligible to participate in the CDM. These 
requirements are: ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; establishment of a Designated 
National Authority; and (confirmation of) voluntary participation. In addition to these 
three basic requirements, developed countries have additional requirements to fulfil.
These requirements include: calculation of their assigned amounts under Protocol 
Articles 3(7) and 3(8); establishment of national systems for the estimation of 
greenhouse gases; establishment of national registries in accordance with Protocol 
Article 7(4); submission of annual inventories; and submission of supplementary 
information in accordance with Protocol Articles 7(1) and 7(4).29 These will however 
not be examined here, as they do not apply to developing countries. Developing 
countries are only required to fulfil the three basic requirements which are common to 
developed and developing countries, and are as follows:
a) Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol: participation in the CDM is only open to 
those countries that have ratified the Protocol, and therefore countries may only 
                                                                                                                                      
eligible land use, land use change and forestry projects are afforestation and reforestation projects. See 
Paragraph 7(a) of Decision 17/CP.7. In addition, the eligibility of certain other project types has also 
been subject to negotiation. For example, countries debated the eligibility of projects that involve 
carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological formations and agreed that such projects would be 
eligible as CDM projects if certain issues are resolved. See Decision 7/CMP.6, Carbon dioxide capture 
and storage in geological formations as clean development mechanism project activities 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2, 15 March 2011) and T. Akanle et al., ‘Summary of the Cancun 
Climate Change Conference’ (December 2010) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12498e.pdf, 
www.iisd.ca (IISD, 01/03/2011), 26. 
29 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 31. See also Lee, supra note 12, at 13. 
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participate in the CDM once they become Parties to the Protocol.30 Both private 
entities, such as companies, and public entities, such as governments or government 
agencies, are allowed to participate in the CDM.31 However, before private entities 
can participate in the CDM, they must be authorised to do so by countries that are 
eligible to participate in the CDM.32
As of November 2010, there are 152 developing country Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. The only developing country that has not ratified the Protocol is
Afghanistan.33
b) Establishment of a Designated National Authority: to participate in the CDM 
process, countries must establish a Designated National Authority (DNA) for the 
CDM,34 which will serve as a point of contact within that country for information on 
the CDM.35 The DNAs of Parties are identified on the Convention website.36
The functions of the DNA are primarily to communicate voluntary participation in the 
CDM to the Designated Operational Entity (DOE)37 and, in the case of the host 
country DNA, to confirm that the CDM project activity will assist the host country in 
                                               
30 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs 30 and 31(a). 
31 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(9).
32 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 33. The Designated National Authority (DNA) of each 
country usually issues a letter of authorisation to the private entity, confirming that it, the country, is a 
Party to the Kyoto Protocol, and authorising the private entity’s participation in the CDM project. The 
letters of authorisation issued by DNAs are available on the CDM website http://cdm.unfccc.int under 
the description of each CDM project.
33 See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/items/2352.php ‘Parties to the Convention and 
Observer States’ and http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php ‘Status of 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC, 09/11/2010). 
34 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 29.
35 See generally UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 60-62.
36 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html ‘Designated National Authorities’ (UNFCCC, 
24/11/2010). 
37 DOEs are legal entities accredited to inter alia validate CDM project activities, and verify and certify 
emission reductions generated by CDM project activities. See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs 
26-27. See also UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 20-22. 
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achieving its sustainable development goals.38 The role of the DNA therefore includes 
evaluating and approving proposed projects, ensuring that they conform to national
CDM rules and modalities, and that they are in line with the country’s sustainable 
development agenda. In addition to these basic functions of the DNA, DNAs usually 
perform a variety of other functions relating to actively promoting the CDM in their 
countries.39
As of November 2010, 123 developing countries have established DNAs – 46 in the 
African region, 40 in Asia and the Pacific, 28 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and 9 in the “others” category (which includes developing countries in Europe such as 
Georgia).40 This means 123 developing countries are eligible to participate in the 
CDM.41
c) Voluntary Participation: participation in the CDM is voluntary and hence 
countries must approve their participation in each project activity.42 The project 
participants involved in each project must provide written notice to the DOE 
confirming that they are participating voluntarily in the project, before the DOE 
submits its validation report to the CDM Executive Board.43 As mentioned above, it is 
                                               
38 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 40(a).
39 For more information on DNAs, see Baker and McKenzie, Legal Issues Guidebook to the CDM
(Roskilde: UNEP, 2004), 24–28; and C. Figueres (ed), ‘Establishing national authorities for the CDM: 
a guide for developing countries’ (2002) http://www.iisd.org/cckn/pdf/cdm_national_authorities.pdf,
www.iisd.org (24/11/2010), 60-68.
40 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredDNAPieChart.html ‘Designated National 
Authorities’ (UNFCCC, 24/11/2010) and http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html ‘Designated National 
Authorities’ (UNFCCC, 24/11/2010). 
41 See Appendix A below for a list of all developing countries that are eligible to participate in the 
CDM. Although there are three requirements – ratification of the Protocol, establishment of a DNA and 
voluntary participation, in practical terms, eligibility is determined by the first two. Countries must then 
approve their participation in each project activity, to signify their voluntary participation. 
42 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(5)(a) and Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 28.
43 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 40(a). The CDM Executive Board (the Executive Board) 
is the CDM supervisory body and is responsible for the operation of the CDM. It is under the authority 
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the responsibility of country DNAs to provide this notice of voluntary participation. 
Therefore project participants, both public and private entities, obtain this written 
notice from their country DNAs and submit to the DOE.44
2.2.2 Structure of the CDM
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the CDM as a mechanism under which 
developing countries benefit from project activities resulting in CERs, and developed 
countries can use the CERs generated from such project activities to comply with part 
of their emission reduction targets. This definition of the CDM is somewhat vague, 
and does not specify its exact structure, other than that it is to be project-based. 
However, as the rules and practice have been established and/or developed, the 
structure of the CDM has emerged, and this research can identify three elements of 
the structure: it is project-based, market-based and has an “open architecture.” 
The CDM is project-based in that under the mechanism, project activities are 
implemented in the host developing country, and these project activities generate 
CERs which developed countries can use for the purpose of meeting their Protocol 
targets.45 In addition to the registration of individual project activities as separate 
CDM projects, several project activities can be registered as a single CDM project
under the CDM Programme of Activities (CDM PoA).46 The CDM Executive Board 
has defined a CDM PoA as a voluntary coordinated action by a public or private 
                                                                                                                                      
and guidance of, and fully accountable to, the COP/MOP. See Paragraph 5. See generally on the 
Executive Board, UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 22; and Figueres, supra note 39, at 22-23.
44 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 40(a). 
45 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(3). See also F. Lecocq and P. Ambrosi, ‘The clean development 
mechanism: history, status, and prospects’ (2007) 1 REEP 134, 139; and J. Ellis et al., ‘CDM: taking 
stock and looking forward’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 15.
46 On the CDM PoA generally, see UNEP, Primer on CDM Programme of Activities (Roskilde: UNEP, 
2009); and J. Ellis, ‘Issues related to a programme of activities under the CDM’ (May 2006) 
http://www.iea.org/papers/2006/CDMissues.pdf, www.iea.org (12/01/2011).
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entity which coordinates and implements any policy/measure or stated goal, such as 
incentive schemes. Such a policy/measure or goal can be implemented via an 
unlimited number of project activities (referred to as CDM programme activities or 
CPAs) which must result in GHG emission reductions or removals that are additional 
to any that would occur in the absence of the activities.47 CDM programme activities 
can be included in the PoA at the time of registration and an unlimited number can be 
added to the PoA at any time in the duration of the PoA. These activities can take 
place in a single or multiple locations and can involve a single measure or inter-
related measures to reduce GHG emissions.48
The CDM is also a market-based49 instrument under which developed country entities 
can either invest in GHG emission reduction projects in developing countries and 
benefit from the CERs generated, or buy CERs directly from the host developing 
country or entity, or other developed country entities.50
                                               
47 See ‘Procedures for registration of a programme of activities as a single CDM project activity and 
issuance of certified emission reductions for a programme of activities’ (version 03) Report of the 47th
Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 29 (May 2009) 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/047/eb47_repan29.pdf (UNFCCC, 12/01/2011), 1. 
48 See UNEP, supra note 46, at 11. An example of a CDM PoA is the Masca Small Hydro Programme 
which aims at developing a series of small hydroelectric projects in Honduras. There is currently one 
registered programme activity under this PoA and at least three others seeking inclusion in the PoA. 
See the PoA design document at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/RX67DVBETWMS049YAZ18FPU3NJKI25/PoA-
DD%20Masca.pdf?t=TFh8MTI5NDg0MzQyOS43Mw==|14f8ZbBj3yDOu9CcrdD5sGjoMuQ=
(UNFCCC, 12/01/2011) and the CDM programme activity design document at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/R853T1QP69NEMY4HBJXA20CWLIKSUZ/CPA-
DD%20Masca%20PoA%20Matarras%20I.pdf?t=dTZ8MTI5NDg0MzYyNC43MQ==|yu1cHd6xWb4I
B9p65AGWiYPVV_k= (UNFCCC, 12/01/2011). 
49 A market has been defined as “a decentralised collection of buyers and sellers whose interactions 
determine the allocation of a good or set of goods through exchange.” See S. Olmstead and N. 
Keohane, Markets and the Environment (Washington: Island Press, 2007), 56. 
50 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 11, where the authors note that “CDM investments will be 
market driven.” See also A.E. Prouty, ‘The clean development mechanism and its implications for 
climate justice’ (2009) 34 Colum J. Envt’l L. 513, 522; and J. Ellis and S. Kamel, ‘Overcoming barriers 
to clean development mechanism projects’ (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/14/38684304.pdf, 
www.oecd.org (20/01/2010), 8.
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Thirdly, the CDM can be described as having an “open architecture” in which 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CDM projects are allowed.51 Unilateral projects 
are projects developed, financed and implemented by host developing country 
entities, which then sell on the CERs generated by the projects. In this case, there is 
no foreign investment involved, and developed country entities would simply buy 
CERs from the host developing country entities.52 Bilateral projects involve 
developed country entities in the development, financing and implementation of the 
projects.53 These projects involve foreign investment in the actual CDM projects, 
beyond mere purchase of the CERs generated by the projects.54 Multilateral projects 
involve several developed country public or private entities, which usually act through 
[multilateral] funds. The developed country entities, which are interested in obtaining 
CERs, contribute money to these funds, which then invest in projects or purchase 
CERs on behalf of the contributing public or private entities.55 Examples include the 
various carbon funds administered by the World Bank, such as the Prototype Carbon 
Fund, which is a partnership of 17 companies and 6 governments.56 In this scenario 
the funds either invest directly in the underlying project, as with bilateral projects, or 
                                               
51 Baumert et al outline the different possible structures the CDM could take – unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral – and advocate what they termed an “open architecture” under which all three structures 
would be allowed. See K.A. Baumert et al., ‘Designing the clean development mechanism to meet the 
needs of a broad range of interests’ (August 2000) http://pdf.wri.org/cdm_design_note.pdf
www.wri.org (23/02/2010).
52 See M. Krey, ‘Transaction costs of unilateral CDM projects in India–results from an empirical 
survey’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 2385, 2387; and Baumert et al, supra note 51, at 6. 
53 See Baumert et al, supra note 51, at 3. 
54 See Lecocq and Ambrosi, supra note 45, at 143.
55 See ‘Promoting sustainable energy technology transfers through the CDM: converting from a 
theoretical concept to practical action’ (February 2008) 
http://www.jiqweb.org/images/stories/articles/ENTTRANSd2.pdf, www.jiqweb.org (23/07/2010), 34. 
56 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANC
E/0,,contentMDK:21630008~menuPK:5216148~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:41258
53,00.html ‘Prototype Carbon Fund’ (World Bank, 08/02/2010).
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merely purchase the CERs generated, as with unilateral projects. The difference is that 
in the multilateral structure, the fund acts on behalf of several developed country 
entities, the funding provided by the developed country entities are channelled 
through this fund, and the CERs generated are for the benefit of these entities.57 All 
three models currently operate in the CDM market.
2.3 The Need for Equitable Geographic Distribution
As the aim of this research is to identify the reasons why the distribution of CDM 
projects among countries is inequitable and suggest ways of addressing this problem, 
one issue that needs to be addressed is the importance of having an equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects. The first CDM project was registered in 
2004, and there are now more than 5000 projects in the CDM pipeline at different 
stages of the registration process, including over 2500 registered projects.58 However, 
the distribution of these projects among developing countries varies considerably, 
from many countries hosting no project at all, to a few hosting several hundred 
projects and one country (China) hosting over a thousand projects.59
Because it does not actually matter to the atmosphere where emission reductions take 
place, it could be suggested that it does not matter where CDM projects are hosted, 
provided CDM projects are being registered and climate change mitigation is being 
achieved. However, one of the main reasons for seeking equitable geographic 
distribution of projects lies in the CDM objective of promoting sustainable 
development. According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM should, inter 
                                               
57 Baumert et al., supra note 51, at 4. 
58 Statistics correct as of November 2010. See the CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
59 See Chapter 4 for the current distribution of projects among developing countries.
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alia, contribute to sustainable development in developing countries. The CDM is not 
intended to promote sustainable development in just a few developing countries, but 
in as many countries as possible.60
A key driver of developing countries’ acceptance of the CDM during the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations was the explicit mention of sustainable development as a goal of 
the CDM.61 They accepted the mechanism with the expectation that it would help 
them achieve sustainable development - it was never the intention that it would only 
help a select few achieve sustainable development, but that all countries should have 
the opportunity to derive this benefit from the CDM.62 According to the Convention, 
countries have a right to promote sustainable development.63 One of the central 
principles of sustainable development is equity, including in the distribution of 
resources, in order to eradicate poverty and ensure the meeting of [basic] needs.64 In 
                                               
60 See H. Oppenoorth et al., ‘The Bali guide on CDM: towards a sustainable CDM’ (November 2007) 
http://www.snm.nl/pdf/klimaattopbali_brochure_bali_guide_def_webversie_copy.pdf
http://www.snm.nl/ (19/07/2010), 17, where the authors quoted the Chairman of the African Group to 
COP12 as saying that, “If we knew then what we know now, we would not have agreed to the CDM,” 
referring to the fact that the CDM is not working for Africa. 
61 See A.P. Sari and S. Meyers, ‘Clean development mechanism: perspectives from developing 
countries’ (June, 1999), http://ies.lbl.gov/iespubs/43418.pdf, http://ies.lbl.gov/ (05/08/2010), 2, 5 and 
11; and Prouty, supra note 50, at 522 and 536. 
62 See A. Michaelowa, ‘CDM: current status and possibilities for reform’ (November 2005) 
http://www.hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/HWWI_Research_Paper_3.pdf, www.hwwi.org
(23/02/2010), where the author points out that, “if the CDM really aims to promote sustainable 
development in the developing countries, all developing countries would have to participate in the 
CDM.” In relation to this thesis, the point is that all developing countries should have the opportunity 
to participate in the CDM (not that they must participate in the CDM, given that as discussed above 
under participation requirements, participation in the CDM is voluntary). See also S. Huq, ‘Applying 
sustainable development criteria to CDM projects: PCF experience’ (April 2002), 
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G00083.pdf, www.iied.org (04/08/2010), 22, where the author notes 
that, “Projects need to be equitably spread across the developing countries, otherwise only a handful of 
developing countries will be able to participate effectively in this market.”
63 See UNFCCC, Article 3(4). Sustainable development is one of the key themes of the UNFCCC. See 
French, supra note 19, at 80-81. See also D.B. Magraw and L.D. Hawke, ‘Sustainable development’ in 
D. Bodansky et al., The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 614, 618. See note 19 above for more on sustainable development.
64 See French, supra, note 19, at 28-30, 59-62, 65-66; ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Relating to Sustainable Development (2002) 2 International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 211, 213 (principle 2.1); S. Beder, ‘Costing the earth: 
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addition to ensuring the meeting of needs and eradication of poverty, the other key 
component of sustainable development is the protection of the environment –
sustainable development aims at ensuring that economic development and 
environmental protection are achieved in an integrated manner.65 Equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects will provide all developing countries with 
the opportunity to do both – to enjoy the social and economic benefits of CDM 
projects, and also to protect the environment through the GHG emission reductions 
achieved by the projects.66 Therefore, because the CDM is a mechanism for achieving 
GHG emission reductions and for promoting sustainable development, the location 
and distribution of projects are important, in order to ensure that all developing 
countries are able to take advantage of CDM projects and the benefits they provide.
In addition, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have equity as one of the key 
principles of the climate change regime.67 As an instrument of this regime, the CDM 
firstly must follow these principles and rules,68 and secondly, was established, among 
                                                                                                                                      
equity, sustainable development and environmental economics’ (2000) 4 NZ J. Envt’l Law 227, 227; 
and Segger and Khalfan, supra note 19, at 122-132. 
65 See French, supra note 19, at 2, 3 and 10; and Fuentes, supra note 19, at 7. See also A. Ross, 
‘Modern interpretations of sustainable development’ (2009) 36 J. L. & Society 32. 
66 Article 12 of the Protocol provides that in relation to developing countries, the objectives of the 
CDM are to help these countries achieve sustainable development and also to contribute to the 
Convention’s ultimate objective of stabilising GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. 
67 Equity is factored into every aspect of the climate change regime, from the ultimate objective of the 
regime, to the activities to achieve this objective (such as in the distribution of the responsibilities for 
addressing the climate change problem), and the financing of these activities. The issue of equity in the 
climate change regime is discussed more extensively in Section 3.3. See generally, J.C. Wood, 
‘Intergenerational equity and climate change’ (1996) 8 GIELR 293; J. Ashton and X. Wang, ‘Equity 
and climate: in principle and practice’ in Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort against 
Climate Change (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2003); and E. Claussen and L. McNeilly, 
‘Equity & global climate change: the complex elements of global fairness’ 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/pol_equity.pdf, www.pewclimate.org (1998). 
68 See P. Cullet, ‘Equity and flexibility mechanisms in the climate change regime: conceptual and 
practical issues’ (1999) 8 RECIEL 168, 178.
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other things, to contribute to the fulfilment of the objective of the regime.69 It is 
therefore important that the CDM, like the Convention and Protocol, should promote 
equity in its implementation, including in the way CDM projects, which are the main 
products of the CDM, are distributed. 
Furthermore, countries have repeatedly called for equitable distribution of projects, 
making it apparent that equitable distribution of projects is, in fact, important to them. 
In 2001, when establishing the rules to govern the CDM, COP 7 recognised the need 
to promote equitable distribution of projects.70 Subsequently, at its first meeting in 
December 2005, the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Protocol71 (COP/MOP 1) identified addressing the issue of equitable distribution 
of CDM projects as one of its roles, with a focus on the regional and sub-regional 
distribution of projects.72 At COP/MOP 2, the CDM Executive Board reported on its 
efforts to promote equitable distribution, such as the adoption of simplified modalities 
for small-scale projects and establishment of the DNA Forum.73 All subsequent 
decisions in relation to the CDM acknowledge the need to ensure an equitable 
distribution of CDM projects among countries and regions, and various actions have 
been taken, all aimed at achieving this goal.74 However, the goal has proven elusive, 
                                               
69 Protocol Article 12(2) provides inter alia that the purpose of the CDM is to assist developing 
countries to contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention and to assist developed countries to 
achieve compliance with their emission reduction commitments under the Protocol.
70 Decision 17/CP.7, Preamble, paragraph 6. 
71 The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP) is 
the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.
72 Paragraph 4(c) of the Annex to Decision 3/CMP.1 provides that the COP/MOP shall “review the 
regional and subregional distribution of CDM project activities with a view to identifying systematic or 
systemic barriers to their equitable distribution and take appropriate decisions, based, inter alia, on a 
report by the Executive Board.” 
73 See the 2005-2006 Annual Report of the Executive Board to the COP/MOP, Addendum 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/4/Add.1 (Part I), 7 November 2006), Paragraph 9.
74 See the following, which are examples taken from all the meetings of the COP/MOP so far, from 
COP/MOP 1 in 2005 to COP/MOP 6 in 2010: Decision 7/CMP.1, Paragraphs 32-35 (COP/MOP 1, 
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and the distribution of CDM projects, both nationally and regionally, is still 
inequitable, and it is important to determine why, in order to help fulfil both 
objectives of the mechanism, as well as to ensure equity among developing countries. 
Huq points out that “experience so far has shown that it is likely that a small number 
of developing countries (e.g. China, India, South Africa, Brazil and few Latin 
American countries) could effectively account for almost all CDM projects if there is 
no concerted effort to enable other (smaller and poorer) developing countries to 
access the CDM market.”75
                                                                                                                                      
December 2005); Decision 1/CMP.2, Paragraphs 31 – 42 (COP/MOP 2, December 2006); Decision 
2/CMP.3, ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 14 March 2008), Paragraphs 26 – 42 (COP/MOP 3, December 2007); 
Decision 2/CMP.4, ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.1, 19 March 2009), Paragraphs 48 – 63 (COP/MOP 4, December 2008); 
Decision 2/CMP.5, ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, 30 March 2010), Paragraphs 44 – 55 (COP/MOP 5, December 2009); 
and Decision 3/CMP.6, ‘Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2, 15 March 2011), Paragraphs 61 – 69 (COP/MOP 6, December 2010). 
75 Huq, supra note 62, at 10. 
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CHAPTER THREE
Defining Equitable Distribution
3.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is to determine whether the CDM 
regime can support an equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects. One of the 
stated objectives of the CDM is to promote sustainable development in host 
developing countries. Equity and distributive justice are key aspects of sustainable 
development, and as highlighted in Chapter 2, to be truly promoting sustainable 
development and to give all developing countries the opportunity to contribute to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, there ought to be an equitable distribution of 
CDM projects.1 A key objective of this thesis therefore is to determine whether the 
current distribution of CDM projects among countries is equitable, and to identify the 
reasons for the inequitable geographic distribution, if the distribution is deemed to be 
inequitable. 
In order to determine whether the current distribution of projects is equitable, it is 
necessary first to ascertain the meaning of “equitable geographic distribution.” Even 
before COP/MOP 1 in 2005, countries have been calling for efforts to ensure an 
equitable distribution of projects.2 Most COP/MOP decisions relating to the CDM 
deal with the need to ensure an equitable distribution of CDM projects, and various 
                                               
1 See the discussion of the need for equitable distribution in Section 2.3.
2 In 2001, when establishing the rules to govern the CDM, countries recognised the need to promote 
equitable distribution of projects. See Decision 17/CP.7, Preamble, paragraph 6. At COP/MOP 1,
countries requested the Executive Board to report on barriers to equitable distribution and options to 
address these barriers. This report was made by the Executive Board at COP/MOP 2. See Decision 
7/CMP.1, Paragraph 33 and the 2005-2006 Annual Report of the Executive Board to the COP/MOP, 
Addendum (FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/4/Add.1 (Part I), 7 November 2006), Paragraph 9.
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actions have been taken, all aimed at achieving this goal.3 Despite these repeated calls 
however, the actual meaning of the term “equitable geographic distribution” has not 
been defined or described by any of these bodies or in any of these documents, neither 
has the ideal distribution of projects among countries been identified. This chapter 
focuses on providing such a definition, and therefore fills the gap of the lack of a 
definition of equitable distribution under the CDM. 
As highlighted in Chapter 1, this thesis investigates relevant aspects of international 
law and theory, with the aim of determining whether, and the extent to which, any of 
these can contribute to providing a definition of equitable distribution of CDM 
projects. It resists the temptation to simply select an equitable approach without 
determining its suitability to the CDM, specifically, to achieving the objectives of the 
CDM.  
This chapter begins by examining the meaning and application of equity in 
international law. This is because the basis of the search for equitable geographic 
distribution is the desire to achieve equity in the distribution of CDM projects among 
developing countries.4 How equity is applied under international law could therefore 
provide some input into how equity should be applied by the CDM, which is an 
international mechanism. 
                                               
3 See for example paragraph 32 of Decision 7/CMP.1 (in December 2005), where countries were 
requested to submit their views on the barriers to equitable distribution of CDM projects and options to 
address these barriers, for consideration by the COP. Paragraph 38 of Decision 1/CMP.2 (December 
2006) also emphasizes that, “...further efforts are necessary to promote equitable regional distribution 
of clean development mechanism project activities.” See Chapter 1, note 74, for a list of decisions on 
equitable distribution from all COP/MOP meetings to date. See the discussion in Chapter 5 for the 
various initiatives within the CDM regime to promote equitable geographic distribution. 
4 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1). See also Ashton and Wang, supra Chapter 2, note 67; and Wood, supra 
Chapter 2, note 67.
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Next, the chapter reviews the climate change regime to determine its framework of 
equity. This regime is reviewed because: it provides the context for the operation of 
the CDM; and the Convention and Protocol contain certain guiding principles and
rules which are relevant to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention 
and the Protocol, and which the CDM, as an instrument of this regime, must follow.5
Because the research on equity in international law, including in the international 
climate change regime, does not produce a concrete definition of equity (although it 
does provide ideas regarding what should be considered in efforts to ensure equity), 
this research turns to theory to provide further guidance as to what equitable 
geographic distribution might mean. 
Consequently, the theories of distributive justice are examined. These are 
philosophical theories that aim to determine how to achieve a just or fair distribution 
of resources in society. These theories are examined because the goal of equitable 
geographic distribution within the CDM is the same – to determine how CDM 
projects should be distributed in a way that is equitable (justice and fairness are used 
as synonyms for equity, as highlighted in the section on equity below).
This chapter then determines how distributive justice is achieved in practice, by 
examining various international regimes that aim at achieving a just or fair 
                                               
5 See UNFCCC, Article 3 and Kyoto Protocol, Preamble, paragraph 4. On the interpretation of treaties 
and the need to interpret and implement a treaty in accordance to its object and purpose, see 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna) 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980; 8 ILM 679 
(1969); V. Crnic-Grotic, ‘Object and Purpose of Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties’ (1997) 7 Asian YBIL 141; and T. Akanle, ‘Impact of ozone layer protection on the avoidance 
of climate change: legal issues and proposals to address the problem’ (2010) 19 RECIEL 239, 244. See 
also Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 173; and Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 359, where 
the authors state that Article 3 of the Convention (which contains the guiding principles for the 
regime), provides the parameters within which the parties are required to work towards the objective of 
the Convention. See also Protocol Article 12(2).
38
distribution of resources. Finally, using these reviews and analyses, this chapter 
defines equitable distribution of CDM projects and outlines the analytical framework 
to be used to undertake a critique of the CDM regime.6
As stated in Chapter 1, the methodology used by this research is grounded theory. 
Consequently, the problem area and research question determine the investigations to 
be carried out in the course of the research. In the search for a definition of equitable 
geographic distribution, some of the investigations carried out in this chapter turned 
out not to be particularly useful or relevant. As will be seen later in the chapter, such 
investigations include the examination of the theories of distributive justice and some 
of the international regimes, such as the fisheries and moon regimes. Some of the 
investigations did turn out to be relevant and very useful, such as the examination of 
equity in international law and in the climate change regime, as well as distributive 
justice in some of the international regimes, such as the international watercourses
regime. 
Consequently, before concluding that any particular approach should be applied to the 
CDM, this chapter goes through a process of determining its appropriateness for the 
CDM. It does this by first examining the relevant approach (for example, the theories 
of distributive justice) and then assessing whether applying that particular approach to 
the CDM would help or hinder it (the CDM) in the achievement of its objectives of 
contributing to GHG emission reduction and sustainable development.  
                                               
6 The critique is undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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3.2 Equity in International Law
This section starts by considering the meaning of equity generally and then focuses on 
equity in international law. It examines the principles of intra-generational equity, 
inter-generational equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, which are 
the main equitable principles applied generally in international law (although not the 
only ones).7 The purpose of this section is to determine how equity is applied in 
international law generally so as to provide some input into how equity should be 
applied within the CDM regime, which is also an international regime. 
The ordinary dictionary meaning of equity includes definitions like “justice according 
to natural law or right, freedom from bias or favouritism, or something that is 
equitable,”8 “a situation in which all people are treated equally and no one has an 
unfair advantage,”9 “the quality of being fair and impartial,”10 “fairness,”11 “justice,”12
“the quality of being equal or fair,”13 and “that which is just or right.”14 Harold and 
Martin describe it as “that which is fair and just, moral and ethical.”15 These can be 
used interchangeably with “equity” when being used in the ordinary, lay, sense. 
                                               
7 See generally, E. Louka, International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); A. Boyle and D. Freestone, International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); Schrijver and Weiss, supra Chapter 2, note 19; and T. Honkonen, The Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Regulatory and 
Policy Aspects (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
8 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ (Merriam-Webster, 
02/01/2010).
9 The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, (London: Longman, 1978). 
10 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
11 S.J. Hepburn, Principles of Equity and Trusts 2nd ed. (Sydney/London: Cavendish Publishing 
(Australia) Pty Limited, 2001), 3. 
12 Ibid. 
13 L.B. Curzon, Equity & Trusts 2nd ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1996), 1
14 Ibid.
15 G.H. Harold and J. Martin, Modern Equity 17th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), 3. See also 
page 4, where the authors state that “principles of justice and conscience are the basis of equity 
jurisdiction.”
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However, in law, specifically under English law, “equity” refers to the body of rules 
or principles developed to mitigate the harshness or sometimes unfair effect of the 
English common law.16 Equity in this sense aims for justice and fairness, and 
recognises that the strict application of the law does not always achieve these goals.17
The focus of this thesis is on equity within an international regime (the CDM regime). 
Consequently, this section will focus specifically on equity in international law.
Authors have variously defined equity in international law as meaning justice, fairness 
or some similar term.18 For example, according to Shelton, equity is often used in 
international law to mean fairness or justice.19 Sands states that equity allows the 
international community to consider justice and fairness in the establishment, 
operation or application of a rule of international law.20 This is similar to the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of equity as discussed above. However, saying that equity means 
justice, fairness or such other term does not provide a clear understanding of what 
equity actually means in practice,21 as an examination of the meaning of these other 
terms (such as justice, reasonableness, fairness and so on) would then be required.22
                                               
16 J. Duddington, Essentials of Equity and Trusts Law (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2006), 5 – 7. See 
also G.W. Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, Equity, 3rd ed. (Kluwer Law Publishers, 1987); and Curzon, note 
13 above. Also one of the definitions given by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the Longman 
Dictionary of Contemporary English and the Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
17 See generally on equity, R. Edwards, Trusts and Equity (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2007); and 
R.A. Pearce, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations 3rd ed. (London, Edinburgh: Butterworths, 
2002). 
18 See Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 168; and O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and 
Practice (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 55.
19 See D. Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Bodansky et al., supra Chapter 2, note 63, at 640. 
20 Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 152.
21 Schachter, supra note 18, at 55. See also Shelton, supra note 19, at 640, where the author states that 
“the precise nature of the concept [of equity] is obscure.”
22 See the discussion of equity above. For example, equity is taken to mean justice, and the definitions 
of justice include “the treatment of people that is fair and morally right” (the Macmillan Dictionary), 
“the quality of being just, impartial or fair” (the Merriam-Webster Dictionary) and “fairness” or “the 
quality of being right and deserving fair treatment” (the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary 
English). To determine the meaning of justice in order to determine the meaning of equity would then 
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This section attempts to address this issue by examining the principles applied in 
efforts to achieve equity in international law, in order to contribute to the 
understanding of what equity means in international law. 
In addition to being applied to ensure considerations of justice and fairness in the 
establishment, operation or application of a rule of international law or in the 
establishment of an international agreement or treaty, equity is also applied in 
international law to settle disputes between nations.23 In international dispute 
settlement, equity is considered as part of the general principles of law which the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) can apply under Article 38.1 of the Statute of the 
ICJ.24 These principles are often applied by international courts and tribunals as part 
of international law, with the aim of arriving at a more just outcome than would 
otherwise be achieved.25 In these situations, the Court applies equitable principles
which it deems relevant to the given case being considered, rather than “equity” in the 
abstract.26 Similarly, the aim of this chapter is to identify how equity should be 
applied to the distribution of CDM projects. 
                                                                                                                                      
require determination of the meaning of “fairness,” “rightness” and so on. Such an exercise could 
potentially be endless. 
23 See V. Lowe, ‘The role of equity in international law’ (1988-1989) 12 Aust. YBIL 54, 55; and M.W. 
Janis, ‘The ambiguity of equity in international law’ (1983) 9 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 7. 
24 See Lowe, Ibid, at 55; and Janis, Ibid, at 7. See also the Individual Opinion of Judge Hudson in the 
Diversion of the Waters from the Meuse case (1937) PCIJ Series A/B No. 70, 76-77, where he 
recognises the principles of equity as part of international law, and as such often applied by 
international tribunals. On international dispute settlement generally, see M.E. O’Connell (ed.), 
International Dispute Settlement (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 2003); J. Collier and V. Lowe, The 
Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and Procedures (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); and J.G. Merrills, 4th ed., International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
25 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) ICJ Reports 3, 48; and The Diversion of Water from 
the Meuse (1925) PCIJ, Series A./B., No. 70, page 77. See generally, Janis, supra note 23.
26 R. Lapidoth, ‘Equity in international law’ (1987) 81 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 138, 144. Such principles include maxims of equity such as “he who seeks equity must do 
equity.” See The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, 76-77; and Janis, supra note 23, at 11. See 
generally on maxims of equity, G. Watt, Trusts and Equity 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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As explained above, to ascertain how equity is applied in practice in international law, 
the principles of intra-generational equity, inter-generational equity, and common but 
differentiated responsibilities are examined, as they are the principles of equity that 
are generally applied in international law. 
3.2.1 Intra-generational and inter-generational equity
Under international law, the principles of inter-generational and intra-generational 
equity aim to ensure fairness among individuals and states in the present and future 
generations.27 They are key principles of sustainable development, which is also one 
of the stated aims of the CDM.28 Intra-generational equity aims at justice among 
members of the present generation.29 It has been defined as “the right of all peoples 
within the current generation of fair access to the current generation’s entitlement to
the Earth’s natural resources”30 and requires fairness in the use of resources among 
members of the present generation, both nationally and internationally.31 It also 
includes considerations of distribution of resources and justice between and within 
nations.32 For example, international human rights laws set out the human rights of 
                                                                                                                                      
2010), Chapter 2; and G. Moffat et al., Trusts Law: Texts and Materials 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 114-115. 
27 See Shelton, supra note 19, at 642.
28 See generally, French, supra Chapter 2, note 19; and ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, (2002). See also Segger and Khalfan, supra 
Chapter 2, note 19, at 99; D. French, ‘The role of the state and international organisations’ in Schrijver 
and Weiss, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 65; Loibl, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 98; and S. Giorgetta, 
‘The right to healthy environment’ in Schrijver and Weiss, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 395.
29 See Shelton, supra note 19, at 642-643.
30 See ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable 
Development, (2002), Principle 2.
31 See G.F. Maggio, ‘Inter/intra-generational equity: current applications under international law for 
promoting sustainable development of natural resources’ (1996-1997) 4 Buff. Envt’l L.J. 161, 163-164.
32 See ‘What is equity’ http://www.uow.edu.au/~sharonb/STS300/equity/meaning/intragen.html, 
www.uow.edu.au, (University of Wollongong, 28/07/2010); and Segger and Khalfan, supra Chapter 2, 
note 19, at 125. 
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persons, as well as limitations to these rights.33 The purpose of these limitations is to 
secure “due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others,” and to 
meet “the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”34
Inter-generational equity is based on the idea that the present generation holds the 
earth in trust for future generations,35 and should therefore maintain the earth’s 
integrity in order to ensure the survival of the human species36 and that natural 
resources remain available for the benefit of both present and future generations.37
Here, the present generation has the obligation to utilise the earth’s resources “fairly” 
such that future generations receive these resources in a condition comparable to that 
enjoyed by the present generation.38 It requires the present generation to strike a 
balance between meeting its own needs and ensuring that future generations have 
enough resources to also meet their own needs.39 The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development provides that “the right to development must be 
fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present 
                                               
33 See M.N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 247-256. 
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris) (UN Doc. A/810, 10 December 1948), Article 29.
35 Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 256. See for example Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn) 23 June 1979, in force 1 November 1983; (1980) 19 ILM 
15, Preamble, paragraph 2, which affirms that “each generation of man holds the resources of the earth 
for future generations and has an obligation to ensure that this legacy is conserved and, where utilized, 
is used wisely.”
36 Shelton, supra note 19, at 643.
37 See Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 256. See for example, the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity; Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi), 21 June 1985, in force 30 May 1996; IELMT 
985:46; and the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora. 
38 Shelton, supra note 19, at 643. 
39 See Maggio, supra note 31, at 163. 
44
and future generations.”40 Essentially, intra-generational equity will become much 
more difficult for future generations if the present generation does not leave them 
sufficient resources. 
For both intra- and inter-generational equity, a major concern is the meeting of needs: 
equity requires generations to utilise resources in such a way as to ensure that others 
within that generation (intra-generational equity) or in future generations (inter-
generational equity) are able to meet their own needs.41 In this regard, the needs of 
others, and meeting these needs, are of paramount importance, and equity requires 
due consideration to be paid to these needs. In relation to the CDM, this suggests that 
if applicable, consideration of the needs of countries should form part of efforts to 
ensure equitable geographic distribution of projects.
3.2.2 Common but differentiated responsibilities
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) is one that is 
commonly applied under international environmental law. Many multilateral 
environmental agreements incorporate this principle with the aim of ensuring equity 
within the regimes.42 The CBDR principle is set out in the Rio Declaration as follows: 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In 
                                               
40 Rio Declaration, Principle 4. See also similar provisions in: the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (Washington) 2 December 1946, in force 10 November 1948; 161 UN Treaty 
Series 72; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(Washington) 3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975; 993 UN Treaty Series 243; and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993; (1992) 31 ILM 822.
41 See Schachter, supra note 18, at 11-16. 
42 See Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 285 – 289; ‘The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities: origins and scope’ (26 August 2002) http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf, 
www.cisdl.org (CISDL, 19/04/2010); and Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 169.
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view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, 
States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed 
countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.43
The principle recognises that while countries have a common responsibility to protect 
the environment, there are differences in their contributions to global environmental 
degradation and in their financial and technical capacity to address the degradation, 
and there must therefore be differences in their responsibility to address the 
problem.44 The principle therefore has two essential elements: countries’ common 
responsibility to protect the climate; and countries’ differentiated responsibilities 
based on responsibility for the problem and capacity to address it.45 This principle is 
incorporated into several international agreements and instruments, and in general, is 
put in practice through differentiated commitments to address global environmental 
problems, together with preferential treatment for specific groups of countries. 
For example, the Stockholm Declaration provides that resources should be made 
available to preserve and improve the environment, taking account of the 
circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries. It further 
highlights the need to make available to these countries, additional technical and 
                                               
43 Rio Declaration, Principle 7. 
44 See generally, L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 9 and Chapter 5. 
45 See Y. Matsui, ‘Some aspects of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”’
(2002) 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 151, 153; Honkonen, 
supra note 7, at 1; and Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 286. 
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financial assistance to help them incorporate environmental safeguards into their 
development planning.46 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer47 contains different obligations for developed and developing countries, and, 
for instance, Article 5 recognises the “special situation” of developing countries and 
allows them 10 additional years to phase out the substances controlled by the 
Protocol. This is in consideration of the special needs and circumstances of 
developing countries and to enhance their ability to fulfil their obligations. 
The International Tropical Timber Agreement allows developing country members 
whose interests are adversely affected by measures taken under the agreement to 
apply for differential and remedial measures.48 The UNFCCC, which is also based on 
the CBDR principle,49 contains far fewer obligations for developing countries than for
developed countries. Article 4(1) contains general commitments for all parties, both 
developed and developing, and then in paragraph 2, outlines further commitments for 
developed countries alone. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol contains commitments 
regarding policies and measures, greenhouse gas emission reductions and reporting 
for developed countries, with no corresponding commitments for developing 
countries.50 The CDM itself is also a key differentiation mechanism under the climate 
change regime, as it gives developing countries the opportunity to participate in 
                                               
46 See Principle 12 of the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, in Report of 
the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, Section I, 16 
June 1972), reprinted in (1972) 11 ILM 1416 (Stockholm Declaration).
47 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal) 16 September 1987, in force 1 
January 1989; (1987) 26 ILM 154 (Montreal Protocol). 
48 International Tropical Timber Agreement (Geneva) 26 January 1994, in force 1 January 1997; (1994) 
33 ILM 1016, Article 34.
49 See UNFCCC, Articles 3(1), 3(2) and 4(1). The UNFCCC refers to “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.” This does not differ in substance from the principle as 
generally applied, as the Rio Declaration refers to the “the technologies and financial resources” that 
developed countries command, which is a reference to their “respective capabilities.” See the text at 
footnote 43 above.
50 Kyoto Protocol, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7.
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climate change mitigation, without taking on substantive commitments to do so, and 
provides them with sustainable development benefits at the same time.51
As seen from these examples, in allocating differentiated responsibilities, this 
principle achieves equity by granting preferential treatment to certain groups of 
countries. This preferential treatment is often expressed as a requirement to take 
account of the special circumstances, needs or requirements of specific groups. 
Agenda 21 provides that the objective of international environmental law is, inter 
alia, to promote international standards for the protection of the environment that 
“take into account the different situations and capabilities of countries.”52 The 
Convention on Biological Diversity notes the special conditions of least developed 
countries and small island States.53 The Stockholm Declaration provides that 
resources should be made available to preserve and improve the environment, “taking 
into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing 
countries...”54
The principle is also applied through the requirement for international assistance, 
including financial aid and technology transfer, usually to developing countries.55 An 
                                               
51 See for instance, P. Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 118-119, where the author, among other things, notes that the 
CDM is the most important of the three Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms in terms of differential 
treatment, adding that it is “closely linked” to the CBDR principle. 
52 See Agenda 21 (UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26, June 1992), Paragraph 39.3(d).
53 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, paragraph 17. 
54 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 12. See also Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, (Vienna) 22 March 1985, in force 22 September 1988; (1985) 22 ILM 1529, Preamble, 
paragraph 3; and Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (Paris) 17 June 1994, in force 26 December 1996; 
(1994) 33 ILM 1328, Article 7.
55 See D. French, ‘Developing states and international environmental law: the importance of 
differentiated responsibilities’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 35, 42; Centre for International Sustainable 
Development Law, ‘The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities: origins and scope’ 
(August 2002) http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf, www.cisdl.org (19/04/2010), 2; and 
Rajamani, supra note 44, at 107-114.
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example is the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, 
which, among other things, was established to provide financial assistance to 
developing countries to enable them to comply with the control measures established 
by the Montreal Protocol, by meeting the agreed incremental costs incurred by these 
countries in complying with their obligations.56
The principle therefore advocates different obligations to address a problem, based on 
responsibility for the problem, the capability to address the problem, and needs.57 It 
also supports giving preferential treatment based on these elements. As noted above, 
this preferential treatment could be in the form of financial, capacity or technological 
support. In conclusion, as applied in the CBDR principle, equity requires 
consideration of responsibility, capability and needs. 
3.2.3 Conclusion
The discussion above shows that equity in international law usually requires 
consideration of countries’ needs. Specifically in relation to dealing with an 
environmental problem, it also requires consideration of countries’ responsibility for 
the problem and capability to address the problem. In addition, consideration of 
countries’ needs is often manifested by giving preferential treatment or support to 
                                               
56 Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol in Report of the 2nd Meeting of 
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Decision II/8, Financial Mechanism (UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 29 June 
1990) (Multilateral Fund), Paragraph 1. Other examples include the UN Environment Programme 
Fund, the World Heritage Fund and the Wetland Conservation Fund. See French, supra note 55, at 42. 
The principle was also cited by the WTO dispute settlement Panel in the Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products case. See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001, Paragraph 7.2.
For more examples, see Rajamani, supra note 44, at Chapter 2 and pages 96-114.
57 See C.D. Stone, ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities in international law’ (2004) 98 AJIL
276, 290, where the author states that Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration, by referring to undeveloped 
and vulnerable countries, suggests differentiation in accordance with needs, the pressures each country 
places on the environment, and capabilities in terms of wealth and technology. See also Sands, supra 
Chapter 2, note 19, at 288-289. 
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specific groups of countries. If these factors are applicable to the CDM, it means 
CDM projects should be distributed among developing countries according to their 
needs, responsibility and capability. 
The question to be answered is whether these factors are appropriate for the CDM, 
and if so, what they mean in the context of the CDM. Responsibility does not appear 
to be particularly appropriate for the CDM. This is because, as shown above, it is
generally used when determining countries’ duty to address an environmental 
problem, that is, when allocating the burden of addressing a problem. For example, 
under the UNFCCC, responsibility is used to determine how much countries should 
contribute to climate change mitigation efforts. Based on their responsibility for the 
problem, developed countries are required to take the lead in addressing climate 
change, and based on their limited responsibility, developing countries have fewer 
obligations than developed countries.58 Responsibility cannot be used as a basis for 
determining the distribution of CDM projects because under the CDM, the issue is 
distribution of a benefit, not of a burden. In this sense, developing countries are not 
“responsible” for anything (or any problem) that could serve as the basis of 
distributing CDM projects. 
However, there is a possible argument for using responsibility as a basis for 
determining the distribution of CDM projects. This would entail differentiating 
among developing countries on the basis of their “responsibility” for the climate 
change problem, that is, their contribution to global GHG emissions. In this scenario, 
certain developing countries would be excluded from participation in the CDM, 
                                               
58 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraphs 3 and 18, and Article 3(1). This is discussed in greater detail in
Section 3.3 below. 
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because of their responsibility for the climate change problem. The benefit of this to 
equitable distribution is that there would then be more projects for the participating 
countries, and hence, possibly (although not inevitably) a better distribution of 
projects. The most obvious countries that would be excluded in this scenario are those 
countries with the highest GHG emissions, such as China, Brazil, Indonesia and 
India.59
Although this would doubtless increase the number of projects available to other 
countries (considering that China alone currently hosts almost half of the total number 
of registered projects), this will not necessarily help achieve the objectives of the 
CDM. This is because the CDM is meant to reduce GHG emissions and promote 
sustainable development. Excluding the countries with the highest GHG emissions
would be counter-productive as it means these emissions cannot be reduced through 
the CDM, thereby reducing the overall emission reduction potential of the CDM.60 It 
also would not contribute to the promotion of sustainable development, at least, not in 
these countries. Presumably, these countries will continue to develop, but without the 
sustainability the CDM can contribute to. Such exclusion would require that another 
avenue be found to involve these countries in climate change mitigation, considering 
that they account for such a large proportion of global GHG emissions. Bakker et al
acknowledge this fact, highlighting that such exclusion would need to be 
                                               
59 See CAIT Version 7.0 (2005 data). See S.J.A. Bakker et al., ‘Differentiation in the CDM: options 
and impacts’ (May 2009) http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500102023.pdf, www.rivm.nl
(16/07/2010), 32-35, where the authors propose differentiation among developing countries, but not 
based on responsibility. They propose differentiation based on per capita income and emissions. 
60 Under the current rules, developing countries have no emission reduction obligations and the CDM is 
currently the only means of involving developing countries in climate change mitigation efforts under 
the Kyoto Protocol. See the discussion on page 19 above. This is however changing, and there are 
concerted efforts to involve developing countries in climate change mitigation, outside the CDM. This 
includes by requiring them to undertake nationally-appropriate mitigation actions. See Chapter 1, note 
22.  
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accompanied by other mitigation actions.61 However, this is probably not a discussion 
or decision that can effectively be undertaken in the context of the CDM, but under 
the climate change regime generally, due to its highly political nature.62 Countries are 
unlikely to take on emission reduction obligations outside of the CDM simply in order 
to improve the distribution of CDM projects among countries.
In any case, in the context of the CDM, the objective of equitable geographic 
distribution is to include as many developing countries as possible in the CDM and 
enable more countries to participate, rather than to exclude some countries from 
participation. Consequently, for these reasons, “responsibility” is not an appropriate 
basis for deciding distribution of CDM projects. 
The element of “needs” on the other hand, particularly if this is taken to mean 
countries’ need for sustainable development, is relevant to the distribution of CDM 
projects.63 One of the objectives of the CDM is to promote sustainable development, 
which has been defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” According 
to the Brundtland Report, one of the key concepts of sustainable development is 
needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor.64 Need, or the fulfilment 
of needs, is therefore a key element of sustainable development and is regarded as 
                                               
61 Bakker et al., supra note 59, at 9. 
62 At COP 16 in November 2010, countries agreed that developing countries would take on nationally-
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and recognised the NAMAs submitted by these countries. 
These provisions however do not mandate actions by developing countries. See Chapter 1, note 22. 
This decision is the outcome of a long, very political process that goes well beyond the issue of 
equitable distribution of CDM projects. See generally Akanle et al., ‘Summary of the Cancun Climate 
Change Conference’ supra Chapter 2, note 28. See also C. Romano and E. Burleson, The Cancún 
Climate Conference’ 15 ASIL Insight 1. 
63 Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 43. 
64 See Brundtland Report, Paragraph 1. See also Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 252; Birnie et al.,
supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 53-54; and Magraw and Hawke, supra Chapter 2, note 63, at 614 and 618. 
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central to equity and distributive justice.65 According to Chowdhury et al., “the 
satisfaction of basic human needs and legitimate aspirations for an improved quality 
of life – both for the present and future generations – is of the essence of the principle 
of sustainable development.”66 As one of the objectives of the CDM is to promote 
sustainable development, then the fulfilment of needs, which is an essential part of 
sustainable development, is relevant to ensuring equity under the CDM. 
In the same way, capability or ability to address a problem appears to be relevant to 
the distribution of CDM project, particularly when capability is taken to include
technical capacity to host CDM projects.67 Such capability or ability should be a 
relevant factor in the distribution of projects, not in the sense of giving preference to 
countries that have greater capabilities, but rather, the opposite. One of the sustainable 
development benefits the CDM is supposed to produce is increased capacity, 
including capacity to develop and implement sustainable and environmentally-
friendly projects and activities.68 Ability, or rather, lack of it, should be regarded as a 
measure of sustainable development in developing countries. Hence, countries with 
less capacity should be regarded as having greater sustainable development potential
in this regard, and enabling them to host projects and providing them with the 
associated increased capacity, should be regarded as contributing to the sustainable 
                                               
65 See Schachter, supra Chapter 2, note 18, at 16. 
66 See Chowdhury et al. (eds.), The Right to Development in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 20. 
67 For example, in terms of project development and implementation experience, and local expertise. 
68 See Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 365; and Sari and Meyers, supra Chapter 2, note 61. 
See also the World Bank’s brochure for Community Development Carbon Fund Plus 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=CDCF&FID=9709&ItemID=9709&ft=Plus#Top  
(World Bank, 25/01/2010), where the World Bank highlights the importance of experience gained from 
the first and second carbon finance transactions for building countries’ capacity to participate in the 
carbon market. Contrast M. Jung, ‘Host country attractiveness for CDM non-sink projects’ (2006) 34 
Energy Policy 2173, 2174-2175, where the author uses institutional capacity, including previous 
project experience, as a measure of host country CDM attractiveness.
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development objective of the CDM. If countries with greater capacity were given 
preference on the basis of this capacity, and lack of capacity counted against 
countries, this would amount to “putting the cart before the horse” – that is, expecting 
countries to already have the benefit (capability or capacity) that the CDM is meant to 
provide them with.
In conclusion therefore, although equity in international law generally requires 
consideration of countries’ responsibility, capability and needs, the element of 
responsibility is not relevant to the CDM, while the elements of needs and capability 
are. This is further discussed below (in Section 3.6.1), when identifying the elements 
of, and factors for achieving, equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects.
3.3 Equity in the International Climate Change Regime
Having analysed the application of equity in international law generally in the 
previous section, this section focuses on equity in the international climate change 
regime (comprising the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol), which is the regime 
under which the CDM operates. The aim of this section is to determine the climate 
change regime’s framework of equity, in order to provide the context for the 
application of equity under the CDM and also to provide some guidance on how the 
question of equity should be approached under the CDM. This is because, as already 
noted, the CDM, as an instrument of the climate change regime, must function within 
its framework of equity. The Convention contains the guiding principles for the 
implementation of the Convention and its instruments, including the Protocol.69 In 
addition to the Convention and Protocol, relevant rules are also provided by decisions 
                                               
69 See UNFCCC, Article 3 and Protocol, Preamble, paragraph 4.
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of the COP and COP/MOP. These instruments will be examined in order to determine 
the framework of equity of the climate change regime.
3.3.1 Climate Change
The problem of climate change itself raises issues of equity, particularly with regard 
to the causes and impacts of the problem.70 This is because those that have 
contributed the least to climate change bear most of the burden or face most of its 
impacts.71 Climate change is historically attributable to the developed world72 but 
developing countries, which have historically contributed the least to climate change, 
are expected to be the most affected by it.73
The impacts of climate change are expected to be quite severe. Such impacts include:
increased incidence of dangerous, extreme weather conditions such as monsoons, 
floods, droughts and hurricanes; increased water scarcity, especially in regions that 
already suffer from water scarcity; expansion of the range of vector-borne diseases;
                                               
70 See generally Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 168; Ashton and Wang, supra Chapter 2, note 67; 
Claussen and McNeilly, supra Chapter 2, note 67; and Wood, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 321.
71 See for example Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 255, where the author concludes for example 
that the African region is the region most vulnerable to climate change and most likely to be worst 
affected by enhanced climate change. See Parry et al., supra Chapter 1, note 5. The region however has 
the lowest standards of living and the lowest per capita GHG emissions. See Pittock, Ibid. See also 
Ashton and Wang, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 61-62. 
72 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 3. See also Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 216 and 223. 
Although this is still true, in terms of current emissions, some developing countries have overtaken or 
are overtaking developed countries and there is therefore a call for such developing countries to 
undertake appropriate mitigation actions. See the discussion in Chapter 1, note 22.
73 See ‘Summary for policymakers’ in J.J. McCarthy et al. (eds.), Climate change 2001: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8, 
where it is stated that “the effects of climate change are expected to be greatest in developing countries 
in terms of loss of life and relative effects on investment and the economy.” The report states that those 
with the least resources have the least capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable. See also 
‘Adaptation to climate change in the context of sustainable development and equity’ in McCarthy et 
al., Ibid; Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 108-121; and Dawson and Spannagle, supra Chapter 1, 
note 15, at 97-99, 336-337.
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and reduced crop yields.74 These are predicted to impact negatively on human health, 
water availability, agriculture and marine systems, amongst others.75 Regarding the 
distribution of these impacts, the IPCC notes that impacts would be greater in 
developing, than in developed, countries, concluding that: 
The impacts of climate change will not be evenly distributed among the 
peoples of the world. There is high confidence that developing 
countries will be more vulnerable to climate change than developed 
countries, and there is medium confidence that climate change would 
exacerbate income inequalities between and within countries. There 
also is medium confidence that a small temperature increase would 
have net negative impacts on market sectors in many developing 
countries and net positive impacts on market sectors in many developed 
countries. However, there is high confidence that with medium to high 
increases in temperature, net positive impacts would start to decline and 
eventually would turn negative, and negative impacts would be 
exacerbated.76
According to Munasinghe and Swart, developing countries have higher impacts and 
lower capacity to adapt.77 This also goes to another issue of equity – the ability or 
capacity to address the problem of climate change. Developed countries, with their 
                                               
74 See generally on the impacts of climate change, Parry et al., supra Chapter 1, note 5.
75 See ‘Summary for policymakers’ in McCarthy et al., supra note 73, at 5. See also Pittock, supra 
Chapter 1, note 5, at 230, where he states, inter alia, that a one metre rise in sea level would displace 
tens of millions of people in Bangladesh and Viet Nam, among others.
76 S. Fankhauser et al., ‘Vulnerability to climate change and reasons for concern: a synthesis’ in 
McCarthy et al., supra note 73, at 916. 
77 See Munasinghe and Swart, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 47, where the authors state that there is broad 
agreement that developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change than developed countries. 
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greater resources and technological advancement, are generally recognised as having 
a greater capacity to address climate change than developing countries, through for 
example, conservation of energy and development of low-carbon technologies.78
The issue of historical responsibility for climate change also raises another point of 
equity. Developing countries argue that developed countries have had many years to 
develop, and in their development process, have caused the current climate change 
problem; and that they (developing countries) in turn need to increase their energy use 
in order to achieve development and alleviate poverty in their countries.79 This is one 
of the reasons why developing countries have resisted attempts to cap their GHG 
emissions, as they fear this would likewise cap their development, sustainable or 
otherwise.80 Responsible development however means that this should not be taken to 
mean unrestricted freedom to continue to produce GHG emissions. Any consumption 
that leads to GHG emissions should be done in light of the need for “sustainable” 
development81 – defined by the Brundtland report as “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.”82 Economic development, which for developing countries means 
increasing economic growth, should therefore be achieved sustainably, in a manner 
                                               
78 See Ibid, where developing countries’ capacity to address climate change is described as being 
limited by their lack of technological, institutional, financial and knowledge capacity. See also Pittock, 
supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 216. 
79 See Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 216. See also UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 22, which 
recognises that developing countries need access to resources and that their energy consumption will 
grow, in order to achieve sustainable social and economic development, albeit taking account of the 
possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling GHG emissions. 
80 See M. Cazorla and M. Toman, ‘International Equity and Climate Change Policy’ (2000) 27 Climate 
Issue Brief 1, 1-2. 
81 See UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 22. See also Article 2, which refers to the need to “enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”
82 See Brundtland Report, Paragraph 1.
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that considers the need to protect the environment and to preserve the ability of 
others, both present and future, to meet their own needs.83
3.3.2 The UNFCCC 
The inequity described above is one of the main drivers of the design of the climate 
change regime. Pittock noted that although rich countries are becoming less well-
adapted to climate change, global warming will increase the inequity between rich 
developed countries and poorer developing countries.84 For this reason, when 
designing the climate change regime, several attempts have been made to redress this 
inequity and to ensure that those that contributed least to the problem do not take on 
disproportionate responsibilities to solve it.85 The CBDR principle is applied 
throughout both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,86 and is the reason why 
developed countries have specific commitments to reduce their GHG emissions while 
developing countries do not.87 That is also why equity is one of the basic principles of 
                                               
83 See UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 22, where it is recognised that developing countries in particular 
need access to resources to “achieve sustainable social and economic development.” It also refers to the 
need to take account of the possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling 
GHG emissions. See also Articles 2, 3(1) and 3(5), which refer respectively to the need to: enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner; protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind; and cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development. As 
stated in the World Energy Outlook, “the challenge for all countries is to put in motion a transition to a 
more secure, lower-carbon energy system, without undermining economic and social development.” 
See OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2007), 41. See also 
pages 49-51, where it is stated that “unchecked growth in fossil fuel use will hasten climate change.” 
84 See Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 121. See also Pittock’s discussion of equity at pages 223-226. 
85 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraphs 3, 19 and 20; and Article 3(1). 
86 See the discussion of this principle above in Section 3.2.2 and below in Section 3.3.2.
87 However, this situation is changing. During COP 16 in November 2010, countries agreed that 
developing countries will take nationally-appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable 
development, with the aim of achieving a deviation in emissions relative to business-as-usual emissions 
in 2020. Countries also took note of the nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be implemented by 
non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), as communicated by them. See Decision 1/CP.16, 
Paragraphs 48-49. See also Chapter 1, note 22. 
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the UNFCCC, with developed countries expected to take the lead in mitigating 
climate change and its adverse effects.88
In addition to the issues of intra-generational equity discussed above, climate change 
also raises issues of inter-generational equity.89 The IPCC notes that the 
implementation of the ultimate objective of the Convention90 raises issues of equity 
within and among communities, including future generations.91 One of the principles 
of the Convention is the protection of the climate system for the benefit of future 
generations.92 Inter-generational equity is an important reason for taking action now 
as, generally, the impacts of global warming are felt far into the future.93 Hence to 
reduce the impact on future generations, it is important for the present generation to 
take action.94
The Convention establishes the guiding principles for the implementation of the 
climate change regime.95 These principles, together with the commitments contained 
in the Convention, will be analysed in order to determine their definition, treatment or 
                                               
88 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1). See also Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 248; and Cullet, supra
Chapter 2, note 68, at 170. 
89 Inter-generational equity aims at justice between the present and future generations. Here, the present 
generation has the obligation to utilise the earth’s resources “fairly” such that future generations 
receive these resources in a condition comparable to that enjoyed by the present generation. See the 
discussion of this concept in Section 3.2.1 above. 
90 This is found in Article 2 of the Convention, and is to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) interference with the 
climate system. 
91 See H.-H. Rogner et al., ‘Introduction’ in B. Metz et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation: 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 100-102. 
92 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1). 
93 See Wood, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 298, where he states that, “current practices of energy 
production, industrial activity, agriculture, and forestry generate risks that potentially affect climatic 
change and impact future generations.”
94 See Claussen and McNeilly, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 7; and Wood, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 
298. 
95 UNFCCC, Article 3. See also J. Peel, ‘Climate change law: the emergence of a new legal discipline’ 
(2008) 32 Melbourne Univ L. Rev.922, 928.
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application of equity. Article 3 of the Convention contains the principles that should 
guide countries in implementing the Convention.96 Other principles are also contained 
in the Preamble to the Convention, and these and other principles are to guide 
countries in implementing the provisions of the Convention and its related 
instruments (including the CDM).97 The principles of the Convention that are related 
to the issue of equity are as follows:98
a) Protection of the climate for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind on the basis of equity;
b) The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities;
c) Climate change as a common concern of humankind;
d) The requirement for developed country Parties to take the lead in combating 
climate change and its adverse effects;
e) The requirement that the specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties should be given full consideration; and
f) The importance of sustainable development and sustainable economic growth, and 
the right to promote sustainable development.
                                               
96 Although the Protocol does not contain principles, the principles spelt out in the Convention also 
apply to the Protocol. See paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Protocol, where the Parties to the 
Protocol agree to be guided by Article 3 (Principles) of the Convention. 
97 The use of the word “inter alia” in the chapeau of Article 3 means that the relevant principles are not 
restricted to those listed in Article 3. See also F. Yamin & J. Depledge, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 66. 
98 The precautionary principle is one of the principles applied in the Convention. This principle is 
however not examined here as it is not a principle of equity.  
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Protecting the climate for current and future generations on the basis of equity99
relates to the principles of intra- and inter-generational equity, which are discussed 
above.100 As highlighted (in Section 3.2.1), equity in the context of intra- and inter-
generational equity requires consideration of the needs of both current and future 
generations. 
Under the climate change regime, application of the principle can be seen in 
provisions requiring countries to take necessary action to protect the climate in order 
to ensure that the needs of the present and future generations are met, and are not 
jeopardised. For example, consideration of the needs of future generations requires 
urgent action to be taken to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system; 
and consideration of the needs of the present generation requires that developed 
countries should take the lead in carrying out these actions, inter alia because the 
share of global emissions originating in developing countries will need to grow to 
meet their social and development needs.101 It is also recognised that climate change 
will have a greater negative impact on developing than developed countries,102 and 
consideration of the needs of the present generation, including of developing 
countries, requires climate protection in order to mitigate this impact. 
This consideration of needs has already been highlighted, as equity in international 
law generally usually requires consideration of needs.103 As it is a principle of the 
Convention that is directly relevant to the CDM, it is therefore applicable to the CDM. 
                                               
99 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 23, and Article 3(1). 
100 These principles aim to ensure fairness among individuals and states, in the present and future 
generations. See the discussion in Section 3.2.1 above. See Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 253; 
and Maggio, supra note 31, at 163.
101 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1) and Preamble, paragraph 3.
102 See the discussion above, in Section 3.3.1.
103 See the discussion in Section 3.2 above.  
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In order to ensure an equitable distribution of CDM projects among countries, the 
needs of all countries should be taken into consideration.104
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDR)105 is a key principle in the climate regime,106 and one that is 
often evoked during negotiations.107 As discussed, the principle has two elements: 
common responsibility; and differentiated responsibilities based on responsibility for 
the problem, capability to address it, and needs.108 With regard to climate change, the 
first element recognises that climate change is the common concern of all countries 
and that all countries should participate in international efforts to address the 
problem.109 According to the second element, differentiated standards are set for 
different countries or groups of countries, based on their contribution to, or 
responsibility for, the problem being addressed.110 This element also requires 
consideration of the capability of countries to address the problem when establishing 
                                               
104 This is discussed in full below in Section 3.6. 
105 See the discussion of this principle in Section 3.2.2 above. See generally, French, supra note 55; and 
Stone, supra note 57.
106 See Peel, supra note 95, at 928-929; and A.M. Halvorssen, ‘The Kyoto Protocol and developing 
countries – the clean development mechanism’ (2005) 16 CJIELP 353, 359. For an extensive 
discussion of the CBDR under the climate change regime, see Rajamani, supra note 44, at Chapter 6. 
107 See Cazorla and Toman, supra note 80, at 1-3. See also the Earth Negotiations Bulletin reports of 
the climate change negotiations. See for example, T. Akanle et al., ‘SB 30 and AWG highlights’ (June 
2009) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12415e.pdf www.iisd.ca (25/11/2010), 1-2, where the 
principle was cited by the Philippines and China. See also T. Akanle et al., ‘Twenty-eighth sessions of 
the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies, second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention, 
and fifth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol’ (June 2008) 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12375e.pdf www.iisd.ca (25/11/2010), 4 and 10; T. Akanle et al., 
‘Summary of the Bonn climate change talks’ (June 2009) 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12421e.pdf, www.iisd.ca (25/11/2010), 8 and 9; and T. Akanle et 
al., ‘Summary of the Bangkok climate change talks’ (October 2009) 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12439e.pdf, www.iisd.ca (25/11/2010), 13, 14 and 18, where the 
principle was cited several times by various countries. 
108 See the discussion in Section 3.2.2 above. 
109 See for example, UNFCCC, Article 4(1), which imposes certain obligations on all countries. See 
Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 286-287 and Stone, supra note 57, at 276-277. See also the 
discussion of the concept of the common concern of mankind below. 
110 See Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 285-287; and N.E. Bafundo, ‘Compliance with the ozone 
treaty: weak states and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility’ (2005-2006) 21 
AUILR 461. 
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commitments or obligations. Among other things, financial and technological 
capabilities, special needs and circumstances, as well as future economic development 
needs, are considered.111 In relation to climate change, there is general acceptance that 
developed countries have contributed the most to the problem – they have the greatest 
responsibility.112 In addition, these countries, because of their greater wealth and 
technological advancement, are better able to address climate change – they have 
greater capabilities.113 According to the Convention, therefore “the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.”114
Consequently, although the Convention contains general commitments for all 
countries to fulfil, it also contains additional commitments for developed countries in 
light of their historical responsibility.115 There is also differentiation among developed 
countries, with those countries that are making the transition to a market economy 
(economies in transition) being exempt from some of the financial obligations that
other developed countries have, in recognition of their lesser financial capability.116 In 
                                               
111 See Rio Declaration, Principle 6; Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 287; and Bafundo, supra note 
110, at 462-463.
112 See UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 3. Although it is generally agreed that developed countries are 
historically responsible for the current level of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, developing country 
emissions are predicted to exceed developed country emissions in the future, and in fact, some 
developing country emissions already exceed that of many developed countries. See Rogner et al., 
supra note 91, at 108; and Claussen and McNeilly, supra Chapter 2, note 67, at 3. The principle is not 
meant to be static, but dynamic, considering the situation and circumstances of countries at the relevant 
point in time, not just at the time the Convention was agreed. See for example A. Halvorssen, 
‘Common but differentiated commitments in the future climate change regime – amending the Kyoto 
Protocol to include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund’ (2007) 18 CJIELP 255, 258-260; and 
L.D. Guruswamy, ‘Climate change: the next dimension’ (1999-2000) 15 J. Land Use & Envt’l L. 341, 
343 and 363. See also note 87 above and Chapter 1, note 22 for a discussion of the mitigation actions 
developing countries are now to take on. 
113 Yamin and Depledge, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 105; and Pittock, supra Chapter 1, note 5, at 216. 
114 UNFCCC, Article 3(1). 
115 Ibid, Article 4. See also Ashton and Wang, (2003), 62.
116 See for example, UNFCCC, Article 4(3).
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addition, the Convention requires consideration of the special needs and 
circumstances of specific groups of countries, such as developing, least developed and 
small island countries.117 The Convention also provides that the extent to which 
developing countries will implement their Convention commitments will depend on 
how developed countries implement their financial and technology transfer 
commitments.118
Also, as highlighted in the CBDR discussion in Section 3.2.2 above, the CDM itself is 
an instrument of differentiation within the climate change regime. In recognition of 
their limited responsibility for the climate problem and their limited capability to 
address it, developing countries do not have emission reduction commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol. However, through the CDM, they are given the chance to 
contribute to climate change mitigation. According to Cullet, “by participating in the 
CDM, host countries can be said to take on voluntary climate change mitigation 
commitments.”119 In addition, in recognition of their need for sustainable 
development, CDM projects are required to contribute to sustainable development in 
developing countries. The CDM therefore combines all three elements of the CBDR 
principle – consideration of countries’ responsibility, capability and needs.
The CBDR principle has been discussed above, and as noted, it requires consideration 
of countries’ needs, responsibility and capability. The conclusion reached is that 
                                               
117 See Ibid, Preamble, paragraphs 19-22; and Articles 4(7) – 4(10). 
118 Ibid, Article 4(7).
119 See Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, supra note 51, at 115-116. 
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although the element of responsibility is not relevant to the CDM, the elements of 
needs and capability are relevant.120
The requirement that developed countries should take the lead in combating climate 
change and its adverse effects is an upshot of the CBDR principle. In the application 
of the principle, the differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of 
countries dictate that developed countries should take the lead in addressing climate 
change, because they are primarily responsible for the problem and are also better 
able to deal with it. As already discussed above under the CBDR principle, this has 
played out both in the form of the commitments taken on by developed countries and 
the requirement for financial support to be provided by developed countries to 
developing countries.121 For example, the Convention contains far more obligations 
for developed countries than for developing countries.122 Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
developing countries do not have any quantified emission reduction targets, whereas 
developed countries do.123 This particular principle has limited relevance to the CDM, 
except to the extent already discussed above under the CBDR principle. 
The common concern of mankind concept was first referred to in the context of 
discussions of the need to address the problem of climate change, when the UN 
General Assembly recognised climate change as a common concern of mankind, 
because “climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth.”124 The reason 
                                               
120 See the discussion in Section 3.2.2 above. This element of need is discussed in full in Section 3.6.1 
below. 
121 See Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 169. 
122 See UNFCCC, Articles 4(1) and 4(2). Article 4(1) contains general commitments for all parties, 
both developed and developing, and Article 4(2) outlines further commitments for developed countries 
alone.
123 See Protocol, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7.
124 UNGA Resolution 43/53, Paragraph 1. 
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given suggests the rationale behind the concept: the climate is important to everyone,
as climate change affects everyone, and is therefore the concern of everyone.125
The original proposal to the UN General Assembly was for the conservation of 
climate to be regarded as the common heritage of mankind126 but the common 
concern concept was adopted instead.127 Murillo states that the reasons for rejecting 
the common heritage concept were mainly fear by developing countries that the 
concept would lead to an infringement of their sovereignty and a rejection by 
developed countries of the shared benefit system of the concept.128 The common 
concern concept was adopted as preferable because it is based on the equitable 
sharing of the burdens of environmental protection, rather than of the benefits of 
exploiting common resources or environmental wealth.129 According to several 
                                               
125 See L. Glowka and others, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Gland and 
Cambridge: IUCN, 1994), 3. The concept has also being used in relation to the protection of 
biodiversity. See Biodiversity Convention, Preamble, paragraph 3. Other instruments that have applied 
this concept in some form include the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention (London) 24 January 
1959, in force 27 June 1963; 486 UN Treaty Series 157, Preamble, paragraph 1, which describes the 
conservation of the fish stocks and the rational exploitation of the fisheries of the North-East Atlantic 
Ocean and adjacent waters as of common concern. See also the UN Declaration on International 
Economic Cooperation, in particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth and Development of the 
Developing Countries (UN Doc. A/RES/S-18/3), paragraph 29, which states that the threat to the 
environment is the common concern of all and requires all countries to take effective action to protect 
and enhance the environment. As it is a relatively new concept, it does not appear to have been adopted 
or applied explicitly in any other regime. See generally Murillo, ‘Common concern of humankind and 
its implications in international environmental law’ (2008) 5 MqJICEL 133. It has however also been 
implicitly applied in some, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Convention for the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage. See J. Brunnée ‘Common areas, common heritage, and common 
concern’ in Bodansky et al., supra Chapter 2, note 63, at, 565; and Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 
15, at 128. 
126 This was the proposal of the Government of Malta. See UNGA Resolution 43/53, Preamble, 
paragraph 1. See the discussion of the common heritage of mankind concept in chapter 6.
127 See L. Horn, ‘The implications of the concept of common concern of a human kind on a human 
right to a healthy environment’ (2004) 1 MqJICEL 244. See also ‘The implications of the “common 
concern of mankind” concept on global environmental issues’ (December 1990) 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/iidh/cont/13/doc/doc27.pdf, www.juridicas.unam.mx
(National University of Mexico, 25/11/2010), 240. 
128 Murillo, supra note 125, at 138.
129 See ‘The implications of the “common concern mankind” concept on global environmental issues,’
(1990), 238-239. See also Murillo, supra note 125, at 138. However the common heritage of mankind 
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authors, the common concern concept primarily relates to the sharing of burdens, not 
of benefits.130
The concept has been applied under the climate change regime to give all countries 
the responsibility to protect the climate system.131 The Convention acknowledges that 
“the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international 
response…”132 In application of the concept, developed countries have a greater 
burden of climate protection than developing countries, based on their responsibility 
for the problem,133 although all countries are ultimately expected to actively protect 
the climate.134 The concept therefore has two elements: common responsibility or 
duty to address a problem; and apportionment of this duty based on responsibility for 
the problem. 
As explained above, in the context of the CDM, it is not relevant to talk about the 
sharing of burdens because the CDM is concerned with sharing of benefits, not of 
burdens.135 Equitable distribution of CDM projects cannot therefore be done on the 
                                                                                                                                      
concept, with its benefit-sharing element, is utilised in some regimes, such as the deep seabed regime. 
See the discussion of this concept in Section 3.5 below.
130 See K. Baslar, The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (the Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), 290; Murillo, supra note 125, at 138; Brunnée, supra note 125, at 56; 
and Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 128.
131 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1). This application of the concept is also evidenced in the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities discussed above, the element of common responsibility 
being linked to the common concern of all countries to protect the climate system.
132 Ibid, Preamble, paragraph 6. See also Rio Declaration, Principle 7, which requires countries to 
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the 
Earth's ecosystems.
133 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1), and Preamble, paragraphs 3 and 18. See also L. Horn, ‘Globalisation, 
sustainable development and the common concern of humankind’ (2007) 7 Macquarie L.J. 57-58.
134 See for example UNFCCC, Article 4(1), which contains commitments for all Parties. 
135 It is important at this point to note that although the CDM is not concerned with the sharing of 
burdens, the mechanism itself may result in substantial future burdens for developing countries. This is 
because if developing countries are required to take on binding emission reduction commitments (see 
Chapter 1, note 22 for a discussion of the steps being taking towards this), these countries may be left 
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basis of responsibility.136 The common concern concept is consequently not directly 
relevant to the CDM, except to the extent that it: provides a basis for all countries, 
including all developing countries, to participate in efforts to address climate change; 
and shows that the design of the climate change regime is based on equity and 
equitable sharing, and the CDM, as an instrument of the regime, should likewise be 
based on equity and equitable sharing. 
The Convention also recognises the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing countries and requires that these be taken into consideration. This 
principle is based on Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration, which provides that the 
special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed 
and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority.137 It is also 
regarded as an aspect of the CBDR principle.138
Many international agreements incorporate a form of this principle in order to ensure 
equity in the treatment of specific groups of countries, usually developing 
                                                                                                                                      
with no choice but to fulfil these commitments by undertaking relatively expensive mitigation actions. 
This will be the case if, through the CDM, most of the cost-effective mitigation actions have already 
been undertaken for the benefit of developed countries, leaving only the more expensive actions for 
developing countries themselves to undertake in fulfilment of any future mitigation commitments. This 
will result in developing countries bearing a greater financial mitigation cost than developed countries 
bore, as a direct result of the mitigation activities undertaken under the CDM and the fact that the CDM 
has resulted in most of the “low-hanging fruit” mitigation actions being undertaken to aid developed 
countries in the achievement of their emission reduction commitments. In recognition of this possibility 
and to prevent this situation, Cullet points out that the CDM should focus more on avoiding future 
emissions than on the cheapest mitigation opportunities. See Cullet, Differential Treatment in 
International Environmental Law, supra note 51, at 119-120. 
136 See the discussion of this point in Section 3.2.2. This conclusion would be different if the common 
heritage concept, rather than the common concern concept, had been adopted, as originally proposed. 
This is because the common heritage concept deals with the sharing of benefits. See Section 3.5.4 
below for a discussion of the common heritage concept. 
137 Rio Declaration, Principle 6. 
138 See Section 3.2.2 above for a discussion of the CBDR principle. See also French, supra note 55, at
40-42; and Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 288-289.
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countries.139 The UN Millennium Declaration recognises the obstacles faced by 
developing countries in mobilising the resources needed to finance their sustained 
development, as well as the special needs and problems of small island developing 
States (SIDS) and the least developed countries (LDCs).140 As applied under the 
climate change regime, this, for example, requires consideration of the specific needs 
and special circumstances of developing countries,141 such as their right to promote 
sustainable development,142 their need to achieve sustained economic growth and 
eradicate poverty,143 as well as their need for support with climate change education 
and training,144 and capacity building.145 The Protocol provides that developed 
countries should strive to implement policies and measures in such a way as to 
minimise adverse effects on other countries, especially developing countries.146
                                               
139 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 10 December 1982, in force 
16 November 1994; (1982) 21 ILM 1261 (UNCLOS), Preamble, paragraph 5; Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Preamble, paragraph 3; Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona) 16 February 1976, in force 12 February 1978; (1976) 
15 ILM 290, Article 11(3) (1976 Barcelona Convention); Montreal Protocol, Article 5; Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Preamble, paragraph 17; and http://www.unescap.org/LDCCU/index.asp ‘Special 
Unit on Countries with Special Needs’ (UNESCAP, 13/07/2010).
140 See UN Millennium Declaration (UN Document A/RES/55/2), Section III. The Economic and 
Social Council of the UN classifies countries as LDCs if they satisfy three criteria: a low income 
criterion, based on their gross national income per capita; a human capital status criterion, based on 
indicators of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy rate; and an economic vulnerability 
criterion, based on indicators of population size, remoteness, merchandise export concentration, share 
of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross domestic product, homelessness owing to natural 
disasters, instability of agricultural production, and instability of exports of goods and services. See 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/ ‘Criteria for identification of LDCs’ (UN Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island 
Developing States, 21/10/2010). 
141 UNFCCC, Article 3(2). 
142 Ibid, Article 3(4).
143 Ibid, Preamble, paragraph 21 and Article 4(7). 
144 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10(e). See also Decision 11/CP.8, New Delhi Work Programme on Article 6 
of the Convention, (FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1, 28 March 2003), which provides for financial and other 
support for developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS, to implement Convention Article 6 
(education, training and public awareness). 
145 See generally, Yamin and Depledge, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at Chapter 10, on the finance, 
technology and capacity building provisions of the Convention and Protocol. 
146 Kyoto Protocol, Article 2(3). 
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These general provisions could also be applied to distinguish among the needs of 
individual developing countries, rather than between developed and developing 
countries. For instance, the Convention explicitly recognises certain groups of 
developing countries as having special circumstances that should be considered. 
These include those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response 
measures.147 The specific needs and special situations of the LDCs148 are also 
specifically recognised and for instance, the COP established the LDC Fund to 
provide financial support for LDCs.149
The key element of this principle therefore is that equity requires consideration of the 
needs of the relevant groups of countries. When identifying the needs of developing 
countries, the Convention explicitly refers to the needs of all developing countries as 
opposed to those of developed countries, but also differentiates among developing 
countries. It is the latter that equitable distribution of CDM projects would require. 
For example, in relation to economic growth and poverty eradication, different 
countries are at differing stages of development and their needs in this regard vary. 
Countries such as Timor-Leste, Chad and Afghanistan are classified as LDCs because 
they have low human development150 levels and greater developmental needs, while 
                                               
147 UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 19 and Articles 4(8) and 4(10). 
148 See the definition of LDCs in note 140 above. The UN maintains a list of all LDCs. See 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ ‘Least developed countries’ (UN Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island 
Developing States, 28/07/2010).
149 Decision 7/CP.7. 
150 Human development is defined by UNDP as development that ensures peoples’ wellbeing, 
empowerment and agency, and justice. It is measured using the indicators of life expectancy, adult 
literacy, gross enrolment in education, purchasing power parity, and income. See UNDP, Human 
Development Report 2010, The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development (New York: 
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countries such as Singapore, Barbados, Qatar and the Republic of Korea (which are 
still regarded as developing countries by the Convention) are actually classified as 
having high human development levels and therefore less developmental needs.151
This is because the latter countries have relatively high life expectancy, high adult 
literacy and gross enrolment in education, as well as a decent standard of living 
measured by their gross domestic product.152 Consequently, such countries for 
example have less economic, developmental and capacity needs than the LDCs. 
Consideration of countries’ levels of needs should form part of efforts to achieve 
equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects.
The principles that Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development and also promote sustainable economic growth and development in all 
Parties, especially developing country Parties,153 are two inter-related Convention 
principles, which aim at protecting the right of countries to strive for sustainable 
economic growth and development. 
In 1986, the UN General Assembly recognised the right to development as an 
inalienable human right.154 This was reaffirmed by the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, which stated that “the right to development, as established in 
the Declaration on the Right to Development, is a universal and inalienable right and 
                                                                                                                                      
UNDP, 2010), 13 and 22. It is therefore about more than peoples’ or countries’ incomes. See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ ‘The Human Development concept’ (UNDP, 16/02/2011).
151 See ‘Human Development Report 2009 - HDI rankings’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (UNDP, 
21/10/2010). 
152 These are the indicators used by UNDP to measure countries’ human development levels. See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ ‘The Human Development concept’ (UNDP, 16/02/2011). See 
‘Human development index 2007 and its components’ 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Table_H.pdf (accessed 21/10/2010). 
153 UNFCCC, Articles 3(4) and 3(5).
154 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development (UN document A/RES/41/128), Article 1.
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an integral part of fundamental human rights.”155 Subsequently, this right has been 
recognised by many international declarations,156 including the Copenhagen 
Declaration on Social Development157 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.158 The Rio Declaration provides that the right to development 
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet the developmental and environmental needs 
of present and future generations.159
The right to development is often linked to equity160 and cited as a way of ensuring 
equity, such as through ensuring equal and adequate access to essential resources.161 It 
is also regarded as an element of sustainable development.162 No international treaty 
explicitly contains the “right to development” and the UNFCCC comes closest, by 
explicitly asserting the right to “promote sustainable development.” Sustainable 
development goes beyond economic development, and is an attempt at reconciling the 
objectives of economic development and environmental protection, aimed at ensuring 
that both are achieved in an integrated manner.163 As already highlighted in Chapter 2, 
key ideas included in the concept of sustainable development are: economic
                                               
155 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
(A/CONF.157/23), Article 10. 
156 See generally A. Sengupta, “On the theory and practice of the right to development” (2002) 24 
Human Rights Quarterly 837, 841-842. 
157 See for example paragraphs 26(j) and 29(f) of the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, 
adopted by the 1995 World Summit for Social Development (UN Document A/CONF.166/9). 
158 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by UN General Assembly 
Resolution 61/295, 13 September 2007 (UN Document A/RES/61/295), Article 2(3).
159 Rio Declaration, Principle 3. 
160 See Sengupta, supra note 156, at 846 and 850. See also page 849, where the author emphasises that, 
“the right to development implies a process with equity and justice.”
161 See for example the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, Article 8, which requires States 
to ensure “equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, 
food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.” See also 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/right/index.htm ‘Development - Right to 
development’ (Website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13/07/2010).
162 See Loibl, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 98; and Boyle and Freestone, supra note 7, at 11-12.
163 See French, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 2, 3 and 10. See also Fuentes, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at
7; and Segger and Khalfan, supra Chapter 2, note 19. For more on sustainable development, see 
Chapter 2, note 19.
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development, including meeting the needs of present and future generations; and 
environmental protection.164 The issue of the recognition of needs has already been 
highlighted several times.
The climate change regime recognises the right to promote sustainable development 
and the right to promote sustainable economic growth and development in all 
countries, especially developing countries. These rights have been implemented under 
the climate change regime in several ways. It has been implemented to give 
developing countries far fewer commitments and obligations than developed 
countries, in recognition of the fact that they (developing countries) have greater 
needs and fewer resources. It recognises their need for poverty eradication,165
increased energy resources,166 technology transfer167 and financial support,168 among 
others. The regime also makes provisions to contribute to meeting these needs, for 
example, through provisions relating to transfer of environmentally-sound technology 
and know-how,169 enabling capacity building in developing countries170 and the 
provision of financial assistance for developing countries to address climate change 
                                               
164 See also Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 252; Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 53-54; 
and Magraw and Hawke, supra Chapter 2, note 63, at 614 and 618.
165 UNFCCC, Article 4(7).
166 Ibid, Preamble, paragraph 21.
167 Ibid, Article 4(5). See also L.D. Guruswamy, ‘Energy, environment & sustainable development’ 
(2005) 8 Chapman L. Rev. 77, 101, where the author notes that commitment to sustainable 
development requires developed countries to undertake research and development on new technologies 
for producing better forms of primary energy and then transfer such technologies to developing 
countries.
168 UNFCCC, Article 4(3).
169 Ibid, Articles 4(5) and 4(7); and Kyoto Protocol, Article 11(2)(b). 
170 See for example Decision 10/CP.5, Capacity-building in developing countries (non-Annex I Parties) 
(FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1, 2 February 2000); and Decision 2/CP.7, Capacity building in developing 
countries (non-Annex I Parties) (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002). 
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issues.171 This is in order to help them achieve sustainable social and economic 
growth, while considering the possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and 
for controlling GHG emissions in general.172 The CDM is also one of the tools 
employed by the climate change regime to promote sustainable development in 
developing countries – one of the main objectives of the CDM is to assist developing 
countries to achieve sustainable development.173  
Equity under this principle therefore has two elements: recognition and consideration 
of the needs of countries; and provision of support to specific groups of countries. In 
relation to the CDM, the element of needs has already been discussed, as so far, it 
appears to be a recurring element of equity.174 With regard to the provision of support 
(which is also seen under the CBDR principle), this could for example, be interpreted 
to mean that certain categories of countries should receive support to enhance their 
participation in the CDM. Such support should for example be targeted towards 
overcoming barriers to CDM participation. This is discussed in more detail in Section 
3.6 below. 
3.3.3 The Kyoto Protocol
As explained above, the guiding principles under the Convention also apply to the 
Protocol.175 For example, the Protocol highlights that no new commitments are 
                                               
171 Such as through the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund - Decision 7/CP.7, Funding 
under the Convention (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002), as well as the Adaptation Fund –
Decision 10/CP.7, Funding under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002). 
172 See Preamble to the UNFCCC. 
173 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. See also Loibl, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 110. The CDM is a 
good example of a sustainable development tool, as it aims to promote economic development in an 
integrated manner with environmental protection (by reducing GHG emissions in developing 
countries).
174 See the discussions above in this Section and in Section 3.2.2. 
175 See Kyoto Protocol, Preamble, paragraph 4 and UNFCCC, Article 3. 
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introduced for developing countries, but that the aim is to reaffirm and advance the 
implementation of their existing Convention commitments.176 Consequently, the 
Protocol contains very few commitments for developing countries.177 This is in 
accordance with the CBDR principle which recognises the historical responsibility of 
developed countries and the development priorities of developing countries, resulting 
in the need for developed countries to take the lead in climate change mitigation 
efforts.178 The Protocol also recognises the “needs” of developing countries, and for 
example, provides that developed countries should provide new and additional 
financial resources to meet the cost borne by developing countries in implementing 
their Convention and Protocol commitments.179 In implementing Article 10, account 
should be taken of Convention Articles 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7.180 These, as discussed above, 
relate to the provision of financial resources to developing countries to implement 
their commitments. It means therefore that: the implementation of Article 10 by 
developing countries (which in essence means implementation of their Convention 
commitments, as Article 10 does not contain any new commitments) depends on 
developed countries fulfilling their financial and technology transfer commitments; 
and that account is to be taken of the fact that economic and social development, and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries. 
                                               
176 Kyoto Protocol, Article 10 (chapeau). 
177 That is, additional to those in the Convention. See also Decision 1/CP.1, Paragraph 2. 
178 See Dawson and Spannagle, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 236. See however the discussion in note 87
above for the caveat to the statement, regarding the push for some developing countries, in recognition 
of their rapidly increasing GHG emission levels, to take on mitigation commitments or actions. 
179 Kyoto Protocol, Article 11. 
180 Ibid, Article 11(1). 
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The Protocol therefore imports the principles contained in the Convention, as well as 
the conditionalities on developing country commitments.181 As already discussed, it 
requires consideration of responsibility, ability/capability and needs of the relevant 
countries or groups of countries, such as developing countries, LDCs, SIDS and those 
countries with economies in transition.
3.3.4 Conclusion
As explained above, inequity can be seen in the problem of climate change itself, 
particularly when the distribution of its cause and impacts are considered.182 In order 
to ensure that in addressing climate change, this inequity is not perpetuated, the 
principle of equity is one of the fundamental principles of the regime established to 
address climate change. Equity is factored into every aspect of the regime, from its 
ultimate objective,183 to the activities to achieve this objective,184 the financing of 
these activities185 and participation in governance.186 Both in theory and practice 
therefore, the Convention and Protocol aim to ensure equity among countries.187
                                               
181 See Yamin and Depledge, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 93-94. 
182 See the discussion in Section 3.3.1 above. 
183 Article 2 of the Convention provides that stabilising GHG concentrations at safe levels should be 
achieved in such a way as not to threaten food production and economic development. 
184 As discussed above, Article 2 of the Convention, as well as the Kyoto Protocol, contain 
differentiated commitments for different groups of countries. 
185 See for example UNFCCC, Article 4(7).
186 Participation in the various governance mechanisms is based on equity. For example, the COP 
Presidency rotates among the five UN regional groupings, and the COP Bureau consists of 11 members 
– 2 each from the 5 regional groupings and one from SIDS. See the Draft Rules of Procedure of the 
Conference of the Parties and its Subsidiary Bodies (FCCC/CP/1996/2), Rule 22(1). Additionally, it is 
practice to have one member from a developed country and one from a developing country to be the 
chair and vice-chair of the various subsidiary bodies under the Convention. Also when establishing 
contact groups during negotiating sessions, the contact groups are usually co-chaired by a 
representative each from a developed and developing country Party. See for example the list of contact 
group chairs for the November 2009 Ad hoc Working Group sessions, in T. Akanle et al., ‘Summary of 
the Barcelona climate change talks’ (November 2009) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12447e.pdf
(25/11/2010). See also Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 173; and UNFCCC, Article 11(2). 
187 See generally, H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), Chapters 1-3. 
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Equity as applied by the climate change regime requires consideration of certain 
elements. As already identified above, these are: responsibility, capability, needs, and 
the provision of support (financial, technological and capacity building support). This 
application of equity is the same as that found in international law generally.188 The
climate change regime does not identify what the equitable outcome should be, but 
establishes what should be considered in order to ensure an equitable outcome, and 
the outcome varies depending on the elements and issues being considered. For 
example, in consideration of countries’ responsibility for climate change, developed 
countries are required to take the lead in mitigating climate change and have 
quantified emission reduction commitments, whereas developing countries generally 
have no such commitments.189 In consideration of developing countries’ needs and 
responsibility (or rather, lack of responsibility), they have far fewer commitments 
than developed countries and are to receive financial and technological support from 
developed countries to implement the commitments that they do have.190
These elements should also apply, to the extent possible, to the CDM, which is an 
instrument of the regime and therefore must be implemented according to the 
principles and rules of the regime.191 As underscored,192 the CDM itself embodies 
these elements of equity in the CDM regime, as it combines a recognition of 
developing countries’ limited responsibility for the climate change problem and 
limited capability to address it, with their need for sustainable development, and is an 
                                               
188 See Section 3.2 which concludes that equity in international law requires consideration of countries’ 
responsibility, capability and needs, and also requires the giving of preferential treatment or support to 
specific groups of countries.
189 See UNFCCC, Article 3(1) and Article 10, and Kyoto Protocol, Annex B. 
190 UNFCCC, Article 4(7) and Kyoto Protocol, Article 10. 
191 See Introduction (Section 3.1) above. 
192 On page 63 above. 
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instrument for achieving sustainable development in developing countries, among 
other things, through the provision of financial, technological and capacity building 
support.193As already discussed,194 although the element of responsibility is relevant 
within the general framework of the CDM (as an instrument of differentiation 
between developed and developing countries), it is not directly relevant to equitable 
geographic distribution within the CDM195 because it relates in particular to the 
sharing of burdens, whereas the issue of distribution of projects within CDM relates to 
the sharing of benefits, not burdens, among developing countries.196 The other 
elements (needs, capability and preferential treatment/support) however can be 
applied to the CDM, and have been discussed to some extent above.197 They will be 
considered in full below, in the context of the elements and factors of equitable
geographic distribution of CDM projects.
3.4 Theories of Distributive Justice
Next, this chapter examines theories of distributive justice, which are theories that aim
to determine how goods and/or services should be distributed or allocated in society 
in a way that can be regarded as just or fair.198 The aim of equitable geographic 
                                               
193 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for a discussion of the benefits the CDM is intended to provide to 
developing countries. 
194 In Section 3.2.2 (on the CBDR principle) and in Section 3.3.2 above. 
195 See the discussion on pages 49-51 and at note 136 above. 
196 See note 135 above for an explanation of the fact that the CDM may result in substantial future 
burdens for developing countries, although this fact is not directly relevant to the issue of the 
geographic distribution of projects under the CDM. 
197 In Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.3.2. 
198 Distributive justice aims to determine the appropriate distribution of goods. See M.D.A. Freeman, 
Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 523. Principles of 
distributive justice are normative principles designed to guide the allocation of the benefits and burdens 
of economic activity. See ‘Distributive Justice’ by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ (Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, 12/03/2010). 
See also Roemer, supra Chapter 1, note 48; J. Arthur, and W.H. Shaw (eds.), Justice and Economic 
Distribution 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991). See also C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and 
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distribution of CDM projects is similar – to achieve equity in the distribution of CDM 
projects among developing countries.199 Because the goal of equitable geographic 
distribution is to achieve equity in the distribution of CDM projects, this section 
focuses on theories of distributive justice.200 This section: identifies relevant lessons 
or principles from the theories; assesses their applicability to the issue of equitable 
geographic distribution of CDM projects; and uses them (the lessons or principles) to 
attempt to define equitable geographic distribution. The theories of distributive justice 
examined below are: egalitarianism, the difference principle and utilitarianism.
There are, of course, other theories of distributive justice apart from those examined 
below. However, this thesis only examines these three theories for two reasons. The 
first is that many of the other theories of distributive justice are variations or 
expansions of these ones, and are generally fundamentally based on these three 
theories. For example, egalitarianism advocates equality or an equal distribution. 
However, egalitarians disagree about what should be the object (“currency”) of equal 
distribution, or what form of equality is the most important. There are consequently 
many variations of the theory based, inter alia, on the object of equal distribution.201
                                                                                                                                      
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 152, where the author states that 
the role of a principle of distributive justice is to specify what a fair distribution of benefits and burdens 
would be like. 
199 See Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 2. As noted in Section 3.2 above, “equity” is used as a 
synonym for “justice” or “fairness.” 
200 Other theories of justice include theories of retributive justice, restorative justice and corrective 
justice. This chapter only considers theories of distributive justice, because it is these theories that are 
relevant to the issue of equitable distribution of CDM projects (because of the distributive element). 
201 For example, Ronald Dworkin argues for “equality of resources,” which he distinguishes from 
“equality of welfare.” See R. Dowrkin, ‘What is equality? Part 1: equality of welfare’ in M. Hajdin, 
(ed.) The Notion of Equality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 120. Bruce Landesman advocates 
“maximum equal wellbeing.” See B.M. Landesman, ‘Egalitarianism’ in Hajdin, Ibid, at 207-236.
Thomas Nagel presents his own view of egalitarianism, which is a combination of the personal (the 
consideration by an individual of his personal desires, experiences and interests) and impersonal 
(individuals occupy when they abstract themselves from their identities and positions in the world) 
standpoints. See T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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The second reason is that there are very many theories, including variations on 
theories, and it is beyond the scope and capability of this thesis to examine every 
single theory. In selecting the theories to examine, this thesis was guided by 
jurisprudence texts as to the main theories of distributive justice, specifically those 
that are both widely discussed and on which many of the other theories are based. 
These three theories (egalitarianism, the difference principle and utilitarianism) 
appear to be among the main theories, and consequently, it is these theories that this 
thesis examines.
3.4.1 Egalitarianism
Egalitarianism advocates allocating equal shares of the object of distribution (for 
example, benefits or resources) to all members of society.202 As a distributive justice 
theory, it advocates equal distribution of goods or services – equality of resources, 
income or wealth.203 With regard to this thesis, the issue is whether the distribution of 
CDM projects among developing countries should be based on equality. 
Strict equality in the distribution of CDM projects would mean that all countries 
should receive the same number of projects or generate the same amount of CERs, 
irrespective of countries’ circumstances or differences among countries. For example, 
as at October 2010, there were 2463 registered CDM projects which were expected to 
                                               
202 See F.E. Oppenheim, ‘Egalitarianism as a descriptive concept’ in L.P. Pojman and R. Westmoreland 
(eds) Equality: Selected Readings (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 56, where 
he refers to this as “the most extreme view.” See generally, R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: Equality in 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Hajdin supra note 201; Nagel, 
supra note 201; J. Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos’ (1998) 27 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 97; and J. Gross, Fair Shares for All (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
203 See A. Mason, (ed.), Ideals of Equality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 3. See also Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy which states that egalitarianism is used in modern democratic societies to 
refer to a position that favours greater equality of income and wealth than currently exists.
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generate about 390 million CERs annually,204 and there were 123 eligible developing 
countries.205 Equality would require that each developing country should host about 
20 projects each or produce about 3.2 million CERs annually (2463 and 390 million 
divided by 123). This seems like an attractive outcome, particularly considering the 
current distribution, where one country (China) hosts over 1000 projects, some 
countries host several hundred, and many countries host none at all. Nevertheless, 
there is a problem with this solution, which is that strict equality does not allow 
consideration of relevant differences among countries.
Applying this to the CDM, a key relevant difference is countries’ differing CDM 
hosting potential. One of the objectives of the CDM is to achieve cost-effective GHG 
emission reductions through projects in developing countries.206 Countries have 
different emission reduction potentials because they have different GHG emission 
levels. They therefore cannot all host the same number of projects or generate the 
same amount of CERs. Due to their low GHG emission levels, not all countries can 
host 20 CDM projects or generate 3.2 million CERs annually. For example, about 32 
countries produce less than 3 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions annually.
207
It is therefore impossible for them to reduce their emissions by 3.2 million, when they
produce less than this, even assuming that all of a country’s GHG emissions can be 
optimally reduced through the CDM. 
One way around this would be for countries with low levels of GHG emissions to 
increase their GHG emissions so that that they can host as many projects as those with 
                                               
204 See CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
205 See the discussion of participation requirements and eligible countries in Chapter 2. 
206 See the discussion of the objectives of the CDM, in Chapter 2. 
207 Statistics correct as of November 2010. See CAIT Version 7.0 (2005 data). See also Appendix B 
and the analysis of countries’ emission reduction potential in Chapter 4. 
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higher GHG emission levels. However, this option is contrary to the CDM’s objective 
of reducing GHG emissions and so is not an appropriate solution.208
Another solution is to require that countries can only host the number of projects 
which the countries with the lowest GHG emission reduction potential can host (say 
10, for example). This would ensure equality, as no country would be allowed to host 
more projects than any other country, even if they have the potential to do so.209 For 
example, assume that the CDM has the potential to reduce 30% of global emissions 
and increase countries’ sustainable development levels by 20% if no limit is placed on 
the number of projects countries can host, but can only reduce global emissions by 
10% and increase countries’ sustainable development levels by 5% if all countries are 
limited to hosting a specific number of projects. Choosing the latter option would be 
counter-productive as it would limit the ability of the CDM to achieve its objectives 
of sustainable development and GHG emission reductions.
For these reasons, strict equality would not be a suitable theory to apply to the CDM. 
It is therefore not surprising that the CDM Executive Board has noted that equitable 
distribution of projects does not mean equal distribution of projects.210
3.4.2 The Difference Principle
In his Theory of Justice, John Rawls proposes principles of justice to determine how 
rights and duties in society are to be assigned, and how benefits and burdens of social 
                                               
208 See the discussion of the CDM and its objectives in Chapter 2. 
209 This raises the issue of levelling down, for example, by destroying the eyes of the sighted to create 
equality with those who are blind. See D. Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’ (1997) 10 Ratio 202, 211. 
210 See the 2005-2006 Annual Report of the Executive Board to the COP/MOP, Addendum 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/4/Add.1 (Part I), 7 November 2006), Annex III, Paragraph 4(b).
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cooperation should be distributed.211 He asserts that to determine the distribution of 
income and wealth, the difference principle, combined with fair equality of 
opportunity, would be chosen.212 These distributive principles provide that social and 
economic inequalities are only just if they are to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged (the difference principle) and attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.213
The difference principle states that the higher expectations of those better off are just 
only if these expectations result in an improvement in the expectations of the worst 
off members of society.214 Social and economic inequalities are only allowed if they 
are for the benefit, or to the advantage, of the least advantaged in society,215 and 
where lowering the expectations of the better off would also lower the expectations of 
the worst off. 
Rawls explains further that under this principle, there are two cases. The first is where 
the expectations of the worst off are maximised, such that no changes in the 
expectations of those better off could improve the lot of the worst off. This, according 
                                               
211 See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 4, 11 and 54. In 
setting out his theory of justice, Rawls outlines (on page 84) the principles that, according to him, 
would apply to the “basic structure of society,” and govern the assignment of rights and duties and 
regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages. See generally on Rawls’s theory of justice, 
N. Daniels, (ed.) Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1989); B. Barry, Theories of Justice (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), Chapters 
5 and 6; and Freeman, supra note 198, at 523-534.
212 This is Rawls’s second principle of justice. The first principle, which refers to the basic liberties of 
society, provides for equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties. However, since this thesis is 
concerned with distributive justice, it is Rawls’s second principle, that concerning the distribution of 
income and wealth, that this thesis focuses on. Ibid, at 61. 
213 Ibid, at 302. See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 6-7, where Rawls affirms his principles of justice, together with the basis of 
the arguments for them. He clarifies that the revisions in Political Liberalism do not affect this feature 
of his conception of justice. 
214 Rawls, note 211, at 75. See generally, Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to 
Legal Theory, 256-261; J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997), 282-
287.
215 See Harris, note 214, at 284-285. 
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to Rawls, is the best arrangement, a perfectly just scheme. The second case is where 
this maximum has not been reached. The expectations of those better off contribute to 
those of the worst off, but there is still room for improvement, such that even higher 
expectations for the better off would raise the expectations of the worst off. If the 
expectations of the better off were reduced, the expectations of the worst off would 
likewise drop. This scheme, according to Rawls, is just, but is not the best 
arrangement. An unjust scheme is one where higher expectations are excessive and do 
not contribute to the expectations of the worst off, such that if these higher 
expectations of the better off were reduced, the expectations of the worst off would be 
improved. The difference principle therefore seeks to maximise the situation of the 
worst off in society and advocates equality unless inequality is to the benefit of the 
worst off.216
To determine the applicability of the difference principle to the CDM, the first 
consideration is whether the principle can be applied at the international level, which 
is the level at which the CDM operates. This is because in developing his theory and 
principles of justice, Rawls specifies that his principles of justice do not characterise 
international relations217 and his international theory of justice does not include an 
egalitarian distributive component.218 Rather, he says that “peoples” with decent 
political institutions have a duty of assistance to help burdened societies manage their 
affairs reasonably and rationally, in order to enable them to establish decent 
                                               
216 Rawls, note 211, at 79. 
217 Ibid, at 7-8. See also J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 116, where he inter alia rejects the attempts made by some authors to extend the difference 
principle to the international level. See also pages 85-86. Rawls, Law of Peoples is a revision of his 
lecture, published in S. Shute and S. Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures
(New York: Basic, 1993), 41-82. See also Beitz, note 198, at 132. 
218 See T.W. Pogge, ‘An egalitarian law of peoples’ (1994) 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs 195. 
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institutions. Once all societies have been able to establish either a liberal or a decent 
regime, the aim of the law of peoples would be fully achieved.219
Some authors however believe that Rawls’s principles of justice, although developed 
for the domestic level, can also be applied at the global level, and have attempted to 
extend the principles to the international level.220 These authors believe that at the 
international level, just as at the domestic level, there is need for distributive justice. 
For example, Pogge and Beitz adopt and extend Rawls’s difference principle to 
international relations.221 Barry also questions why representatives of countries, in the 
original position and choosing principles of justice, would be silent on the issue of 
international redistribution of income. He queries why these representatives would not 
choose a global difference principle to govern the relations between countries.222  
One of the reasons for Rawls’s rejection of a global distributive principle is that he 
believes that social cooperation, which is the source of the benefits and burdens to be 
distributed, only exists within national boundaries.223 Beitz disagrees with this 
assumption and asserts that “national boundaries cannot be regarded as the outer 
limits of social cooperation.”224 This opinion is shared by Scanlon.225 This research 
supports these views that the difference principle can be applied beyond domestic 
public systems, particularly in the case of the CDM.
                                               
219 See Rawls, note 217, at 5. 
220 See for example, T.W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Chapter 6; 
Pogge, supra note 218, at 195; Beitz, note 198; B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical 
Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973); and T.M. Scanlon, ‘Rawls’ Theory of Justice’ (1972-1973) 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1020.
221 See Beitz, supra note 198, at 127-160; and Pogge, supra note 220, at Chapter 6.
222 See Barry, supra note 211, at 188-189.
223 See Rawls, supra note 211, at 4 and 457; and Beitz, note 198, at 132-133. 
224 Beitz, note 198, at 143-150. 
225 See Scanlon, supra note 220, at 1066-1067.
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The CDM is an international scheme, in which members of the international society 
participate, and it is not restricted to social cooperation within national boundaries. In 
fact, it cannot be said to apply to social cooperation within national boundaries 
because CDM projects are either implemented by a country (or its entities) in another 
country, or, in the case of unilateral CDM projects, the product of the projects (CERs) 
is sold to another country or entities within another country.226 Inherently, the CDM is 
a scheme of international cooperation and for it to achieve its objectives, it must, and 
does, extend beyond national boundaries. Therefore, Rawls’s objection against a 
global distributive justice on the basis that social cooperation only exists within 
national boundaries does not apply in the case of the CDM. Even beyond the CDM, 
Rawls’s view of social cooperation only existing within national boundaries is one 
that is rapidly becoming outdated. This is because there is increasing international 
social cooperation, with countries, for instance, cooperating to achieve environmental 
and developmental objectives. The climate change regime contains examples of this, 
such as the various financial and capacity building mechanisms established by the 
regime, which involve some countries (usually developed countries) providing some 
form of assistance, such as financial and capacity building support to other countries 
(usually developing countries), with the aim both of mitigating climate change and 
contributing to sustainable development in these other countries.227 Another example 
is the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund, which was established to assist 
developing country parties to the Montreal Protocol to comply with the control 
                                               
226 See the discussion of the CDM and its operation in Chapter 2.
227 See the discussion of the assistance provided by developed countries to developing countries in
Section 3.3.2 above.  
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measures of the Protocol. The Fund is replenished by contributions from developed 
countries.228
Beitz also discusses another reason for applying Rawls’s principles of justice at the 
global level. This is the fact that the principles are deemed to be those that would be 
chosen by persons in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance. Behind this 
veil, these persons are ignorant of their citizenship, generation, social status and so 
on.229 There is no reason to assume that they would be aware of the fact that they are 
members of a particular national society, choosing principles of justice for that 
society. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the principles of justice chosen 
by these persons would change if the scope of the original position is widened to 
include the world as a whole. Beitz concludes that if the difference principle would be 
chosen in the domestic original position, it would also be chosen in the global original 
position.230 This thesis accepts Beitz’s justification that Rawls’s difference principle 
can be applied at the international level, and will attempt to apply it to the CDM to see 
if it would contribute to understanding of the meaning of equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects.
Secondly, there is a need to define, for the purposes of the CDM, the terms used in the 
difference principle. Rawls provides two possibilities for the meaning of the worst off 
in society, affirming that either possibility would do. One possibility would be to 
choose a particular social position (such as that of the unskilled worker) and classify 
as worst off, all those with the average income of this position or less. The second 
                                               
228 See http://www.multilateralfund.org/ ‘Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol’ (Multilateral Fund, 25/03/2011). See also the discussion in note 56 above. 
229 See Rawls, supra note 211, at 11–19. 
230 See Beitz, supra note 198, at 151.
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possibility is to classify persons according to their relative income and wealth, and so 
for example, all those with less than half of the median income and wealth can be 
regarded as the worst off in society.231 For both of these, “income/wealth” is used as 
the means of classifying people as worst off or better off. This (income or wealth) can 
be defined under the CDM in one of two ways - it could be used to refer to
development levels or to number of CDM projects. Applying the former definition (to 
Rawls’s two options for defining the worst off in society) would mean that the worst 
off are those countries with lower than a specific level of human development (for 
example the LDCs)232 or those countries whose human development level is less than 
half of the median. Applying the latter would mean that the worst off are those 
countries with less than a specific number of CDM projects (10 projects, for 
example), or those countries with fewer than half of the median number of projects 
hosted by countries. 
The second appears to be the more appropriate application of Rawls’s difference 
principle in the context of the CDM. Rawls, in outlining his principle of distribution, 
was concerned with the distribution of the “primary social goods” (rights and 
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth) as a means to an end, rather 
than with the outcome of the use of such goods (that is, the “satisfactions” derived 
from their use). He leaves it up to people to determine how to use these goods to 
satisfy their interests.233 Under the CDM, the “means” can be regarded as the CDM 
                                               
231 Rawls, supra note 211, at 98. 
232 LDCs are defined as countries with low income, low human capital status and economic 
vulnerability. See the definition of LDCs in note 140 and the description of “human development” in 
note 150 above. 
233 See Rawls, supra note 211, at 92-93. See also Davies and Holdcroft, Jurisprudence: Texts and 
Commentary, Commentary (London: Butterworths, 1991), 279.
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projects themselves and the “end” as the GHG emission reductions and the 
sustainable development such projects would produce. Consequently applying 
Rawls’s interpretation to the CDM, the worst off countries should be defined in terms 
of the “means” (CDM projects) available to them, rather than in terms of their “end” 
(emission reductions and sustainable development). 
Therefore, as suggested by Rawls, a particular position could be chosen and those in 
or below this position could then be regarded as the worst off. For example, the worst 
off countries could be taken to be those that currently host 10 or fewer CDM 
projects.234 There are 123 eligible countries but only 19 host more than 10 projects.235
There are therefore 104 countries that qualify as the worst off in this scenario.236
The other option (Rawls’s second possibility) would be to categorise those countries 
that host less than half of the median number of projects as the worst off. Currently, 
69 countries host a total of 2463 projects.237 The median number of projects is 3.238
Half of the median is 1.5 and this can be rounded up or down (to 2 or 1), as it is not 
possible to host 1.5 projects. This would mean any country hosting less than 1 or 2 
projects would qualify as the worst off, and those hosting 3 or more projects would be 
                                               
234 Rawls acknowledges the difficulty of avoiding arbitrariness in selecting the worst off group. See 
Rawls, supra note 211, at 98. 
235 Statistics correct as at October 2010. See CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010.  
236 As already noted, any number can be chosen as the cut-off point. A higher number could be chosen 
and this would reduce the number of countries that would fall in the worst off category.
237 Data correct as at October 2010. See CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010.
238 The statistical median of a list of numbers is obtained by sorting the list according to value (highest 
to lowest or lowest to highest) and selecting the middle number. To obtain the statistical median of 
CDM projects, the numbers of projects hosted by all countries are arranged in order (from 1003, which 
is the largest number of projects hosted, to 1, which is the lowest number of projects hosted by any 
country). 69 countries host CDM projects and the statistical median is represented by the number of 
projects hosted by the 35th country (which is the middle number), in the numerical listing of all projects 
(taking account of both the numbers of projects and the numbers of countries). Using this process, the 
statistical median is determined to be 3, which is the number of projects hosted by the 35th country in 
the list of countries hosting projects, sorted according to the number of projects hosted by all countries.  
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regarded as better off. Taking for example, the number of countries hosting less than 2 
projects (34 countries) and the number that do not host any project at all (54 
countries), 88 countries would be regarded as worst off. However, it is difficult to see 
how a country that hosts 3 projects out of a total of 2463 can be regarded as “better 
off,” particularly considering that some, also regarded as “better off,” host several 
hundred projects. The first option (selecting a cut-off point) is therefore probably the 
better option.
With regard to the meaning of “expectations” (Rawls talks about inequalities that 
increase the expectations of the worst off being permissible), this can be taken to 
mean CDM project hosting expectations or potential. Countries expect to be able to 
participate in the CDM and to enjoy the benefits that CDM projects are meant to 
produce. Reducing a country’s expectations could mean reducing the number of 
projects that country could expect to host239 and increasing a country’s expectations 
could mean increasing the number of projects hosted by the country. 
Rawls specifies that where the basic structure is unjust, his principles of justice would 
authorise changes that may lower the expectations of the better off.240 It appears 
therefore to be acceptable to reduce the expectations of the better off in order to 
increase those of the worst off.241 In addition, changes that would improve the 
                                               
239 Once a CDM project is registered to a country, it cannot be taken away from that country, so in this 
sense, reducing a country’s expectations cannot be taken to mean reducing the number of projects the 
country currently hosts. It can however be taken to mean reducing the number of projects the country 
could expect to host, so if it could host 300 more projects, then this number could be reduced to benefit 
the worst off. 
240 See Rawls, note 211, at 79-80.
241 Rawls attempts to answer the question of why the better off would accept their expectations being 
lowered to benefit the least advantaged. He explains that: the wellbeing of each member of society 
depends on a scheme of social cooperation; without this scheme, no one would have a satisfactory life; 
members of society would only be willing to participate in the scheme if its terms are reasonable; the 
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expectations of the worst off without increasing or reducing the expectations of the 
better off are presumably also acceptable.242 However the reverse is not the case. 
Where changes would increase the expectations of the better off without reducing the 
expectations of the worst off, such changes are still not justified unless they actually 
increase the expectations of the worst off. This is because the difference principle 
specifies that inequalities are only acceptable where they are to the benefit of the 
worst off. Rawls’s “perfectly just” scheme is one under which the expectations of the 
worst off have been maximised and no changes to the expectations of the better off 
can improve the situation of the worst off.243 Presumably at this point, no 
improvements in the situation of the better off would be allowed because this would 
result in inequalities that do not improve the situation of the worst off.
Applying this to the CDM would mean that CDM projects should be distributed 
equally among all developing countries and an unequal distribution would only be 
acceptable if this directly benefits those that currently host less than a specific number 
of projects (say 10 projects, or 3 projects if the second possibility for the meaning of 
worst off is applied). All future CDM projects must be hosted by countries considered 
the “worst off” unless having a better off country hosting more projects would benefit 
the worst off countries. The implications of this are that investors can invest in the 
worst off countries without investing in the better off and they can also invest in the 
better off countries, but only if this would benefit the worst off. Where there is a 
choice to be made between a better off country and a worst off country, the worst off 
                                                                                                                                      
difference principle seems to be a fair basis on which the better off can expect the worst off to 
participate in this scheme of social cooperation which is necessary for the wellbeing of all. Ibid, at 103.
242 Ibid, at 80.
243 Ibid, at 76. 
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country should be selected. However, the difference principle does not permit 
increasing the number of projects in the better off countries without increasing the 
number of projects in the worst off countries. This would probably be the case even 
where no further improvements can be made to the situation of the worst off, that is, 
when these countries have completely achieved their CDM hosting potential. 
This means that once the expectations of the worst off have been maximised and they 
cannot host any more projects because of a lack of emission reduction potential to do 
so, the difference principle would not permit any more CDM projects to be registered. 
This is because any more CDM projects in the better off countries would not result in 
more projects in the worst off, as the expectations of the latter would have already 
been maximised. The question that must be answered is whether this would contribute 
to the objectives of the CDM.
The answer to this question has to be no. If no projects can be registered under the 
CDM, then the CDM cannot fulfil all of its objectives. This is because the CDM can 
only fulfil its objectives through the CDM projects, specifically, through the 
sustainable development benefits and GHG emission reductions the projects provide. 
A lack of projects would mean that GHG emission reductions and contributions to 
sustainable development are not being made through the CDM, and adopting a 
definition of equitable distribution that stops the registration of CDM projects is 
therefore not appropriate. 
It could perhaps be argued that even when the CDM hosting potential of the worst off 
countries has been maximised, the difference principle would allow the better off 
countries to continue to host projects. This is because it can be considered that the 
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continuation of the CDM would still benefit the worst off countries through the GHG
emission reductions achieved, because all countries benefit equally from GHG 
emission reductions, irrespective of where these are achieved. However, it is noted 
above that in terms of defining the “worst off” and their expectations, the currency to 
be considered is either countries’ levels of human development or number of CDM 
projects, and the conclusion is that the latter, that is, the number of CDM projects, 
appears to be more appropriate. Consequently, the benefit to the worst off countries 
has to be in terms of increasing the number of CDM projects they host. Increasing
countries’ expectations means increasing the number of projects hosted by countries, 
and reducing their expectations means reducing the number of projects countries 
could host. Even if the latter option of countries’ human development levels was 
chosen, this would mean that the benefit to countries has to be in terms of improving 
their human development level. Consequently, the general benefit of global GHG 
emission reductions that all countries will enjoy probably does not count as sufficient 
benefit in the context of the CDM.  
It is also difficult to see how investing in projects in one country would benefit 
another country, apart from in terms of reducing global GHG emissions, which would 
benefit all countries. Take, for instance, a situation where an investor wants to invest 
in two CDM projects and it would be more cost-effective and less risky to invest in 
one of the better off countries, for instance because the country has a better 
investment environment.244 Such an investor could decide to have one project in a 
better off country (because this country is more attractive investment-wise) and one in 
                                               
244 See the discussion of the barriers to equitable distribution discussed in Chapter 5. Such barriers 
include lack of CDM capacity and the poor investment climate in some countries. 
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a worst off country (because theoretically, the investor cannot invest in a better off 
country without investing in a worst off country). However the investment in the 
better off country does not directly benefit the worst off country – it only benefits the 
investor and the better off country. This would not be acceptable under the difference 
principle, as improving the expectations of the better off must be because such 
improvements would likewise improve the expectations of the worst off countries.
What this would mean for the CDM is that only those countries that qualify as the 
“worst off” can continue to host projects as an increase in the projects hosted by the 
better off would not benefit them. Would this be acceptable to countries? It is difficult 
to state conclusively what countries would accept or reject. However, it is unlikely 
that the developing countries that already host a substantial amount of CDM projects 
and that have the potential to host many more projects would be willing to completely 
give up this opportunity, even if they accept that they cannot host quite as many 
projects as they would like to. Developed countries could also be reluctant to accept 
such a specific requirement as to which countries they can invest in, as well as a de 
facto prohibition on investing in certain countries. However, even if countries 
accepted this limitation, as discussed above, the difference principle would not 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CDM. 
In this sense, the difference principle cannot be directly applied to the CDM without 
defeating the purpose of the CDM. Under the CDM, inequalities that do not benefit 
the worst off should be allowed, especially if the expectations of the worst off have 
been maximised and their situation cannot be further improved. Such inequalities 
would not arise as a result of reducing the expectations of others, but as a result of 
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countries’ varying GHG emission reduction potential. Rawls appears to be of the view 
that changes that do not improve the expectations of the worst off are not allowed, 
even if these changes do not reduce their expectations and even when their situation 
has been maximised (this is his perfectly just scheme). Under the CDM, countries that 
are considered “better off” must be allowed to continue to host projects, provided in 
so doing, it does not prevent the worst off from exploiting their own potential (which 
would be the case when the expectations of the worst off have been maximised). 
Otherwise, it would mean ultimately restricting the number of projects these countries 
can host, and this would not benefit any country, and would not help achieve the 
CDM objectives of achieving GHG emission reductions and contributing to 
sustainable development in developing countries.  
3.4.3 Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism asserts that the right action is that which produces the greatest overall 
balance of pleasure over pain – the action which most maximises pleasure and 
minimises pain.245 According to the theory, “actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.”246 Bentham puts it thus: “the greatest happiness of the greatest number is 
                                               
245 See R. Crisp (ed.), J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
11. See generally, J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener: 
Batoche Books, 2000) (originally published 1781); J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (London: Electric Book 
Company, 2001); Freeman, supra note 198; Harris, supra note 214, at 41-43; Wacks, supra note 214, 
at 244-253; Davies and Holdcroft, supra note 233, at 205-229; and H.R. West, The Blackwell Guide to 
Mill’s Utilitarianism (Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
246 Crisp, note 245, at 55. 
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the foundation of morals and legislation.”247 The theory therefore aims to maximise 
pleasure and minimise pain.248
Utilitarian morality asserts that humans have the power to sacrifice their own greatest 
good for the good of others, and that this sacrifice is good only when it increases the 
sum total of happiness (it is not intrinsically good).249 The happiness which 
utilitarianism refers to is not the happiness of the particular individual, but that of all 
concerned. To achieve this, the theory requires that laws and social arrangements 
should, as far as possible, harmonise the happiness or interest of every individual with 
that of the whole, and then teach every individual that their interest is closely 
associated with the good of the whole. The result of this would be that no individual 
would think that any action opposed to the general good could bring him happiness, 
and the desire to promote the general good would motivate every individual action.250
A main criticism of utilitarianism is the lack of weight that it gives to individual 
happiness.251 It is collective happiness that matters and utilitarianism would require an 
individual to sacrifice his own happiness if this would increase the overall collective 
happiness.252 This, according to Davies and Holdcroft, goes against general intuitions 
about justice,253 and, according to Hart, may “license the grossest form of inequality 
                                               
247 See ‘Extracts from Bentham's Commonplace Book’ in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. X 
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), 142. See generally Bentham, supra note 245, at Chapter 1.
248 Crisp, supra note 245, at 59. 
249 Ibid, at 63-64.
250 Ibid, at 64.
251 The principle faces other criticisms, which will not be examined here, as they do not directly affect 
its application to the CDM. These criticisms include the emphasis on pleasure as the standard of 
evaluation, with the objections including the fact that not all pleasures are right (such as the pleasure 
from committing crime); the difficulty involved in calculating consequences or measuring pleasure and 
pain; and the ability to manipulate peoples’ pleasure and pain. See Davies and Holdcroft, supra note 
233, at 213-219; and Wacks, supra note 214, at 247-248.
252 See Davies and Holdcroft, supra note 233, at 219.
253 Ibid, at 221.
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in the actual treatment of individuals if that is required to maximize aggregate or 
average welfare.”254 For utilitarians, a situation where a few enjoy great happiness 
while many suffer is as good as a situation in which happiness is more equally 
distributed.255
As a theory of distributive justice, utilitarianism holds that the just distribution is the 
one that results in the greatest overall utility. In particular, with reference to society, 
utilitarianism dictates that the only just distribution is one which maximises the 
happiness of society as a whole.256 A particular distribution is unjust where a different 
distribution of resources would increase the overall happiness of society. Applying 
this to the CDM, happiness or pleasure can be taken to mean the objectives of the 
CDM, that is, GHG emission reduction and sustainable development, both of which 
are obtained through CDM projects. Consequently, according to the utilitarian theory, 
distributive justice under the CDM would be realised when the greatest number of 
countries achieve the greatest GHG emission reductions and sustainable development. 
The objectives of GHG emission reductions and sustainable development are 
achieved through the CDM projects and it is not possible for example, to talk about 
distributing emission reductions or distributing sustainable development among 
countries, except by talking about distributing projects, as both can only be achieved 
through, and depend on, the distribution of CDM projects. Hence, in the context of the 
CDM, it makes better sense to talk of the greatest number of projects. For utilitarians 
therefore, the issue would be which distribution would result in the greatest number of 
countries hosting the largest number of projects possible. To achieve this result, 
                                               
254 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Between utility and rights’ (1979) 78 Colum L. Rev. 828, 830. 
255 Ibid.
256 See Harris, supra note 214, at 41.
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individual countries would be required to sacrifice their opportunity to host projects if 
this would help increase the total number of projects – the objective is maximisation 
of happiness (CDM projects).257
The question then is whether applying utilitarianism to the CDM would contribute to 
achieving the objectives of the CDM and help resolve the apparent inequity of the 
current distribution of projects. In relation to the CDM’s objective of reducing GHG 
emissions, utilitarianism would almost definitely help achieve this goal. This is 
because this theory seeks to maximise the happiness of society as a whole. Climate 
change is a global problem, and the underlying principle of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
flexibility mechanisms is that wherever GHG emission reductions take place, such 
reductions have the same effect on the environment.258 Therefore, maximising GHG 
emission reductions is good for the environment, irrespective of where (that is, in 
which country) such reductions occur. But GHG emission reductions cannot be the 
only consideration.
The CDM is also meant to contribute to sustainable development in developing 
countries.259 As highlighted in Chapter 2, one of the reasons why developing countries 
accepted the CDM was its explicit reference and their expectation that it would 
contribute to sustainable development in all developing countries, not just in a few.260
The expectation from the CDM is not that just a few countries will enjoy the 
sustainable development benefits it provides – that is the precise problem that the goal 
of equitable geographic distribution is currently trying to address. The utilitarian 
                                               
257 Ibid, at 40.
258 See Yamin and Depledge, supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 136.
259 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. 
260 See Michaelowa, supra Chapter 2, note 62; Sari and Meyers, supra Chapter 2, note 61, at 2, 5 and 
11; Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 522 and 536; and Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 22. 
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theory will not contribute to the sustainable development objective of the CDM, at 
least not in the way it was intended to. Rather, it is likely to reinforce the status quo. 
This is because the theory focuses on society (the international community) as a 
whole, not on individual countries, and countries are in fact to forgo benefits or make 
sacrifices for the good of society. This would obviously be to the disadvantage of 
such countries (that have to forgo CDM hosting). It also would not necessarily fulfil 
the CDM’s objective of contributing to sustainable development in developing 
countries generally, especially if the countries that benefit from this are the countries 
that are already dominating the CDM market, or if the benefits of the CDM or CDM 
projects keep going to the same countries because the projects have greater overall 
utility in such countries. 
In conclusion, as noted in Chapter 2, the aim of equitable geographic distribution of 
projects is to ensure that all countries are able to benefit from the CDM, not just a few 
countries. To require some countries to sacrifice their opportunity to host projects in 
order that other countries may host more projects, would not contribute to this aim. 
The end result of applying utilitarianism to the CDM might in fact be a reinforcement 
of the status quo, which has already been deemed inequitable. As Hart stated, it may 
actually end up permitting gross inequality.261
3.4.5 Conclusion
Although the theories of distributive justice examined above may have their 
advantages and attractions, problems arise when an attempt is made to apply them to
the distribution of CDM projects. This is because applying these theories to the CDM 
                                               
261 See Hart, supra note 254, at 830. 
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would not contribute to achieving its objectives, and in the case of egalitarianism for 
example, could actually frustrate the purpose of the CDM. 
Egalitarianism cannot be applied to the CDM because it requires that all countries, 
regardless of their circumstances (particularly their GHG emission reduction 
potential), should host the same number of CDM projects or generate the same 
amount of CERs. This cannot be achieved without limiting the ability of the CDM to 
achieve its objectives. This is because this solution would either require countries 
with limited potential to increase their GHG emission levels in order to host as many 
projects as those with greater potential or it would require limiting the CDM hosting 
of those with greater potential. Likewise, the difference principle cannot be applied to 
the CDM without limiting its ability to achieve its objectives. The end result of 
applying the difference principle to the CDM would be similar to the effect of 
applying egalitarianism. Once countries considered the worst off have fulfilled their 
emission reduction potential, the difference principle would not permit the registration 
of any more CDM projects. This would be the case even if other countries still have 
the potential to host more CDM projects. Finally, utilitarianism cannot be applied to 
the CDM because it requires individual countries to sacrifice their opportunity to host 
projects, irrespective of their situation – whether they are well off or badly off. This is 
not in accordance with the goal of equitable distribution which, inter alia, seeks to 
ensure that all developing countries have the opportunity to participate in the CDM. In 
addition, it would not contribute to the CDM’s goal of contributing to sustainable 
development in all countries, as ultimately, it could limit CDM hosting, together with 
the sustainable development benefits it produces, to just a few countries. 
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Having determined that none of the theories of distributive justice can be applied 
directly to the CDM, the next section continues the search for the meaning of 
equitable geographic distribution under the CDM. It examines the approach to 
achieving distributive justice in international law, to determine if there are lessons that 
can be learned to contribute to understanding of the meaning of equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects.
3.5 Distributive Justice in International Law
This section continues the search for a definition of equitable geographic distribution 
of CDM projects by examining efforts to achieve distributive justice in practice. 
Specifically, the section undertakes an analysis of various international regimes that 
aim to achieve equity in the distribution of a resource or benefit. The expectation is 
that their application of distributive justice will contribute to the understanding of the 
meaning of equitable distribution under the CDM. At the end of this section, a 
conclusion is drawn regarding what distributive justice means in international law and 
what it might mean for the CDM. This section examines the law of the sea regime, 
specifically the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the fisheries regime, as well 
as the international watercourses regime. In addition, the moon and deep seabed 
regimes are also examined, because these two regimes aim to achieve equity through 
the application of the common heritage of mankind concept. This concept, with its 
benefits sharing element, are analysed through these two regimes, which are the only 
two regimes in which the concept is applied.262 These regimes (delimitation of 
                                               
262 Although the moon and the deep seabed are the only two areas that have been explicitly declared to 
be the common heritage of mankind, some elements of the common heritage concept are contained in 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
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maritime boundaries, fisheries, international watercourses, moon and deep seabed 
regimes) are examined because they are the international regimes that aim to achieve 
equity in the distribution of a benefit or resource.
3.5.1 The Law of the Sea Regime
The international law of the sea is the law that governs states’ dealings in relation to 
the international marine environment and its resources.263 This law is found in a range 
of instruments, including global and regional treaties, as well as soft law 
instruments.264 Examples of global treaties are the 1958 Geneva Conventions,265 the 
                                                                                                                                      
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (London, Moscow, Washington) 27 January 1967, in 
force 10 October 1967; 610 UN Treaty Series 205 (Outer Space Treaty). These elements include non-
appropriation (Article II) and exclusive peaceful use (Article IV). The Outer Space Treaty does not 
contain explicit reference to the sharing of benefits element of the common heritage concept. The 
closest provision is that which states that, “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries...” The 
Outer Space Treaty therefore does not go as far as explicitly designating these areas as the common 
heritage of mankind nor does it require the resources from the exploration and use of these areas to be 
[equitably] shared. See generally, C.Q. Christol, ‘The common heritage of mankind provision in the 
1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies’ (1980) 14 
International Law 429; G.C. Raclin, ‘From ice to ether: the adoption of a regime to govern resource 
exploitation in outer space’ (1986) 7 Nw. J. Int’ L. & Bus. 727; and M.V. White, ‘Common heritage of 
mankind: an assessment’ (1982) 14 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 509. See also S. Coffey, ‘Establishing a 
legal framework for property rights to natural resources in outer space’ (2009) 14 Case W. Res. J. Int’l 
L. 119, 125-127. The concept is also reflected, to a very small degree, in the legal framework for the 
protection of the Antarctic region. See R. Wolfrum, ‘The principle of the common heritage of 
mankind’ (1983) 43 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 312, 313.
263 See R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999), 1, 6-25. See generally R. Dupuy and D. Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the New Law of the 
Sea (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991); E.D. Brown, The International 
Law of the Sea (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); and D. Freestone, et al. (eds), The Law of the Sea: 
Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
264 Examples of soft law instruments on the law of the sea are: the UN Environment Programme’s 
Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
(Decision 13/18/II of the Governing Council of UNEP, Of 24 May 1985), reproduced in (1985) 14 
Environmental Policy and Law 77-83; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN’s Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/v9878e/v9878e00.pdf, 
www.fao.org (FAO, 17/02/2011);  and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP)’s Washington 
Declaration and Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-based Activities (UNEP(OCA)/LBA/IG.2/7, 5 December 1995), reproduced in (1996) 26 
Environmental Policy and Law 37-51.
265 The 1958 Geneva Conventions are: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(Geneva) 29 April 1958, in force 10 September 1964; 516 UN Treaty Series 205 (1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention); the Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva) 29 April 1958, in force 10 June 1964; 
499 UN Treaty Series 311 (1958 Continental Shelf Convention); the Convention on the High Seas 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,266 the Agreement on the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks,267 the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,268 the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships269 and the International 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter.270 There are also regional treaties such as the Convention on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,271 the Convention for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution,272 the Kuwait Regional Convention for 
Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,273 the 
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and 
                                                                                                                                      
(Geneva) 29 April 1958, in force 30 September 1962; 450 UN Treaty Series 82 (1958 High Seas 
Convention); and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas (Geneva) 29 April 1958, in force 20 March 1966; 559 UN Treaty Series 285 (1958 High Seas 
Fishing and Conservation Convention).
266 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 10 December 1982, in force 16 
November 1994; (1982) 21 ILM 1261 (UNCLOS). 
267 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New York) 4 December 1995, in force 11 December 2001; 
(1995) 34 ILM 1542 (1995 Fish Stocks Agreement). 
268 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (New York) 28 July 1994, in force 28 July 1996; (1994) 33 ILM 1311 
(the 1994 Implementing Agreement). 
269 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (London) 2 November 1973, not 
in force; (1973) 12 ILM 1319, as modified by the Protocol Relating to the Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (London) 17 February 1978, in force 2 October 1983; (1978) 17 
ILM 246. 
270 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter (London), 13 November 1972,  in force 30 August 1975; (1972) 11 ILM 1294.
271 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki) 22 
March 1974, in force 3 May 1980; (1974) 13 ILM 546. 
272 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona) 16 February 
1976, in force 12 February 1978; (1976) 15 ILM 290; revised in Barcelona, Spain, 9-10 June 1995, as 
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean (not yet in force). 
273 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution (Kuwait) 23 April 1978, in force 1 July 1979; 1140 UN Treaty Series 133.
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Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region,274 and Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East 
Pacific.275 In addition to these treaties and instruments, the law of the sea is also found 
in customary international law.276 In examining this regime, particular attention will 
be paid to decisions of international courts and tribunals, where available. This is 
because, in most cases, the courts and tribunals have been required to actually apply 
the principles in practice, rather than merely stating what the principles are without 
showing their practical applicability, as is often the case with conventions.277
As this thesis focuses on distributive justice, the relevant aspects of the law of the sea
regime are those aspects in which resources are required to be shared or where there 
are competing claims to resources. Where there are no competing claims, for 
example, where a state’s claim to one of its maritime zones goes unchallenged 
because it does not encroach into the area another state intends or desires to claim as 
part of its own maritime zone, there is no relevant problem to be examined. 
Consequently, the aspects of the regime that will be examined are: the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries; and transboundary, straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
In addition, the deep seabed regime is examined in the section (Section 3.5.4)
analysing the common heritage of mankind concept. 
                                               
274 Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the West and Central African Region (Abidjan) 23 March 1981, in force 5 August 
1984; (1981) 20 ILM 746. 
275 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East 
Pacific (Lima) 12 November 1981, in force 19 May 1986; IELMT 981:85. 
276 UNCLOS is binding on states that have ratified it, currently numbering about 159 (see UNCLOS 
website - http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm.) For those states that are not party to UNCLOS or 
the 1958 Conventions, the law that governs their activities is customary international law. See Shaw, 
supra note 33, at 490-493; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 24-25.
277 As described above, many of the provisions relating to equitable distribution of the CDM merely 
refer to the goal of equitable distribution, without specifying what it means or how it can be achieved 
or applied in practice. The advantage of decisions of courts and tribunals is that they usually relate to 
practical situations. 
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3.5.2 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries
This relates to the delimitation or determination of international boundaries for 
maritime zones, in particular, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)278
and the continental shelf.279 Here, there are competing claims which give rise to the 
need to delimit or determine maritime boundaries, which happens specifically in 
situations where states’ maritime zones overlap because of close geographic 
proximity.280
With regard to this aspect of the law of the sea, the courts and tribunals have said that,
in delimiting maritime boundaries, they are not involved in the sharing out of 
something held in undivided shares, or in “awarding a just and equitable share of a
previously undelimited area.”281 By this, they mean that they are not engaged in an 
exercise of distributive justice,282 drawing a distinction between delimitation and 
apportionment, the former being what they are engaged in.283 Nevertheless, some of 
the rules or principles applied in this area could be useful in this research. For 
example, according to Ahnish, the aim of the law on delimitation has always been to 
                                               
278 The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, and extends to a maximum of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Within the 
EEZ, the coastal state enjoys extensive rights in relation to natural resources and related to 
jurisdictional rights, and third nations enjoy the freedom of navigation, overflight by aircraft and the 
laying of cables and pipelines. See UNCLOS, Articles 55 and 57. See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 
263, at 160.
279 See G. J. Tanja, The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries (Deventer: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990). For more on the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf, 
see UNCLOS, Parts II, V and VI, respectively. 
280 See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 181.
281 See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) ICJ. Reports 3, 22, also quoted in Maritime 
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway) (1993) ICJ Reports 
38, 66-67; and the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (1985) 
ICJ Reports 13, 40 (Libya v Malta).
282 See Libya v Malta, 40, where the Court says one of the equitable principles of maritime delimitation 
is that “there can be no question of distributive justice.” See also Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, 
at 187.
283 See A.G. Oude Elferink, The Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: A Case Study of the Russian 
Federation (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).
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establish principles and rules that ensure an equitable delimitation in accordance with 
the geography of the area concerned.284 Many of the provisions relating to 
delimitation, which will be examined below, refer to the ultimate aim of reaching an 
equitable outcome.285
The focus here is on delimitation by courts and tribunals, when the relevant countries
have been unable to reach an agreement regarding how to delimit their overlapping 
maritime zones. This is because countries are of course free to negotiate to reach 
agreement on delimitation and such agreements do not necessarily have to follow the 
rules of the courts and tribunals, and could, for example, be based on politically-
motivated compromises. For example, with regard to delimitation of the territorial 
sea, UNCLOS provides the rule that should apply in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary,286 and for the continental shelf, UNCLOS provides that delimitation 
shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law.287
Regarding the territorial sea, UNCLOS provides that the limit of the breadth of the 
territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from the baseline288 of the coastal State, which has 
                                               
284 See F.A. Ahnish, The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 31. See also Churchill and Lowe, supra 
note 263, at 183. 
285 For example, in the Arbitration Tribunal Award for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary 
Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (1986) 25 ILM 251 (Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Arbitration), the 
tribunal stated that all delimitations had to be measured against the single goal of reaching an equitable 
solution in the circumstances of the case. See also Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. 
Ukraine) (2009) ICJ Reports 61, 100, where the Court points out that the object of delimitation is to 
achieve a delimitation that is equitable (not an equal apportionment of maritime areas).
286 UNCLOS, Article 15 (emphasis added). See also N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 228-229. The same 
rule was also provided by the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 12. See below for the rules for 
delimitation of the territorial sea.
287 See UNCLOS, Article 83(1).
288 A baseline is the line from which the outer limits of a State’s maritime zones are measured. It also 
forms the boundary between the internal waters and territorial sea, as the waters on the landward side 
of the baseline are the coastal nation’s internal waters. See Klein, supra note 286, at 228.
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the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to this limit.289 Where there is 
a need to delimit the territorial seas of two countries, where they overlap for example, 
the general rule is the equidistance-special circumstances rule.290 The Territorial Sea 
Convention and UNCLOS prohibit countries, in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary, from extending their territorial seas beyond the “median line every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines...”291 These treaties then 
provide further that this rule does not apply where it is necessary by reason of special 
circumstances, such as historic title, to delimit the territorial seas in a different way. 
The equidistance/special circumstances is now regarded as part of customary law and 
applicable to those countries not party to either the Territorial Sea Convention or 
UNCLOS. For example, in Qatar v Bahrain, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
noting that this equidistance/special circumstances rule is found in both the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention and UNCLOS, stated that the rule “is to be regarded as 
having a customary character.”292
The special circumstances to be considered could include circumstances such as 
historic use, the presence of offshore islands, past conduct of the parties in the area, 
interests of third states and exceptional coastal configurations.293 These circumstances 
generally deal with practical or geographical circumstances, and are therefore not 
                                               
289 UNCLOS, Article 3. Even for countries that are not party to UNCLOS, the 12 mile limit has been 
established in international law. See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 80. 
290 See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 182-183.
291 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 12 and UNCLOS, Article 15. This suggests also that 
countries can reach agreement to the contrary if they so desire. 
292 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain)
(2001) ICJ Reports 40, 94. See also Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between 
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (2007) ICJ Reports 1. 
293 See Nicaragua v Honduras, 89. See generally, University of Cambridge, International Boundary 
Cases: The Continental Shelf vol. 1 (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1992), 46-47; and 
Ahnish, supra note 284, at Chapter 2. See for example, the Beagle Channel Arbitration (1978) 17 ILM 
634, where the Arbitral Tribunal considered coastal configuration and convenience. 
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applicable or relevant to the issue of equitable geographic distribution of CDM 
projects. However, the general idea is still relevant. If the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule were to be applied to the CDM and equitable geographic 
distribution, this would mean that the distribution of CDM projects among countries 
should be equal or as equal as possible, except where special circumstances require 
otherwise. The special circumstances could include the fact that countries have 
different levels of GHG emissions and therefore cannot host the same number of 
projects.294 Applying this rule would result in a more equitable outcome than the 
current situation, where one country hosts over 1000 projects and many countries host 
none at all.295 Beyond this however, the rules concerning the delimitation of the 
territorial sea are not directly applicable to the CDM. 
With regard to the continental shelf, the customary law is discussed in decisions of 
the ICJ and arbitral tribunals. Most of the cases decided by these have in common the 
reference to equitable principles or an equitable basis.296 In the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, the ICJ held that the principles and rules of international law applicable to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the parties included delimitation 
“by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the 
relevant circumstances...”297 In the Jan Mayen case, the ICJ, referring to the 
provisions of Articles 73 and 84 of UNCLOS on achieving an “equitable solution,” 
                                               
294 See the discussion of the theory of egalitarianism in Section 3.4.1 above. As highlighted, equitable 
distribution of CDM projects cannot be taken to mean equal distribution, without defeating the purpose 
of the CDM. 
295 See Table 3 in Chapter 4 for the current distribution of CDM projects.
296 See generally B. Kwiatkowska, ‘Equitable maritime boundary delimitation – a legal perspective’ in 
H. Caminos ed., Law of the Sea (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 241. 
297 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Reports 3, 53 (North Sea Continental Shelf). See also the Case 
Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway) (1993) ICJ Reports 38 (the Jan Mayen case); and Libya v Malta.
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said that, ‘that statement of an “equitable solution” as the aim of any delimitation 
process reflects the requirements of customary law as regards the delimitation both of 
continental shelf and of exclusive economic zones.’298 The Court of Arbitration in the 
Anglo-French arbitration refers to the equidistance-special circumstances rule as 
giving expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, determination of the 
continental shelf should be on equitable principles.299
The rule under the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention is that the boundary of the 
continental shelf should be determined by agreement between the concerned States, 
but in the absence of this and unless otherwise justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary was to be determined by applying the equidistance principle.300 This 
reference to special circumstances was in recognition of the fact that in some 
situations, application of the equidistance principle would result in an inequitable
outcome.301 The rule under UNCLOS is that delimitation should be done by 
agreement on the basis of international law, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.302 Countries are therefore encouraged to negotiate an agreement that is 
equitable. In making this provision, UNCLOS does not identify how parties should 
                                               
298 See the Jan Mayen case, 59. 
299 See the report of the Court of Arbitration in the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK, France) Vol. 
XVIII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 45 (Anglo-French arbitration). See also Kwiatkowska, 
supra note 296, at 289; Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263; N. Dundua, ‘Delimitation of maritime 
boundaries between adjacent states’ (2006-2007) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/dundua_0
607_georgia.pdf, www.un.org (UN, 25/11/2010), 32, 53-82; L.M. Alexander ‘Baseline delimitations 
and maritime boundaries’ (1983) 23 VJIL 503, 524-533, for forms of modified equidistant boundaries; 
and S.H. Amin, ‘Customary rules of delimitation of the continental shelf: the Gulf States practice’ 
(1979-1980) 11 JMLC 509, 509.
300 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Article 6. 
301 See Anglo-French arbitration, 45; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 184. 
302 UNCLOS, Article 83(1). 
109
reach an equitable solution, or what should be taken into consideration.303 However, 
the courts have held that the rule is the “equitable principles/relevant circumstances” 
rule, which according to the courts, is very similar to the “equidistance/special 
circumstances” rule. In applying this rule, the courts usually (although not 
necessarily) start by drawing an equidistance line and then consider whether there are 
factors requiring adjustment of the line in order to achieve an equitable outcome.304
On the other hand, the court could decide that the equidistance method should not be 
used due to special circumstances, and apply another method entirely (that is, rather 
than drawing then adjusting an equidistance line).305 In all three situations (that is, 
customary law, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and UNCLOS), the ultimate 
aim is reaching an equitable outcome.306
The Court, in Libya v Malta, has identified some of the equitable principles applicable 
to maritime delimitation cases. These include: the principle that there is to be no 
question of refashioning geography or compensating for the inequalities of nature; the 
principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other, 
that is, that the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf off its 
coasts to the full extent authorised by international law in the relevant circumstances; 
                                               
303 See Libya v Malta, 30, where the Court notes that the Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is 
silent as to the method to be followed to achieve it. See also Kwiatkowska, supra note 296, at 291; 
Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 191-192; Dundua, supra note 299, at 33.
304 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Cameroon v Nigeria) (2002) ICJ Reports 303, 441-442; Libya v 
Malta, 47; and the Jan Mayen case, 61-62. See also Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 187.  
305 See Nicaragua v Honduras, 90, where the Court held that there were special circumstances, such as 
the geographical configuration of the coast, which precluded the application of the equidistance 
principle. See also pages 86 and 90, where the Court notes that there may be factors which make 
application of the equidistance method inappropriate, but that the method remains the general rule. 
306 See Alexander, (1982-1983), 522; and Kwiatkowska, (2001), 243-244. See also Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (1982) ICJ Reports 18 (Tunisia v Libya), where the Court held that 
the principles and rules of international law applicable for the delimitation included delimitation in 
accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all relevant circumstances. 
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the principle of respect due to all such relevant circumstances; the principle that 
although all States are equal before the law and are entitled to equal treatment, equity 
does not necessarily imply equality, nor does it seek to make equal what nature has 
made unequal; and the principle that there can be no question of distributive justice.307
Just as with the delimitation of the territorial sea, for the continental shelf, the 
circumstances that the Court has found relevant to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf include proportionality, coastal configurations and the presence of islands.308
These mainly relate to geographic features and can therefore not be applied to the 
CDM. In addition, the courts have been clear in stating that economic factors, 
particularly the relative wealth of the countries involved, are not relevant 
considerations in the process of delimitation, and do not constitute special 
circumstances.309
The rule for delimitation of the EEZ and/or fishing zone is practically identical to 
that regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the Gulf of Maine case, 
which concerned both the continental shelf and EEZ, the ICJ specified that general 
international law in every maritime delimitation requires that delimitation: must be 
effected by agreement between the concerned States or (where agreement cannot be 
reached) by recourse to a third Party; and must be based on the application of 
equitable criteria and the use of practical methods to achieve an equitable result.310
                                               
307 Libya v Malta, 39-40. 
308 See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 54; Libya v Malta, 57; Tunisia v Libya, 88; and the 
Anglo-French arbitration. See also Freestone et al, supra note 263, at 150-159; and Dundua, supra 
note 299, at 53-68. 
309 See Libya v Malta, 41; Tunisia v Libya, 77; the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States of America) (1984) ICJ Reports 246 
(Gulf of Maine case); and the Guinea/Guinea Bissau arbitration. See also Ahnish, supra note 284, at
90-92. 
310 Gulf of Maine case, 299-300 (emphasis author’s).
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The Court stated that this rule represents the fundamental norm of customary 
international law governing maritime delimitation.311 Likewise, the provision of 
UNCLOS regarding delimitation of the EEZ is identical to that regarding the 
continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, the delimitation of the EEZ should be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, to reach an equitable 
solution.312 In most cases regarding delimitation of the EEZ, the ICJ has been asked to 
delimit a single maritime boundary for both the EEZ and the continental shelf, rather 
than just for the EEZ alone.313 In these cases, the Court has also followed its decision 
in the Gulf of Maine case. For example, in the Guinea/Guinea Bissau arbitration, the 
Tribunal stated that the objective of finding an equitable solution is a rule of 
international law, and that the application of this rule requires the consideration of 
factors and the application of methods, which the Tribunal can select.314
Applying these equitable rules to the CDM, achieving an equitable outcome would 
require consideration of relevant factors, although the exact factors to be considered 
will differ from those relevant to maritime border delimitation cases. In maritime 
border delimitation, relevant factors include the presence of islands and the 
configuration of coasts, which have no direct relevance to the issue of equitable 
distribution of CDM projects, because they relate mainly to the physical and/or 
geographic characteristics of maritime zones. The ICJ has also pointed out that the 
aim of delimitation is not to change geography or refashion nature, and that 
                                               
311 Ibid, at 300. 
312 UNCLOS, Article 74(1).
313 Such as in Nicaragua v Honduras, Cameroon v Nigeria, the Gulf of Maine case, the Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau arbitration and the Case Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and 
the French Republic (1992) 31 ILM 1149 (Canada/France arbitration). See also Churchill and Lowe, 
supra note 263, at 192. 
314 Guinea/Guinea Bissau arbitration, 289. 
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delimitation therefore does not aim at addressing natural inequalities.315 Likewise in 
the case of the CDM, the goal of equity should not be that all countries should host 
the same number of projects irrespective of the reality of their circumstances and 
limitations in this regard (such as limited emission reduction potential), as this would 
likely result in limiting the number of projects that can be hosted by the latter group of 
countries.316 As noted by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
delimitation is not a question of “rendering the situation of a State with an extensive 
coastline similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline.”317 Extending this to the 
CDM suggests that equitable distribution of CDM projects does not necessarily mean 
equal distribution – relevant factors should be taken into consideration when 
ascertaining how projects should be distributed. 
3.5.3 Fisheries Regime
The international law of fisheries addresses various issues relating to fisheries, 
particularly their conservation and management.318 Article 56(1) of UNCLOS 
provides that the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, 
exploiting, conserving and managing the living and non-living natural resources in its 
EEZ, which includes fish stocks.319 This section focuses on the aspect of the fisheries 
                                               
315 See for example, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 49-50; and Libya v Malta, 39-40. See also 
Oude Elferink, supra note 283, at 51; and Ahnish, supra note 284, at 86-87.
316 See Section 3.4.1 above for a discussion of the problems of trying to achieve an equal distribution of 
CDM projects. 
317In Libya v Malta, 39, the Court identifies the principles of equity, including the principle that 
although all States are equal before the law and are entitled to equal treatment, equity does not 
necessarily imply equality. 
318 See generally Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 558-589; Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 
Chapter 13; and UNCLOS, Articles 61-63.
319 See Shaw, supra note 33, at 556; E. Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 20-24; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 289. 
These sovereign rights are subject to some duties, particularly conservation and management duties. 
See UNCLOS, Articles 61(1), 61(3) and 62(1). 
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regime that deals with access to resources. In this regard, one important characteristic 
of fish is their migratory nature. Many fish stocks migrate between the EEZs of 
several countries, and/or between EEZs and the high seas. The fish stocks that 
straddle the EEZs of two or more countries, or that cross the EEZ boundary of one 
country into the EEZ of another or several countries, are usually referred to as shared, 
joint or transboundary stocks (hereinafter referred to as transboundary stocks). Fish 
stocks that straddle or move across a country’s EEZ boundary and the adjacent high 
seas, or that are to be found both within a country’s EEZ and the adjacent high seas, 
are called straddling stocks.320 Although “highly migratory” fish stocks are not
defined in UNCLOS, it does contain an agreed list of species considered highly 
migratory.321 These generally have a wide geographic distribution both within and 
outside countries’ EEZs, and migrate through high seas and countries’ EEZs during 
their life cycle.322 The focus of this section is on access to these transboundary, 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, in particular, how access is allocated or 
determined.323
                                               
320 See M. Hayashi, ‘The Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks under the LOS Convention’ 
(1993) 8 IJMCL 245; Shaw, supra note 33, at 557; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 294. 
See also G. Munro et al., ‘The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: legal and economic 
aspects’ (2004) ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5438e/y5438e00.pdf, www.fao.org (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN, 25/11/2010), 3, where shared stocks are defined to include stocks 
occurring both within and outside EEZs, so covering both transboundary and straddling stocks as 
defined above. Article 63 of UNCLOS refers to: “stocks occurring within the exclusive economic 
zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond 
and adjacent to it.” 
321 See UNCLOS, Annex I.  
322 See M. Christopherson, ‘Toward a rational harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species’ (1996) 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 357, 363. See also 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/13686/en ‘Highly migratory species’ (FAO, 18/02/2011). 
323 Other aspects of the fisheries regime include access to fish stocks in the internal waters, territorial 
seas, exclusive fishing zone and continental shelf of countries. These aspects of the fisheries regime are 
not considered here because the coastal states have sovereignty and sovereign rights over these areas 
and the resources found therein. See Article 2 of UNCLOS on internal waters and territorial seas, 
Article 56 on the exclusive economic zone, and Article 77 on the continental shelf. Article 77(2) for 
example provides that the coastal states’ rights are exclusive in the sense that if it does not explore the 
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The issue of transboundary fish stocks is dealt with in Article 63(1) of UNCLOS, 
which requires States to agree on measures necessary for the conservation and 
development of such transboundary stocks. This provision relates to conservation and 
development, rather than access to, and distribution of, these stocks. It does not go 
further to provide specific guidance on what the necessary measures could be. Unlike 
with straddling and highly migratory stocks (examined below), there is no 
international agreement specifically geared towards regulating, conserving or 
managing transboundary fish stocks, possibly because such stocks tend to migrate 
between the EEZs of specific countries and consequently, it is these countries that 
have the primary responsibility for such stocks.
There are, however, bilateral and regional agreements which regulate certain 
transboundary stocks. Most of these agreements relate, as provided for in UNCLOS, 
to the conservation and management of transboundary resources, and generally 
contain procedural provisions regarding agreement to cooperate in the conservation 
and management of transboundary fish stocks.324 Even though some of these 
agreements contain provisions relating to access to transboundary stocks, these 
agreements will not be examined here. This is because, as in the case of maritime 
boundary delimitation, countries are generally free to agree on access rules and these 
are not necessarily motivated by desire to achieve distributive equity.325 For instance, 
they could be, and some appear to be, based on politically-motivated reasons. 
                                                                                                                                      
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the 
express consent of the coastal state. These aspects therefore do not give rise to issues of distribution of 
resources. See Hey (ed.), supra note 319, at 20-22; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 289.
324 See Hayashi, supra note 320. 
325 See the discussion of maritime boundary delimitation in Section 3.5.2 above.
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For example, although the basis of the access rules agreed by Australia and Papua 
New Guinea in the Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the 
Two Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters326 is
not explicitly defined, Burmester has suggested that the motivation is political.327
While the Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina concerning the Rio de la Plata and 
the Corresponding Maritime Boundary,328 specifies that the basis for the distribution 
of the fish resources in the common fishing zone should be equity and 
proportionality,329 the Joint Technical Commission appears to use historical catch 
volumes as the basis for its decisions.330 This is also one of the factors considered 
under the EU Common Fisheries Policy.331 The bases of distribution in the Agreement 
between Norway and Iceland on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions332 appear to 
                                               
326 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea Concerning Sovereignty 
and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres 
Strait, and Related Matters, Australian Treaty Series 1985 No 4, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1985/4.html (Australasian Legal Information Institute, 
02/08/2010) (Torres Strait Treaty). 
327 See H. Burmester, ‘The Torres Strait Treaty: ocean boundary delimitation by agreement’ (1982) 76 
AJIL 321, 345. 
328 Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina concerning the Rio de la Plata and the Corresponding 
Maritime Boundary (Montevideo), 19 November 1973, in force 12 February 1974; 1295 UN Treaty 
Series 293 (Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina) 
329 Ibid, Article 74. 
330 See L. del Castillo-Laborde, The Río De La Plata and its Maritime Front Legal Regime (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Brill Academic, 2008), 271.
331 See M. Holden, The Common Fisheries Policy: Origin, Evaluation and Future (Oxford: Fishing 
News Books, 1994), 43. It is difficult to conclusively state that the use of historic catches is equitable 
or inequitable, as this would largely depend on how equitable the original distribution was. The basing 
of current distribution on historical distribution cannot be said to be equitable or inequitable one way or 
another, as it would be necessary to examine whether the historical distribution is equitable or 
inequitable to reach a conclusion. For example, if a distribution method for CDM projects is agreed on, 
this method can continue to be used indefinitely and can be said to be equitable, not because of its 
continued use, but because the distribution method itself is equitable.  
332 Agreement between Norway and Iceland on Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions (Reykjavik), 
28 May 1980, in force 13 June 1980; 2124 UN Treaty Series 225 (Norway and Iceland Fisheries 
Agreement).
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be political and socio-economic.333 For this reason (the freedom of countries to base 
their agreements on various reasons, including political reasons), and for the reason 
that no general rule of distributive justice can be deduced from these agreements,334
bilateral and regional fisheries agreements are not further examined. 
Regarding straddling stocks, as noted above, these are fish stocks that straddle 
countries’ EEZs and the high seas. The rule regarding fishing in the EEZ is that the 
coastal country has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the 
natural resources, including fisheries, in its EEZ.335 For the high seas however, the 
rule is “freedom of the high seas” which means that all countries have the right to fish 
in the high seas, subject to obligations to conserve and cooperate.336 The obligation to 
cooperate is two-fold: cooperation in the conservation of the living resources in the 
high seas; and cooperation in the conservation of straddling stocks in the high seas. 
This suggests that access to straddling stocks occurring in the high seas is only subject 
to rules regarding conservation of these resources, and does not, for example, include 
the objective of ensuring that countries have equitable access to the resources.
UNCLOS requires the coastal State and the States fishing for straddling stocks in the 
high seas337 to seek agreement on measures necessary to conserve these stocks.338
This provision is quite succinct and does not outline what types of measures should be 
                                               
333 See E.L. Richardson, ‘Jan Mayen in perspective’ (1988) 82 AJIL 443, 450-451; and C. Archer and 
P. Joenniemi, The Nordic Peace (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 117.
334 The agreements highlighted here have different distributive bases. 
335 UNCLOS, Article 56. 
336 UNCLOS, Articles 63(2), 87, 116-120. See also J.A. de Yturriaga, ‘Fishing in the high seas: from 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) 3 African YBIL 151.
337 The provision talks about “an area beyond and adjacent to the zone,” which actually means the high 
seas. See Shaw, supra note 33, at 557; and Munro et al., supra note 320, at 3. 
338 UNCLOS, Article 63(2). 
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established. To provide further guidance for the treatment of straddling stocks,339 the 
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement was adopted.340 The objective of the Agreement is to 
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks341 and it aims inter alia to prevent over-fishing.342 The Fish 
Stocks Agreement outlines the general principles that should govern the conservation 
and management of straddling fish stocks. These include provisions requiring 
countries to: apply the precautionary approach; take conservation and preservation 
measures; promote and conduct scientific research and develop appropriate 
technologies in support of fishery conservation and management; share information; 
protect biodiversity; and minimise pollution and waste.343 These principles generally 
relate to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks,344 rather than 
ensuring access to such stocks,345 and are therefore not relevant to equitable 
distribution of the CDM, which is concerned with access and distribution. 
                                               
339 Munro et al., supra note 320, at 37. 
340 Supra note 267.
341 Ibid, Article 2. 
342 See generally G. Vigneron, ‘The most recent efforts in the international community to implement 
the 1995 United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement’ (1998) 10 CJIELP 225, 227; H.L. Brown, 
‘United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: An analysis 
of international environmental law and the conference's final agreement (1996-1997) 21 Vt. L. Rev.
547; and Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 285-287.
343 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 5. 
344 See generally, S. Oda, ‘Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ and 
M. Hayashi, ‘The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention’ both in Caminos, supra note 
296.
345 Access is governed by UNCLOS, Articles 87, 116-120, and the general rule is that all countries 
have access to the resources of the high seas, although there are some exemptions to this general rule. 
For example, Article 8(4) of the Fish Stocks Agreement provides that where a subregional or regional 
fisheries management organisation or arrangement establishes conservation and management measures, 
only countries which are members of such organisations or participants of such arrangements, or which 
agree to apply the conservation and management measures, shall have access to the fishery resources to 
which the measures apply. However, the issue of access is not further taken up, that is, regarding those 
countries that do have access, the Agreement does not attempt to determine how the access should be 
distributed among them. 
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Consequently, the straddling stocks regime will not be examined further as it is not 
directly relevant to equitable distribution of CDM projects.
The rules with regard to highly migratory stocks are similar to those for straddling 
stocks. UNCLOS requires fishing nations to cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organisations to ensure conservation, and promote optimum utilisation, 
of highly migratory stocks. It provides further that in regions where there are no 
appropriate international organisations, fishing nations should cooperate to establish 
such an organisation and participate in its work.346 Just as with the UNCLOS 
provisions relating to straddling stocks, these provisions are very succinct and 
consequently, the rules regarding highly migratory stocks are also expanded on in the 
Fish Stocks Agreement. The objective and principles of the Agreement relating to 
highly migratory stocks are identical to those relating to straddling stocks: they are 
primarily concerned with the conservation and management of these species, rather 
than with access to them.347 Consequently, as with straddling stocks, the provisions 
relating to [conservation and management of] highly migratory stocks will not be 
examined in detail, as they are not directly relevant to the issue of the distribution of 
CDM projects. 
3.5.4 Common Heritage of Mankind
The concept of the common heritage of mankind was proposed by Maltese 
Ambassador Arvid Pardo requesting that the use of the seabed and the ocean floor be 
undertaken for the benefit of mankind as a whole, and that the net financial benefits 
                                               
346 UNCLOS, Article 64. 
347 See Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 2, 5 and 8. See also discussion of straddling stocks on pages 
116-118 above. 
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derived be used primarily to promote the development of poor countries.348 The 
concept advocates that the benefits derived from the “common heritage” should be 
shared by the whole of humankind, not just a few members/countries: the resources 
should profit all of mankind, and the benefits derived from the use of these resources 
should be shared internationally.349
The common heritage concept has been the subject of a lot of discussion and debate in 
international law. There is as yet, no generally-accepted definition of the concept and 
no general view regarding its status in international law.350 Attempting to define the 
concept and identify its status under international law is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, so this section will focus on examining the elements of the concept as applied 
under international law. Currently, the only two areas that have been explicitly 
designated as the common heritage of mankind are the moon and the deep seabed,351
as provided in the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
                                               
348 See 22 UN General Assembly Official Records, Annex 3 (19 August 1967), UN Doc. A/6695. See 
also B. Larschan and B.C. Brennan, ‘The common heritage of mankind principle in international law’ 
(1982-1983) 21 CJIL 305, 318; Baslar, The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind in International 
Law; M.G. Schmidt, Common Heritage or Common Burden? The United States Position on the 
Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 22-23; Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 226; R.P. Arnold, ‘The 
common heritage of mankind as a legal concept’ (1975) 9 International Lawyer 153, 153; and Gorove, 
‘The concept of “common heritage of mankind”: a political, moral or legal innovation?’ (1975) 9 San 
Diego L. Rev. 390, 390. Although the idea (of a common heritage of mankind) had been mentioned 
before this time, in discussions regarding the use of outer space, Ambassador Pardo’s proposal gave it 
prominence and a much clearer description. See C.C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The 
Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
1998), 221.
349 See Joyner, supra note 348, at 223. 
350 See Baslar, supra note 348, at xx-xxi; S. Errin, ‘Law in a vacuum: the common heritage doctrine in 
outer space law’ (1984) 7 B. C. Int’l Comp. L. Rev. 403, 404; J. Frakes, ‘The common heritage of 
mankind principle and the deep seabed, outer space, and Antarctica: will developed and developing 
nations reach a compromise?’ (2003) 21 Wisconsin Int’l L.J. 409, 409-410; and E. Egede, Africa and 
the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of Mankind
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 66-73. Attempts to define the concept are sometimes made by defining 
each element of the concept, that is, defining, “common,” “heritage” and “mankind.” See for example, 
Baslar, supra note 348; and Arnold, supra note 348, at 154. See generally, Joyner, supra note 348, at 
Chapter 8.
351 See footnote 262 above. 
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Other Celestial Bodies,352 and UNCLOS, respectively. The elements of the common 
heritage of mankind concept, as contained in these treaties, are: non-appropriation;353
equitable sharing of benefits;354 international management;355 and exclusive peaceful 
use.356
This concept is generally used in relation to the distribution of resources, particularly 
resources that are outside areas of national jurisdiction.357 It is used to achieve an 
equitable distribution of resources.358 It is in this sense that the concept is relevant to 
this thesis. Consequently, the element of the concept which is of interest is the 
element of the equitable sharing of benefits. Because there is no general definition of 
the concept and because it has only been adopted under two regimes, rather than 
examine the meaning of the concept generally, this section will proceed to examine 
the concept as applied under the two regimes that have adopted it: the moon and deep 
seabed regimes.
                                               
352 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (New York) 
5 December 1979, in force 11 July 1984; (1979) 18 ILM 1434 (1979 Moon Treaty). See Article 11. 
Although this article refers to the moon and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, Article 1 
provides that provisions relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies, other than the 
earth, within the solar system.  
353 Moon Treaty, Article 11(2) and UNCLOS, Article 137(1). 
354 Moon Treaty, Article 11(7)(d) and UNCLOS, Article 140(2).
355 Moon Treaty, Article 11(5) and UNCLOS, Article 137(2) and 140(2).
356 Moon Treaty, Article 3(1) and UNCLOS, Article 141. See generally, Murillo, supra note 125; 
Baslar, supra note 348, at Chapter 3; L.E. Viikari, ‘The legal regime for moon resource utilization and 
comparable solutions adopted for deep seabed activities’ (2003) 31 Advanced Space Research 2427; 
and Frakes, supra note 350, at 411-413. According to at least one author, “equitable sharing of 
benefits” is not necessarily an element of the concept, but may be more regime-specific. See E. 
Holmila, ‘Common heritage of mankind in the law of the sea’ (2005) 1 Acta Societatis Martensis 187, 
195 and 201-202. However, most authors agree that it is an element of the concept, and is one that can 
be seen in the two treaties that have adopted it. 
357 See Wolfrum, supra note 262, at 313. 
358 See S.D. Mau, ‘Equity, the third world and the moon treaty’ (1984) 8 Suffolk Trans. L.J. 221, 225. 
121
(a) Moon Regime
The first point to make about the Moon Treaty is that it is considered a “failed” treaty 
because since its adoption in 1979 and entry into force in 1984, it has only been 
ratified by 13 countries, none of which has engaged, or has immediate plans to 
engage, in space exploration.359 None of the countries which has engaged, or plans to 
engage, in space exploration (regarded as “space powers”) has ratified the treaty and it 
therefore has minimal effect on actual space exploration and exploitation of lunar 
resources.360 Secondly, the exploitation of the Moon’s resources has yet to 
commence361 although some countries have expressed an interest in exploiting these 
resources.362 For these two reasons, primarily the first reason, the Moon Treaty has 
had no practical application.363
Article 11(7)(d) of the Moon Treaty provides for the equitable sharing of the 
resources of the Moon. It however does not specify exactly how such sharing should 
be carried out and due to the fact that no such sharing, whether equitable or otherwise, 
has been carried out in practice, it is not possible to determine precisely what is meant 
                                               
359 It has been ratified by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and Uruguay. Status as of 03/08/2010. See the UN Treaty 
Series, Status of Treaties. 
360 See H.R. Hertzfeld and F. von der Dunk, ‘Bringing space law into the commercial world: property 
rights without sovereignty’ (2005) 6 Chicago J. Int’l L. 81, 85; and Coffey, supra note 262, at 127.
361 See Coffey, supra note 262; M. Menter, ‘Commercial space activities under the moon treaty’ (1979-
1980) 7 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 213, 235; and B.M. Hoffstadt, ‘Moving the heavens: lunar mining 
and the “common heritage of mankind” in the moon treaty’ (1994-1995) 42 UCLA L. Rev. 575. 
According to Coffey, this is inter alia because of the lack of a stable legal regime governing 
exploitation of the moon resources. See Coffey, supra note 262, at 120. 
362 See P.J Blount, ‘Jurisdiction in outer space: challenges of private individuals in space (2007) 33 J.
Space Law 299, 303-304.
363 See generally on the Moon Treaty, C.Q. Christol, “The moon agreement: where is it today?’ (1999) 
27 J. Space Law 1; and D.A. Porras, ‘The common heritage of outer space: equal benefits for most of 
mankind’ (2006) 37 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 143.
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by “equitable sharing” under this treaty.364 According to some authors, this lack of 
precision in the meaning of equitable sharing is one of the factors inhibiting 
investment in space activities.365 Nevertheless, although the article does not specify 
how “equitable sharing” is to be achieved, it does provide that the interests and needs 
of the developing countries and of those countries that have contributed to the 
exploration of the Moon should receive special consideration. 
Therefore, although the moon regime does not currently provide an explanation of the 
meaning of “equitable sharing,” one of the possible elements of such equitable 
sharing that can be identified from its provisions is that the needs and interests of a 
specific group or groups of countries, in this case, developing countries and those 
countries that have contributed to the exploitation of the resources of the moon, 
should be considered.366
(b) Deep Seabed Regime
The deep seabed regime is governed by UNCLOS367 and the 1994 Implementing 
Agreement.368 According to UNCLOS, the seabed,369 ocean floor and subsoil beyond 
                                               
364 See Mau, supra note 358, at 246 and 251; M.E. Davis and R.J. Lee, ‘Twenty years after: the moon 
agreement and its legal controversies’ (1999) 1999 Austl. Int’l L.J. 9, 20-21, 23; Porras, supra note 363, 
at 172-173; and Hoffstadt, supra note 361, at 591-592.
365 See G. Wohl, ‘Outer space, inc.: transmitting business, ethics, and policy “across the universe”’ 
(2008-2009) 111 W. Va. L. Rev. 311, 332, 341-342; and Hoffstadt, supra note 361, at 591-592.
366 Moon Treaty, Article 11(7)(d).
367 UNCLOS, Part XI. 
368 Supra note 268. The 1994 Implementing Agreement was adopted to address developed countries’ 
concerns with Part XI of UNCLOS. Article 2 of the Agreement provides that both UNCLOS and the 
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument, and that the Agreement 
shall prevail in the event of inconsistencies between the Agreement and Part XI. See 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_part_xi.htm ‘Agreement 
relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982: Overview’ (UN Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea website, 
17/06/2010). The changes made to Part XI by the Implementing Agreement relate to issues such as 
production limitations, mandatory technology transfer and the decision-making power of the 
International Seabed Authority. The common heritage concept as applied under UNCLOS, including 
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the limits of national jurisdiction, collectively referred to as “the Area,” together with 
the resources found in them, are the common heritage of mankind.370 The legal status 
of the Area is outlined in Article 137, which prohibits States from exercising 
sovereignty over the Area or its resources and provides that the resources of the Area 
are vested in mankind as a whole. 
Just as with lunar resources, exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed is yet to 
commence. As such, there are no practical examples of the application of the common 
heritage concept, or its equitable sharing element, to be examined. However, unlike 
the moon regime, the deep seabed regime of UNCLOS is widely accepted: 160 
countries have ratified UNCLOS and 138 countries have ratified the 1994 
Implementing Agreement.371
One point to note regarding the deep seabed regime is that there are similarities 
between certain elements of the regime and the CDM, other than the sharing of 
benefits element. For example, private entities and investors are involved in both 
regimes and there are systems in place for these entities and investors to get a return 
on their investment.372 However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis (and this chapter) 
                                                                                                                                      
the equitable sharing requirement, remained unchanged by the Agreement. See generally, E. Guntrip, 
‘The common heritage of mankind: an adequate regime for managing the deep seabed’ (2003) 4 Melb. 
J. Int’l L. 376, 385-386; B.H. Oxman, ‘The 1994 Agreement and the Convention’ (1994) 88 AJIL 687; 
and L.D.M. Nelson, ‘The new deep sea-bed mining regime’ (1995) 10 IJMCL 189, 203.
369 The seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction contains vast amounts of mineral resources, in 
the form of “manganese nodules,” which contain almost inexhaustible amounts of nickel, copper, 
manganese and cobalt. See Guntrip, supra note 368, at 377. 
370 UNCLOS, Article 136. See generally Guntrip, supra note 368; Larschan and Brennan, supra note 
348.
371 See  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%
20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea, ‘Chronological lists of 
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 01 
March 2010’ (UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 17/06/2010).
372 Under the CDM, this is mainly a contractual issue between the investor and the host country, and 
both are free to agree on the terms of profit sharing. This can vary depending on the nature of the 
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to examine every aspect of the deep seabed regime and, as noted above, the part of the 
deep seabed regime and its common heritage concept that is of interest and relevance 
to this thesis is the equitable sharing element and the rules for achieving such 
equitable sharing. This is because the focus of this thesis and this chapter is to 
determine how the benefits of the CDM regime (CDM projects) should be distributed 
among developing countries (recipients of the benefits to be shared). It does not, for 
example, examine the contracts between the investors and the recipient host countries 
or consider how the CERs generated by CDM projects should be shared between the 
investor and the host country. Consequently, this section will not, for instance, 
examine issues of how much profit investors should be allowed to take from deep 
seabed mining (which is similar to the issue of how the CERs or other profits 
generated from CDM projects should be allocated between the investor and host 
country). 
The sharing provisions of the deep seabed regime are found principally in Article 140 
of UNCLOS, which provides for activities in the Area to be carried out for the benefit 
of mankind as a whole, taking account of the interests and needs of developing 
countries and peoples who have not gained self-governing status. It further provides 
that the International Seabed Authority shall provide for the equitable sharing of 
financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area, in 
                                                                                                                                      
agreement and the point in which the “investor” is involved – whether during before, during or after the 
life of the project. If for example, the project is a unilateral project and the investor simply purchases 
the CERs generated from the project, then there is no real issue of profit sharing, as the “investor” (who 
in this situation is not really an investor, but simply a CER purchaser), simply pays the market price for 
the CERs. See the discussion of the CDM structure in Chapter 2. Under the deep seabed regime, there 
are more specific rules regarding profit sharing, which arise not just from the equitable sharing element 
of the common heritage of mankind concept, but from its rules regarding non-appropriation, 
international management and exclusive peaceful use. These rules are contained in Part XI of 
UNCLOS, as amended by the 1994 Implementing Agreement. These rules are however not further 
examined here.  
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accordance with Article 160(2)(f)(i) of UNCLOS. This article requires the Authority, 
through its Assembly, to establish the rules, regulations and procedures for equitable 
sharing, again taking into particular consideration, the interests and needs of 
developing countries and peoples who have not attained full independence or other 
self-governing status. These rules, regulations and procedures are to be established 
taking into consideration the recommendations of the Finance Committee.373
Just like under the moon regime, the deep seabed regime does not set out the rules for 
achieving equitability in the sharing of benefits. Rather, it requires the International 
Seabed Authority to set out these rules, and it is this Authority that is in charge of 
deciding how the financial and other economic benefits derived from exploitation of 
the Area are to be shared.374 This has however not yet happened and it is not clear 
when exactly these rules will be established.375 It can however be expected that the 
rules will be established in accordance with the principles of the regime, because 
UNCLOS provides the Authority with some direction in establishing these rules: it 
requires particular consideration of the interests and needs of developing States and 
peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status.376
In addition to deciding the rules for equitable sharing (based on the recommendations 
of the Finance Committee), the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority also 
has the mandate to make the decisions on the sharing of benefits. Such decisions are 
                                               
373 1994 Implementing Agreement, Annex, Section 9, paragraph 7(f). 
374 See Holmila, supra note 356, at 201.
375 The International Seabed Authority is still in the process of establishing the various rules, 
regulations and procedures required by UNCLOS. It has for example, issued the regulations on 
prospecting and exploration for Polymetallic Nodules and Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area. See 
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/mcode ‘Mining Code’ (International Seabed Authority, 
18/06/2010).
376 UNCLOS, Article 160(2)(f)(i). 
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to be consistent with the Convention and the sharing rules established.377 Again, 
because deep seabed mining has not commenced, there has been no distribution of the 
benefits of mining, and no rules have yet been established for such distribution. 
Therefore, although the exact manner of achieving equitability is not spelt out in the 
Convention, according to Churchill and Lowe, some countries will in effect have a 
preferential claim on the monies.378 This will be done in consideration of their 
interests and needs.
In conclusion, although the precise meaning and application of the common heritage 
of mankind concept is uncertain, from the two regimes that have established the 
concept, an element that can be identified is the requirement to consider the interests 
and needs of specific groups of countries (in this case, developing countries) in order 
to achieve equitable sharing. 
3.5.5 International Watercourses Regime
The focus here is on international legal rules governing the use of shared 
watercourses, that is, freshwater resources that are shared by more than one country or 
parts of which are found in more than one country.379 With regard to the use of, or 
                                               
377 Ibid, Article 160(2)(g). Although the 1994 Implementing Agreement does not contain any 
provisions directly relating to the sharing of benefits or the rules for this, it does contain rules regarding 
the decision-making powers of the Authority. Such rules relate to decisions by the Assembly, as well as 
the composition and voting procedure of the Council. See 1994 Implementing Agreement, Section 3. 
See generally, Oxman, supra note 368, at 687; P.A. Burr, ‘The International Seabed Authority’ (2006) 
29 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 271; and Nelson, supra note 368.
378 See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 263, at 253. 
379 See generally S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. Grzybowski et al., ‘Beyond international water law: 
successfully negotiating mutual gains agreements for international watercourses’ (2010) 22 Pac. 
McGeorge Global Bus. Dev. L.J. 139; and Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at Chapter 10. 
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access to, shared watercourses, one of the basic rules is the requirement for equitable 
and reasonable sharing of the watercourses.380
As far back as 1966, the [non-binding] Helsinki Rules provided that basin States are 
entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an 
international drainage basin.381 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ 
referred to Hungary’s right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of 
the shared watercourse.382 In his separate opinion in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, 
Judge Kooijmans, although falling short of declaring that this was a rule of customary 
international law, noted that the rule has been widely accepted both for the 
navigational and the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.383 Relevant 
treaty law on international watercourses is the Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses.384 According to the Convention, 
watercourse States are to use international watercourses in an equitable and 
reasonable manner.385 This Convention is however not yet in force.386 Nevertheless, 
as noted above, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is the most widely 
                                               
380 See Shelton, supra note 19, at 647-648; Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 462; Birnie et al., supra 
Chapter 1, note 15, at 541; and M.S. Amr, ‘Diversion of international watercourses under international 
law’ (2002) 10 African YBIL 109, 112-113.
381 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, International Law Association, 
Report of the Fifty-second Conference, 1966 (London, International Law Association, 1967), Article 
IV (Helsinki Rules).
382 See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Reports 
7, 54 (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case). 
383 See the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans in the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v Namibia) (1999) ICJ Reports 1045, 1150-1152. 
384 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (New York), 
opened for signature 21 May 1997 (not yet in force); (1997) 36 ILM 703 (Watercourses Convention)
385 Ibid, Article 5(1). 
386 According to Article 36 of the Convention, 35 instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession are needed for the Convention to enter into force. As of 30 June 2010, there were 16 
signatories and 19 Parties to the Convention. See the UN Treaty Collection 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en (accessed 30/06/2010). 
128
endorsed principle relating to the use of shared watercourses,387 and is regarded by 
some as the fundamental norm governing this area of law.388 Consequently, this 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation probably reflects customary 
international law regarding allocation of, or access to, shared watercourses,389 and this 
section focuses on this principle.
The Convention requires watercourse States to use international watercourses in an 
equitable and reasonable manner. This, inter alia, means that these countries should 
use and develop international watercourses with a view to attaining optimal and 
sustainable use of the watercourses and its benefits. In doing this, the watercourse 
States should take account of the interests of the watercourse States concerned and
should act in a manner consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.390 The 
Convention further requires watercourse States to participate in the use, development 
and protection of international watercourses in an equitable and reasonable manner, 
with such participation including both the right to utilise watercourses and the duty to 
cooperate in their protection and development.391
Although the Convention does not expressly define “equitable and reasonable” use, it 
provides guidance as to what can be deemed equitable and reasonable. It does this by 
outlining some of the factors for determining whether a use is equitable and 
                                               
387 See Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 541; and Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 462. The 
principle has also been incorporated into other shared watercourses agreements such as the Revised 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community, 7 August 2000; 
(2001) 40 ILM 321 (SADC Protocol) and the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin (Chiang Rai), 5 April 1995, in force 5 April 1995; (1995) 34 
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388 See McCaffrey, supra note 379, at 325; and Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 542. 
389 See J.W. Dellapenna, ‘The customary international law of transboundary fresh waters’ (2001) 1 Int’l 
J. Global Envt’l Issues 264, 288. See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, 54.
390 Watercourses Convention, Article 5(1). 
391 Ibid, Article 5(2). See also Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 466-467. 
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reasonable. According to Article 6 of the Convention, account should be taken of all 
relevant factors and circumstances, including: geographic and other factors of a 
natural character; the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
the population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; the effects of 
the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse 
States; existing and potential uses of the watercourse; conservation, protection, 
development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the 
costs of measures taken to that effect; and the availability of alternatives, of 
comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.392 Grzybowski divides these 
factors into two categories: natural factors (such as climatic and geographic factors) 
and human-related factors (such as the social and economic needs of watercourse 
States and the existing and potential uses of the watercourses).393
The starting point for the use of shared watercourses is the equality of States, and their 
equality of right to use shared watercourses. The ICJ, in the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros 
Project case, refers to the “perfect equality of all riparian States” as an essential 
feature of the use of the shared watercourse.394 This equality of right does not mean an 
equal division of the shared waters, but that all the parties have an equal right to use 
the shared waters, due to the equality of independent States.395 Likewise with the 
                                               
392 See also the Helsinki Rules, Article V; and Grzybowski et al., supra note 379, at 142. 
393 Grzybowski et al., supra note 379, at 142.
394 See Gabcikovo/Nagymaros Project case, 54. See also Case relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of 
the International Commission of the River Oder (1929) PCIJ Series A, Number 23 (River Oder case). 
See also McCaffrey, supra note 379, at 328; Amr, supra note 380, at 135; and Shelton, supra note 19, 
at 648. Shelton however notes the limitations to this arising from the possibility of one party’s use 
impacting the beneficial uses of others and the fact that not all uses can be satisfied. 
395 McCaffrey, supra note 379, at 330. See the US case of Connecticut v Massachusetts (1931) 282 US 
660, 670-671. See also the US case of Kansas v Colorado (1907) 206 US 46 and the Swiss case of 
Aargau v Zurich (1878) IV Entsch des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts 34. See also Birnie et al.,
supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 542.
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CDM, all countries have an equal right to participate in the CDM, but this does not 
necessarily mean there should be an equal distribution of CDM projects.396
Applying the principle of equitable utilisation as conceived in the international 
watercourses regime to the CDM, this means that to ensure an equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects, all relevant factors should be taken into account. If the 
division used by Grzybowski is also applied, this could mean these factors could 
include both natural and human-related factors. Natural factors, because of their 
nature, will, in most cases, be specific to the issue being considered. For example, in 
the case of shared watercourses, natural factors include geographic and hydrographic 
factors, which would not necessarily be applicable to the CDM. In the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries, natural factors considered include factors such as the existence 
of islands and the configurations of coasts, which again, cannot be applied to the 
CDM (or presumably even to the issue of shared watercourses). In relation to the 
CDM, a natural factor that could be taken into consideration could be the GHG 
emission levels of countries. In addition, human-related factors may also vary 
depending on the issue. In the case of shared watercourses, human-related factors 
include social and economic needs, and the existing and potential uses of the 
watercourses. Birnie et al noted that this rule requires a balance of interests, which 
accommodates the needs and uses of each State.397 Whereas social and economic 
needs could be applied to the CDM, it would be difficult to determine the distribution 
of projects based on the existing and potential uses of CDM projects.
                                               
396 See the argument against equal distribution of CDM projects in Section 3.4 above. 
397 Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 542. 
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In conclusion, as applied under the international watercourses regime, equitable 
utilisation requires consideration of specific factors in order to achieve an equitable 
outcome. One of such factors, which most of the regimes analysed appear to also 
consider, is the social and economic needs of countries.  
3.5.6 Conclusion
The above regimes show that an equitable outcome very much depends on the 
specific law, issue or circumstance under consideration. None of the regimes analysed 
here defines what an equitable outcome is. Rather, they identify some of the factors 
that should be taken into consideration in order to achieve such an outcome.398
Consequently, the conclusion from the above analysis is that in international law, an 
equitable outcome is best understood as the outcome of a process that takes certain 
issues into consideration.399 Distributive justice is achieved when the necessary 
factors are fully taken into consideration. In the case of international watercourses for 
example, an equitable outcome is achieved when factors such as the needs and uses of 
States, as well as the geographic and hydrographic factors of the watercourses, are 
taken into consideration.400 In the case of the delimitation of maritime borders, 
                                               
398 Ibid, at 543, where the authors, with regard to the meaning of equitable utilisation, note that what 
constitutes reasonable and equitable utilisation is “not capable of precise definition” but requires a 
balancing of relevant factors. 
399 See McCaffrey, supra note 379, at 343, where, in relation to the international watercourses regime, 
the author states that “the obligation of equitable and reasonable utilization is thus best understood as a 
process.” See also Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 543. 
400 See the discussion of the international watercourses regime in Section 6.6 above. See also 
Watercourses Convention, Article 6; Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 543; and McCaffrey, 
supra note 379, at Chapter 9.
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account must be taken of circumstances such as the existence of islands, coastal 
configurations and proportionality, in order to reach an equitable outcome.401
In Section 3.4, this thesis concluded that none of the distributive justice theories 
(egalitarianism, the difference principle and utilitarianism) can be directly applied to 
the CDM, and in any case, the regimes analysed here do not appear to apply these 
theories. For example, none of the regimes examined support strict equality (in 
distribution) without consideration of relevant circumstances. Rather, most require 
that to reach an equitable outcome, relevant circumstances should be considered, and 
the outcome will then depend on these circumstances. Likewise, although there is no 
reference to the theory of utilitarianism, most regimes require consideration of 
specific circumstances as they apply to or affect all relevant parties, which is not 
compatible with this theory. Utilitarianism dictates that the only just distribution is 
one which maximises the happiness of society as a whole and this could require 
individual countries sacrificing their own interests in order to increase the interests of 
the global community.402 At the international level, the utilitarian theory would 
require consideration of the happiness of the global society as a whole, rather than 
that of individual countries, and sanction the “unfair” treatment of individual 
countries if this would result in a fair global outcome.403 However, none of the 
regimes examined above requires that in order to achieve distributive justice,
countries should ignore their own needs or interests if this would increase the benefits 
                                               
401 See the discussion of maritime delimitation in Section 6.3 above. See also Freestone et al, supra 
note 263, at 150-159; Dundua, supra note 299, at 53-68; and Ahnish, supra note 284, at Chapter 2. 
402 See the discussion in Section 3.4.3. See generally, Bentham, supra note 245; and Harris, supra note 
214, at 41.
403 See for example, Davies and Holdcroft, supra note 233, at 228, who, quoting Hart ‘Between Utility 
and Rights’ (1979) 78 Columbia Law Review 8282, state that utilitarianism may “license the grossest 
form of inequality in the actual treatment of individuals.”
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to society as a whole. Rather, regimes such as the international watercourses regime, 
the delimitation of maritime borders and the deep seabed regime, require 
consideration of the needs and interests of individual countries or groups of countries. 
The only theory that appears to be somewhat relevant to the practice of distributive 
justice in these regimes is the difference principle. This is because of the theory’s 
emphasis on maximising the situation of the worst off in society.404 Although none of 
the regimes examined appears to go to the extent of seeking to maximise the situation 
of the worst off, some of them do seek to improve their situation. For example, the 
moon and deep seabed regimes, which both apply the common heritage of mankind 
concept, require consideration of the needs of developing countries.405 Additionally, 
equity in international law also requires consideration of the needs of developing 
countries and supports provision of preferential treatment to these countries, inter 
alia, to improve their situation. Nevertheless, the difference principle cannot be said 
to be directly applied in international law, as maximising the situation of the worst off 
does not appear to be an objective of any of the regimes examined. It is actually 
counter to the approach taken in maritime delimitation, where it has been said that the 
aim of an equitable solution is not to correct geographical disadvantages, as 
                                               
404 See Rawls, supra note 211, at 75 and 79; and Harris, supra note 214, at 284-285.
405 The regimes however do not seek to meet all the needs of developing countries before attending to 
those of other countries or to meet all the needs of developing countries regardless of the needs of all 
other countries. As noted above, the difference principle would probably require that only the situation 
of those countries regarded as worst off should be improved unless improving the situation of the better 
off would directly improve the situation of the worst off. These regimes (moon and deep seabed 
regimes) do not go to this extent. 
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maximising the situation of the worst off could require disregarding or correcting 
physical inequalities and maritime delimitation, for example, does not support this.406  
In addition, according to the difference principle, increasing the welfare or situation of 
those countries that are already better off would only be justified if this would result 
in an increase in the welfare or situation of those countries that are worst off.407
Again, this does not appear to be a distributive principle of any of the regimes 
examined. To apply this principle, regimes would contain something to the effect that 
in determining how a benefit or resource should be distributed or shared, the entirety 
of the benefit or resource should go to those countries considered “worst off” (for 
instance, developing countries) unless giving “better off” countries (for instance, 
developed countries) some of the benefit or resource would directly benefit the worst 
off. Although some of these regimes do require consideration of the needs/interests of 
other countries,408 they do not require that in distributing or sharing a resource or 
benefit, benefits can only be given to the better off if doing so would improve the 
situation of the worst off.
Consequently, from the above, distributive justice in international law does not 
require equal distribution, maximisation of the circumstances of the worst off in 
society, or maximisation of the happiness of the international community as a whole, 
regardless of the happiness of individual countries. Distributive justice in international 
                                               
406 See the discussion in Section 3.5.2 above. See also the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 49-50; 
and Libya v Malta, 39-40. See also Oude Elferink, supra note 283, at 51; and Ahnish, supra note 284, 
at 86-87.
407 Rawls, supra note 211, at 75. See generally, Wacks, supra note 214, at 256-261; Harris, supra note 
214, at 282-287.
408 For example, in the international watercourses regime, countries are to inter alia consider the social 
and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; the population dependent on the watercourse 
in each watercourse State; and the effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse 
State on other watercourse States. See Watercourses Convention, Article 6.
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law does not have a specific outcome. Rather, it takes a “process-based” approach, 
being the outcome of a process in which certain factors are taken into consideration. 
These factors must be specific to the issue under consideration and cannot be 
generalised. When these factors are adequately taken into consideration, the outcome 
of this process would then be considered just or equitable. There is therefore no “one-
size-fits-all” outcome. 
Following on from the conclusion that an equitable outcome requires consideration of 
relevant factors and is the result of a process that considers these factors, the next 
section determines, from the principles and regimes examined in this and previous 
sections, as well as the objectives of the CDM, the elements that should be considered 
in order to achieve an equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects.
3.6 Meaning of Equitable Geographic Distribution of CDM Projects
Applying the conclusion in the previous section to the CDM means that equitable 
distribution is better regarded as the result of a process that takes certain factors into 
consideration, rather than as a set or pre-determined outcome. Further to this, this 
section identifies the criteria for equitable geographic distribution, that is, the 
elements that determine, or that should be considered when determining, whether a 
distribution of projects among countries is equitable. This section also identifies the
factors that should be used to achieve equitable geographic distribution, that is, the 
factors that need to be considered in efforts to achieve equitable distribution of 
projects among countries.
These elements and factors are identified drawing from the above analyses of equity 
and distributive justice. Upon identifying these elements and factors, this section then 
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provides a working definition of equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects, 
still based on the discussions above, as well as the elements and factors identified in 
this section. 
3.6.1 Elements and Factors of Equitable Geographic Distribution
The aim of this chapter so far has been to provide a definition of equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects, as this definition has so far not been provided in 
literature or by the CDM regime. 
To provide this definition, this chapter examined different aspects of equity and 
distributive justice. It concluded that in international law, an equitable outcome is not 
defined. Instead, distributive justice seems to focus on a process which takes account 
of specific factors in order to reach an equitable outcome. This approach reflects the 
definition of equity in international law, as well as distributive justice in the various 
international regimes examined. It is also the approach taken in the climate change 
regime and it can therefore be expected that it should be the approach to equitable 
distribution under the CDM. This approach is, however, different from that in general 
theories of distributive justice. In these theories, distributive justice generally does not 
require relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration. Rather, these 
circumstances are often disregarded409 and distributive justice would require that the 
same formula be applied to all cases, irrespective of relevant circumstances. This 
chapter therefore concluded that the theories of distributive justice – egalitarianism, 
                                               
409 For instance, both utilitarianism and egalitarianism do not require consideration of relevant 
circumstances.
137
the difference principle and utilitarianism – cannot be applied to the CDM.410 Rather, 
the approach to equitable distributive justice under the CDM should be the same as 
that in international law – account should be taken of relevant factors in order to 
achieve an equitable outcome. 
The factors to be considered vary depending on the regime being considered. One 
almost constant element however is that of “need.” Most of the regimes considered, 
with the exception of the maritime delimitation regime, require consideration of need 
and differentiate on this basis, in order to achieve an equitable outcome. This 
consideration of “need”, together with the provision of preferential treatment to 
countries in consideration of their need, is also seen in equity in the international 
climate change regime and in international law generally.
The importance of considering need and preferential treatment in the search for equity 
is also recognised by various authors. Birnie et al, in their discussion of the ozone 
regime, state that, “acknowledging the inequity of equal treatment for all, and the very 
small contribution to ozone depletion made by developing states, the protocol makes 
special provision for their needs.”411 Schachter suggests that “equality among 
unequals may be inequitable and that differential treatment may be essential for real 
equity.”412 Equality has been examined and rejected in Section 3.4 above, and it is 
criticised because it may yield extreme outcomes when pre-existing economic or 
other inequalities exist in society. In the case of the CDM, formal equality has already 
                                               
410 See Sections 3.4 and 3.5.6 above for a more detailed discussion of why the theories of distributive 
justice are inapplicable to the CDM. 
411 See Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, 352. 
412 See O. Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 7.
See also Shelton, supra note 19, at 647.
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been criticised as leading to a perverse outcome, which would neither benefit 
countries nor contribute to the objectives of the CDM.413
One of the reasons why equitable geographic distribution cannot mean equal 
distribution of projects or CERs is because countries have varying levels of GHG 
emissions, and hence, varying levels of emission reduction potential. This is important 
because the CDM aims inter alia to help developing countries contribute to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention (to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere) and to assist developed countries to comply with their emission reduction 
commitments.414 Countries’ emission reduction potential and the realisation of this 
potential determine how much countries can contribute to these objectives of the 
CDM. 415 Uruguay, which produces about 45 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
emissions annually, cannot be expected to host the same number of projects as 
Indonesia, which produces in excess of 2 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions 
annually.416 According to Diakoulaki et al, a country’s total GHG emissions 
theoretically represent the maximum potential of the CDM market in that country.417
If all countries were required to host the same number of projects or produce the same 
amount of CERs, this would result in those countries with greater potential being 
prevented from fulfilling their potential, as they would be prevented from hosting 
more projects than those countries with a lower potential. This would limit the extent 
                                               
413 See the discussion in Section 3.4 above.
414 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. See also the discussion of the CDM in Chapter 2.
415 See Jung, supra note 68, at 2174-2175; C. Karakosta et al., ‘Directing clean development 
mechanism towards developing countries’ sustainable development priorities’ (2009) 13 Energy for 
Sus. Dev. 77, 77; and Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 42-47. 
416 CAIT Version 7.0 (2005 data). See the classification of countries according to their GHG emission 
levels in Chapter 4. 
417 Diakoulaki et al., supra Chapter 2, note 26, at 1091.
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to which these countries can contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention –
that of GHG stabilisation418 and would give rise to the problem of “levelling 
down,”419 which is one of the criticisms of the egalitarian theory of distributive 
justice.420 It would also not help fulfil the sustainable development objective of the 
CDM, as these countries would potentially continue to develop economically, but 
without the sustainability CDM projects could provide. In determining equitable 
distribution therefore, countries’ emission reduction potential must be taken into 
consideration, and as stated by the Executive Board, each country should be given the 
opportunity to achieve its full potential.421
The reference to potential is often a reference to emission reduction potential, which 
can be determined by the GHG emission levels of countries. However, another kind 
of potential that should also be considered is the sustainable development potential of 
countries. Since sustainable development is one of the objectives of the CDM, it is not 
sufficient to only consider the emission reduction potential and opportunities for cost-
effective reductions in countries, as these only measure one of the objectives of the 
CDM – its objective to promote cost-effective emission reductions. The objective of 
contributing to sustainable development is equally important, and must also be 
considered. As highlighted in Section 3.3, one of the principles of equity of the 
climate change regime is the right to promote sustainable development and the CDM, 
which is an instrument of this regime, should to the extent possible, contribute to 
                                               
418 UNFCCC, Article 2. 
419 For example, by destroying the eyes of the sighted to create equality with those who are blind. See 
Parfit, (1997), 211.
420 According to a school of egalitarian thought, “we should sometimes choose a smaller sum of 
benefits, for the sake of a better distribution.” See Mason, supra note 203, at 2.
421 See the 2005-2006 Annual Report of the Executive Board to the COP/MOP, Addendum 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/4/Add.1 (Part I), 7 November 2006), Annex III, Paragraph 4(a). See also the 
discussion and criticisms of equality in Chapter 3.
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achieving the principles and objectives of the regime.422 Consequently, in order to 
achieve this objective of the CDM (and of the climate change regime), countries’ 
sustainable development should also be considered, in addition to their emission 
reduction potential.423 Sustainable development has been defined as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” Consideration of needs (particularly the 
essential needs of the world’s poor) is considered a key concept of sustainable 
development.424 In addition, as noted above, capability is also relevant to the CDM to 
the extent that it refers to technical capacity to host environmentally-friendly projects, 
as this is one of the intended benefits of the CDM. Capability in this context should 
therefore be taken as a measure of sustainable development potential in countries, and
countries with less capability should be regarded as having greater sustainable 
development potential, just as countries with greater needs are regarded as having 
greater sustainable development potential. For example, one of the needs of 
developing countries identified by the climate change regime is their need for capacity 
building.425 However, rather than being a separate element, it is, in the context of the 
CDM, a measure of countries’ need and sustainable development. 
                                               
422 See Cullet, supra Chapter 2, note 68, at 173, where the author notes that implementation of the 
flexibility mechanisms cannot be dissociated from the guiding principles of the Convention. See also 
Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(2), which provides inter alia that the purpose of the CDM is to assist 
developing countries to contribute to the ultimate objective of the Convention and to assist developed 
countries to achieve compliance with their emission reduction commitments under the Protocol.
423 See Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 47; and Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 22.
424 See Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. See 
also Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 252; Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 53-54; and 
Magraw and Hawke, supra Chapter 2, note 63, at 614 and 618. 
425 See UNFCCC, Articles 5(b) and (c), 7 and 9.2(d); and Kyoto Protocol, Article 10(e). See also 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/capacity_building/items/1033.php ‘Capacity-building’ for a 
summary of capacity building-related activities under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 
21/02/2011). 
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The element of need is recognised and applied to achieve equity in international law 
generally, as well as in the climate change regime and in most of the other 
international regimes examined here (with the exception of the maritime delimitation 
regime).426 Most international regimes, in aiming towards an equitable outcome, 
provide developing countries with some form of preferential treatment, in recognition 
of their greater need or lower capacity.427 Such preferential treatment, rather than 
determining whether an outcome is equitable, is used to help achieve an equitable 
outcome. The Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC, the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement and the World Trade Organization’s generalised system of preferences all 
contain examples of such preferential treatment, based primarily on the principles of 
equity and of common but differentiated responsibilities.428
From the above, the two criteria or elements that should be used to determine whether 
a distribution of CDM projects is equitable are countries’ GHG emission reduction 
potential and their need (sustainable development potential). In addition, just as is 
seen in most international regimes, efforts to promote equitable geographic 
distribution should then be supported by preferential treatment, specifically in 
consideration of countries’ need. These are the factors which should be taken into 
consideration and balanced in order to achieve a more equitable geographic 
distribution of CDM projects. 
One important consideration in the distribution of CDM projects is countries’ 
population. It cannot really be expected that a country with a very small population 
                                               
426 See the discussion in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 above.
427 See the discussion of the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle in Section 
3.2.2 above. See also the Stockholm Declaration, the Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC, which are 
also discussed in the section on the CBDR principle in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 above.
428 See the discussions in Section 3.2 of equity in international law. 
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should host the same number of projects as a country with a very large population. 
This is mainly due to the fact that a country with a larger population will almost 
invariably have larger GHG emissions and also need more resources to sustain its 
population. This could be taken to suggest that countries such as China, India and 
Indonesia should, simply because of their larger populations, host more projects than 
countries like Panama, Jamaica and Lesotho, which have much smaller populations in 
comparison.429 However, population should not be a separate consideration for 
equitable distribution of projects. This is firstly because it is not a factor that is 
generally considered in equity or distributive justice in international law. The only 
regime that makes a reference to population is the international watercourses regime, 
where the population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State is a 
factor to be considered in determining equitable utilisation.430 In this context, the 
international watercourses regime probably differs from the CDM, because of the 
nature of the resource being divided. Specifically, under the international 
watercourses regime, the resource in question is water, which is, obviously, 
fundamental for survival. This is in contrast with the CDM, where the issue is one of
economic benefit and development, rather than of survival. The element of population 
is not seen in any other regime and cannot therefore be considered a general element 
of distributive justice in international law. 
More important, however, is the fact that population is not independently linked to 
either of the CDM’s objectives (of reducing GHG emissions and promoting 
sustainable development), and is not directly relevant to achievement of these 
                                               
429 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html ‘Country 
comparison: population’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 03/02/2011).
430 See Watercourses Convention, Article 5. 
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objectives. Whereas emission reduction potential and need are directly linked to, and 
relevant for, the CDM’s objectives of reducing GHG emission and promoting 
sustainable development, population does not have any such direct link, except to the 
extent already covered by the elements of emission reduction potential and need. 
Firstly, population is, to a very great extent, already factored into countries’ GHG 
emission levels and emission reduction potentials. One of the drivers of emissions in 
countries is the size of their population and population growth.431 This is partly 
because the larger the size of the population, the more energy is consumed, and more 
than 60% of GHG emissions come from energy production and consumption.432 For 
example, a country such as China is the world’s largest GHG emitter partly because it 
has the world’s largest population.433 A country like China can therefore be expected 
to host more projects than a country like Ethiopia, not simply because of its larger 
population, as this will not directly contribute to achievement of either of the CDM’s 
objectives, but because it has a larger emission reduction potential and can therefore 
contribute to the CDM’s objective of reducing GHG emissions.
                                               
431 See Metz et al., supra note 91, at 178-179; and OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris: 
International Energy Agency, 2007), 180 and 401. 
432 See OECD/IEA, Ibid, at 3. 
433 There are other factors involved, such as rapid industrialisation and the nature of energy consumed. 
See OECD/IEA, Ibid, at 82, where it is noted that the increase in China’s [projected] energy demand in 
2006-2030 dwarfs that of all other countries and regions, because of its rapid economic and population 
growth.
For example, China’s per capita emissions are low (5.5 tonnes per person) compared to other 
developing countries such as Qatar (68.9 tonnes per person – the highest in the world) and Equatorial 
Guinea (18 tonnes per person). However, looking at total emissions, China’s are the highest globally 
(7.2 billion tonnes), while Qatar’s is 61 million tonnes and Equatorial Guinea’s is 11 million tonnes. 
These figures are obviously a function of these countries’ population – 1.3 billion in China, 848,016 in 
Qatar and 668,225 in Equatorial Guinea. For countries’ per capita emissions, see CAIT Version 7.0. 
For countries’ population, see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html ‘Country comparison: population’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 
03/02/2011). 
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With relation to need and the CDM’s objective of promoting sustainable 
development, population again is not a directly relevant factor. For example, although 
Brazil has the fifth largest population in the world (fourth largest in the developing 
world), it has low need because of its high human development.434 Its large population 
should not therefore be a basis for it to be expected to host more projects than 
Pakistan, which has the next highest population, but has high need because of its low 
human development. In this context, population is irrelevant, as the relevant 
consideration is countries’ sustainable development potential and how much the CDM 
can contribute to this. Adding the population element would simply distort the picture 
of how CDM projects should be distributed among developing countries. 
In addition, presumably, as a country hosts more CDM projects, its sustainable
development levels will improve and its “need” will reduce. For example, assume that 
10 CDM projects would contribute as much to Ethiopia’s sustainable development as 
100 CDM projects would to China’s (because of the difference in the size of their 
populations). If Ethiopia and China were each to host 10 CDM projects, then 
Ethiopia’s “need” would reduce significantly because of the contribution of these 
projects to its sustainable development, while China’s would not reduce at the same 
rate (because it requires more projects to achieve a comparable level of sustainable 
development). Under the CDM, China would then be expected to continue to receive 
more projects while Ethiopia would not (or would not be expected to receive as 
many). This adequately takes account of these countries’ populations, and there is 
therefore no benefit to taking each country’s population into account, independently 
of their need.
                                               
434 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3 for the classification of countries according to their need. 
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Consequently, population is not a separate element that requires to be considered in 
efforts to achieve equitable geographic distribution.
(a) Potential
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ noted that equity does not 
necessarily imply equality. In deciding the case, which dealt with three countries with 
relatively similar coastlines, the Court stated that, 
...there can never be any question of completely refashioning nature, 
and equity does not require that a State without access to the sea should 
be allotted an area of continental shelf, any more than there could be a 
question of rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline 
similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline. Equality is to be 
reckoned within the same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as 
these that equity could remedy.435
The Court’s point here is that where countries are different in certain relevant
respects, there should be no expectation of treating such countries equally in such 
respects. With regard to the CDM, equitable geographic distribution does not mean 
that countries with limited potential to host CDM projects should be expected to host 
the same number of projects as those that have greater potential. Equity does not 
require this.
Consequently, a country which for example produces very little GHG emissions may 
not have much in the way of potential CDM projects and should not be expected to 
host more CDM projects than it has the potential for. To ensure that the CDM 
                                               
435 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 49-50.
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objective of GHG emission reduction is achieved, countries’ emission reduction 
potential, determined by their GHG emission levels, must be taken into consideration. 
Countries’ emissions data is available from the World Resources Institute’s Climate 
Analysis Indicators Tool.436 This tool contains the GHG emissions of most countries 
and can help with calculating a country’s potential for GHG emission reductions.437
Data from the CAIT shows that all eligible developing countries have the potential to 
reduce their GHG emissions. Chapter 4 discusses this issue further and classifies 
countries according to their GHG emission reduction potential. 
(b) Need
The role of the consideration of need in efforts to achieve equity is recognised in 
many international treaties and by many authors. According to Schachter, “it is 
undeniable that the fulfilment of the needs of the poor and disadvantaged countries 
has been recognised as a normative principle which is central to the idea of equity and 
distributive justice.”438 Shelton notes that need as a basis for equitable allocation is 
recognised in the Rio Declaration and other treaties, including the UNFCCC.439
As highlighted above, “need” is a recurring and important consideration in the search 
for an equitable outcome in most of the regimes examined in Section 3.5, and is also a 
                                               
436 CAIT Version 7.0.
437 Several studies have been conducted on CDM potential, mainly on a regional level. See for 
example, E. Haites, Estimating the market potential for the clean development mechanism: review of 
models and lessons learned’ (June 2004), http://www.iea.org/papers/2004/cdm.pdf, www.iea.org (IEA, 
04/08/2010), which summarises a few of these studies. 
438 Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources, supra note 412, at 16. See generally, M.G. Erasmus, 
‘The New International Economic Order’ (1976) 2 South African YBIL, 111-127; and D.H. Hunter ‘The 
Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone Layer’ (1988) 63 Washington Law Review 
997, 1005–1007
439 See Shelton, supra note 19, at 655. See also Stone, supra note 57, at 291; French, (2000), supra note 
55, at 52; and T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), 74.
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key consideration in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and in 
the climate change regime.440 The common heritage of mankind concept, as contained 
in the moon and deep seabed regimes, requires consideration of the needs and 
interests of a specific group or groups of countries (in this case, developing countries), 
in order to achieve equitable sharing of the common heritage.441
In the context of this research, “need” is used in the context of countries’ sustainable 
development needs or their sustainable development potential, as sustainable 
development is one of the primary objectives of the CDM.442 Although there is no 
generally acceptable definition of sustainable development, the definition most 
commonly applied is that contained in the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission), as follows: 
“sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”443 This 
definition highlights “need” as an important element of the principle.444 Silayan, in 
outlining his criteria for CDM project distribution, identifies sustainable development 
                                               
440 See the discussions above. 
441 See the Moon Treaty, Article 11(7)(d) and UNCLOS, Article 140(1). This concept is discussed in 
full in Section 3.5.4 above. 
442 See Karakosta et al., supra note 415, at 77; and Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 47. See also B. 
Metz et al., ‘Towards an equitable global climate change regime: compatibility with Article 2 of the 
Climate Change Convention and the link with sustainable development’ (2002) 2 Climate Policy 211, 
where the authors highlight development needs as a key dimension to achieving an equitable global 
climate change regime. 
443 See ‘Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development’ from Our Common 
Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, paragraph 1
444 According to the Report, sustainable development contains two key concepts: needs, in particular 
the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and limitations 
imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present 
and future needs. 
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as one of such criteria.445 This criterion however raises the question of how to 
measure a country’s need. 
Shelton notes that determining need may require the development of objective criteria 
and a continuous assessment of the situation.446 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, while not explicitly defining need, identify categories of countries whose 
needs and interests should be taken into particular consideration, including: SIDS, 
countries with low-lying coastal areas, and land-locked and transit countries.447
During COP/MOP 1 in 2005, African countries and LDCs were identified by Parties 
as requiring special attention.448 More specifically, the CDM identifies three groups of 
countries as requiring particular consideration: SIDS, LDCs and African countries.449
Regarding what constitutes the special need of LDCs, SIDS and African countries, the 
most obvious is the need for sustainable development. This is particularly so in the 
case of LDCs, which are the countries with the lowest human development and are 
therefore the most in need of sustainable development.450 Most African countries and 
SIDS are among the countries with the lowest human development. For example, 33 
of the 53 countries in the African region are on the UN LDCs list;451 that is 33 out of a 
total of 49 LDCs. Likewise, 12 of the 38 SIDS are also LDCs. Several SIDS are 
                                               
445 Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 47. See also Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 22.
446 See Shelton, supra note 19, at 656.
447 See for example, UNFCCC, Preamble, paragraph 19, and Articles 4(8) and 4(9). 
448 See S. Aguilar et al., ‘Summary of the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol’ (December 2005) http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12291e.pdf, 
www.iisd.ca (17/01/2010).
449 See Decision 1/CMP.2, paragraphs 39 and 41; Decision 2/CMP.3, paragraph 34; and Decision 
2/CMP.4, paragraphs 53, 55 and 56. 
450 See the criteria for classifying countries as LDCs in note 140 above. See http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm ‘The Criteria for the identification of the LDCs’ (UN, 01/07/2010). 
See also T. de Lopez et al., ‘Clean development mechanism and least developed countries: changing 
the rules for greater participation’ (2009) 18 J. Env’t & Dev. 436, 438.
451 See ‘Least developed countries’ note 148 above. 
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actually classified among those countries with the highest human development.452
Classifying countries broadly by these groups therefore will not accurately 
differentiate among countries according to their need, as within these groups, 
countries’ sustainable development potentials and their needs vary widely. 
Countries’ need can be measured in different ways. These include the Human 
Development Index (HDI), Gross National Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). 
The HDI is an index that measures human development in three basic dimensions: a 
long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The index 
combines measures of a country’s life expectancy at birth (health), adult literacy rate 
and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (education), and 
GDP per capita (standard of living). The basic use of HDI is to rank countries by level 
of “human development.”453 The HDI has not been generally accepted as a measure of 
human development and has been criticised for, inter alia, not including 
environmental indicators in its assessment.454 Nonetheless, it is a widely used measure 
of human development and is regarded as a more complete assessment of a country’s 
development than GDP or GNP, because unlike these two indicators, it assesses not 
only economic, but also social development.455 The ISEW, on the other hand, can be 
                                               
452 Such as Barbados, the Bahamas and Antigua and Barbuda. See the UN Development Programme 
human development index http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ ‘Human Development Report 2009 - HDI 
rankings’ (UNDP, 01/07/2010). 
453 Ibid. 
454 See M. McGillivray, ‘Measuring development? The UNDP’s Human Development Index’ (1993) 5 
J. Int’l Dev. 183; and A.D. Sagara and A. Najam ‘The human development index: a critical review’ 
(1998) 25 Ecological Economics 249. 
455 See R.A. Dias et al., ‘The limits of human development and the use of energy and natural resources’ 
(2006) 24 Energy Policy 1026; S. Globerman, ‘Global foreign direct investment flows: the role of 
governance infrastructure’ (2002) 30 World Development 1899; V. Constantini and S. Monni, 
‘Measuring human and sustainable development: an integrated approach for European countries’ 2004) 
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regarded as a more complete measure of sustainable development than the HDI, 
because it includes what the HDI lacks – environmental considerations, such as air 
pollution and climate change.456 It covers consideration of income inequality, health, 
education, air pollution, depletion of resources and cost of climate change, among 
others.457 Although more complete than the HDI, the ISEW too has been criticised, 
inter alia, as lacking a sound theoretical basis and as being dependent on arbitrary 
assumptions.458 In any case, this research cannot use the ISEW to measure countries’ 
need because the ISEW has not been calculated for most countries - it has only been 
calculated for about nine countries so far.459
Therefore, this thesis will use the HDI to measure countries’ need and sustainable 
development potential, because it is the most complete and available index of 
sustainable development that could be identified.
(c) Preferential treatment
Equity sometimes requires positive discrimination. This is not unusual, especially in 
dealings between developed and developing countries, where developing countries 
                                                                                                                                      
http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/economia/pdf/wp41.pdf, http://www.uniroma1.it/ (Università di 
Roma, 24/02/2010); Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 8; D.D. Moran, ‘Measuring sustainable 
development - nation by nation’ (2008) 64 Ecological Economics 470; J.M. Harris, ‘Basic principles of 
sustainable development’ (June 2000) 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/Working_Papers/Sustainable%20Development.PDF, 
www.tufts.edu (24/02/2010), 15-16; N.C. Lind, ‘Some thoughts on the Human Development Index’ 
(1992) 27 Social Indicators Research 89; and Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 46. 
456 On the ISEW, see H. Daly and J. Cobb, For The Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward 
Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (revised edition) (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1994). 
457 See http://www.foe.co.uk/progress/java/ServletStoryISEW Friends of the Earth ISEW website 
(Friends of the Earth, 02/02/2011). 
458 See E. Neumayer, ‘The ISEW – not an index of sustainable economic welfare’ (1999) 48 Social 
Indicators Research 77; and J. Porritt, Capitalism as if the World Matters (London: Earthscan, 2007), 
251.  
459 See http://www.foe.co.uk/community/tools/isew/international.html ‘International examples’ 
(Friends of the Earth, 02/02/2011).
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often receive some form of preferential treatment, usually in consideration of their 
special needs, interests and circumstances. Cullet notes that “differential treatment is 
intrinsically linked to the notion of equity.”460 According to Rajamani, real 
differences exist between states and “norms of differential treatment recognize and 
respond to these real differences between states by instituting different standards for 
different states or groups of states.”461 For example, the Montreal Protocol allows 
developing countries to delay by 10 years, their compliance with the control measures 
contained in the Protocol.462 Under the UNFCCC, developing countries are generally 
given far fewer obligations than developed countries, and under the Kyoto Protocol 
are not given any additional obligations, whereas developed countries are.463 The 
CDM, too, is an instrument of differentiation, differentiating between developed and 
developing countries by giving developing countries the opportunity to participate in 
climate change mitigation without taking on the kind of binding emission reduction 
commitments developed countries and have, and also providing them with the 
sustainable development benefits that CDM projects are supposed to provide.464
In his discussion of differential treatment in international law,465 Cullet notes that, 
“rules which treat all partners in the same way and only allow for divergence from the 
established patterns in special circumstances are suitable as long as the partners have 
the same capacity to benefit from the standards in place.” He concludes that, “certain 
classes of actors need to be singled out on account of differences which affect their 
                                               
460 See Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, supra note 51, at 29. 
461 See Rajamani, supra note 44, at 1. 
462 Montreal Protocol, Article 5. 
463 UNFCCC, Articles 3 and 4; and Kyoto Protocol, Article 10. 
464 See the discussion at pages 46-47, 63 and 76 above. 
465 Cullet notes that although differential treatment and preferential treatment have different conceptual 
bases, both lead to broadly similar outcomes in practice. See P. Cullet, ‘Differential treatment in 
international law: towards a new paradigm of inter-state relations’ (1999) 10 EJIL 549, 551.
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capacity to enjoy the rights established by the rules in force.” He gives the example of 
access to a market and notes that identical rules of access may not be fair when people 
do not have the same economic capacity to enter the market and states that this is the 
basis for the establishment of rules which give disadvantaged members of the 
community the capacity to compete.466 Highlighting the importance of differentiation 
in the allocation of burdens and benefits, Cullet also notes that economic inequalities 
are the “backbone of differentiation.”467 According to Schachter, many international 
decisions affecting the allocation and distribution of resources seek to meet specific 
needs on a preferential basis. He asserts that “differential treatment may be essential 
for real equality.”468 Accordingly, there is support for giving preferential treatment on 
the basis of need, in order to achieve equity. This can already be seen under the CDM. 
For example, LDCs are exempt from payment of the share of proceeds levy under the 
CDM,469 as well as the CDM registration fee.470
                                               
466 Ibid, at 557-558. 
467 Ibid, at 574. He notes that differential treatment goes beyond giving a specific category of countries 
privileges such as different obligations or the right to delay implementation of obligations, and also 
differentiates between differential and preferential treatment, noting that whereas preferential treatment 
relied on claims by developing countries against developed countries, differential treatment is based on 
mutually accepted non-reciprocity. He further notes however the “strong affinities” between 
differential and preferential treatment, stating that in practice, both lead to broadly similar results. See 
pages 551 and 556. 
468 See Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources, supra note 412, at 7 and 16. See also Shelton, supra 
note 19, at 647; and French, (2000), supra note 55, at 52-54; and Cullet, supra note 465, at 549. See 
Rio Declaration, paragraph 6, which states that, “the special situation and needs of developing 
countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given 
special priority. International actions in the field of environment and development should also address 
the interests and needs of all countries.” See also the Convention on Biological Diversity, Preamble, 
paragraph 16, which acknowledges that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing 
countries.
469 Article 12(8) of the Protocol provides that a share of the proceeds of CDM projects should be used 
to cover administrative expenses, as well as to assist in meeting the cost of adaptation in developing 
countries. The share of proceeds to support adaptation in developing countries is 2% of CERs issued 
(Paragraph 15(a) of Decision 17/CP.7). The share of proceeds to cover administrative expenses, 
including the registration fee, is US $0.10 per CER issued for the first 15,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
and US $0.20 per CER issued for any amount in excess of 15,000 tonnes (Paragraph 37 of Decision
7/CMP.1).
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Regarding which countries or categories of countries should receive such preferential 
treatment, as preferential treatment is to be given on the basis of need, it follows that 
preference should be given to the countries with the greatest need or lowest level of 
development,471 such as those countries with the lowest HDI.472
It is also important to determine what kind of preferential treatment countries should 
receive.473 The aim of preferential treatment is to improve countries’ access to the 
CDM and ensure a more equitable distribution of projects among countries. Whatever 
preferential treatment is given should be such that would help countries increase their 
access to the CDM and overcome barriers to CDM hosting. Barriers to CDM hosting 
include lack of capacity and lack of financing474 and these barriers can for instance, be 
overcome through targeted capacity building and financial support for this category of 
countries.475 For example, under the CDM, the Nairobi Framework was established 
inter alia to provide capacity building support to sub-Saharan African countries.476
Regarding financial support, at COP/MOP 5, the CDM Executive Board was asked to 
provide loans to countries with fewer than 10 registered projects, to help these 
countries cover: the costs of developing project design documents; and the costs of 
                                                                                                                                      
470 See Decision 17/CP.7, Paragraphs 15(b) and Decision 2/CMP.3, Paragraph 31. 
471 de Lopez et al., supra note 450, at 439. See also Shelton, supra note 19, at 647; and French, supra 
Chapter 2, note 19, at 87. 
472 Table 2 below classifies countries according to the need/HDI, and the countries with high and very 
high need should probably be the ones to receive preferential treatment. 
473
474 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the barriers to equitable distribution of CDM projects. See 
http://www.cd4cdm.org/index.htm ‘Enhancing a more equitable regional distribution of CDM project 
activities: overview of UNEP’s CDM activities’ (UNFCCC, 21/01/2010); Ellis and Kamel, supra 
Chapter 2, note 50; C. Brunt and A. Knechel, ‘Delivering sustainable development benefits through the 
clean development mechanism’ (November 2005) http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/SDBenifits_bg.pdf, 
www.pembina.org (27/02/2010), 5; and H. Kimura et al., ‘Clean development mechanism’ in A. 
Srinivasan (ed.) Asian Aspirations for Climate Regime beyond 2012 (Japan: IGES, 2006), 35, 37-38.
475 See Bakker et al., supra note 59. 
476 See the Concept Note for the Nairobi Framework Mobilization Event held at the 26th meeting of the 
UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies, in May 2006: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/Nai_framework_mobSB26.pdf.
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the validation and first verification of projects.477 Such preferential treatment, which 
should be targeted at the countries with the greatest need, should be provided to help 
achieve a more equitable distribution of projects. Importantly also, it should be 
genuine preferential treatment, aimed at reducing, not increasing, dependency (that is, 
it should not amount to “handouts”). The various forms of preferential treatment 
currently provided under the CDM regime are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, 
where the barriers to equitable geographic distribution, together with the initiatives to 
overcome these barriers, are discussed.
3.6.2 Definition of Equitable Geographic Distribution
As noted above, in general, distributive justice in international law does not have a set 
definition or outcome. Instead, most regimes provide that certain factors should be 
considered in order to achieve an equitable outcome. Likewise, under the CDM, there 
can be no set outcome in terms of prescribing exactly how many projects or exactly 
what percentage of projects each developing country should host. Rather, equitable 
distribution of CDM projects would be the result of a process that gives all developing 
countries an equal right to participate in the CDM regime and to benefit from the 
sustainable development benefits of the CDM. This equal right does not mean an 
equal number of projects. Instead, it means a share of projects proportionate to each 
country’s GHG emission reduction potential and need (sustainable development 
potential). These two elements represent the two objectives of the CDM and both 
need to be equally taken into consideration. In addition to these two elements, efforts 
                                               
477 See Decision 2/CMP.5, Paragraphs 49-50. However see Chapter 5 for a critique of this preferential 
treatment, particular regarding the lack of differentiation on the basis of potential or need among 
countries with fewer than 10 projects.
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to achieve equitable distribution should also give preferential treatment, such as 
capacity building and financial support, to those countries with the greatest need, 
provided they also have emission reduction potential. This is in order to help these 
countries fulfil their CDM potential.478
In conclusion, an equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects is a distribution 
among countries based on their GHG emission reduction potential and their need or 
sustainable development potential. A distribution that is the result of the consideration 
of these two elements can then be regarded as equitable. These two elements make up 
countries’ CDM potential and it is these elements that should determine the priority to 
be given to countries in terms of CDM hosting. Countries with the greatest need 
should then also be given preferential treatment, as long as they have some emission 
reduction potential. Such preferential treatment could be in the form, inter alia, of 
financial and capacity building support, and should be aimed at enabling these 
countries to fulfil this emission reduction potential. 
3.6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has identified two [inter-linked] sets of criteria. The first set is the 
elements that should be considered when selecting host countries to invest in and that 
determine how equitable the distribution of projects is. These elements are countries’ 
GHG emission reduction potential and their need (sustainable development potential).
Paying serious, deliberate and explicit attention to equity in the distribution of 
projects will compel investors to consider developing countries’ need, together with 
                                               
478 Preferential treatment is not used to calculate CDM potential. Instead, preferential treatment should 
be given to countries with the greatest need to help them fulfil their CDM potential (calculated using 
countries’ emission reduction and sustainable development potentials). See the discussion in Chapter 4 
for more on countries’ CDM potential. 
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their emission reduction potential, when selecting countries to invest in. These two 
elements are used in Chapter 4 to answer the two research sub-questions: “what 
should an ideal distribution of projects among countries be?” and “does the current 
distribution of CDM projects meet this ideal geographic distribution of projects?” 
The second set is those factors that should be considered in efforts to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of projects (than what currently obtains). This set comprises the 
elements of GHG emission reduction potential and need, together with preferential 
treatment. These three factors make up the analytical framework used to undertake the 
critique of the CDM regime in Chapter 5, and to answer the two research sub-
questions: “what are the main reasons for the inequitable geographic distribution of 
CDM projects?” and “are these reasons/barriers being addressed within the CDM 
regime, and if so, how?”
As already highlighted (in Section 3.1 above), countries are operating under a 
presumption that the distribution of CDM projects among countries is not equitable,
and many efforts have been taken to achieve an equitable distribution. In order to 
ascertain whether this presumption is in fact correct, the next chapter will determine 
how projects should be distributed among countries, using countries’ emission 
reduction and sustainable development potentials as the measurements. This will then 
be compared to the current distribution to determine how the current distribution 
compares to this ideal distribution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
Distribution of CDM Projects in Practice – Is the Current 
Geographic Distribution Equitable?
4.1 Introduction
Having determined an appropriate meaning and elements of equitable geographic 
distribution in Chapter 3, this research now examines whether the current distribution 
of CDM projects among countries is in accordance with that meaning and elements. 
This chapter contains a practical application of the conceptual discussions undertaken 
and conclusions reached in Chapter 3. Applying the elements of equitable geographic 
distribution identified in Chapter 3, this chapter determines whether the current 
geographic distribution of CDM projects is equitable or inequitable. As identified in 
Chapter 3, the elements of equitable distribution which determine countries’ CDM 
potential are emission reduction potential and need.1 The current geographic 
distribution of projects2 is compared to this ideal distribution, with the aim of 
determining whether or not the current distribution fits this ideal. 
The questions this chapter answers are “what is the ideal distribution of CDM projects
among countries?” and “is the current distribution of CDM projects equitable?”
                                               
1 As explained in Chapter 3, the element of preferential treatment is not used to determine countries’ 
CDM potential, and so will not be used in this Chapter. Rather, its purpose is to promote a more 
equitable distribution, by helping countries with the greatest need to fulfil their CDM potential. This 
element will therefore play a role in the critique of the CDM regime undertaken in Chapter 5.
2 In looking at the current distribution of projects, the focus is on the number of projects and no account 
is taken of the size of projects. 
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4.2 Emission Reduction Potential
As identified in Chapter 3, one of the elements of equitable geographic distribution is 
countries’ emission reduction potential. This element should be taken into 
consideration when determining whether a geographic distribution is equitable. 
Consequently, this section analyses countries’ emission reduction potential, as the 
first step to calculating their CDM potential and ascertaining whether the current 
distribution of projects matches their potential.
Chapter 3 notes that all developing countries produce GHG emissions. Therefore all 
have the potential to reduce their GHG emissions. It is however unlikely that every 
country will be able to host as many projects as it has the potential to, largely due to 
practical issues, specifically the size of the CDM market. As of November 2010, the 
CDM generated approximately 390 million CER units annually, which is equivalent 
to annual reductions of 390 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents.
3 Annual developing 
country GHG emissions for 2005 are estimated to be about 25 billion tonnes of CO2
equivalent,4 which means that annually, only about 1.36% of developing countries’ 
emissions are being reduced through the CDM. The monetary value of CERs depends 
on the CDM market and usually varies depending on many factors, such as the type of 
CERs and whether the investor provides upfront finance or simply buys CERs already 
issued. However, although there is no set price, according to the World Bank, CER 
                                               
3 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html ‘CDM Statistics’ (UNFCCC, 10/11/2010).
4 Data obtained from CAIT Version 7.0. See the CAIT website: http://cait.wri.org/. 
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prices in 2009 averaged US$12.7 per tonne of CO2, down from the 2008 average of 
US$16.1 per tonne.5
This section classifies countries according to their GHG emission reduction potential. 
This is the first step in the process of calculating countries’ CDM potential, in order to 
determine whether the current distribution of projects is consistent with this potential, 
and is equitable or inequitable. The data used here is obtained from the World 
Resources Institute Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.6 This database contains the total 
GHG emissions of all eligible developing countries,7 with the exception of Serbia and 
Montenegro. For these two countries, their 2005 GHG emission levels are computed 
together and there is therefore no emissions data available for each country - only 
joint emissions data is available.8
The available data however has some shortcomings. For all countries, their total CO2
emissions data is available up to 2006. For non-CO2 emissions (such as methane and 
nitrous oxide), this data is only available up to 2005 and is not available for all 
countries. In addition, for some countries, their emissions data from land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities is also not available. However, the CAIT database 
contains the most up to date and comprehensive information found.9 As a result, the 
                                               
5 See A. Kossoy and P. Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010 (Washington: World 
Bank, 2010), 39. 
6 CAIT Version 7.0 (2005 data). 
7 “Eligible developing countries” refers to those countries that are eligible to participate in the CDM, 
that is, those countries that currently meet the CDM requirements (Protocol ratification and DNA 
establishment). See Appendix A for a list of these countries. The data is correct as of July 2010. 
8 This is because the data used is 2005 data, and at this time, Serbia and Montenegro were a single 
country. The countries became independent of each other in 2006. 
9 The GHG emissions data submitted by countries themselves as part of their UNFCCC reporting 
commitments is out of date, as most of the data submitted was for 1994. Although some countries have 
submitted more recent data, for the majority of countries, the data submitted by them is out of date. See 
Sixth compilation and synthesis of initial national communications from Parties not included in Annex 
I to the Convention (FCCC/SBI/2005/18, 25 October 2005), paragraphs 32-34. According to CAIT, the 
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emissions data for 2005, which is the year with the most comprehensive record of all 
GHG emissions for all countries, will be used.10
For ease of analysis, countries will be divided into 5 categories, representing the 
emission reduction potential of each category: 1 billion tonnes and over (very high); 
500 million – 1 billion tonnes (high); 100 million – 500 million tonnes (medium); 1 -
100 million tonnes (low); under 1 million tonnes (very low). The actual GHG 
emissions values are contained in Appendix B. 
Table 1: eligible developing countries and their GHG emission reduction 
potential
Very High (5) High (4) Medium (3) Low (2) Very Low (1)
China Mexico Nigeria Turkmenistan Maldives 
Brazil Republic of 
Korea 
South Africa Guatemala Cape Verde 
Indonesia Iran Saudi Arabia Kuwait Antigua & 
Barbuda 
India Malaysia Chile Saint Lucia 
Thailand Israel Samoa 
Argentina Ethiopia Grenada 
Dem. Republic 
of the Congo
Syria 
Myanmar Zimbabwe 
Pakistan Honduras 
Egypt Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Philippines Morocco 
Bolivia Qatar 
Uzbekistan Papua New 
Guinea 
Vietnam Oman
Colombia Singapore 
                                                                                                                                      
GHG emissions data is obtained from many sources, including the United Nations, the International 
Energy Agency, and World Bank. Data for a single country could be drawn from as many as seven 
sources. See http://cait.wri.org/faq-about-cait.php#1 ‘FAQ: About CAIT’ (CAIT, 26/01/2011). 
10 Accessed at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode=view&sort=cou-
asc&pHints=shut&url=form&year=2005&sector=natl&co2=1&ch4=1&n2o=1&pfc=1&hfc=1&sf6=1
&lucf=1, www.wri.org (CAIT, 30/07/2010). 
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Zambia Azerbaijan 
United Arab 
Emirates
Uruguay 
Peru Kenya 
Bangladesh Cuba 
Algeria Nepal 
Angola Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Ecuador Tunisia 
Sudan Côte d’Ivoire 
North Korea Madagascar 
Tanzania Uganda 
Cambodia Mongolia 
Cameroon Yemen 
Paraguay 
Dominican 
Republic 
Sri Lanka 
Mozambique 
Jordan 
Mali 
Senegal 
Ghana 
Bahrain 
Chad 
Lebanon 
Guinea 
Burkina Faso 
Laos 
Gabon 
Nicaragua 
Moldova 
Jamaica 
Botswana 
Namibia 
Macedonia
Benin 
El Salvador 
Panama 
Costa Rica 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Albania 
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Georgia 
Mauritania 
Cyprus 
Armenia 
Niger 
Malawi 
Togo 
Guyana 
Eritrea 
Rwanda 
Mauritius 
Sierra Leone 
Suriname 
Malta 
Fiji 
Swaziland 
Burundi 
Bahamas 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Bhutan 
Lesotho 
Barbados 
Gambia 
Djibouti
Belize 
Source of data: CAIT Version 7.0 (2005)
Source of classification: Author
4.3 Need
Chapter 3 identifies the second element of equitable geographic distribution of 
projects as countries’ need or sustainable development potential. In this Section, 
countries are classified according to their need (sustainable development potential). 
As explained in Chapter 3, the most complete measurement of countries’ development 
this research was able to identify is UNDP’s Human Development Index and it is this 
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that is used in this section to measure countries’ sustainable development.11 The latest 
HDI data available is for 2007, and it is this data that is used in this section.12 HDI 
data is available for all eligible developing countries with the exception of Zimbabwe 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).
UNDP classifies countries into four groups, which are defined based on values, as 
follows: Low HDI (0.000 to 0.499); Medium HDI (0.500 to 0.799); High HDI (0.800 
to 0.899); and Very High HDI (0.900 to 1.000). Currently 75 countries fall into the 
medium HDI group, while 20-40 countries fall into each of the other groups. Because 
so many countries fall in the medium HDI group, compared to the other groups, and 
to make it easier to analyse the data more precisely, this section further splits this 
group into two. To achieve this, UNDP’s low HDI group is renamed “very low HDI” 
and UNDP’s medium HDI group (0.500 – 0.799) is split into two equal groups and 
these become the low (0.500 – 0.649) and medium (0.650 – 0.799) HDI groups. As a 
result, this section classifies countries into five groups according to their HDI, which 
also enables cross comparison with the data on developing country GHG emissions, 
where countries are also categorised into 5. 
The groups and values used by this thesis to categorise countries are as follows: very 
low HDI = very high need (0.000 to 0.499); low HDI = high need (0.500 to 0.649); 
medium HDI = medium need (0.650 to 0.799); high HDI = low need (0.800 to 0.899);
                                               
11 See the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) website http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (UNDP, 
30/07/2010). 
12 See ‘Human development index 2007 and its components’ 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/87.html, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ (UNDP, 30/07/2010). Although it 
is possible to use the 2005 HDI data in order to be consistent with countries’ GHG emissions data, the 
2007 data is a more accurate measurement of countries’ current development levels than the 2005 data. 
As the purpose of this section is not to compare countries’ sustainable development potential to their 
GHG emission reduction potential, but to carry out a comparison among countries, this author 
determines that it is better in this situation to be accurate. 
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very high HDI = very low need (0.900 to 1.000). Countries’ actual HDI values are 
contained in Appendix C. 
Table 2: eligible developing countries and their sustainable development 
potential/need
Very Low 
Need (1)
Low Need 
(2)
Medium Need 
(3)
High Need (4) Very High 
Need (5)
Singapore Bahrain Armenia Bhutan Togo
Republic of 
Korea
Chile Azerbaijan Laos Malawi
Israel Antigua and 
Barbuda
Thailand India Benin
Kuwait Argentina Iran Cambodia Côte d’Ivoire
Cyprus Uruguay Georgia Myanmar Zambia
Qatar Cuba Dominican 
Republic
Yemen Eritrea
United Arab 
Emirates
Bahamas China Pakistan Senegal
Barbados Mexico Belize Swaziland Rwanda
Malta Costa Rica Samoa Angola Gambia
Saudi Arabia Maldives Nepal Liberia
Panama Jordan Madagascar Guinea
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Suriname Bangladesh Ethiopia
Montenegro Tunisia Kenya Mozambique
Malaysia Jamaica Papua New 
Guinea
Guinea-
Bissau
Serbia Paraguay Sudan Burundi
Saint Lucia Sri Lanka Tanzania Chad
Albania Gabon Ghana Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo
Macedonia Algeria Cameroon Burkina Faso
Grenada Philippines Mauritania Mali
Brazil El Salvador Djibouti Sierra Leone
Colombia Syria Lesotho Niger
Peru Fiji Uganda
Ecuador Turkmenistan Nigeria
Mauritius Indonesia
Lebanon Honduras
Bolivia
Guyana
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Mongolia
Viet Nam
Moldova
Equatorial 
Guinea
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Cape Verde
Guatemala
Egypt
Nicaragua
Botswana
Tajikistan
Namibia
South Africa
Morocco
Source of data: UNDP HDI (2007)
Source of classification: Author
4.4 CDM Potential and the Current Geographic Distribution of 
Projects
Having classified countries according to their emission reduction potential and their 
need (the two criteria for equitable distribution of CDM projects), this thesis then 
shows the complete CDM potential of all countries. To do this, a simple arithmetic 
calculation is done using the values assigned to each country grouping in Tables 1 and 
2, and adding these numbers to show overall out of 10, what each country’s potential 
is. 
Countries are then classified again into 5 groups to show what the distribution of 
projects among countries should look like, based on their CDM potential. The 
categories and values used are as follows: very high CDM potential (9-10); high 
CDM potential (7-8); medium CDM potential (5-6); low CDM potential (3-4); and 
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very low CDM potential (1-2). This is compared to the current geographic distribution 
of projects, to show whether or not this distribution is equitable. This is presented in 
Table 3 below. 
The first point to note about this table is that it is intended as a rough representation of 
countries’ CDM potential. It cannot, and is not intended to, be used to determine 
exactly how many projects countries should host compared to other countries. Instead, 
the purpose of Table 3 is to provide a guide as to which countries should be 
performing well under the CDM, due to both their emission reduction potential and 
need taken together. The ultimate objective is to use this information to reach a 
conclusion about whether or not those countries that should be doing well are the ones 
doing well and if not, to ascertain the possible reasons for this. However, the exact 
number of projects that a particular country can or should host will depend on the 
country’s own emission reduction potential and need. 
This is particularly so because, due to countries’ varying emission reduction potential, 
the number of projects they can host will also vary. Therefore, countries which, 
according to Table 3, have the same CDM potential, are not necessarily expected to 
host the same number of projects, because, inter alia, of their varying emission 
reduction potentials which determine how many projects they can physically host. For 
example, although Guinea-Bissau and Iran have the same CDM potential value of 7, 
this does not mean both countries should host the same number of projects. While 
Guinea-Bissau has a low emission reduction potential, Iran has a high potential and 
this necessarily affects the numbers of projects these countries can host. This however 
does not change the fact that Guinea-Bissau should be performing well under the 
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CDM because it has a high CDM potential, considering both its emission reduction 
potential and need. Because Guinea-Bissau has high need, it should receive priority 
(preferential treatment) to facilitate its participation in the CDM and to enable it to 
achieve the emission reduction potential that it does have. However, the precise 
meaning of “well,” in terms of exact number of projects, will depend on the country’s 
emission reduction potential and how many projects it can physically host. And 
because the country currently hosts no project and the CDM is only reducing about 
1.36% of developing country emissions, it is obvious that the country can, and should, 
do much better than it is currently doing.  
The scale of the projects hosted, whether large- or small-scale, also affects the number 
of projects a country can host. One single large-scale project can reduce the same 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions as several small-scale projects, and therefore, 
when determining how many projects countries can or should host, the size or scale of 
the projects also play an important role. However, this detail is not provided in Table 
3 because it is not relevant to the information the table aims to present – the aim is not 
to specify how many projects countries should host, but to identify countries’ CDM 
potential and also to identify those countries doing well under the CDM and those not 
doing well. Considering that all countries produce GHG emissions and therefore all 
have the potential to reduce their GHG emissions, but the CDM is only reducing 
about 1.36% of total developing country emissions, generally, all countries have the 
potential to host more projects. However, as already explained, to determine the exact 
number of projects a particular country should host, its emission reduction potential 
(with necessary deductions made for the volume of emissions already being reduced 
through the CDM and other means, if any), will require to be taken into consideration. 
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Consequently, Table 3 does not aim to identify exactly how many projects should be 
hosted by countries and cannot be used for this purpose. In determining how many 
projects countries should host, countries’ emission reduction potential and their need 
must both be taken into account, and for instance, a country cannot be expected to 
host more projects than it has the emission reduction potential to host. 
Table 3: Current geographic distribution of projects compared to ideal 
distribution/prioritisation of hosting
Country Potential Need CDM 
Potential
No of 
Registered 
Projects
1 India Very high (5) High (4) 9 (Very high) 547
2 Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
Medium (3) Very high (5) 8 (High) 0
3 China Very high (5) Medium (3) 8 (High) 1003
4 Indonesia Very high (5) Medium (3) 8 (High) 49
5 Nigeria High (4) High (4) 8 (High) 4
6 Zambia Medium (3) Very high (5) 8 (High) 1
7 Angola Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 0
8 Bangladesh Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 2
9 Benin Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
10 Brazil Very high (5) Low (2) 7 (High) 179
11 Burkina Faso Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
12 Burundi Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
13 Cambodia Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 4
14 Cameroon Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 1
15 Chad Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
16 Côte d'Ivoire Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 1
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17 Gambia Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
18 Guinea Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
19 Guinea-Bissau Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
20 Iran High (4) Medium (3) 7 (High) 1
21 Liberia Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
22 Malawi Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
23 Mali Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 1
24 Mozambique Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
25 Myanmar Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 0
26 Niger Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
27 Pakistan Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 9
28 Rwanda Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 1
29 Senegal Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 1
30 Sierra Leone Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
31 Sudan Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 0
32 Togo Low (2) Very high (5) 7 (High) 0
33 Tanzania Medium (3) High (4) 7 (High) 1
34 Algeria Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 0
35 Bhutan Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 2
36 Bolivia Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 4
37 Djibouti Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 0
38 Egypt Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 6
39 Ghana Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 0
40 Kenya Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 2
41 Lao Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 1
42 Lesotho Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 0
43 Madagascar Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 1
44 Mauritania Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 1
45 Mexico High (4) Low (2) 6 (Medium) 123
46 Nepal Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 2
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47 Papua New 
Guinea
Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 1
48 Philippines Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 42
49 South Africa Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 17
50 Swaziland Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 0
51 Thailand Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 40
52 Uganda Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 2
53 Uzbekistan Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 7
54 Viet Nam Medium (3) Medium (3) 6 (Medium) 36
55 Yemen Low (2) High (4) 6 (Medium) 0
56 Argentina Medium (3) Low (2) 5 (Medium) 17
57 Armenia Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 5
58 Azerbaijan Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
59 Belize Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
60 Botswana Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
61 Colombia Medium (3) Low (2) 5 (Medium) 24
62 Dominican 
Republic
Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 2
63 Ecuador Medium (3) Low (2) 5 (Medium) 14
64 El Salvador Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 6
65 Equatorial 
Guinea
Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
66 Eritrea Low (2) Very high (5) 5 (Medium) 0
67 Ethiopia Low (2) Very high (5) 5 (Medium) 1
68 Fiji Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 1
69 Gabon Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
70 Georgia Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 2
71 Guatemala Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 11
72 Guyana Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 1
73 Honduras Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 16
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74 Jamaica Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 1
75 Jordan Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 2
76 Kyrgyzstan Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
77 Moldova Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 4
78 Mongolia Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 3
79 Morocco Low (2) High (3) 5 (Medium) 5
80 Namibia Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
81 Nicaragua Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 4
82 Paraguay Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 1
83 Tajikistan Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
84 Peru Medium (3) Low (2) 5 (Medium) 22
85 Republic of 
Korea
High (4) Very low (1) 5 (Medium) 48
86 Saudi Arabia Medium (3) Low (2) 5 (Medium) 0
87 Sri Lanka Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 7
88 Suriname Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
89 Syria Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 2
90 Tunisia Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 2
91 Turkmenistan Low (2) Medium (3) 5 (Medium) 0
92 Albania Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 1
93 Bahamas Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
94 Bahrain Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
95 Cape Verde Very low (1) Medium (3) 4 (Low) 0
96 Chile Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 38
97 Costa Rica Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 6
98 Cuba Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 2
99 Lebanon Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
100 Macedonia Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 1
101 Malaysia Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 86
102 Maldives Very low (1) Medium (3) 4 (Low) 0
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103 Mauritius Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
104 Montenegro Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
105 Panama Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 6
106 Samoa Very low (1) Medium (3) 4 (Low) 0
107 Serbia Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
108 Trinidad and 
Tobago
Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 0
109 United Arab 
Emirates
Medium (3) Very low (1) 4 (Low) 4
110 Uruguay Low (2) Low (2) 4 (Low) 3
111 Antigua and 
Barbuda
Very low (1) Low (2) 3 (Low) 0
112 Barbados Low (2) Very Low (1) 3 (Low) 0
113 Cyprus Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 6
114 Grenada Very low (1) Low (2) 3 (Low) 0
115 Israel Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 17
116 Kuwait Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 0
117 Malta Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 0
118 Qatar Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 1
119 Saint Lucia Very low (1) Low (2) 3 (Low) 0
120 Singapore Low (2) Very low (1) 3 (Low) 1
121 Democratic 
People’s 
Republic of 
Korea
Medium (3) NA NA 0
122 Zimbabwe Low (2) NA NA 0
Source: Author
Source of project data: CDM Pipeline (November 2010)
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4.5 Analysis of the Geographic Distribution of CDM Projects
Table 3 above shows clearly the countries with the highest CDM potential. Thirty-
three countries fall into the category of those with the higest CDM potential (those 
with very high and high CDM potential), comprising countries from all regions. 
Within this category are those hosting the largest number of projects (such as India, 
China and Brazil), and this is as it should be. On the other hand, of this number, only 
about half (16 countries) currently host projects and this hosting is extremely skewed. 
It ranges from China hosting 1003 projects, to countries like Mali and Iran hosting 1. 
The other 17 countries, such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola and 
Myanmar, host no projects at all. 
This skewed distribution cannot be explained solely by the GHG emission reduction 
potential of countries. Although the countries that are currently performing well are 
among those with the highest GHG emission reduction potential,13 many of the 
countries that also have relatively high potential are underperforming14 particularly 
when compared to other countries in the same category15 or those in a lower 
category.16 Therefore the current distribution of projects cannot be justified on the 
basis of countries’ emission reduction potential. 
It also cannot be explained by countries’ need, as the current distribution of CDM 
projects does not match with that required by the element of need. The groups of 
countries with the greatest need (such as those with high and very high need, shown in 
                                               
13 For example, China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Mexico and the Republic of Korea are the countries 
with the highest GHG emissions and they are among the countries with the largest number of CDM 
projects. 
14 Such as Iran (1 project), Nigeria (3 projects) and Cambodia (4 projects). 
15 Such as the Philippines (41 projects) or Malaysia (83 projects). 
16 Such as Chile (37 projects). 
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Table 2) are actually hosting the least number of projects, with most of them not 
hosting any project. Therefore considering both GHG emission reduction potential 
and need separately, neither of these elements explains the current distribution of 
CDM projects. 
Also taking both indicators together, the distribution of projects is still inequitable. 
Out of the 33 countries with the highest CDM potential, 24 are in the African region. 
However, these 24 countries only host a total of 11 projects out of the 1805 hosted by 
the countries in the category of those with the highest potential. Many of these 
countries (such as Zambia and Nigeria) have relatively high emissions and some of 
them (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia) are also among 
those with the greatest need because they have the lowest HDI. Despite this, many of 
them are not hosting projects or not hosting as much as their potential would allow. 
This again is patently inequitable, considered both on an individual country basis and 
a regional basis.17
Table 3 shows also that many of the countries (such as Mexico, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Viet Nam) currently performing very well under the CDM are not 
among those with the highest CDM potential. In fact, countries like Israel, Malaysia 
and Chile have among the lowest CDM potential, but relatively high number of 
projects. This again cannot be explained by either their GHG emission reduction 
potential (relatively low) or their need (very low or low). In relation to those countries 
with higher CDM potential, the conclusion must be that this distribution is not 
equitable. 
                                               
17 See the regional analysis of the distribution of CDM projects on pages 6-7 above.
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It is therefore reasonable to conclude, based on the data set out above, that the current 
geographic distribution of CDM projects is inequitable.
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the current distribution of projects among countries with the 
aim of determining whether this distribution is equitable or inequitable. The 
conclusion reached is that it is inequitable. The current distribution cannot be 
explained by countries’ GHG emission reduction potential because many countries 
with relatively high levels of GHG emissions are underperforming, whereas some 
countries with relatively low GHG emission levels are performing well under the 
CDM. Likewise, the current distribution cannot be explained by countries’ need, 
because most of the countries with the highest need are underperforming, while some 
countries with the lowest levels of need are actually doing well under the CDM. 
Consequently, the conclusion is that the distribution is inequitable and the reason for 
this inequity cannot be found solely in countries’ emission reduction potential or 
need.
In order to address the problem of the inequitable geographic distribution of projects, 
it is necessary to ascertain the cause(s) of the problem, so that efforts can be targeted 
at these causes. This is what the next chapter sets out to do: to identify the main 
reasons for the inequitable geographic distribution of CDM projects.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Distribution of CDM Projects in Practice – Barriers to Equitable 
Distribution
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, the elements of equitable distribution of CDM projects identified in Chapter 3
(emission reduction potential and need) are used to determine whether the current distribution 
of projects is equitable or inequitable. The conclusion reached is that the current distribution 
of projects is inequitable, because the distribution does not fit with these elements. Following 
this conclusion, this chapter identifies the reasons for this inequitable distribution. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the current CDM regime to: determine the barriers to the 
equitable distribution of CDM projects; and ascertain whether the current CDM regime can 
support an equitable distribution of projects. To achieve these objectives, the chapter 
undertakes a further critique of the CDM legal regime. This is carried out using the second 
component of the analytical framework set up in Chapter 3, that is, the factors for achieving
equitable distribution (emission reduction potential, need and preferential treatment), to 
assess whether the regime supports, or can support, an equitable distribution of projects in the 
way it (the regime) is set up or operates. The chapter also concludes as to whether there are 
aspects of the regime that prevent achievement of equitable distribution. 
Through a review of relevant literature, this chapter first identifies the barriers to equitable 
distribution of projects, which are: the CDM participation requirements; lack of capacity and 
local expertise; finance and other cost-related barriers; the size of projects; the market-based 
nature of the CDM; and the unilateral CDM structure. Some of these barriers might appear to 
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refer to the same thing, but as used within the CDM regime and in this thesis, they refer to 
different issues. Specifically, lack of capacity and local expertise, and the size of projects, 
might appear to both refer to some form of potential. However, as explained further below, 
lack of capacity and local expertise refers, inter alia, to lack of technical expertise to 
implement projects, lack of awareness and an unattractive investment climate. The size of 
projects, as a barrier to equitable distribution, refers to the fact that some investors prefer to 
invest in large-scale projects and this is a disadvantage for countries that have more 
opportunities for small-scale projects and limited opportunities for large-scale projects. 
Potential, on the other hand, refers to emission reduction potential generally, determined by 
countries’ levels of GHG emissions, and is irrespective of whether the potential is for both 
small- and large-scale projects or for only one or the other. In this sense, potential is not a 
barrier, but an element of equitable distribution.  
While little effort has gone into addressing some of these barriers, for others,  such as lack of 
capacity and cost-related barriers, attempts are being made to address them within the regime 
through various initiatives like payment exemptions (to address cost-related issues) and 
capacity building initiatives, such as the Nairobi Framework. These initiatives, together with 
the barriers, are analysed in this chapter and the factors for achieving equitable distribution 
are used to undertake this analysis, with the specific aim of identifying the reasons for the 
inequitable distribution of projects and determining whether enough is being done to address 
this problem. As identified in Chapter 3, the factors for achieving equitable distribution of 
CDM projects are potential, need and preferential treatment. For each initiative discussed, 
this chapter will identify whether, and the extent to which, the initiative adequately considers 
these factors. 
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The question this chapter answers is whether the CDM regime can achieve an equitable 
distribution of CDM projects among developing countries, given its current structure and 
operation.
5.2 Barriers to Equitable Distribution and Solutions
Some of the barriers to participation in the CDM and equitable distribution of projects are 
internal to the countries involved, and include barriers that would affect any kind of 
investment. Examples of such internal barriers are corruption, lack of security, poor 
governance structures, conflict and political instability, all of which lead to high investment 
risks.1 These internal barriers to investment are beyond the ability of the CDM regime to 
address, and so will not be discussed in this chapter, as modifications to the CDM regime 
itself at the international level cannot address these barriers. However, many other barriers 
stem from the institutional makeup of the CDM itself and are issues that the international 
CDM regime can address, such as lack of capacity and lack of financing opportunities. These 
CDM barriers are the focus of this chapter.
Nevertheless, before moving on, it is important to show that the internal barriers (that is, the 
barriers internal to the countries themselves, such as corruption and government instability) 
are not the key or sole reasons for the inequitable distribution of CDM projects. This is 
                                               
1 See generally, M. Habib and L. Zurawicki, ‘Corruption and foreign direct investment’ (2002) 33 J. Int’l Bus 
Studies 291, which highlights the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment; M. Busse and C. Hefeker, 
‘Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment’ (2007) 23 European J. Pol. Econ. 397, which 
concludes that significant determinants of foreign investment inflows include government stability, internal and 
external conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and 
quality of bureaucracy; S. Globerman and D. Shapiro, ‘Global foreign direct investment flows: the role of 
governance infrastructure’ (2002) 30 World Development 1899, which highlights the importance of governance 
infrastructure to FDI inflows and outflows; and C. Dupasquier and P.N. Osakwe, ‘Foreign direct investment in 
Africa: Performance, challenges, and responsibilities’ (2006) 17 J. Asian Econs 241, which identify political and 
macroeconomic instability, low growth, weak infrastructure, poor governance, inhospitable regulatory
environments, and ill-conceived investment promotion strategies, as responsible for the limited FDI flows into 
Africa. 
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because if the inequitable distribution of projects is primarily because of these internal 
barriers, and, as noted above, the CDM regime cannot address these barriers, then the 
conclusion would have to be that the CDM regime cannot address the problem of inequitable 
distribution of projects. 
Statistics show that although many countries do have internal barriers to investment, this has 
not stopped some of them from performing well under the CDM. In addition, some of the 
countries that are actually doing well in terms of their internal governance structures are 
under-performing under the CDM. For instance, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, the 
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Qatar are performing relatively well in terms of the 
World Bank’s governance indicators,2 which are: voice and accountability,3 political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.4
Nevertheless, these countries are not doing well under the CDM: Botswana, Cape Verde and 
Mauritius do not host any project; Qatar hosts just one; and the United Arab Emirates hosts 4. 
The Republic of Korea and Israel, whose good governance rankings are similar to these 
countries’, host 48 and 17 projects, respectively. Mexico and the Philippines have much 
worse rankings, but they host 123 and 42 projects, respectively. China, which hosts almost 
half of all registered projects (1003), ranks low compared with many other countries, such as 
Brazil (179), South Africa (17), Bhutan (2) and Lesotho (0), but this has not stopped it from 
                                               
2 For the World Bank good governance indicators, see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp ‘The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project’ (World Bank, 22/03/2011). See generally, D. Kaufmann et 
al., ‘The worldwide governance indicators: methodology and analytical issues’ (September 2010) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMACRO/Resources/WPS5430.pdf, www.worldbank.org (16/11/2010).
On good governance, see also International Monetary Fund, ‘Good governance – the IMF’s role’ (August 1997) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf, www.imf.org (22/02/2011); C. Santiso, ‘Good 
governance and aid effectiveness: the World Bank and conditionality’ (2001) 7 Georgetown Public Policy 
Review 1; and UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development’ (1997) 
http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/, www.undp.org (22/02/2011). 
3 These refer to the perception of how much a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression and association, and a free media. See Kaufmann et al., Ibid, at 4.
4 These countries are performing well for most, though not necessarily all of the statistics. But in comparison to 
other developing countries, they are performing very well. 
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being the single largest CDM host country and doing far better than these other countries. 
Even though some of these difference can be explained by the varying levels of emission 
reduction potential and/or need in these countries, not all can. For example, South Africa has 
more emission reduction potential and greater need than the Philippines,5 South Africa’s 
governance ranking by the World Bank is higher than that of the Philippines, but while South 
Africa hosts 17 projects, the Philippines hosts more than double this number – 42 projects.6
These statistics suggest that while internal structures and barriers may play a part in 
determining the distribution of CDM structures, there are other, probably more important, 
considerations that investors look out for, and these internal barriers are not the overriding 
barrier to CDM participation. Therefore, this chapter determines what the other barriers to 
equitable distribution are and also identifies the key barriers to equitable distribution, arising 
from the CDM regime itself. 
5.2.1 CDM Participation Requirements
Participation in the CDM is regulated by the Convention, the Protocol and the COP/MOP.7
These establish the rules regarding eligibility to participate in the CDM, the kinds of 
activities that qualify as CDM projects and other relevant issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
there are three requirements that all countries, both developed and developing, must fulfil to 
be eligible to participate in the CDM. These are ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
                                               
5 In absolute values. See Appendixes A and B for countries’ GHG emission reduction and HDI values. In the 
classification in Chapter 4, both have the same emission reduction potential and need rankings (as these 
rankings cover a range of values). 
6 All governance statistics are for 2009 (the latest available) and are available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp ‘Access governance indicators’ (World Bank, 
23/03/2011). Even computing beyond 2009, the conclusion remains that governance is not the key barrier to 
equitable distribution. For example, comparing South Africa’s and the Philippines’ governance indicators for 
2007, 2008 and 2009, South Africa has consistently ranked higher, but the Philippines is still performing better 
under the CDM. 
7 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(4). See generally the discussion in Chapter 2.
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establishment of a designated national authority (DNA) and confirmation of voluntary 
participation.8
Firstly, only countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol can participate in the CDM.9
These countries may also authorise private entities within their jurisdictions to participate in 
the CDM.10 Secondly, countries must establish a DNA for the CDM,11 which will serve as a 
point of contact within that country for information on the CDM.12 Thirdly, countries’
participation in the CDM must be voluntary, and each country involved must approve its 
participation in the particular CDM project.13 This is usually done by the DNA of the 
country, which issues a letter of approval confirming that the country participates voluntarily 
in the CDM.14
Accordingly, any country must fulfil these requirements to be eligible to participate in the 
CDM. Because of this, one author concluded that these requirements effectively mean that 
the CDM is not available to all developing countries.15 This might be factual, but it does not 
necessarily point to inequity. The CDM was set up for very specific reasons and has very 
specific rules. The CDM rules, modalities and guidelines, including the participation 
                                               
8 See the discussion in Chapter 2.
9 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraphs 30 and 31(a).
10 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(9) and Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 33.
11 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 29
12 Examples of DNAs include: in the UK, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
acts as the DNA (see www.defra.gov.uk) and in India, the DNA is a body specifically constituted for the 
purpose – the National Clean Development Mechanism Authority (see the India CDM website 
http://cdmindia.nic.in). 
13 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(5)(a) and Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 28.
14 The letters of approval issued by DNAs for CDM projects are on the CDM website under the description of 
each CDM project. See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html, www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 16/11/2010).
15 See Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 22, where he states that the requirements hindered participation of 
67% of developing countries. This is as of 2005, and since then, more developing countries have become 
eligible to participate in the CDM – 117 (77% of developing countries) as opposed to the 44 identified by 
Silayan. 
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requirements, are inter alia designed to ensure the environmental integrity of the CDM.16 In 
addition, these requirements do not seem particularly or unreasonably onerous and do not 
seem to have had a significant effect on CDM hosting.17 For example, as of November 2010, 
there are 152 developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The only developing country
that has not ratified the Protocol is Afghanistan.18 123 of the 152 developing country Parties 
have established DNAs.19 However, only 69 are CDM hosts.20 This means that although over 
80% of developing countries (123 out of 152 developing countries) are eligible to participate 
in the CDM, only 45% of them currently do (56% of eligible countries). In practice therefore, 
the participation requirements probably do not significantly affect the distribution of CDM 
projects, considering that most developing countries are currently eligible to participate in the 
CDM but less than half do. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that about 30 developing countries are currently not eligible to 
participate in the CDM – 1 (Afghanistan) because it is not a party to the Protocol, and 29
because they have not established DNAs. Therefore, to a limited extent, the CDM 
participation requirements act as a barrier, not to equitable distribution of projects, but to 
CDM hosting by those countries that have not fulfilled the requirements. Of the 29 that have 
                                               
16 See Decision 2/CMP.1, ‘Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of 
the Kyoto Protocol’ (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006), Preamble, paragraph 7. 
17 The situation has changed since the article referred to was written, and many more developing countries are 
now eligible to host CDM projects. 
18 See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/items/2352.php ‘Parties to the Convention and Observer 
States’ and http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php ‘Status of ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC, 09/11/2010). 
19 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredDNAPieChart.html ‘Designated National 
Authorities’ (UNFCCC, 09/11/2010) and http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html ‘Designated National 
Authorities’ (UNFCCC, 09/11/2010). See generally the discussion in Chapter 2.
20 Information correct as of 16/11/2010. See ‘Registered projects by host party’ 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html (UNFCCC, 
16/11/2010).
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not established DNAs, 10 are least developed countries (LDCs)21 and so are among the 
countries with the greatest need. Many of them also have sufficient GHG emission reduction 
potential to make their participation in the CDM worthwhile.22 This could therefore suggest 
the need to assist these countries, particularly the LDCs among them, to fulfil the 
participation requirements, in order to make them eligible to participate in the CDM and 
begin to enjoy its sustainable development benefits. Such assistance can, for example, be in 
the form of building the capacity of these countries to establish DNAs.23
5.2.2 Lack of Capacity and Local Expertise
Description of Barrier 
There are two different elements to hosting CDM projects which may impact on the equitable 
distribution of projects: the CDM-specific element and the general investment/project 
element. CDM-specific issues arise out of the need to comply with the various CDM 
modalities and procedures when developing and implementing CDM projects.24 These 
modalities and procedures relate to activities such as selecting and applying baseline 
methodologies to establish baselines, proving additionality and preparing the necessary 
                                               
21 Central African Republic, Comoros, Haiti, Kiribati, Sao Tome and Principe, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, 
Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The other 19 are Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Republic of 
Congo, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, 
Seychelles, Tonga and Venezuela.
22 With the exception primarily of most of the small island developing States (SIDS), such as Comoros, Kiribati, 
Sao Tome and Principe, the Cook Islands and Dominica, most of these countries have the potential to reduce 
their emissions, with some such as Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Iraq, having substantial emission reduction 
potentials. See CAIT Version 7.0 (2005 data). 
23 See the discussion of capacity building in Section 5.2.2 below. 
24 The rules relating to the CDM are provided by the COP/MOP and the CDM Executive Board. The basic rules 
can be found in the early decisions of the COP/MOP: Decision 3/CMP.1, ‘CDM Modalities and Procedures’; 
Decision 5/CMP.1, ‘Modalities and procedures for CDM afforestation and reforestation project activities in the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol’; and Decision 6/CMP.1, ‘Simplified modalities and procedures 
for small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM in the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol and measures to facilitate their implementation.’ In addition to these, there are various 
other rules that must be complied with by project developers and other project participants. See generally Lee, 
supra Chapter 2, note 12, at Chapters 4-6. 
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project documentation such as the project design documents, as well as other issues such as 
an effective DNA, general CDM awareness and willingness to participate in the CDM.25
General investment issues are those that would affect normal investments (not just CDM 
projects), and relate to the underlying project.26 They include the legal and regulatory 
framework for investment within the host developing country, political stability and adequate 
infrastructure, such as transportation and telecommunications facilities.27 Lack of capacity in 
these two areas (that is, lack of CDM-specific and general investment capacity) has been 
identified as one of the barriers to CDM hosting and equitable distribution of projects.28
However, this section focuses on the CDM-specific capacity issues because, as noted above, 
this chapter focuses on the barriers that stem from the CDM’s institutional makeup as it is 
these that the CDM regime can effectively address. Issues such as political stability and 
                                               
25 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28; Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 25-32; and Ellis and Kamel, supra 
Chapter 2 note 50, at 27-30. 
26 CDM projects are essentially normal projects with added CDM elements. An example is a CDM project 
involving the construction of a hydroelectric power plant to provide electricity to a particular province, to 
replace the fossil fuel-generated electricity currently in use. Apart from the CDM rules (such as establishing a 
baseline and proving additionality), such a project would generally also have to comply with the host country’s 
rules that would apply to any other project for the installation and operation of a hydroelectric power plant 
(although some countries may give special concessions to CDM projects). See J. Morisset and O.L. Neso, 
‘Administrative barriers to foreign investment in developing countries’ (2002) http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/06/24/000094946_02061104142385/Re
ndered/PDF/multi0page.pdf, www.worldbank.org (27/01/2010). For some of the host country legal issues that 
would affect CDM projects, see P. Curnow and G. Hodes (eds.), Implementing CDM Projects: Guidebook to 
Host Country Legal Issues (UNEP: Roskilde, 2009). 
27 See generally Curnow and Hodes, supra note 26, at Chapter 4; Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2, note 50; S. 
Jackson and S. Markowski ‘The attractiveness of countries to foreign direct investment’ (1995) 29 J. World 
Trade 159; B. Seyoum, ‘The impact of intellectual property rights on foreign direct investment’ (1996) 31 
Colum J. World Buss 50; and R.J. Hunter et al., ‘Legal considerations in foreign direct investment’ (2003) 28 
Oklahoma City Univ. L. Rev. 851.
28 See Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 523; and S. Lutzeyer ‘Climate trading: the clean development 
mechanism and Africa’ (2008) 12 Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers 1, 27. According to Boyd et al, ‘the 
constituents of a successful “enabling environment” for foreign direct investment, such as macroeconomic and 
political stability, institutional predictability, legal competence in contract law and enforcement, and regulatory 
and business transparency’ appear to ‘mirror the variables that explain variation in CDM investment across 
different countries.’ See E. Boyd et al., ‘The clean development mechanism: an assessment of current practice 
and future approaches for policy’ (2007) http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp114.pdf, 
www.tyndall.ac.uk (23/07/2010), 23.
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regulatory and business transparency go beyond what the CDM regime can address, and in 
any case, as noted above, are probably not the key barriers to equitable distribution.29
Regarding lack of CDM capacity as a barrier to CDM development, Ellis and Kamel 
highlight that the CDM framework within host countries is an important factor that can help 
or hinder CDM project development.30 This is because the various elements of CDM project 
development and implementation could be fairly technical and complicated and require a 
degree of expertise to act within the rules.31 For example, Pakistan identified lack of project 
development capacity as a barrier to CDM hosting in the country.32
Specifically, lack of CDM capacity has been identified as a barrier to CDM development in 
some groups of countries, such as LDCs and African countries.33 Lutzeyer points out that 
most African countries find it difficult to fulfil CDM registration requirements such as 
conducting project baseline studies and fulfilling approved methodologies due to a lack of 
local infrastructure and qualified personnel.34 Ellis and Kamel also highlight lack of CDM 
knowledge at the project origination level (that is, among those that should ordinarily 
originate projects, such as rural electrification and solid waste management practitioners) and 
lack of adequate CDM information among financial intermediaries, as barriers to CDM 
hosting in some regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.35
                                               
29 See pages 179-180 above.
30 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 25.
31 See http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/OverviewUNEPsCDMActivities.pdf ‘Enhancing a more equitable 
regional distribution of CDM project activities: overview of UNEP’s CDM activities’ (CD4CDM, 21/01/2010); 
Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50; Brunt and Knechel, supra Chapter 3, note 474, at 5; and Kimura et 
al., supra Chapter 3, note 474, at 35, 37-38.
32 See the submission of Pakistan to the COP/MOP, in ‘Equitable distribution of clean development mechanism 
project activities: submissions from Parties’ (FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/MISC.1, 14 August 2006), 8. See also 
Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 523; and Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 29.
33 See Lutzeyer, supra note 28, at 27; Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 29; and Oppenoorth et al.,
supra Chapter 2, note 60, at 18. 
34 Lutzeyer, supra note 28, at 27. 
35 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 29-30. 
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One point to be made is that the real barrier to equitable distribution might be a perception of 
lack of capacity, rather than an actual lack of capacity. This is because there does not appear 
to have been any comprehensive study of the technical capacity of all developing countries to 
host CDM projects.36 While there is some information available about the general investment 
climate in many countries, this information is either not comprehensive or does not cover all 
countries. For example, the World Bank’s indicators of good governance do not specifically 
cover technical capacity in a comprehensive manner, even though they could help with the 
evaluation of the general investment climate of countries.37 Even the World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Assessments: have only been carried out for some developing countries; 
and mostly do not assess CDM capacity – although they cover the general investment climate 
in these countries.38 In her paper on host country attractiveness for CDM non-sink projects, 
Jung uses ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, participation in the Activities Implemented
Jointly pilot phase, timely establishment of a DNA and completion of a National Strategy 
Study as indicators of a country’s institutional CDM capacity.39 However, although these 
may form part of countries’ capacity, they do not represent every aspect of countries’ 
capacity. In fact, two of these indicators – Protocol ratification and DNA establishment – are 
                                               
36 In the course of this research, no such comprehensive study could be identified or obtained. Although there is 
a lot of literature asserting lack of capacity as a barrier to CDM hosting in certain countries, groups of countries 
or regions, often this literature is based on other literature (rather than studies) or on evidence showing a lack of 
capacity in specific countries, making such evidence insufficient to prove a general lack of capacity. See for 
example, Ellis and Kamel, where the authors often rely on other literature or on interviews conducted with 
specific companies, and which generally only relate to a handful of countries. See Ellis and Kamel, supra 
Chapter 2 note 50, at 29-30. See also G.R. Timilsina et al., ‘Clean development mechanism potential and 
challenges in sub-Saharan Africa’ (2010) 15 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 93, 105-
106, where the authors identify the methodologies used to assess CDM potential in sub-Saharan Africa, but do 
not specifically identify the source of the information about the challenges. 
37 See the discussion of the World Bank’s governance indicators on pages 179-180 above.
38 See the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTAFRSUMAFTPS/0,,content
MDK:20763282~menuPK:2153382~pagePK:51246584~piPK:51241019~theSitePK:2049987,00.html (World 
Bank, 26/01/2010). 
39 Jung, supra Chapter 3, note 68.
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actually participation requirements and rather than measuring countries’ capacity, they 
determine countries’ eligibility to participate in the CDM. Therefore, although it is not 
disputed that many countries probably lack sufficient capacity to register and implement 
CDM projects, there is a need for a comprehensive study to determine countries’ capacity, 
inter alia to enable targeted and effective capacity building to be undertaken.40
The primary reason why lack of capacity, particularly project development capacity, 
constitutes a barrier to CDM hosting and the equitable distribution of projects is the unilateral 
nature of many CDM projects.41 In the unilateral CDM structure, developing country entities 
themselves develop and implement projects, rather than with developed country support, as 
was originally envisaged.42 As a result of this, those that lack the capacity to develop and 
implement projects are under-performing in the CDM market which is currently dominated 
by unilateral projects.43 In addition, it must be noted that one of the objectives of the CDM, as 
already discussed, is to promote sustainable development,44 and the CDM is inter alia
expected to facilitate technology transfer and capacity building in developing countries.45
Particularly in relation to the ability to actually implement CDM projects, current inability or 
limited ability to do so should not constitute a reason for not implementing CDM projects in 
                                               
40 Capacity building should be undertaken in countries that lack sufficient capacity and that have the greatest 
need. Such capacity building will form part of the preferential treatment that should be given to these countries 
to enable a more equitable distribution of projects. See the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.1. 
41 See the discussion below of the unilateral CDM structure as a barrier to equitable distribution. See Chapter 2 
for a discussion of the CDM structure, including the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CDM structures. 
42 See the discussion in Section 5.2.6 below. See generally M. Jahn et al., ‘Climate protection programme: 
unilateral CDM – chances and pitfalls’ (2003) http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-climate-unilateral-cdm.pdf
www.gtz.de (04/02/2010). 
43 Baumert et al, supra Chapter 2, note 51, at 7, for example point out that generally, the unilateral CDM would 
be attractive to countries with sufficient capacity and resources to select, develop, finance, and operate CDM 
projects. See also A. A. Niederberger and R. Saner, ‘Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM 
potential’ (2005) 14 Transnational Corporations 1, 6; and Michaelowa, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 13. See 
generally the discussion of the unilateral CDM structure in Section 5.2.6 below. 
44 See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
45 See for example Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 365; and Sari and Meyers, supra Chapter 2, note 
61.
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these countries. On the contrary, it should be seen as a measure of their sustainable 
development potential and such technical capacity should be built both through capacity 
building and by “learning-by-doing.”46
It cannot however be denied that many countries lack sufficient capacity to develop and 
implement CDM projects compared to other countries, and that this negatively impacts on 
their attractiveness to CDM investors. This capacity barrier to equitable distribution of CDM 
projects primarily undermines the “need” factor for achieving equitable distribution because 
the countries with the lowest human development and greatest need are often those with the 
least capacity and expertise. It also undermines the “potential” factor because many of the 
countries that lack the capacity to effectively participate in the CDM and are therefore 
affected by this capacity barrier, such as LDCs and sub-Saharan African countries among 
others,47 do have sufficient emission reduction potential to participate in the CDM.48
Recognising that lack of capacity is a barrier to CDM hosting, various international 
organisations have capacity building programmes aimed at enhancing countries’ CDM 
capacity.49 For example, UNEP’s Capacity Development for the Clean Development 
Mechanism (cd4cdm) project was established to build developing country capacity to 
participate in the CDM, and the project organises training workshops and publishes CDM 
                                               
46 See the World Bank’s brochure for Community Development Carbon Fund Plus 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=CDCF&FID=9709&ItemID=9709&ft=Plus#Top (World Bank, 
25/01/2010), where the World Bank notes that “the experience gained from the first and second carbon finance 
transactions is essential for building the capacity of government agencies, small and medium enterprises, NGOs, 
and intermediaries to participate in the emerging carbon market.” It also highlights the importance of building 
capacity through “learning by doing.”
47 See notes 33, 34 and 35 above. 
48 Most of these countries fall in the medium emission reduction potential category and others fall in the low 
potential category. See the classification of countries according to their emission reduction in Chapter 4, Table 
1. 
49 See generally Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 65-73, for a list of various capacity building programmes.
189
guidebooks to help achieve this objective.50 Other institutions and [developed] countries also 
provide capacity building to developing countries to inter alia build their CDM capacity, both 
within and outside the CDM framework.51 In addition to these external programmes, several 
initiatives have been launched within the CDM framework to build developing countries’ 
capacity to host projects. These initiatives are examined below, and the extent to which they
have succeeded in their goal of building CDM capacity is also analysed.
Mechanisms for Addressing the Capacity Barrier under the CDM Framework
a) The Nairobi Framework: the Nairobi Framework was launched at COP/MOP 2 in 
November 2006, with the aim of helping all developing countries, especially those in sub-
Saharan Africa, to improve their participation in the CDM. The Framework was first 
announced by the UN Secretary-General during his address at the Conference.52 It was 
initiated by five agencies - the UNFCCC Secretariat, the UN Environment Programme, the 
UN Development Programme, the African Development Bank and the World Bank. The UN 
Conference on Trade and Development and the UN Institute for Training and Research 
subsequently joined the initiative, bring the total number of Nairobi Framework partner 
                                               
50 See http://www.cd4cdm.org/index.htm (UNEP CD4CDM, 26/01/2010). See also the UNEP Risoe Centre’s 
CDM capacity building activities, at http://www.uneprisoe.org/CDMCapacityDev/index.htm (UNEP Risoe 
Centre, 26/01/2010). 
51 For example, the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), established by an initiative of the 
Japanese Government, runs the CDM Programme, which provides CDM capacity building to developing 
countries in Asia. See http://www.iges.or.jp/en/cdm/index.html ‘Market mechanism (CDM programme)’ (IGES, 
26/01/2010). For a description of the various capacity building activities undertaken by the UN Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), see ‘CDM Project Activities/Capacity Building’ 
http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o7184800 (UNIDO, 09/02/2010). The World Bank’s Carbon Finance 
Assist programme is a “consolidated capacity building and technical assistance” programme which aims to 
enhance capacity and expertise of host countries to inter alia participate in the CDM. See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
entMDK:21849454~menuPK:5232931~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html
‘Capacity building’ (World Bank, 09/02/2010). 
52 http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2303 ‘Secretary-General’s Address to the UN Climate Change 
Conference’ (UN, 26/02/2010). See also Decision 1/CMP.2, Paragraph 37.
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agencies to 7. The aim of the Framework is inter alia to “catalyse the CDM in Africa”53 and 
it has five objectives, all aimed at enhancing different aspects of CDM capacity. The 
objectives of the Nairobi Framework are to: build and enhance DNA capacity; build capacity 
to develop CDM projects; promote investment opportunities for projects; improve 
information sharing, outreach and exchange of views on activities, as well as education and 
training; and enhance inter-agency coordination.54 The UNFCCC Secretariat has also 
identified some of the possible elements of each of these objectives, based on the needs to be 
addressed by the Framework and also identified some of the activities that could be 
undertaken to achieve the objectives.55 In recognition of their limited CDM capacity and to 
help increase their participation in the CDM, the Framework aims to build the capacity of 
African countries to identify, develop, submit and process CDM projects.56 This essentially 
means building their capacity to go through the CDM project cycle. 
The Framework operates through each partner agency, either individually or in partnership 
with others, undertaking activities in support of the Framework. Since the launch of the 
Framework, the agencies have carried out a variety of capacity building and other activities.57
An example of such activities is the Africa Carbon Forum. The first Africa Carbon Forum 
                                               
53 See the Nairobi Framework webpage ‘Regional Distribution - Nairobi Framework’ 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/index.html (UNFCCC, 26/01/2010). 
54 See Ibid. 
55 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/Nai_framework_possible_elements.pdf ‘Elements of the 
Nairobi Framework’ (UNFCCC, 26/01/2010).
56 See the Concept Note for the Nairobi Framework Mobilization Event held at the 26th meeting of the UNFCCC 
Subsidiary Bodies, in May 2006: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/Nai_framework_mobSB26.pdf
(UNFCCC, 26/01/2010).
57 There is very limited information available on the Nairobi Framework webpage about the activities being 
carried out in response to the Framework. See the UNFCCC Secretariat presentation on the Nairobi Framework 
“Nairobi Framework: Achievements and Challenges” available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/cop15_se_091211_nf.pdf (UNFCCC, 26/01/2010) for a summary of 
the various activities undertaken under the Framework. 
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was held in September 200858 and aimed to strengthen links between CDM project 
developers and the African region’s investment community, as well as to provide 
opportunities for DNAs to exchange views and share experiences on the CDM. It combined a 
carbon investment trade fair with targeted CDM capacity building.59 A second Africa Carbon 
Forum was held in March 2010, to “build on CDM gains on the continent.” The Forum 
comprised a conference and trade fair, and provided knowledge-sharing and matchmaking 
opportunities for project developers and investors.60 A third Forum is planned for April 
2011.61 Another activity under the Framework is a joint UNDP–UNEP six-country CDM 
capacity development project in sub-Saharan Africa initiated in September 2007 and 
launched in October 2007.62 The Framework is therefore in essence, a capacity building 
initiative for all developing countries but with a specific focus on sub-Saharan African 
countries.  
b) The DNA Forum: the DNA Forum is another capacity building initiative 
established under the Kyoto Protocol/CDM framework to promote equitable distribution of 
CDM projects. It was established by the CDM Executive Board in response to the request by 
COP/MOP 1 for the organisation of DNA Forum meetings to help broaden participation in 
                                               
58 Organised by the UNFCCC Secretariat in collaboration with the International Emissions Trading Association 
and the Nairobi Framework partner organisations.
59 See T. Akanle et al., ‘Summary of the Africa carbon forum’ (September 2008) 
http://www.iisd.ca/africa/pdf/arc1501e.pdf, www.iisd.ca (17/11/2010).
60 See the Forum website http://africacarbonforum.com/2009/english/index.htm (Africa Carbon Forum,
19/07/2010). 
61 See http://africacarbonforum.com/2011/english/index.htm (Africa Carbon Forum, 18/01/2011).
62 The countries covered by this project are Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. 
See the UNFCCC Press Release of 6 December 2007, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/nf_release_english.pdf, 
www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 26/01/2010). These are the concrete programmes under the Nairobi Framework 
reported so far by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Other activities include general information exchange and 
awareness raising, among others. See generally, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Nairobi_Framework/NF_Work_programme_20100607.pdf ‘Nairobi Framework 
Implementation: Work Programme 2010’ (UNFCCC, 17/11/2010).  
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the CDM.63 The DNA Forum is held regularly and aims to provide an information exchange 
platform, enabling DNAs to share their experiences regarding the CDM, and also provide an 
opportunity for DNAs to bring common views and issues to the attention of the Executive 
Board.64 The DNA Forum is therefore specifically targeted at enhancing DNA capacity by 
providing a platform for DNAs to interact with one another, and exchange information, 
experiences, problems and best practices in relation to the CDM process. 
c) The CDM Bazaar:65 the CDM Executive Board, during its 21st meeting, identified 
as one of its functions, the development of a publicly-available database of CDM project 
activities.66 To implement this, the CDM Bazaar was launched by the UNFCCC Secretariat 
and the UNEP Risoe Centre to facilitate the exchange of information about CDM projects 
and opportunities, with the ultimate aim of “creating an efficient global CDM market.”67 The 
CDM Bazaar was not specifically established as an equitable distribution initiative. Rather it 
is essentially a capacity building and information sharing tool for all CDM participants, 
particularly developing country participants. 
The Bazaar is a web-based, free information platform, which provides information on CDM 
buyers, sellers and service providers. It is designed to provide information about CDM 
opportunities, and lists specific CDM projects and CDM project ideas, notices about CERs 
for sale, as well as the profiles of CDM market participants such as investors, buyers and 
sellers. Potential host countries can thus “advertise” project ideas and potential projects that 
they would like to see developed in their countries as CDM projects. Examples include 
                                               
63 See Decision 7/CMP.1, Paragraph 36. 
64 See the DNA Forum webpage, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/DNAForum/index.html (UNFCCC, 12/02/2010). 
65 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/public_inputs/bazaar/CDM_Project_Bazaar_v4.pdf ‘Concept note for a CDM 
Bazaar’ (UNFCCC, 12/02/2010).
66 See ‘CDM Management Plan’ Annex 25 of the Report of the 21st Meeting of the Executive Board (18 October 
2005) http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/021/eb21repan25.pdf (UNFCCC, 12/02/2010), 17. 
67 See http://www.cdmbazaar.net/about (CDM Bazaar website, 17/11/2010).  
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project ideas for a hydropower project in Serbia68 (which currently does not host any CDM 
project) and for a fossil fuel switch project in Uganda69 (which currently has 3 registered 
projects). 
As an information sharing tool, it aims to make relevant CDM information readily and easily 
available to interested stakeholders in the process, thus facilitating their participation. It is in 
this sense that it aims to contribute to the equitable distribution of projects, by helping 
facilitate the participation of countries in the CDM, through making relevant information 
readily and easily available to potential project participants.70
Effectiveness of the Capacity Building Mechanisms
These three capacity building initiatives (the Nairobi Framework, the DNA Forum and the 
CDM Bazaar) aim to build the capacity of developing countries to participate in the CDM, 
with one – the Nairobi Framework – targeting sub-Saharan African countries specifically. As 
highlighted, lack of capacity and local expertise is one of the barriers to equitable distribution 
of CDM projects and it particularly affects those countries with the lowest human 
development and greatest need, as they generally have the least capacity and experience. 
These initiatives are a start to addressing this barrier and to ensuring equitable distribution of 
CDM projects. 
It is however difficult to assess the effectiveness of these capacity mechanisms, specifically 
because of the difficulty of linking specific capacity building activities to any improvements 
in countries’ participation in the CDM. Nonetheless, it is clear that with regard to the Nairobi 
                                               
68 See http://www.cdmbazaar.net/repo/project_ideas/project_idea-340480702.0 ‘CDM project idea: SHPP 
Gramada’ (CDM Bazaar, 22/03/2011). 
69 See http://www.cdmbazaar.net/repo/project_ideas/project_idea-297196027.0 ‘CDM project idea: Sameer's 
Environment Conservation Project through Boiler Fuel Switch to Biomass’ (CDM Bazaar, 22/03/2011). 
70 See the CDM Bazaar website, www.cdmbazaar.net. 
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Framework for instance, the African region is still significantly under-performing compared 
to other regions, although the Nairobi Framework has been in operation for over 3 years. 
Although the number of projects hosted by African countries has increased from 11 (in 
December 2006) to 48 (in November 2010), the region’s share has dropped from 2.61% of 
total CDM projects to 1.9%, as the total number of CDM projects has more than quadrupled 
from 421 (in December 2006) to 2513 (in November 2010).71
With regard to the DNA Forum also, it can only be noted that as insufficient DNA capacity is 
one of the barriers to equitable distribution, initiatives such as this have the potential to help 
address the problem. Unlike the Nairobi Framework however, this capacity building initiative 
does not provide targeted capacity building to the categories of countries with the greatest 
need. In its current forum format, it does make sense for the DNA Forum to be a general 
capacity building initiative. However because lack of DNA capacity remains a problem, 
additional capacity building that provides direct capacity building to the DNAs of the 
countries with the greatest need would be useful to supplement the more general capacity 
building assistance provided by the DNA Forum. Such capacity building should go beyond 
information and experience exchange. It should include capacity building, such as training 
workshops and exercises, that would directly address the capacity needs of DNAs and help 
them to be more effective in carrying out their functions. This capacity building should, as 
advocated in Chapter 3, be targeted at those countries with the greatest need which also have 
emission reduction potential.72
                                               
71 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProjByRegionPieChart.html ‘Registered projects 
by region’ (UNFCCC, 17/11/2010). 
72 See Chapter 4, Table 3 for the classification of countries according to their need and potential.
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The CDM Bazaar also aims to help facilitate countries’ participation in the CDM by 
providing a platform to share information regarding, among other things, project ideas and 
proposed projects. Again, the success of this initiative is not easy to evaluate, but, whereas 
some of the project ideas advertised on the Bazaar may have been developed and registered 
as CDM projects, many of them, such as those by Benin (1), Cuba (7) and Nigeria (1) have 
not been registered.73 This suggests that the CDM Bazaar has not been completely successful 
in achieving its objectives.
As discussed in Chapter 3, in order to achieve equitable distribution, there is a need for 
preferential treatment to be given specifically to those countries with the greatest need. Such 
countries should receive support to enable their effective participation in the CDM, provided 
they have sufficient emission reduction potential to make the preferential treatment, such as 
targeted capacity building, worthwhile.74 The Nairobi Framework, in targeting African 
countries75 and also in aiming specifically at enhancing their capacity to identify, develop, 
submit and process CDM projects, appears to be providing this preferential treatment.76
However without practical action in support of this initiative, the initiative is unlikely to 
                                               
73 For details of these project ideas, see http://www.cdmbazaar.net/overview?listing_type=project_idea ‘CDM 
project ideas’ (CDM Bazaar, 22/03/2011). Benin and Cuba currently do not host any CDM project, while 
Nigeria hosts just 4. 
74 As noted above, most of the countries with the greatest need also have emission reduction potential. See note 
48 above. For example, Zambia (1 project) has medium emission reduction potential and very high need, and 
Tanzania (1 project) has medium emission reduction potential and high need. Both these countries have 
comparable governance rankings to countries like China (very high emission reduction potential and medium 
need - 1003 projects), Indonesia (very high emission reduction potential and medium need - 49 projects) and 
Viet Nam (medium emission reduction potential and medium need - 36 projects), as well as comparable CDM 
potential. See Chapter 4, Table 3 for countries’ CDM potential and see 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp ‘Access governance indicators’ (World Bank, 
23/03/2011) for countries’ governance rankings. 
75 With the exception of Mauritius, all African countries fall into the medium to very high need categories. 
Tunisia, Gabon, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde and Egypt are in the medium need category and all 
others are in the high and very high need categories. All 21 countries in the very high need category are African 
countries. See Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
76 See also H. van Asselt and J. Gupta, ‘Stretching too far? Developing countries and the role of flexibility 
mechanisms beyond Kyoto’ (2009) 28 Stanford Envt’l L.J. 311, 364, where the authors state that the Nairobi 
Framework appears to be well designed in this regard, noting however that its effects remain to be seen.
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achieve its objective of catalysing the CDM in Africa. The initiative contains voluntary 
obligations, activities carried out in implementing it are not always reported and there is 
inadequate publicly-available information about these activities, making it difficult to assess 
the extent to which the initiatives are actually being implemented. This is not to suggest that 
the Nairobi Framework is not being implemented, but to underline that in order for it to be 
effective in promoting equitable distribution, it requires to be practically implemented.
Nevertheless, much more is required. None of the other capacity building initiatives provides 
targeted capacity building for countries with the greatest need. For example, there is no 
capacity building initiative specifically designed to address the capacity problems of LDCs.77
This is despite LDCs being the countries that most require capacity building, because they 
have the lowest human development and least capacity. The CDM regime is failing to 
provide sufficient preferential treatment to those countries with the greatest need. Since such 
preferential treatment is one of the factors for achieving equitable distribution of projects, the 
regime is, consequently, not doing enough to address the problem of the inequitable 
distribution of CDM projects. The absence of targeted capacity building, particularly for 
those countries with the greatest need, which also have sufficient emission reduction potential 
to make such capacity building worthwhile, is a key failing of the CDM regime in achieving 
a more equitable distribution of CDM projects. 
5.2.3 Finance and Cost-Related Barriers
Lack of funding has been identified as a major barrier to the equitable distribution of CDM 
projects, or as a barrier to the hosting of projects by certain groups of countries, such as 
                                               
77 Although it is possible that some organisations also carry out capacity building initiatives targeted at specific 
groups of countries.
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LDCs and African countries.78 As with most projects, the funding required for CDM projects 
can be divided into: funding for the project transaction costs; and funding for the underlying 
project.
(a) Transaction costs
Description of Barrier 
Transaction costs are costs that accrue in the process of making an economic exchange or 
effecting a transfer of goods from seller to buyer.79 Although there is no generally-accepted 
definition,80 transaction costs have been defined as the “costs of running the economic 
system”81 or the costs of organising and conducting business activities.82 Under the CDM, 
transaction costs are incurred in the creation, alteration, protection or enforcement of CERs83
and have been described as additional costs beyond the cost of production.84 Krey outlined 
CDM transaction costs as follows: market transaction costs, comprising search and 
negotiation costs; pre-implementation transaction costs, comprising project design document, 
approval, validation and registration costs; and implementation transaction costs, comprising 
                                               
78 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, Guidebook to Financing CDM Projects (Roskilde: UNEP, 2007), 3 and 7. See 
also the Annotated Agenda of the 26th Meeting of the CDM Executive Board, Equitable distribution of clean 
development mechanism project activities - Analysis of submissions, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/026/eb26annagan4.pdf (UNFCCC, 11/02/2010), Annex 4, pages 2 and 8, where lack of 
financing was identified as one of the main obstacles to increased participation of SIDS, LDCs and African 
countries.
79 See generally, D.W. Carlton, ‘Transaction costs, externalities, and “two-sided” payment markets’ (2005) 2005 
Columbia Business Law Review 617, 618-619; P. Schlag, ‘The problem of transaction costs’ (1988) 62 Southern 
California Law Review 1661, 1674-1676; C.J. Dahlman, ‘The problem of externality’ (1979) 22 J. L. Econs
141, 147-148; D.J. Dudek and J.B. Wiener, ‘Joint implementation, transaction costs, and climate change’ (1996) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/33/2392058.pdf, www.oecd.org (29/01/2010); and C. Pitelis (ed.), 
Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993).
80 See G.M. Hodgson, ‘Transaction costs and the evolution of the firm’ in Pitelis supra note 79, at 81. 
81 See K. Arrow, ‘The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus non-
market allocation’ in R.H. Haverman and J. Margolis (eds.), Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis (Chicago: 
Markham Publishing, 1970), 60; and Pitelis, supra note 79, at 9. 
82 See P. Holden, ‘Government reforms to reduce transaction costs and promote private sector development’ 
(January 2004) http://www.cipe.org/publications/papers/pdf/IP0406.pdf, http://www.cipe.org/ (28/01/2010), 1.
83 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at Chapter 5.
84 Ibid, at 56.
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monitoring, verification and certification, and adaptation fee costs.85 They therefore include 
the cost of identifying potential CDM projects, identifying potential partners and negotiating 
the CDM contract, as well as the costs involved in the approval process, such as those 
associated with establishing baselines, proving additionality, validation, registration and 
verification of the project.86 They also include the share of proceeds and registration fees 
required by the Protocol.87 These costs are part of the transaction costs of CDM projects, as 
they do not result directly from implementing the project itself.88
Transaction costs constitute a barrier to the distribution of CDM projects in two ways. Firstly, 
they are a barrier to CDM project development by local developers who cannot access the 
funds required to pay the transaction costs associated with the development of projects. As 
these costs are incurred upfront (that is, before the project generates CERs), project 
developers would require some financing to cover the costs, which could be quite 
substantial.89 UNEP estimates the costs incurred during the planning phase as from 
US$18,500-610,000, depending on various things such as the complexity and scale of the 
project (whether small- or large-scale).90 The need for host country project developers to bear 
the bulk of these transaction costs would generally only arise in the case of unilateral 
                                               
85 Krey, supra Chapter 2, note 52, at 2388. 
86 See B.P. Chadwick, ‘Transaction costs and the clean development mechanism’ (2006) 30 Natural Resources 
Forum 256, 256; Kimura et al., supra Chapter 3, note 474, at 39; UNESCAP, Implementation of the Clean 
Development Mechanism in Asia and the Pacific: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (New York: 
UNESCAP, 2003), 19; and A. Michaelowa et al., ‘Transaction costs of the Kyoto mechanisms’ (2003) 3 
Climate Policy 261.
87 Article 12(8) of the Protocol provides that a share of the proceeds of CDM projects should be used to cover 
administrative expenses, as well as to assist in meeting the cost of adaptation in developing countries. The share 
of proceeds to support adaptation in developing countries is 2% of CERs issued (paragraph 15(a) of Decision 
17/CP.7). The share of proceeds to cover administrative expenses, including the registration fee, is US $0.10 per 
CER issued for the first 15,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent and US $0.20 per CER issued for any amount in 
excess of 15,000 tonnes (paragraph 37 of Decision 7/CMP.1).
88 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 52, for the activities carried out during the various phases of a 
CDM project. 
89 See the estimates in Michaelowa et al., (2003), supra note 86 above; and Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 
note 50, at 33. 
90 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 56.
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projects, where the host country entity itself undertakes and finances all the preliminary 
elements of the CDM project.91 However, even in the case of bilateral projects, the host 
country project developer may still have to bear some of the transactions costs, such as 
negotiation costs.
In order to address this problem, some CER purchasers offer advance payments to project 
developers to help them pay the transaction costs of the project. This advance payment could 
be in the form of an advance payment of the purchase price of the CERs.92 For example, the 
World Bank states that it can advance funds for the preparation of the necessary CDM 
documentation and recover the costs of preparing the documentation from future payments. It 
also states it can make upfront payments of up to 25% of the value of the purchase contract.93
The second way transaction costs could constitute a barrier to equitable distribution is where 
high transaction costs associated with investment in some countries discourage investors 
from investing in such countries. As noted by the UNDP, if the transaction costs associated 
with the CDM project are high compared to the total costs of the project, this reduces the 
project’s feasibility.94 This is also of concern in the case of small-scale projects, which do not
generate large quantities of CERs, compared to large-scale projects, as “[t]he smaller the 
                                               
91 See the discussion in Section 5.2.6 below on unilateral CDM projects. In this type of projects, the host country 
entity also incurs the operating costs of the project – that is, the entity must finance the underlying CDM project 
as well. This is discussed in more detail below under production costs as a barrier to equitable distribution of 
projects. 
92 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 32-33. See also UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 
56, which notes that government tenders and carbon funds will often pay a proportion of the transaction costs 
(the CDM-specific costs incurred during the planning phase) in return for a contract to purchase some or all of 
the resulting CERs. 
93 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
entMDK:21844272~menuPK:5220636~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html ‘For 
project developers’ (World Bank, 03/02/2010). 
94 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 57.
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project’s financing requirements, the higher the financing transaction costs per unit of finance 
will be.”95
High transaction costs could also act as a barrier where the transaction costs of projects are 
higher in some areas and for some projects than others.96 This constitutes a barrier in cases 
where the foreign entity actually invests in the CDM project directly, rather than just 
purchasing the CERs generated from the project. Where the foreign entity is only purchasing 
CERs generated (which is the case with unilateral projects), some of the transaction costs are 
already borne by the project developer and would not impact on the investor. Some 
transaction costs are however still relevant even where the developed country entity is only 
purchasing CERs, such as the cost of negotiating and implementing the purchase agreement. 
In addition, to the extent that high transaction costs would drive up the price of the CERs, this 
could also affect the attractiveness of such CERs to investors, especially considering the 
market nature of the CDM, where host countries are competing for CERs and investors can 
simply purchase CERs from other projects if the price for the CERs generated by some 
projects is too high. 
This transaction costs barrier to equitable distribution of CDM projects particularly affects 
those countries with the greatest need and therefore undermines the “need” factor for 
achieving equitable distribution.97 It also, obviously, undermines the “potential” factor,
because some of these countries with the greatest need that are unable to effectively 
                                               
95 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 75. See the discussion of this barrier in Section 5.2.4 below.
96 S. Humphreys et al., ‘Equity in the CDM’ (1998) http://www.iisd.ca/journal/enda.html, www.iisd.ca
(14/01/2010); and UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at Chapter 4. 
97 See, for example, Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2, note 50, 32-33, where the authors state that transactions 
costs are a barrier faced by many project developers, especially for small-scale projects, and in poor developing 
countries. See also Michaelowa, (2005), supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 11-13.
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participate in the CDM also have emission reduction potential.98 Their inability to participate 
effectively therefore means that their potential is not being adequately exploited under the 
CDM.  
In order to address the problem of the transaction costs of small-scale projects (by reducing 
such transaction costs), the CDM Executive Board has adopted simplified modalities and 
procedures for small-scale CDM project activities99 and simplified baseline and monitoring 
methodologies for small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities.100 These 
initiatives are discussed in Section 5.2.4 below, which addresses the size of projects as a 
barrier to equitable distribution.
Mechanisms for Addressing the Transaction Costs Barrier under the CDM Framework
With regard to the transaction costs associated with investing in certain groups of countries, 
some steps have been taken to help to reduce these costs. Firstly, in order to support a more 
equitable regional distribution of projects by reducing the transaction costs associated with 
CDM projects in LDCs and thus making these projects more attractive, the share of proceeds 
levy and registration fee for CDM projects, were abolished for projects hosted in LDCs.101
This means that for CDM projects hosted by LDCs, there is no registration fee to pay, and 
also no amount will be deducted upon issuance of CERs to cover the share of proceeds levy 
for administration expenses and adaptation. 
Secondly, for countries with fewer than 10 registered project activities, the payment of the 
registration fee has been deferred until after the first issuance of CERs.102 This deferment 
                                               
98 See notes 48 and 74 above for examples of such countries. 
99 See Decisions 17/CP.7 and 4/CMP.1.
100 Decision 7/CMP.1, Paragraph 3. 
101 See Decision 17/CP.7, Paragraph 15(b) and Decision 2/CMP.3, Paragraph 31. 
102 See Decision 2/CMP.5, Paragraph 47. 
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means that these countries do not have to source financing to cover this registration fee, but 
can cover the payment after the first issuance of CERs, presumably from the revenue 
generated from the sale of the CERs. 
In addition, the CDM Executive Board will provide loans to countries with fewer than 10 
registered projects, to help these countries cover: the costs of developing project design 
documents; and the costs of the validation and first verification of projects. These loans will
be provided from the interest accrued on the principal of the CDM Trust Fund, as well as any 
voluntary contributions from donors, and will be repaid starting from the first issuance of 
CERs.103
Finally, during COP/MOP 6 in November 2010, countries agreed to allow the application, 
and request the development, of standardized baselines, with the aim inter alia of reducing 
the time and costs associated with establishing baselines on a case-by-case basis and 
facilitating access to the CDM.104 As explained in Chapter 2, to be registered as CDM 
projects and generate CERs, project developers must show that the projects will reduce GHG 
emissions below what would be otherwise produced in the absence of the CDM projects.105
To do this, a baseline must be established which represents the emission reduction scenario 
without the proposed project and CERs are issued for emission reductions below this 
baseline. This process could be time-consuming and costly, and streamlining the process 
could reduce the time and costs involved.106
                                               
103 Ibid, Paragraphs 49-50. See also Decision 3/CMP.6, Annex III, for the guidelines and modalities for the 
operationalisation of the loan scheme.
104 See Decision 3/CMP.6, Paragraphs 45-46. 
105 See the discussion in Chapter 2. See generally, Lee, supra Chapter 2, note 12.
106 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at Chapter 5; and IETA, ‘Multi-project, standardized baselines: 
explaining a key issue in the reform of the clean development mechanism’ 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=3375 www.ieta.org (26/07/2010), 1. 
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The COP/MOP defines a standardized baseline as a baseline established to facilitate the 
calculation of emission reductions and removals and/or the determination of additionality for 
CDM project activities, while providing assistance for assuring environmental integrity.107
What this would entail is still somewhat unclear but countries have requested that a workshop 
be organised on the issue and that the Executive Board should report to COP/MOP 7 on its 
work on standardized baselines.108 However, a standardized baseline would likely involve 
uniform parameters for determining the baseline emissions of specific kinds of projects, 
thereby removing the need to determine such parameters on a project-by-project basis.109
The approach of these four initiatives is therefore to make investing in projects hosted by a 
specific group of countries more financially attractive than they would otherwise be, by 
reducing some of the transaction costs associated with the projects. In the case of the loan 
scheme, the aim is to make accessing funds, albeit for the project transaction costs, easier for 
project developers. 
Effectiveness of the Transaction Costs Mechanisms
As highlighted in Chapter 3, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of projects, 
preferential treatment should be given to those countries with the greatest need, in order to 
help them increase their participation in the CDM. LDCs fall in this category, as they are 
among the countries with the greatest need/lowest human development.110 Therefore, by 
exempting projects hosted in LDCs from payment of transaction costs, the CDM has taken a 
step towards ensuring a more equitable distribution of projects by providing LDCs with 
                                               
107 See Decision 3/CMP.6, Paragraph 44. 
108 Ibid, Paragraphs 51 and 52.
109 See IETA, supra note 106. See also the submission of the European Union in ‘Views related to modalities 
and procedures for the development of standardized baselines from the clean development mechanism: 
Submissions from Parties and relevant organizations’ (FCCC/SBSTA/2010/MISC.3/Rev.1, 27 April 2010), 6. 
110 See the discussion and classification in Chapter 4.
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preferential treatment, as recommended in Chapter 3. In addition, because most LDCs, other 
than Samoa, have at least medium CDM potential, this initiative also goes some way in 
meeting the “potential” factor for achieving equitable distribution, because, as shown in 
Chapter 4, most LDCs are significantly underperforming in the CDM and are not fulfilling 
their potential.111 This payment exemption initiative therefore ticks all the boxes regarding 
the factors for achieving equitable distribution – it provides preferential treatment to those 
countries with the greatest need, which also have emission reduction potential. 
However, although this initiative is undoubtedly a good one, it does not appear to have been 
particularly successful in helping LDCs effectively and equitably participate in the CDM. 
The payment exemption was introduced in 2001, before the first CDM project was 
registered.112 To date however, out of the 49 LDCs, only 14 of them host projects – all 14 
host a total of 19 projects between them. A further 5 have projects either at the validation or 
registration request stage. Out of the 5619 projects in the CDM pipeline (including registered 
projects and those in the registration process) as of November 2010, only 62 are in LDCs.113
CDM projects in LDCs therefore currently constitute about 1% of the projects in the CDM 
pipeline. As the analysis in Chapter 4 shows, LDCs are not currently fulfilling their CDM 
potential in terms of GHG emission reduction potential, so the reason for this poor 
performance cannot be said to be a lack of emission reduction potential of these countries.114
And from the fact that this initiative has not been completely successful, it is obvious that 
there are issues other than transaction costs that influence CDM project hosting.115 Therefore 
                                               
111 See Chapter 4, Tables 1-3, for a classification of countries according to their emission reduction potential, 
need, CDM potential and number of projects hosted. 
112 Decision 17/CP.7, which establishes the exemption, was adopted by the Parties in COP 7 in 2001. The first 
CDM project entered the CDM pipeline in December 2003. 
113 Statistics obtained from the CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
114 See the analysis in Chapter 4. 
115 Other barriers to equitable distribution of projects are discussed in this chapter.
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while this initiative may have contributed to these countries being able to participate in the 
CDM, more obviously needs to be done to ensure that CDM projects are more equitably 
distributed among all developing countries, including LDCs. 
The loans that will be made available to countries currently hosting fewer than 10 registered 
projects will undoubtedly be helpful to these countries, and combined with the deferment of 
the payment of the registration fee, will contribute to overcoming the transaction cost barrier 
in these countries. As high transaction costs constitute a barrier partly because they are 
incurred upfront (before the project begins to generate income), these initiatives will help 
countries that cannot raise sufficient upfront financing. Nonetheless, only time will tell how 
successful the initiative will be in helping these countries increase their participation in the 
CDM because as noted above, the similar initiative for LDCs has not been particularly 
successful in promoting the participation of LDCs. 
However, the loans initiative is not in accordance with the factors for achieving equitable 
distribution identified in Chapter 3 (that is, need, potential and preferential treatment for 
those with the greatest need). This is because the payment postponement and the loans are to 
be made available to all countries with fewer than 10 registered projects, regardless of their 
GHG emission reduction potential or their need. It is also not restricted to countries with the 
greatest need, which is what is advocated in Chapter 3. Consequently, countries like 
Barbados, Kuwait, Singapore and Qatar, which have very high human development (and very 
low need) will be as eligible to receive these loans as countries like the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Zambia, which have very low human development (and very high need). It 
also means that countries like Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Lucia, which have very low 
emission reduction potential will also be as eligible to receive these loans as countries like 
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Iran and Nigeria, which, respectively, have very high and high emission reduction 
potential.116 Such generic preferential treatment therefore does not adequately consider the 
specific circumstances of countries and would not be an effective use of resources, as 
resources would be better targeted at those countries that need them the most,  particularly 
those that do have sufficient GHG emission reduction potential. In this regard, this 
preferential treatment (given to all countries with fewer than 10 registered projects) falls short 
of the effort needed to achieve equitable distribution. 
Regarding standardized baselines, the main aim appears to be to simplify the process for 
proving additionality, thereby reducing the cost and complexity involved in the process. 
Specifically, this will address two of the barriers to equitable distribution identified above: 
lack of capacity and transaction costs. It may contribute to a more equitable distribution of 
projects, to the extent that the other capacity building and transaction cost-related initiatives 
discussed above do. However, as already noted, similar initiatives already adopted under the 
regime (those to increase capacity and to reduce transaction costs) have not resulted in a 
significantly more equitable distribution of projects, although they may have helped improve 
participation in the CDM to some degree.117 The extent to which this initiative will further 
improve equitable distribution remains to be seen, but this author does not consider that the 
initiative will significantly improve equitable distribution because, as noted, similar 
initiatives have not been particularly successful. In addition, the initiative does not provide 
preferential treatment to the developing countries with the greatest need (identified in Chapter 
4) and does not provide any extra incentive to encourage developed country entities to invest 
in these developing countries. Instead, it is an initiative that applies to all countries, 
                                               
116 See Chapter 4, Tables 1-3 for the classification of countries according to their need, emission reduction 
potential, CDM potential and number of registered projects. 
117 See the previous discussion in this section and in Section 5.2.2 above. 
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regardless of their need or emission reduction potential, although the Executive Board was 
requested to, when developing these baselines, prioritise methodologies that are applicable to 
LDCs, SIDS, countries with 10 or less registered CDM projects and underrepresented project 
activity types or regions.
(b) Implementation costs
Description of Barrier 
These refer to the actual or direct cost of producing the goods, as opposed to the transaction 
costs, which are the costs associated with organising production. Under the CDM, the 
implementation costs would include the project construction costs (such as purchasing the 
plant and equipment) and the project operating costs (such as the cost of maintenance and 
other running costs).118 CDM project implementation costs include the costs of the 
underlying project which either removes a GHG from the atmosphere or prevents the 
emission of the GHG to the atmosphere.119 For example, the implementation costs of a CDM 
hydropower project would include the cost of constructing and operating the hydropower 
station, but as already noted above, would exclude the costs involved in registering the 
project with the CDM Executive Board. Generally, the largest costs associated with a project 
are implementation costs, incurred specifically at the construction stage. UNEP estimates that 
even a relatively small engineering project could cost several million dollars.120
Lack of underlying finance for the project has been identified as a major barrier to CDM 
participation, particularly for those smaller developing countries that do not have strong 
                                               
118 See generally for the financing requirements of CDM projects, UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78.
119 See generally Chadwick, supra note 86; and UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28.
120 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 29.
208
financial institutions.121 Ellis and Kamel identify lack of financing as one of the most 
common barriers inhibiting CDM project development, noting that “large numbers of 
potential small-scale CDM projects in poor host countries are unable to move forward due to 
this financing barrier.”122 UNEP notes that one of the challenges facing CDM projects, 
particularly in the African region and in LDCs, is lack of access to financing for the 
underlying project.123 It was also identified as one of the barriers to equitable distribution of 
CDM projects, for example, limiting the ability of LDCs and African countries to participate 
in the CDM market.124 For example, Sieghart, commenting on the Yemeni experience, states 
that “some buyers offer to assist with the designing of the project. However, transaction costs 
are not perceived as the major financial barrier by project developers. Developers face 
difficulties in procuring underlying finance due to a deficiency of domestic capital and both 
to country-specific and CDM-specific risks.”125
The original expectation of the CDM was that it would attract foreign investment, and that 
this foreign investment would provide financing for the actual CDM project, beyond the 
purchase of CERs generated from the projects.126 If this original expectation was generally 
the case, local project developers would only have to secure foreign developed country 
counterparts to invest in the projects and this investment would cover the production costs of 
                                               
121 See S. Mwakasonda, ‘Africa is energizing itself’ (2006) 
http://www.gfse.at/fileadmin/dam/gfse/gfse%206/PLENARY_VI/5.__Energy_Research_Centre_GFSE-
6_Presentation__Stanford_Mwakasonda.pdf, www.gfse.at (12/02/2010).
122 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 30-32.
123 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 3 and 7. 
124 See ‘Equitable distribution of clean development mechanism project activities - Analysis of submissions’ 
Annex 4 to the Annotated Agenda of the 26th Meeting of the CDM Executive Board 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/026/eb26annagan4.pdf www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 11/02/2010), 8. See also 
Oppenoorth et al., supra Chapter 2, note 60, at 18-19; and Mwakasonda, supra note 121, at 18.
125 L.C. Sieghart, ‘Unilateral clean development mechanism – an approach for a least developed country? The 
case of Yemen’ (2009) 12 Environmental Science and Policy 198, 201. 
126 See Lecocq and Ambrosi, supra Chapter 2, note 45, at 143; and E. Paulsson, ‘A review of the CDM 
literature: from fine-tuning to critical scrutiny?’ (2009) 9 International Environmental Agreements 63, 71. See 
the discussion of the unilateral CDM structure in Section 5.2.6 below. 
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the project, in exchange for the CERs generated by the project.127 However because of the 
prevalence of unilateral CDM projects and pure CER purchase style projects, the norm has 
become that local developers source local financing for the underlying projects and then 
secure foreign developed country counterparts to purchase the CERs generated by the 
projects.128 This is a problem for many countries that do not have well-developed financial 
institutions, and for those that even where these institutions exist, local financiers are 
reluctant to invest in CDM projects because of a lack of understanding of its operation and 
because of its greater risk compared to other kinds of projects. In these situations, local 
developers have difficultly sourcing the required financing for the underlying projects locally 
and depend on foreign investment, which is often not forthcoming because of the preference 
for simply purchasing CERs.129
In this scenario of the unilateral CDM structure, CER purchasers/investors, rather than 
actually investing in the underlying project itself, will merely purchase the CERs/pay for the 
CERs generated from the project. The purchase price, or some of it, is sometimes paid 
upfront, and can then be used by the project developers to finance the project, as well as to 
leverage additional financing from other sources.130 For example, the World Bank states that 
it will not provide debt and/or equity finance for the baseline component of the project, which 
should be financed by other sources, but will pay on delivery of CERs.131 However, it can 
                                               
127 Here, the developing country would for example benefit from the use of renewable energy, capacity building, 
technology transfer and other sustainable development benefits arising from the project.
128 See the discussion of the unilateral CDM structure in Section 5.2.6 below. 
129 See G. Pfeifer and G. Stiles, ‘Carbon finance in Africa - a policy paper for the Africa Partnership Forum’
(2008) http://www.africapartnershipforum.org/dataoecd/40/15/41646964.pdf, www.africapartnershipforum.org
(APF, 09/02/2010), 17; A. Michaelowa, ‘Unilateral CDM - can developing countries finance generation of 
greenhouse gas emission credits on their own?’(2007) 7 Int’l Envt’l Agts 17, 17; Sieghart, supra note 125, at
202; and Oppenoorth et al., supra Chapter 2, note 60, at 20.
130 UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 58-61.
131 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
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pay up to 25% of the CER purchase price upfront, where it can be demonstrated that such 
upfront payment is necessary.132 Although the portion of the price paid upfront is rarely 
sufficient to cover the entire production costs, as stated, it can contribute to paying the costs 
and assist the project developer to obtain other financing.133 Sieghart asserts that sourcing of 
underlying finance is seen as the major obstacle for Yemeni project developers, particularly 
for public entity project developers.134
Just like the transaction costs barrier, this implementation costs barrier undermines the 
“need” and “potential” factors for achieving equitable distribution of CDM projects.135
Mechanisms for Addressing Implementation Costs under the CDM Framework
There are currently no initiatives within the CDM framework to address this problem. The 
various financing initiatives aim to reduce transaction costs, but do not directly impact or 
assist with production costs. Yet, implementation costs comprise the bulk of the financing 
required for CDM projects.136 In addition, as already noted, most developed country 
participants in the CDM market do not provide finance for the underlying projects – local 
developers must source this finance themselves. Those countries that are the most affected by 
this barrier are the countries that in fact have the greatest need – the LDCs and many African 
countries.137 In this respect therefore, the CDM regime fails to consider the need of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
entMDK:21844766~menuPK:5220728~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html
‘Minimum project requirements’ (World Bank, 03/02/2010).
132 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
entMDK:21844272~menuPK:5220636~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html ‘For 
project developers’ (World Bank, 03/02/2010).
133 See UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 69. Here, the authors also note that “it is rare for any buyer to 
be willing to pay up front before a project is both registered and ready to commence generating CERs...”
134 Sieghart, supra note 125, at 201. 
135 See the discussion on pages 200-201 above.
136 Transaction costs are estimated to be between US$ 18,500-610,000, whereas production costs are estimated 
to run into several million dollars. See the discussion above. 
137 See Chapter 4 for a classification of countries according to their need.
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countries in efforts to promote a more equitable distribution of projects. As proposed in 
Chapter 3, some form of preferential treatment should be given to these countries to help 
them overcome this barrier.138
5.2.4 Preference for Large-Scale Projects
Description of Barrier
The size of CDM projects has been identified as a barrier to the distribution of projects. 
Specifically, this has been discussed as investors’ preference to invest in projects that will 
generate a specified minimum quantity of CERs. This is partly in order to ensure that 
considering the transaction costs of the project, the quantity of CERs generated is enough to 
make the project worthwhile.139 Linked to this barrier is the relatively low level of industrial 
development of some countries, resulting in limited opportunities for large-scale projects.140
According to some authors, investors prefer to invest in large projects in order to maximise 
the economics of scale.141 The smaller the size of the project, the less the amount of CERs 
such projects will generate. Because the CDM is in part a mechanism to assist developed 
                                               
138 See Chapter 6 for suggested solutions to help promote equitable distribution. 
139 See the discussion of transaction costs in Section 5.2.3 above and the effect of high transaction costs on 
small-scale projects.
140 Ellis and Kamel note that the majority of potential CDM projects in many host countries, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, are within the small-scale range. See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 32.
141 For example, K. Capoor and C. Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008 (Washington: World 
Bank, 2008), 26, state that China is the destination of choice for buyers of credits, because of its large size, 
economies of scale in origination, and favourable investment climate. See also Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 
note 50, at 34-35. 
212
countries to meet their Kyoto targets in a cost-effective way,142 investors will consider cost-
effectiveness in determining the attractiveness of any CDM project.143
Some investors therefore have a minimum project size they will invest in, and will not invest 
in CDM projects that will not generate a specified minimum quantity of CERs.144 For 
example, the World Bank requires the volume of emission reductions to be generated from a 
project to be large enough to make a project viable, and states that for example, a small-scale 
project should generate at least 50,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalents (CO2e) annually.
145 The 
Netherlands CDM Facility (implemented by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment) states it will only enter into a CDM scheme for larger projects, with the 
lower limit of approximately 500,000 tonnes of CO2e for the entire crediting period. This is 
so that the transactions costs of the project do not amount to too large a proportion of the 
payments involved in the project.146
This would particularly be an issue for countries that have more opportunities for small-scale 
projects than for large-scale projects, due inter alia to their low level of industrial 
development resulting in limited opportunities for large-scale projects. For example, Ellis and 
Kamel note that the majority of prospective CDM projects in many host countries, 
                                               
142 See for example T. Brechet and B. Lussis, ‘The contribution of the clean development mechanism to national 
climate policies’ (2006) 28 J. Policy Modeling 981, 982 (“lower marginal cost”); Diakoulaki et al., supra 
Chapter 2, note 26, at 1088 (“profiting from the lower abatement costs in the host-country); and UNESCAP, 
supra note 86, at 1 (“lesser cost”).
143 See the discussion below about the market-based nature of the CDM, and the need to balance considerations 
of cost-effectiveness with considerations of sustainable development need and potential. 
144 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 34-35.
145 See the World Bank Carbon Finance website 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
entMDK:21844766~menuPK:5220728~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html
(World Bank, 03/02/2010). 
146 See 
http://www.vrom.nl/docs/internationaal/CDM%20Implementation%20document%2029%20May%2003%20def
_1.pdf ‘Implementation of the clean development mechanism by the Netherlands’ 29 May 2003 (Dutch Ministry 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 03/02/2010), 18. 
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particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, are within the small-scale range.147 In his classification of 
countries by size and types of projects, Huq identifies LDCs as mainly having opportunities
for small-scale projects.148 This also leads to the loss of the potential for emission reductions 
in these countries. This is because if these countries are overlooked in the CDM because they 
have limited opportunities for large-scale projects, it means that even though they do have the 
potential to reduce GHG emissions, albeit through small-scale projects, this potential is 
largely being lost. 
However, although this has been identified as a barrier by some authors,149 the number of 
small-scale projects that have been ratified and that are in the pipeline belies this claim, as 
there are almost as many small-scale, as large-scale projects.150 As of November 2010, of the 
5619 CDM projects in the pipeline (including registered projects and those in the registration 
process, but excluding those that have been rejected or withdrawn), 2609 (46%) were small-
scale and 3010 (54%) were large-scale projects. As of the same date, out of the 2463
registered projects, 1075 (43%) were small-scale and 1388 (47%) were large-scale.151 This 
                                               
147 Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 32.
148 See Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 22; and Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 44. 
149 See Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 23-24; Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 523; and B. Pearson, 
‘Market failure: why the clean development mechanism won’t promote clean development’ (2007) 15 J.
Cleaner Production 247.
150 According to many authors, small-scale projects are preferable to large-scale projects, because the former 
generally have much greater sustainable development benefits than the latter. For example, according to Huq, 
small-scale projects have high sustainable development impacts and large-scale projects have low sustainable 
development impacts. See Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 22. Michaelowa states that small-scale projects are 
better suited to contribute to sustainable development. See Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 24. See also 
Brunt and Knechel, supra Chapter 3, note 474. This view is, however, not generally held by all authors. For 
example, Olsen and Fenhann show that small-scale projects only deliver slightly more sustainable development 
benefits than large-scale projects, and conclude that small-scale projects cannot be generally assumed to deliver 
more sustainable development benefits than large-scale projects. See K.H. Olsen and J. Fenhann, ‘Sustainable 
development benefits of clean development mechanism projects: A new methodology for sustainability 
assessment based on text analysis of the project design documents submitted for validation’ (2008) 36 Energy 
Policy 2819. It is consequently difficult to state conclusively what the proportion of small- and large-scale 
projects should be in the CDM pipeline, but there probably should be more small-scale projects as these authors 
do all agree that small-scale projects contribute more to sustainable development than large-scale projects, 
however little or great the difference in contributions may be.  
151 See the CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
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means that even if investors do prefer to invest in large-scale projects in order to minimise 
cost and maximise cost-effectiveness, small-scale projects are still being developed and 
registered at almost the same rate as large-scale projects. A likely explanation for this is that 
most small-scale projects are unilateral, the host countries themselves are almost solely 
responsible for the projects, which involve no foreign investment, and therefore what foreign 
investors want does not directly affect the rate of developing and implementing such projects. 
Some authors consider that unilateral projects have stimulated registration of many small-
scale projects which would ordinarily not be very attractive to foreign investors.152 According 
to Michaelowa, most of the registered small-scale projects are unilateral projects which do 
not involve developed country entities before registration.153 It is unfortunately not possible 
to determine conclusively whether or not this is the case. This is primarily because host 
countries are not obliged to disclose whether there are developed country entities involved in 
the project and the kind of involvement of such entities. The project design documents 
(required to be submitted for all proposed CDM projects) sometimes state whether there are 
developed country entities involved and sometimes do not. Even where the project design 
documents specify the involvement of a developed country or its entity, the documents do not 
always identify whether such entities are investing in the projects or are only purchasing the 
CERs generated by the projects, as again, there is no requirement to do so. These two 
                                               
152 See for example C. Sutter, ‘Small-scale CDM projects: opportunities and obstacles - can small-scale projects 
attract funding from private CDM investors? (2001) 
http://www.up.ethz.ch/publications/documents/Sutter_2001_Small-Scale_CDM_Vol1.pdf
http://www.ethz.ch/index_EN (05/02/2010), 6; and A. Cosbey et al., ‘Realizing the development dividend: 
making the CDM work for developing countries’ (2005) 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/climate_realizing_dividend_sum.pdf, www.iisd.org (05/02/2010), 5.
153 See Michaelowa, (2005), supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 12. The paper was published in 2005 and it is possible 
that the situation has changed since the paper was published. 
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categories are sometimes lumped together.154 Without this information, it would be difficult 
to ascertain the proportion of projects that are unilaterally-developed and implemented.
However, given that as of June 2010, about 95% of registered projects were at least 
unilaterally-developed (that is, developed unilaterally by an host country entity without the 
participation of a developed country entity),155 it is logical to assume that most small-scale 
projects also are at least unilaterally-developed (and probably unilaterally-financed) as well.
The barrier presented by many investors’ preference for large-scale projects mainly 
undermines the “potential” factor for achieving equitable distribution. This is because when 
countries with limited opportunities for large-scale projects are ignored or overlooked, their 
emission reduction potential (even though this potential can only be tapped primarily through 
                                               
154 An example is the CDM project “La Gloria Hydroelectric Project” hosted by Honduras (the project design 
document for this project is available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/1L9M8SVJ034UCQYZF7HE5P6NBTDXRO (UNFCCC, 
20/07/2010)). In the project design document, the UK is identified as a Party involved and Ecosecurities as the 
UK private entity involved in the project. This however does not mean that Ecosecurities actually invested in the 
project. In this specific case, it appears that Ecosecurities only contracted to purchase the CERs generated from 
the project. This is shown in the project design document, where in identifying the investment barriers that had 
to be overcome, the project proponents explained the difficulty in obtaining investment for small-scale 
renewable energy projects and that the CERs to be generated from the project provided an additional income 
assurance for the two local banks that financed the project. In this case, it is obvious that although the project 
involved a developed country entity, this entity did not actually invest in the project. Rather, the project was 
locally-financed in the host country and is therefore a unilateral project, as it does not involve foreign direct 
investment in the project (although the fact that the project was going to generate CERs influenced the local 
investors to decide to invest in the project). 
Compare this to another CDM project “Sahabat Empty Fruit Bunch Biomass Project” hosted by Malaysia, with 
the UK and Switzerland identified as Parties involved in the project, and again with Ecosecurities identified as 
the UK and Swiss private entity involved (the project design document for this project is available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/TRIRK6LJSOZKL1TWDQQ5TTM2QY856Y (UNFCCC, 
20/07/2010)). Here however, Ecosecurities’ role was not identified and cannot be deduced, as the source of the 
financing for the project was not identified in the project design document. Consequently for this case, it cannot 
be concluded whether it was unilaterally-financed or whether the developed country entity invested directly in 
it.
155 95% of projects had only been approved by the host developing country at the time of registration. It is 
possible that subsequently, the projects were approved by developed countries, which also provide underlying 
finance in the projects. However this is not known but is unlikely. According to the UNFCCC Secretariat, some 
of these projects are subsequently approved by one or more developed countries, so that the CERs generated can 
be distributed to project participants from these countries directly, but even the frequency of such subsequent 
approval has fallen from 95% to 60%, which means that the CERs are simply purchased from the CDM market. 
See UNFCCC, ‘The contribution of the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to technology 
transfer’ https://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport/TTrep10.pdf, www.unfccc.int (25/11/2010), 11 and 
14. 
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small-scale projects) is basically lost and is not exploited under the CDM. In addition, it also 
undermines the “need” factor because many of the countries with the greatest need have 
limited opportunities for large-scale projects and are thereby affected by this barrier.156
Mechanisms for Addressing the Size of Projects Barrier under the CDM Framework
In order to overcome the size barrier to equitable distribution of projects, two initiatives have 
been adopted within the CDM framework, specifically to reduce the transaction costs of 
small-scale projects, therefore making them more financially attractive. Firstly, projects 
expected to achieve less than 15,000 tonnes of CO2e emission reductions annually (that is 
expected to generate less than 15,000 CERs), have been exempted from paying the project 
registration fee.157 This is similar to the registration fee exemption granted to projects hosted 
in LDCs.158
In addition, and in recognition of the fact that the costs associated with developing small-
scale CDM projects may exceed the financial benefits achievable from such projects because 
of their size, the COP/MOP at its 2nd session adopted simplified modalities for small-scale 
CDM projects,159 the aim of which is to reduce the transaction costs associated with this type
of projects.160 The simplified modalities and procedures include: a simplified project design 
document; simplified methodologies for baseline and monitoring plans; simplified provisions 
for environmental impact analysis; lower project registration fee; a shorter review period for 
                                               
156 See notes 147 and 148 above. 
157 Report of the 37th Meeting of the CDM Executive Board, Annex 20, paragraph 4.
158 See the discussion above in Section 5.2.3. 
159 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex II. 
160 See Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex II, paragraph 9. See also the small-scale CDM webpage at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/pac/pac_ssc.html. See the discussion of transaction costs above.
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the registration of projects; and permitting the same designated operational entity to validate, 
as well as verify and certify emission reductions for specific projects.161
Effectiveness of the Size of Projects Mechanisms 
As with the exemption from payment of the registration fee, the aim of these initiatives is to 
reduce the transaction costs associated with such projects, in order to make them more 
financially attractive than they would otherwise be.162 If both large- and small-scale projects 
bore the same transaction costs, this would be disadvantageous to small-scale projects, as a 
larger percentage (proportionately) of the proceeds of the project would go towards these 
costs, than for large-scale projects. These simplified modalities and resulting lower 
transaction costs, together with the registration fee payment exemption, would be particularly 
beneficial to smaller, less industrialised developing countries, which do not have large 
industries suitable for large-scale CDM projects, or only have few of such opportunities, and 
therefore greater potential for small-scale projects. This initiative would in theory improve 
their chances of attracting CDM investment. 
However, these initiatives are not in accordance with the factors for achieving equitable 
distribution. This is because the two initiatives are available to all developing countries, 
irrespective of their need and emission reduction potential. All countries can take advantage 
of the registration fee exemption and the simplified modalities for small-scale projects, 
together with the reduction in transactions costs these initiatives will achieve. This is not in 
accordance with the recommendations in Chapter 3, to the effect that countries’ emission 
reduction potential and need should be taken into account in efforts to achieve equitable 
                                               
161 The simplified modalities and procedures are contained in decision 4/CMP.1, Annex II. See also the small-
scale CDM webpage at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/pac/pac_ssc.html. 
162 See UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at Chapter 4, where the authors identify some of the costs associated 
with small-scale CDM projects. 
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distribution, and that preferential treatment should be targeted at those countries with the 
greatest need, in order to enable them to fulfil their CDM potential.163
Regarding how effective these initiatives have been in addressing the problem of equitable 
distribution, although undoubtedly well-intentioned and of benefit to some countries, they 
have not actually achieved this goal. Even if the measure has contributed to making small-
scale projects more financially attractive and resulted in an increase in the number of projects 
than would otherwise have been implemented, it has not helped achieve a more equitable 
distribution of projects. Although small-scale projects make up about 46% of the CDM 
pipeline, the distribution of these projects is nearly identical to the distribution of CDM 
projects generally. For example out of the 2609 small-scale projects in the CDM pipeline, 
999 and 631 are in India and China, respectively, but only a total of 34 in the 49 LDCs and 58
in the entire African region.164 It does not appear therefore that this initiative has been 
particularly beneficial to those categories requiring special attention under the CDM (those 
with the greatest need, such as the LDCs and others identified in Chapter 4),165 but has rather 
benefitted those that already had an advantage within the CDM process. The 5 countries with 
the largest number of projects – China (2260), India (1454), Brazil (356), Mexico (175) and 
Malaysia (133) are the countries with the largest number of small-scale projects – India
(999), China (631), Brazil (153), Malaysia (101) and Mexico (87). These five countries 
account for 77% of all projects and 75% of all small-scale projects, with India and China 
hosting by far the largest number of both large- and small-scale projects.166 This, as noted in 
Chapter 4, is not equitable. Whereas India has very high CDM potential and China and Brazil 
                                               
163 See the discussion in Chapter 3 above. Chapter 4 identifies those countries with the greatest need. 
164 Statistics correct as of October 2010 and obtained from the CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
165 See Chapter 4 for the classification of countries according to their need.
166 Statistics as of October 2010, obtained from CDM Pipeline, 1 November 2010. 
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have high potential, Mexico has medium potential and Malaysia has low potential. There are 
many other countries with much higher CDM potential at least than Mexico and Malaysia, 
and even Brazil. In addition, of these 5 countries, only India is in the high need category. 
Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico are in the low need category and China is in the medium need 
category.167 The inequitable distribution therefore remains the same. 
On the face of it therefore, the size of projects does not constitute a barrier to equitable 
distribution since small-scale projects are still getting registered and are almost as many as 
large-scale projects. Those countries that have a greater potential for small-scale projects than 
large-scale projects should therefore not be at a disadvantage. However, because the CDM 
market is currently dominated by unilateral projects, the benefit has gone to those countries 
that can unilaterally develop and implement projects, whether small- or large-scale. These 
unilateral projects appear to be crowding out bilateral projects because given the choice, 
many investors may opt to buy CERs from unilateral projects rather than invest directly in 
[bilateral] projects, with the attendant risks and costs.168
Even to the extent that size is a barrier and there are efforts within the CDM regime to 
address the problem by reducing the transaction costs associated with small-scale projects, 
these efforts do not appear to have been successful in attracting projects to those countries 
with the greatest need and a high potential for small-scale projects. Instead, the current 
inequity has been perpetuated. 
                                               
167 See the classification in Chapter 4. 
168 See the discussion below in Section 5.2.6 about the effect of the dominance of unilateral projects on the 
distribution of projects. 
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5.2.5 The Market-Based Nature of the CDM
Description of Barrier
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the CDM is a market-based mechanism that allows GHG 
emission reduction projects implemented in developing countries to generate CERs which 
can be used by developed country entities to comply with their emission reduction 
commitments.169 Developed or developing country entities can invest in these projects170 and 
the resulting CERs can either be traded or used directly by the developed country participant 
(to comply with its emission reduction commitment). 
Although the CDM was created as a mechanism that would both generate cost-effective 
emission reductions and contribute to sustainable development,171 the very nature of the 
CDM as a market-based instrument is preventing it from achieving these objectives equitably 
among developing countries. The nature of the CDM means that apart from the necessary 
environmental constraints,172 normal market forces, such as risk and cost, largely dictate the 
location of projects. Investors are generally more interested in lower cost and risk projects, 
with the cost of a CDM project and the profit to be derived from it being the major 
considerations.173 This has resulted in investment directed mainly towards the larger 
                                               
169 See Chapter 2 for the structure of the CDM.
170 If investment comes from developing country entities, the projects are referred to as unilateral, and if from 
developed country entities, they are either bilateral or multilateral, depending on the number of developed 
country entities involved in the project. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the three CDM models.
171 Protocol, Article 12. See also Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 522. 
172 Such as rules to ensure that projects result in real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the 
mitigation of climate change, and that reductions in emissions are additional to any that would occur in the 
absence of the certified project activity. See Protocol Article 12. 
173 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 8; Sieghart, supra note 125, at 199; and Oppenoorth et al.,
supra Chapter 2, note 60, at 20. On the risks involved in CDM projects, see generally, Lee, supra Chapter 2, 
note 12; Curnow and Hodes, supra note 26, at Chapter 9; and Baker and McKenzie, supra Chapter 2, note 39, at 
Chapter 8. 
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developing countries that can supply these kinds of projects174 and has led Huq to conclude 
that left to market forces alone, most projects will go to a few of the larger developing 
countries, just as with the case of foreign direct investment.175
According to Ellis and Kamel, “actions by national governments, the international 
community, multi-lateral and financial organisations can all help prospective host countries 
tap their CDM potential more efficiently by strengthening weak links in the CDM 
development chain. These actions will not necessarily lead to an even geographical 
distribution of CDM projects or credits, as cost-effective emission reduction potential varies 
widely by country. However, the CDM was designed to seek out market-based – not 
geographically-balanced – emission mitigation opportunities.”176 From this excerpt, it is 
apparent that the authors regard the cost-effectiveness of projects as investors’ primary 
consideration, and the market-based nature of the CDM and the desire for geographically-
balanced opportunities as not being particularly compatible objectives. This is despite the fact 
that unlike normal foreign direct investment, the CDM is not targeted at enabling investors to 
make profit from CDM projects. It is a mechanism that has [environmental] objectives of
contributing to sustainable development in developing countries and providing cost-effective 
GHG emission reductions for developed countries.177
Added to the problem is the fact that the sustainable development element of the CDM, 
unlike its GHG emission reduction element, has no monetary value put on it, and is therefore 
                                               
174 See generally, Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50.
175 See Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 7. See also Humphreys et al., supra note 96, where the authors note 
that “since investment requires a certain climate of trust and contacts, countries with pre-existing FDI relations 
with Annex I countries will be chosen at first”; and Jung, supra Chapter 3, note 68, at 2181, where the author 
asserts that, “it is rather against the general principle of a market-based tool like the CDM to result in an equal 
geographical distribution of projects.” See also Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 524.
176 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 8.
177 See Protocol, Article 12. See also Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 10. 
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not factored into the cost or profit of the CDM.178 There is no market incentive to promote 
sustainable development and no particular benefit to investors of investing in projects with 
high sustainable development contributions.179 Because of this, for investors, who are 
considering cost and profit, the GHG reduction element is usually the paramount 
consideration, as when calculating profit, investors mainly calculate profit generated from the 
GHG emission reductions achieved. As a result, countries with the potential for low-cost, 
low-risk and high-profit projects will be the first option.180 It is partly because of this barrier 
of the market-based nature of CDM projects that the size of projects (which partly determine 
the profit to be achieved from projects) and cost-related issues also constitute barriers to
equitable distribution.181
The consequence of this is that those developing countries that are rapidly industrialising, 
with the attending industries, high emission levels, institutions and possibly project 
experience or existing foreign direct investment, are better placed to host CDM projects, and 
investors will therefore gravitate towards these countries.182 This is compounded by the CDM 
no longer being used purely as a compliance tool by developed country entities, but also as a 
                                               
178 According to the CDM rules, the host developing countries are responsible for determining that projects will 
contribute to their sustainable development. The host country is required to confirm that the CDM project 
activity assists it in achieving sustainable development (see paragraph 40(a) of the Annex to Decision 3/CMP.1). 
Also the host entity usually provides in the project design document, an explanation of the sustainable 
development contributions of the project. Beyond this, there is no regulation or rule concerning what this means 
or should constitute. The regulatory tools that have been developed (such as tools for assessing the additionality 
of the project) are mainly focused on calculating the emission reductions achieved by the project, and not 
measuring the sustainable development benefits it provides. See K. Capoor and C. Ambrosi, State and Trends of 
the Carbon Market 2009 (Washington: World Bank, 2009), 50. 
179 See Ellis et al., supra Chapter 2, note 45, at 10 and 12; and C. Sutter and J.C. Parreño, ‘Does the current 
clean development mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially 
registered CDM projects’ (2007) 84 Climatic Change 75, 89.
180 See Humphreys et al., supra note 96; and R.M. Lof, ‘Addressing market failures in the CDM: a funding-
based approach’ (2009) 1 CCLR 25, 25.
181 See the discussion of these barriers in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 above. For more on the linkages between the 
barriers, see the discussion in Section 5.3 below. 
182 See Prouty, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 523; Silayan, supra Chapter 1, note 50, at 41; Huq, supra Chapter 2, 
note 62, at 7; and Humphreys et al., supra note 96.
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profit-generating mechanism. This means that although many public and private entities 
invest in the CDM in order to use the CERs generated to meet their emission reduction 
commitments or to comply with environmental regulations in their jurisdictions,183 many 
invest in the CDM in order to trade the CERs generated and make profit from such trade.184
Because of this, these entities would not only go for projects that cost the least, they will in 
particular go for projects that can generate the greatest profit, and most likely follow the 
normal foreign direct investment trends.185
It is worth noting that this relates mainly to bilateral projects in which the developed country 
entity invests directly in the underlying projects and is therefore primarily interested in 
reducing the cost of the investment and generating the most profit from it. It however also 
applies to some unilateral projects, particularly where the foreign entity purchaser, although it 
does not provide financing for the underlying project, is involved in originating the project186
                                               
183 Many public entities such as ministries and utilities invest in the CDM in order to comply with the 
environmental regulations within their jurisdictions or to voluntarily reduce their carbon footprints. Such entities 
include ENEL (Italy), E.ON (Germany) and Kommunalkredit (Austria). See the CDM Pipeline
(www.cdmpipeline.org) for a list of CDM buyers, identified for example as “public” or “utility.” Such buyers 
are usually compliance buyers (the company websites usually identify the purpose for investing in CDM 
projects or purchasing CERs). 
184 See for example, Lecocq and Ambrosi, supra Chapter 2, note 45, at 141, where the authors note that an 
increasing number of CER buyers buy for resale, rather than for domestic compliance needs, such as is the case 
with many UK-based buyers. For example, as of November 2010, Ecosecurities was the largest CDM 
investor/CER purchaser, with a share of about 12% of all registered CDM projects. See the CDM Pipeline, 1 
November 2010. Ecosecurities is however not a compliance buyer, but a CER trader, and is in the business of 
‘sourcing, developing and trading emission reduction credits.’ See 
http://www.ecosecurities.com/Home/EcoSecurities__the_carbon_market/Who_we_are/default.aspx ‘Who we 
are’ (Ecosecurities, 20/11/2010). See the CDM Pipeline (www.cdmpipeline.org) for an analysis of all CDM 
projects and the official CDM website (http://www.cdm.unfccc.int) for CDM statistics. Other carbon market 
traders include AgCert, Trading Emissions and First Carbon Fund. Some investors are both compliance buyers 
and traders - they invest in projects and/or buy CERs both to comply with their emission reduction targets and 
also to trade in the carbon market. An example is Essent Trading. See http://www.essenttrading.com/m/our-
business/our-sustainable-products/emissions/the-compliance-market/index.lbl ‘the compliance market’ (Essent 
Trading, 20/11/2010). See also Lutzeyer, supra note 28, at 13. 
185 See Huq, supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 10.
186 This could involve: identifying potential projects; conducting the initial project assessments; compiling full 
project documentation; and steering the projects through the registration process. See for example, 
http://www.natsource.com/markets/index_sub.asp?s=177 ‘Origination services’ (Natsource, 21/07/2010); 
http://www.ecosecurities.com/Home/Developing_CDM_projects_/Developing_CDM_projects/default.aspx
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and agrees, through a forward contract, to purchase the CERs (before these are generated or 
even before the project is registered). In this case, the purchaser is interested in projects that 
will generate sufficient quantities of CERs that would make the transaction worth their 
while.187
Although these issues are doubtless important to the CDM and to investors and should be 
considered, the important point is that market-based indicators are only suitable for one 
element of the CDM – the GHG emission reduction element. The sustainable development 
element of the CDM must also be considered if the CDM is to actually achieve its dual 
objectives but these indicators do not compute this element. It is not suggested that the CDM 
should no longer operate as a market, or have market characteristics, as these characteristics
appear to have so far contributed to the rapid increase in CDM projects and investment.188
However, it is essential that to ensure achievement of both objectives of the CDM, while 
investors consider market factors in selecting host countries and projects, they also consider 
sustainable development factors, such as countries’ need and sustainable development 
potential. A combination of the two, rather than just the cost-effectiveness factor, should 
guide investors’ choices. 
The climate change regime appears to support this approach of considering cost-effectiveness 
above other issues and it can be argued that the structure of the CDM is a result of this. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Developing CDM projects’ (Ecosecurities, 21/07/2010); and http://www.firstclimate.com/carbon-investment-
management.html ‘Carbon investment management’ (First Climate, 21/07/2010). 
187 See for example, Capoor and Ambrosi, supra note 141, at 26, where the authors state that China is still the 
“destination of choice” for CER buyers, because of its large size, economies of scale in origination, and 
favourable investment climate.
188 The private sector’s ability to participate in, and even profit from, the CDM is perceived as a factor in the 
CDM’s success. See for example, D. Disch, ‘A comparative analysis of the ‘development dividend’ of Clean 
Development Mechanism projects in six host countries’ (2010) 2 Climate and Development 50, 51.
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Convention supports taking a precautionary approach189 to climate change mitigation, “taking 
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”190 According to Birnie et al., this 
emphasis on mitigating climate change at the lowest possible cost “looms large” in the 
Protocol architecture.191 On the other hand, the climate change regime also places great 
emphasis on sustainable development.192 For example, the Convention provides that countries
have a right to promote sustainable development193 and that they should cooperate to promote 
a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic 
growth and development for all.194 These two elements must therefore be balanced and there 
is no justification for focusing more on the cost-effective element than the sustainable 
development element.
The barrier to equitable distribution presented by the market-based nature of the CDM mainly 
undermines the “need” factor for achieving equitable distribution. This is because by not 
considering countries’ need and sustainable development potential, investors are not 
adequately considering the specific circumstances of those countries with the greatest need 
and a high sustainable development potential. If countries’ need and sustainable development 
potential were actually considered by investors, then, it follows that those countries with the 
greatest need and sustainable development potential would be preferred over those countries 
with less need and sustainable development potential, or at least that they would have the 
                                               
189 This requires that precautionary measures should be taken to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects, and that where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures. See 
UNFCCC, Article 3(3). See also Sands, supra Chapter 2, note 19, at 266-279. 
190 UNFCCC, Article 3(3). 
191 Birnie et al., supra Chapter 1, note 15, at 358. 
192 See the discussion of the climate change regime in Chapter 3.
193 UNFCCC, Article 3(4). 
194 UNFCCC, Article 3(5). 
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opportunity to participate more effectively in the CDM.195 In addition, because these 
countries (with the greatest need) also have emission reduction potential, their inadequate 
participation in the CDM due to this market barrier also undermines the “potential” factor for 
achieving equitable distribution.196
Mechanisms for Addressing the Market Barrier under the CDM Framework
There are currently no initiatives under the CDM to address this problem. The responsibility 
to ascertain that CDM projects contribute to countries’ sustainable development belongs to 
host countries themselves.197 Developed country entities are not required to consider the 
sustainable development contribution of projects or potential of countries when investing in 
projects.198 There is no added benefit to them (except perhaps goodwill or public policy) of 
investing in projects with particularly high sustainable development contributions or in 
countries with high sustainable development potential.199 There are no real incentives for 
investors or CER purchasers acting in the CDM market, other than cost or profit. Precisely 
because the CDM is a market, there may be concerns about the level of regulation that can be 
                                               
195 See Table 2 in Chapter 4 for a classification of countries according to their need. 
196 See notes 48 and 74 above. 
197 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 40(a). 
198 There are, however, some voluntary schemes that have developed a premium for projects with high 
sustainable development benefits. An example of such schemes is the Gold Standard, which has the aim of 
ensuring that CDM projects foster sustainable development in developing countries, in addition to producing 
cost-effective emission reductions. See http://cdmgoldstandard.org/What-we-stand-for.66.0.html ‘What we 
stand for’ and http://cdmgoldstandard.org/What-we-do.64.0.html ‘What we do’ (Gold Standard, 25/02/2011). 
Another example is efforts by the European Union to develop its own sustainability criteria. For instance, credits 
from large-scale hydro and forestry projects, among others, are banned from inclusion in the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme, on the grounds of ensuring the environmental integrity of the CDM. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/0004/registered/enel_3_en.pdf ‘A view on CDM qualitative restrictions’ 
(Europa, 21/04/2011); and H. van Asselt, ‘The EU ETS in the European climate policy mix: past, present and 
future’ (2009) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596892, www.ssrn.com (21/04/2011). 
199 See A.M. Halvorssen, ‘The Kyoto Protocol and developing countries – the clean development mechanism’ 
(2005) 16 CJIELP 353, 367. The author notes that this has been criticised as “tipping the balance” to the 
emission reduction element of the CDM over its sustainable development element. 
227
imposed on the market, including on actors in the market.200 In particular, there may be 
questions about whether the CDM legal regime can impose restrictions on, for example, 
which countries investors should invest in, or compel or require them to invest in certain 
countries. However, the fact is that the CDM is a regulated market, and there are already 
restrictions on the countries201 and kinds of projects investors can invest in.202 Some of these 
rules, such as the additionality requirement,203 were established to ensure the environmental 
integrity of the CDM and ensure it actually fulfils its objective of real GHG emission 
reductions.204 In the same manner, it should be possible to regulate the CDM market to 
enable the CDM to meets its objective of contributing to sustainable development in 
developing countries, and not limiting this to just some developing countries.205
5.2.6 The Unilateral CDM Structure
Description of Barrier
The above discussions show that many of the barriers to equitable distribution, such as lack 
of capacity, as well as lack of financing and other cost-related barriers, constitute barriers to 
equitable distribution of projects primarily because of the unilateral nature of many CDM 
projects. Hence, one of the major barriers to equitable distribution of CDM projects is the 
                                               
200 For example, during the negotiations at COP/MOP 5 in December 2009 (at which the author was in 
attendance), some countries objected to the idea of establishing country quotas, questioning the suitability of 
such a solution for a market-based instrument.
201 See the discussion of the CDM participation requirements in Chapter 2. 
202 CERs generated from nuclear activities cannot be used by developed countries to meet their emission 
reduction targets. See Decision 17/CP.7, Preamble, paragraph 5. In addition, with regard to land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities, only afforestation and reforestation project activities are eligible. So for example, 
projects involving avoided deforestation are currently not eligible under the CDM. See Decision 17/CP.7, 
Paragraph 7(a). 
203 According to the additionality requirement, reductions in emissions must be additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the certified project activity. See Protocol Article 12(5)(c).
204 See Curnow and Hodes, supra note 26, at 33. See also the discussion in Chapter 2. 
205 There should be no real reason why this cannot be done, especially for compliance investors, where the 
ultimate aim is to ensure that they are able to meet their Kyoto commitments in a more cost-effective way than 
they can in their own jurisdictions, and not necessarily to make profit.
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predominance of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM market. This is a barrier mainly
because unilateral projects require the developing country hosts to have sufficient financial 
and technical capacity to undertake such projects, and those that lack such capacity are 
unable to undertake unilateral projects.206 They are consequently sidelined in the CDM 
market that is dominated by unilateral projects. 
The Kyoto Protocol defines the CDM as a mechanism under which non-Annex I Parties 
(developing countries) will benefit from project activities resulting in CERs and Annex I 
Parties (developed countries) may use these CERs to comply with part of their Protocol 
emission reduction targets.207 This definition does not identify what structure CDM projects 
should have, and indeed the structure is now largely determined by the entities involved and 
their financial and technical capabilities.208
Although the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM rules left open the question of which structure the 
CDM should take, the CDM was originally conceived as a mechanism under which 
developed country entities would invest in projects in developing countries and use the CERs 
generated to meet their emission reduction commitments.209 As several authors have noted, 
the expectation was that the CDM would follow a mainly investment model, whereby 
developed country entities would provide direct investment of equity or debt in projects in 
                                               
206 One of the barriers identified during a public call for inputs to identify barriers to equitable distribution of 
CDM projects was that, “multilateral and bilateral support has moved from CDM project financing to activities 
linked to purchasing CERs.” See Annex 4 to the Annotated Agenda of the 26th Meeting of the CDM Executive 
Board, Equitable distribution of clean development mechanism project activities - Analysis of submissions, 
available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/026/eb26annagan4.pdf (UNFCCC, 11/02/2010), 8. See also Michaelowa, 
supra note 129, at 26. 
207 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(3). See generally the discussion of the CDM in Chapter 2. 
208 Baumert et al, supra Chapter 2, note 51, outline the various options possible. 
209 See A. Muller, ‘How to make the clean development mechanism sustainable - the potential of rent extraction’ 
(2007) 35 Energy Policy 3203, 3205; Jahn et al., (2003), supra note 42, at i; M. Jahn et al., ‘Measuring the 
potential of unilateral CDM - a pilot study’ (2004) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=508343
www.ssrn.com (04/02/2010), 13; and Krey, supra Chapter 2, note 52, at 2387.
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developing countries.210 After the Kyoto Protocol was agreed and during the negotiation of 
the rules, there was some debate about whether or not unilateral projects would be allowed 
under the CDM.211 The Executive Board formally resolved this debate at its 18th meeting 
when it agreed that a CDM project can be registered without involvement of an Annex I Party 
at the registration stage.212 This effectively permitted the registration of unilateral CDM 
projects213 and consequently, the CDM has moved from its original conception and is now 
also a mechanism under which developing countries themselves implement projects and sell 
the CERs generated to developed country entities, which these entities can then further trade 
or use to meet their emission reduction commitments.214 In this latter model, the host 
developing country entity itself develops, finances and implements the CDM project.215 It 
involves no direct investment by the developed country entity. This model is referred to as 
the unilateral CDM.216
                                               
210 See Lecocq and Ambrosi, supra Chapter 2, note 45, at 143; Paulsson, supra note 126, at 71; and Muller, 
supra note 209, at 3205.
211 See Jahn et al.,(2003), supra note 42, at 1-2; and G.R. Timilsina and R.M. Shrestha, ‘A unilateral clean 
development mechanism scheme for a developing country: a general equilibrium analysis’ (September 2007) 
http://www.usaee.org/usaee2007/submissions/OnlineProceedings/Full%20Paper%20-%20Timilsina.pdf
http://www.usaee.org/ (15/02/2010). In the Co-Chairs’ Note prepared for the negotiation of the rules, three 
options regarding whether there should be explicit reference to unilateral CDM projects were presented: no 
provision regarding unilateral projects, and in the absence of such provision, unilateral projects would not be 
excluded; explicit reference requiring projects to be bilateral; or explicit reference making it optional. See 
Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/CP.4), Note by the Co-Chairmen of the Negotiating Groups, 
FCCC/CP/2001/CRP.8, 20 July 2001, 19. Eventually the rules, as contained in the Marrakesh Accords 
(Decision 17/CP.7) were silent on the structure the CDM would take, and on whether or not unilateral projects 
would be allowed. 
212 See Report of the 18th Meeting of the CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB-18), 25 February 2005, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/018/eb18rep.pdf www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 15/02/2010), paragraph 57. See generally 
Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129. 
213 According to the UNFCCC Secretariat, the share of projects that had been approved only by the host country 
at the time of their entry into the CDM pipeline rose from 70% in 2004 to almost 95% in 2010. In addition, 
fewer subsequent approvals by developed countries of participation in projects are being made, with the share of 
projects with developed country involvement falling from over 95% in 2004 to 60% in 2010. See UNFCCC, 
supra note 155, at 11. 
214 See for example the definition of the CDM in Boyd et al., supra note 28, at i and 1.
215 See Sutter, supra note 152, at 16; and Muller, supra note 209, at 3205.
216 See the discussion of the structure of the CDM in Chapter 2. See also Krey, supra Chapter 2, note 52, at 
2387. 
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In the unilateral CDM structure, the CDM project is developed and implemented by local 
project developers with financing obtained usually from local investors/financial institutions, 
and the resulting CERs are then sold to developed countries, developed country private 
entities or market traders. The sale of CERs could be through a forward contract, where the 
agreement between buyer and seller is reached and signed even before the CERs are 
generated (it could even be before the project is registered).217 On the other hand, the sale of 
CERs could happen after they are generated, on the “spot” market.218 The key element here is 
that the purchaser of CERs does not invest in the underlying project – the only finance 
provided is for the purchase of the CERs.219 This is the case even though under some forward 
contracts (usually referred to as emission reduction purchase agreements or ERPAs), some 
purchasers will advance part of the purchase price ahead of the actual performance of the 
contract, usually to enable the project developer to cover the transaction costs associated with 
the project.220
The main distinction between unilateral and bilateral CDM projects is that for bilateral 
projects, the developed country entities provide direct investment in the underlying projects, 
                                               
217 See Curnow and Hodes, supra note 26, at 78. CERs sold on a forward basis do not yet exist. 
218 Ibid, at 77.
219 See Sutter, supra note 152, at 16. 
220 For example, the World Bank states that it can advance funds for the preparation of the necessary CDM 
documentation and recover the costs of preparing the documentation from future payments. Also, it states it can 
make upfront payments of up to 25% of the value of the purchase contract. See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
entMDK:21844272~menuPK:5220636~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.html ‘For 
project developers’ (World Bank, 03/02/2010).
Contrast this with Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 21, where the author states that CDM projects which 
involve forward contracts may not qualify as unilateral projects, inter alia because the contracts may have a 
strong influence on the financial closure of the project. He states further that where the purchase agreement is 
reached before the project is registered, such a project should be regarded as bilateral or multilateral, inter alia 
because the buyer assumes some of the risk and also because the buyer would probably participate in the 
registration process to reduce the risk of non-registration. However because even if the contract influences the 
financial closure of the project, such as providing leverage for obtaining the financing for the underlying project, 
the purchaser still does not invest in the actual project and the project developer has to obtain other local 
financing for the project, this thesis regards such projects as unilateral. They do not fit the description of the 
“bilateral” structure envisaged under the CDM. See Krey, supra Chapter 2, note 52, at 2387; and Baumert et al,
supra Chapter 2, note 51, at 4-5.
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as was originally envisaged. Bilateral as used in this sense refers to those projects that not 
only involve foreign entities, but in which the foreign entities participate in the development 
and financing of the projects, rather than just in the purchase of the CERs generated from the 
projects.221 The unilateral structure does not provide this. Even the multilateral structure has 
turned out to be very similar to the unilateral structure, with the only distinction being that in 
the multilateral structure, several developed country entities act through the fund or portfolio 
manager.222 Baumert et al, when outlining the various options for the CDM structure, 
envisaged that a multilateral structure would involve investment in the underlying project, 
with the fund providing “ideas, capacity and financing” and being involved in the 
                                               
221 An example of a bilateral project is the “Zafarana Wind Power Plant Project” hosted by Egypt and financed 
by the Japanese government through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), via debt financing 
(loan). The CERs generated by the project were contracted to be purchased by Japan Carbon Finance acting as 
JBIC’s indirect financial instrument. These two Japanese entities worked in collaboration, with JBIC providing 
the underlying finance for the project and Japan Carbon Finance purchasing the CERs generated by the project. 
See the project design document for the project at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/Q1QEHEZG9WGW44Q7R6W0HYKCMNZCNF
(UNFCCC, 22/07/2010), 5 and 9. 
An example of a unilateral CDM project is the La Gloria Hydroelectric Project hosted by Honduras. In the 
project design document, the UK is identified as the Annex I Party involved and Ecosecurities is identified as 
the private entity involved in the project. This on the face of it suggests that this was a bilateral project. 
However, the project design document identifies that the financing for the project was provided by two local 
banks in Honduras (Bamer and Ficohsa). The project therefore does not qualify as a bilateral project because it 
was unilaterally funded by the host country itself. See the project design document for the project at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/1L9M8SVJ034UCQYZF7HE5P6NBTDXRO (UNFCCC, 
22/07/2010), 8 and 10. 
For some projects, the project design documents clearly identify them as unilateral projects. See for example, 
the 1.5 MW Biomass/Bagasse Based Co-generation Power Project hosted by India. Although on the CDM 
website, the UK (Annex I Party) and the CarbonNeutral Company Limited (private entity) are identified as 
parties involved, this is likely only through a CER purchase, as the project design document clearly states that 
“the project has not received any public funding from Annex I countries and Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). The project is a unilateral project.” See the project design document for the project at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/YY0VUKSCL3J4HIRKUC934NUQ2W5IEF (UNFCCC, 
22/07/2010), 10. 
222 See the discussion in Chapter 2. An example of a multilateral project is the Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation 
Project hosted by Uganda. The main investor in the project was Uganda’s National Forest Authority, with other 
Ugandan community groups also providing some investment. The National Forest Authority retained all rights 
to the CERs generated and entered into an emission reduction purchase agreement for the sale of the CERs. The 
CER buyer was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as trustee of the BioCarbon Fund. 
This is an example of a multilateral project (as it involved an investment fund – the BioCarbon Fund, acting on 
behalf of public and private sector participants) that was actually unilaterally funded by the host country itself. 
See the project design document for the project at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/E3A6TBOQ9RDM0KZ47WFJH5LPCYS2GU (UNFCCC, 
22/07/2010), 3.
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development of the project directly.223 This has turned out not to be the case. The multilateral 
structure often operates the same as unilateral projects, as the developing country hosts 
usually need to source the financing for the underlying projects. The multilateral funds tend 
to only purchase the CERs generated, possibly with some upfront/advance payment.224
These commodity-style purchase transactions are now very common and some estimate them 
to be the most common form of CDM projects.225 According to Ellis and Kamel, many CDM 
projects are developed entirely or with a majority stake by the host country, with no foreign 
investment component.226 Sieghart reports that over 90% of the expressions of interest 
received by Yemen’s DNA Secretariat are to purchase CERs from unilateral CDM projects 
rather than to directly invest in/finance projects.227 Hence, the CDM is rapidly moving away 
                                               
223 See Baumert et al, supra Chapter 2, note 51, at 4-5. 
224 For instance, the World Bank, through its various carbon funds is one of the top 20 CER buyers/investors in
the CDM market. It currently acts as Trustee for 12 carbon funds/facilities on behalf of several governments and 
private entities. However, generally, these funds or facilities do not invest directly in the underlying projects but 
only purchase the CERs generated by the projects, just like with unilateral projects. The World Bank states on 
its site that it will only purchase the CERs generated from projects, with payment on delivery [of the CERs]. See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,cont
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requirements’ (World Bank, 22/07/2010). 
225 See Lecocq and Ambrosi, supra Chapter 2, note 45, at 143-144. See also Niederberger and Saner, supra note 
43, at 6, where the authors note that the most common form of transaction is forward contracts to purchase 
CERs; R.K. Chung, ‘How to redefine the role of CDM after 2012?’ (2007) 
http://www.climateanddevelopment.org/ap-net/docs/17th_seminar/chung2_unescap.pdf, 
www.climateanddevelopment.org (04/02/2010), 3, where the author estimates that unilateral projects comprised 
70% of the 1600 registered CDM projects at that time; and Michaelowa, (2005), supra Chapter 2, note 62, at 13, 
where the author shows that there are more unilateral than bilateral projects. See also Krey, supra Chapter 2, 
note 52, at 2388; Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 17; and T. Sudo et al., “Challenges for financing 
clean development mechanism project in Asia: case studies from Indonesia and India” (2005) 
http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/870/attach/challenges.pdf, 
http://www.iges.or.jp/en/index.html (04/02/2010).
However because project proponents are not required to disclose their source and style of funding, it is not 
possible to determine precisely how the market is divided among the various structures available. It is possible 
that although in some PDDs, it is not stated that the foreign entity is investing directly in the project, or that a 
contract has been signed for the purchase of CERs, that this is actually the case. 
226 See Ellis and Kamel, supra Chapter 2, note 50, at 17. 
227 Sieghart, supra note 125, at 201. 
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from the envisaged foreign investment and involvement-based mechanism to one which 
mainly involves local developers and financiers.228
This dominance of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM market constitutes a barrier to 
equitable distribution because of the inability of many countries, particularly the poorer 
developing countries, to undertake such projects. In the unilateral CDM structure, the 
developing country host must itself raise the required funds for the underlying project, rather 
than the financing being provided by the developed country entity in exchange for CERs. 
This ability to unilaterally host projects is not in itself inequitable. On the contrary, it is very 
beneficial particularly to those [usually larger] developing countries that can raise the 
necessary financing locally and that have the capacity to unilaterally develop and implement 
projects. The benefits of the unilateral CDM structure include the fact that it enables 
developing countries to participate in the climate change regime on their own terms, without 
the need for a developed country sponsor. It also enables them to reap all the benefits of the 
CDM, including climate change mitigation, the sustainable development benefits and the 
CERs generated by the projects. In addition, developing countries would be able to focus 
more on projects that align with their sustainable development objectives, rather than those 
projects that are more financially-attractive to a developed country sponsor.229
However because unilateral CDM projects now dominate the CDM market, this is 
disadvantageous to those low income developing countries which do not have the necessary 
capacity to unilaterally develop and implement projects and also cannot obtain the required 
                                               
228 See Niederberger and Saner, supra note 43, at 6; Chung, supra note 225, at 3; Michaelowa, (2005), supra 
Chapter 2, note 62, at 13; Jahn et al.,(2003), supra note 42, at 2; and UNDP, supra Chapter 1, note 28, at 71.
229 For more on the benefits of unilateral CDM projects, see Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 22-24; 
Sieghart, supra note 125, at 199; and Jung, supra Chapter 3, note 68, at 2173-2174, footnote 4.
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financing locally and rely on foreign support.230 While noting the possibility of promoting 
unilateral projects as an opportunity to promote equitable distribution of projects, Paulsson 
also notes that research has shown that the Asian and Latin American countries that are 
already major beneficiaries of bilateral investment are also the most likely countries to 
undertake unilateral projects, and that this suggests that unilateral CDM projects might not be 
feasible for the poorest countries.231 To be able to take advantage of the unilateral CDM, 
developing countries would require the capacity to manage the implementation of CDM 
activities and the sale of the CERs generated, 232 as well as access to sufficient project finance 
in the domestic capital market.233
Oppenoorth et al give the example of a proposed CDM project in Kenya. Due to the upfront 
costs required and the risks involved, all the potential buyers approached were only willing to 
buy the CERs generated after project registration and implementation. The project was 
therefore not able to generate the required financing and could not be registered.234 In this 
example, had this country (Kenya) being able to raise sufficient local capital to register and 
implement the project unilaterally, this project would have been one additional project for the 
country.235
As noted above, the ability for countries to unilaterally develop and implement CDM projects 
is not in itself inequitable, and is actually promoted by some authors.236 For example, some 
                                               
230 Michaelowa concludes that, “Whereas several countries from Asia and Latin America can design and 
implement projects autonomously, most of the Sub-Saharan countries rely on foreign support.” See 
Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 17. See also Sudo et al., supra note 225.
231 See Paulsson, supra note 126, at 73. See also Baumert et al, supra Chapter 2, note 51, at 7; and Sieghart, 
supra note 125.
232 See Sudo et al., supra note 225; and Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 25
233 Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, at 26. 
234 See Oppenoorth et al., supra Chapter 2, note 60, at 20.
235 Kenya currently has two registered projects and 14 in the pipeline. See CDM Pipeline, 1 July 2010. 
236 See Cosbey, et al., supra note 152, at 5. See the advantages outlined in Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, 
at 22-24.
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authors consider that unilateral projects have stimulated registration of many small-scale 
projects which would ordinarily not be very attractive to foreign investors.237 Some have also 
suggested that unilateral projects should be promoted as a way of improving the distribution 
of projects, stating this would benefit those countries that would ordinarily not be able to 
attract bilateral investment due, for example, to country risk or a poor investment climate 
within the countries.238 The disadvantage arises specifically because both unilateral and 
bilateral CDM projects compete in the same market and for the same developed country 
entities. There is a finite demand for CDM projects/CERs – they are primarily targeted at 
contributing to meeting developed countries’ emission reduction commitments.239 If there is 
preference for unilateral projects over bilateral projects (as there appears to be in the CDM 
market, given the prevalence of unilateral projects), then the demand for bilateral projects 
ultimately will be reduced, as developed countries only need a certain amount of CERs to 
contribute to meeting their emission reduction commitments. And because unilateral projects 
currently dominate the market, the share of bilateral projects is inevitably reduced.
For example, Sieghart reports that although there is mounting interest by the carbon 
community in CDM projects from Yemen, this interest is mostly limited to the purchase of 
CERs.240 This could be as a result of the fact that for many, or even most, developed country 
                                               
237 See for example Sutter, supra note 152, at 6; Cosbey, et al., supra note 152, at 5; and Michaelowa, (2007), 
supra note 129, at 24. 
238 See for example Paulsson, supra note 126, at 73; and Jahn et al., (2003), supra note 42, at 6-7. See generally 
Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, for advantages and disadvantages of unilateral CDM projects. 
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http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/StateoftheVoluntaryCarbonMarket18July_Final.pdf
www.ecosystemmarketplace.com (23/07/2010). 
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entities participating in the CDM, the key consideration is cost – either in terms of achieving 
their emission reduction commitments at the lowest possible cost, or in terms of making 
profit from trading in CERs.241 Even the option of concluding forward contracts is often by-
passed in favour of the less-risky option of buying CERs on the spot market.242 As 
highlighted above, even though under forward contracts there is no direct investment 
provided, some foreign entities will provide upfront payment of part of the purchase price 
which can then be used to cover transaction costs and/or leverage finance for the underlying 
project. However, even this option is being by-passed, making the situation even worse for 
those countries that rely on foreign involvement in projects.243
Many countries, especially LDCs and African countries, rely on foreign investment and 
capacity building to be able to develop and host projects. For example, Pfeifer and Stiles 
point out that mechanisms for local financing of small-scale projects in Africa are very 
limited at present and that this limits the opportunities to develop unilateral projects.244
Sieghart concludes that a key barrier to unilateral CDM projects in LDCs like Yemen is 
difficulties in procuring underlying finance and emphasized the need to address this problem 
in the interest of LDCs.245 Although there is no doubt that host country entities will benefit 
from unilateral projects through the associated CER revenues,246 some countries lack the 
financial and technical capability to exploit their CDM potential and will thus be unable to 
enjoy the sustainable development benefits (such as direct investment, capacity building and 
                                               
241 See the discussion above of the market-based nature of the CDM and the fact that the sustainable 
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242 See Capoor and Ambrosi, supra note 178, at 32. 
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technology transfer) the CDM is meant to contribute to. These countries are likely to be those 
most in need of these benefits because of their low human development.247 Consequently, this 
barrier created by the unilateral CDM structure mainly undermines the “need” factor for 
achieving equitable distribution. However, as already highlighted several times, because 
those countries with the greatest need also have emission reduction potential, this barrier also 
undermines the “potential” factor.248
Mechanisms for Addressing the Unilateral Structure Barrier under the CDM 
Framework
There are currently no initiatives to address this problem under the CDM Framework. There 
is no limit to the percentage of unilateral projects in the CDM pipeline or any kind of 
requirement for a minimum share or percentage of bilateral projects. 
Unilateral projects undoubtedly have their advantages.249 They, however, have many 
disadvantages which may outweigh the advantages. One particular disadvantage relating to 
the distribution of projects is that only those developing countries that already have the 
financial and technical capacity to identify, develop and implement projects will be able to do 
so, and this will exclude, and probably already has excluded, many of the poorer developing 
nations.250 Due to its current structure, although the CDM may stimulate sustainable 
development in some developing countries, some countries will still be left behind, because 
of their inability to compete with the larger industrialising developing countries in terms of 
                                               
247 Such as sub-Saharan African countries and the LDCs. See for example, Michaelowa, (2007), supra note 129, 
at 17; and Pfeifer and Stiles, supra note 129, at 17. See the classification of countries according to their need, in 
Chapter 4. 
248 See notes 48 and 74 above. 
249 See page 233 and note 229 above. 
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the capacity and expertise to develop and implement projects, as well as the availability of 
local financing and/or the ability to raise the financing for the underlying project. 
5.3 Analysis and discussion of barriers
This chapter has analysed the barriers to the equitable distribution of CDM projects arising 
from the nature or operation of the CDM, together with the various initiatives to address these 
barriers. The main barriers identified within the CDM are lack of capacity and local expertise, 
finance and cost-related barriers, the size of projects, the market-based nature of the CDM, 
and the prevalence of unilateral projects in the CDM market. All these barriers undermine 
both the “need” and “potential” factors for achieving equitable distribution. For example, the 
barriers presented by lack of capacity, finance and cost-related issues, the market-based 
nature of the CDM and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects primarily affect those 
countries with the greatest need, and so, mainly undermine the “need” factor. These barriers 
nonetheless also affect the “potential” factor because most of the countries with the greatest 
need also do have emission reduction potential, and by overlooking them in the CDM, their 
potential is likewise overlooked and not exploited. The barrier presented by the preference for 
large-scale projects mainly undermines the “potential” factor, because by neglecting small-
scale projects, the emission reductions achievable by these projects are also neglected. The 
barrier also affects the “need” factor to the extent that many of the countries with the greatest 
need have more opportunities for small-scale projects, because of their low levels of 
industrial development and, hence, limited opportunities for large-scale projects.251
Generally, the initiatives to address the inequitable distribution of projects aim to provide 
financial and capacity building support to specific groups of countries, particularly LDCs, 
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African countries and countries with fewer than 10 CDM projects, although there are a few 
initiatives aimed at all countries generally. As already highlighted, LDCs are those countries 
with the lowest human development and most African countries also fall in this category. 
However, not all countries with fewer than 10 CDM projects fall in this category, although 
some of them do.252 It appears therefore that in trying to ensure a more equitable distribution 
of projects, the main consideration is for those countries that have a higher degree of need 
because of their low human development. These countries have limited financial and 
technical capacity, which is why most of the initiatives undertaken by the CDM regime aim 
to support countries by providing them with financial and capacity building assistance, 
through the capacity building initiatives and payment exemptions. This is in accordance with 
the conclusion reached in Chapter 3, that in order to ensure an equitable distribution of 
projects, countries’ need should be considered and preferential treatment should be given to 
those countries with the greatest need to help improve their participation in the CDM.  
Regarding whether the CDM regime can support an equitable distribution of projects, the 
answer is that two of the main elements of the CDM regime constitute the main barriers to 
equitable distribution of projects. These two elements in fact lead to those countries with the 
greatest need being unable to effectively participate in the CDM. These elements are the 
market-based nature of the CDM and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM 
market. Because of the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects and the availability of CERs 
for purchase, developed country entities have less of an incentive to directly invest in CDM 
projects, with the attendant risks and financial commitments required. This is because they 
                                               
252 For example, Singapore, Qatar, Malta and Kuwait, all of which have fewer than 10 CDM projects, all have 
very high human development. See the classification of countries according to their need and number of CDM 
projects in Chapter 4, Tables 2 and 3. See the discussion in Section 5.2.3 above for criticisms of initiatives 
extending preferential treatment to all countries with fewer than 10 projects irrespective of their need or 
emission reduction potential.  
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can more easily purchase CERs on the CDM market. This is a major disadvantage to the 
countries with the greatest need because of their dependence on foreign investment and 
capacity support to help them effectively participate in the CDM. Without these, they are 
constrained in their ability to participate. If there were no unilateral projects, or if there was a 
limit on unilateral CERs, developed country entities would have to invest directly in host 
developing countries to generate the CERs they need, if they want to take full advantage of 
the CDM and the cost-effective emission reductions it could provide (and they would still do 
so provided the marginal abatement costs of such investment made it more cost-effective than 
their domestic reductions). If this were the case, developing countries would only have the 
barrier of the market-based nature of the CDM to overcome. This is however not the case –
there is no limit to the share of unilateral projects in the CDM market, and these currently 
dominate the CDM market.253
Again, the barrier to equitable distribution created by the market-based nature of the CDM 
mostly affects those countries with the greatest need, and this barrier is not being addressed 
by the regime. Generally, even where developed country entities invest directly in projects, or 
where they simply purchase CERs, these entities prefer to transact with larger, rapidly-
industrialising developing countries, mainly because of their greater potential and financial 
and technical capacity, to the detriment of the smaller, less-industrialised developing 
countries, who are often those with the greatest need.254 Investors also likely prefer to re-
invest following initial successes, so success breeds success. This means that even bilateral 
                                               
253 See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4 for proposals on how to address this barrier. 
254 As noted above, internal barriers such as lack of good governance cannot completely explain the distribution 
of CDM projects. Some countries (such as Botswana, Uruguay and Qatar) that can be considered to be doing 
well in terms of good governance are not doing well under the CDM, while others (such as China and Mexico) 
are performing well under the CDM, despite their relatively (compared to other countries) poor governance 
performance. See the discussion on pages 179-180 above.
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projects will often by-pass smaller developing countries because the CDM is a market-based 
instrument where cost-effectiveness, profit maximisation and risk minimisation are key and 
larger developing countries are thereby more attractive than the smaller, less-industrialised, 
ones. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the sustainable development contributions 
of the CDM, unlike the GHG emission reduction contributions, are not monetised. As a 
result, there is no added incentive for developed country entities to invest in those countries 
with the greatest need and sustainable development potential, as the higher sustainable 
development benefits the CDM can bring to smaller countries do not make up for the higher 
costs or lower profits associated with projects in such countries. Even those with relatively 
high levels of emissions and therefore emission reduction potential, are being sidelined, inter 
alia, because of their lack of capacity and local expertise, and greater country risk. 
For example, taking a developed country entity that requires an extra 100,000 CO2e to 
contribute towards meeting its compliance target, and decides to obtain 100,000 CERs from 
the CDM for this purpose. This entity has the option of purchasing the CERs from a 
unilateral project or investing in a project and using the CERs generated to meet its target, or 
a mixture of both. If the entity decides to use CERs generated from a unilateral project, odds 
are that it would purchase the CERs from a larger developing country, because as shown, 
such a country would be in the best position to offer unilaterally-generated CERs. If however 
the entity decides to invest directly in a CDM project and use the CERs generated to meet its 
target, then it could choose any developing country to invest in. However, due to the market 
nature of the CDM, in which risk and cost are key and sustainable development benefits are 
not quantified, again the odds are that the entity would choose to invest in a larger, rapidly-
industrialising developing country, because, again, such a country would have greater 
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capacity to host projects, greater potential for larger projects (and therefore greater economies 
of scale), probably a more favourable and better-developed investment climate, and less risk. 
Either way, the smaller developing country is at a disadvantage. Michaelowa for example 
concludes that sub-Saharan African countries are at a double disadvantage because they 
would be unable to attract foreign investors for bilateral or multilateral projects due to 
perceived country risk, and they would also be unable to carry out unilateral projects due for 
example to lack of human capacity and availability of domestic capital.255
Most of the barriers to equitable distribution identified above actually constitute barriers 
because of these two issues. For example, lack of capacity and local expertise, as well as lack 
of access to financing for the underlying CDM project and for transaction costs are barriers 
because as the CDM currently operates, most countries develop and implement projects 
themselves, with no or limited foreign involvement. They therefore require sufficient 
capacity, together with access to sufficient local financing to cover the transaction and 
production costs. The barriers themselves are not created by this fact – countries lack 
capacity and adequate access to financing because of their low human development levels. 
However, these facts constitute barriers to CDM participation because, rather than the CDM 
operating bilaterally as originally envisaged, the CDM market is currently dominated by 
unilateral projects. Lack of capacity would be less of a barrier if developed country entities 
participated actively in the identification, development and implementation of CDM projects, 
as developing country entities would gain experience and capacity from the participation of 
these (that is, developed country) entities, and would be able to “learn by doing.” However, it 
would still be a barrier in relation to bilateral projects, because, as noted above, investor 
entities would generally prefer to invest in countries that have the required technical capacity 
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to implement CDM projects. Likewise, access to financing for the production costs of the 
project would not constitute a barrier if, as originally intended, developed country entities 
actually invested in the CDM project, rather than simply buying the CERs generated from 
such projects. 
In order to address the barriers created by these two structural issues, some capacity building 
assistance is provided by the CDM regime, aimed at helping build the capacity of countries to 
develop and implement CDM projects. However, the capacity building provided within the 
framework appears to be inadequate. Firstly, it does not target all the right countries – the 
Nairobi Framework, which targets sub-Saharan African countries, is the only targeted 
capacity building provided. The other capacity building initiatives of the regime, such as the 
DNA Forum and the CDM Bazaar, do not consider the needs of any specific group of 
countries, but are directed towards all developing countries generally. LDCs, for instance, do 
not receive specific capacity building support that takes their special circumstances into 
consideration, even though as a group, they have the lowest human capacity and highest 
need. 
In addition, the preferential treatment provided to address the finance-related barriers is also 
inadequate, considering the extent of the finance barriers. Specifically, LDCs are given 
preferential treatment in the form of exemption from payment of the share of proceeds levy, 
in order to help reduce the transaction costs associated with projects hosted by these 
countries. However, there is no financial support provided within the regime for the 
underlying project itself, which as discussed above, is one of the main barriers to CDM 
participation, particularly for those countries with the lowest human development and 
greatest need. This is particularly important because the project operations costs are by far the 
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largest costs involved in implementing projects, possibly running into millions of dollars, 
depending on the size of the project and the capital investment required.256 The loans to be 
made available by the regime are only to cover transaction costs – they will not cover the 
underlying project itself. Sieghart, for example, notes that project developers do not perceive 
transaction costs as the major financial barrier, but that developers face difficulties in 
securing underlying finance.257 As highlighted above, lack of access to finance for the 
underlying project is one of the main barriers to CDM participation, especially by LDCs and 
African countries. Failure to address this barrier is therefore another major shortcoming of the 
CDM regime.
As it currently operates, the CDM regime, with its market-based nature and primacy of 
market forces, and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects, does not and will probably be 
unable to support an equitable distribution of CDM projects. 
5.4 Equitable Distribution Prospects Post-2012
So far, this Chapter has focused on the current CDM structure, and the initiatives discussed 
above have been or will be implemented for the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period. As 
highlighted in Chapter 1, the Kyoto Protocol first commitment periods ends in 2012 and 
negotiations for the second commitment period are currently underway. Under these 
negotiations, various proposals have been made to address the lack of equitable distribution 
of CDM projects and to help promote CDM participation. This section examines the various 
proposals for the post-2012 period and determines whether any of them will contribute to a 
                                               
256 See the discussion above. See also UNEP and Ecosecurities, supra note 78, at 219; and Ellis and Kamel, 
supra Chapter 2 note 50, at 30. 
257 See Sieghart, supra note 125, at 201. 
245
more equitable distribution of projects, considering the barriers to equitable distribution 
discussed above. 
Negotiations for the operation of the CDM post-2012 are being undertaken by the Ad hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
(AWG-KP).258 Currently, the AWG-KP is considering issues relating to the commitments of 
developed countries in the second and subsequent commitment periods. The CDM is being 
considered in the context of determining possible improvements to the Kyoto Protocol 
flexibility mechanisms, as means available to developed country Parties to meet their 
emission reduction commitments.259 At COP/MOP 5 in December 2009, when the AWG-KP 
was meant to conclude its work, countries were unable to reach agreement on the issues the 
Group was mandated to discuss. As a result of this, the COP/MOP extended the mandate of 
the AWG-KP and requested it to deliver the results of its work to COP/MOP 6 in November 
2010. The AWG-KP was still unable to conclude its work at COP/MOP 6, and countries 
agreed that the AWG-KP should aim to complete its work “as early as possible.”260
Consequently, the final decisions regarding the CDM for the post-2012 period have not yet 
been agreed upon. Although the AWG-KP has not yet concluded its work, countries agreed to 
continue working on the flexibility mechanisms on the basis of the draft text prepared by the 
AWG-KP Chair.261 This section focuses on this text, specifically the provisions on improving 
equitable distribution.262 Two proposals for improving equitable distribution are currently 
being considered. The first proposal is for establishing standardised baselines for the 
                                               
258 See the UNFCCC AWG-KP webpage http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/4577.php (UNFCCC, 
03/03/2010).
259 See Report of the First Part of the Fifth Session of the AWG-KP (FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/2, 15 May 2008), 
paragraph 18.
260 See Decision 1/CMP.6, Paragraph 1. 
261 Ibid, Paragraph 6(b). The draft text is contained in Revised proposal by the Chair 
(FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, 10 December 2010), Chapter III.
262 Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, Chapter III, Paragraphs 12-17.
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determination of additionality and the calculation of emission reductions and removals. This 
proposal is discussed above, as it is one of the initiatives that have been adopted for the 
current commitment period.263 The second proposal is regarding the use of CERs from 
projects in certain host countries/increasing the number of projects in certain countries, and 
this is examined below.
This proposal for the use of CERs from projects in certain host countries has evolved over 
time. The previous proposal considered by countries was to either “require” or “encourage” 
developed countries to “take reasonable measures” to ensure that at least 10% of CERs used 
to comply with their reduction commitments are generated from projects in either LDCs and 
African countries, or in countries with fewer than 10 registered project activities.264 The 
current proposal, which parties began considering during COP/MOP 6 in November 2010, is 
that developed countries should take reasonable measures to increase the number of project 
activities either: in LDCs, SIDS, African countries and countries with fewer than 10 
registered projects; or in those developing countries defined in Convention Article 4.8.265
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264 See Documentation to facilitate negotiations among Parties: Emissions trading and the project based 
mechanisms (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/6/Add.3, 29 April 2010), Paragraph 12. See also Draft proposal by the 
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countries with fewer than 10 registered projects. See generally, T. Akanle et al.,’ Summary of the Copenhagen 
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265 See Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, Chapter III, Paragraph 12. Convention Article 4(8)
identifies certain groups of developing countries requiring particular consideration. These groups of countries 
are: small island countries; countries with low-lying coastal areas; countries with arid and semi-arid areas, 
forested areas and areas liable to forest decay; countries with areas prone to natural disasters; countries with 
areas liable to drought and desertification; countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; countries 
with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems; countries whose economies are highly 
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It is difficult to conclusively state how effective this proposal, if adopted, will be in 
promoting equitable distribution, because unlike the case with initiatives to reduce transaction 
costs, there is no precedent under the CDM to compare this with. However, what is clear is 
that the current proposal (to increase project activities) is a significant improvement to the 
former proposal (to use CERs generated from project activities). This is because the former 
proposal would merely require developed countries to use CERs generated from projects in 
these countries, rather than requiring developed countries to generate CERs from projects in 
these countries. The difference is that the first option only requires developed countries to 
purchase generated CERs (which can be as a result of unilateral projects), and the second 
requires more than this – it would require developed countries to actively seek to increase the 
number of projects hosted by these countries. The latter is the option that would benefit the 
countries that are least advantaged, who are not able to effectively undertake unilateral 
projects. The current proposal would probably go some way in achieving this and so goes 
beyond the former proposal.
The language of the current proposal should result in developed countries actually taking 
steps to ensure that more countries host projects. The nature of the measures to be undertaken 
is not prescribed, but could vary widely. The measures should be targeted at overcoming the 
barriers to equitable distribution, including those identified above. They could include 
increased capacity building for those countries that need it the most and very importantly, 
increased direct investment in the underlying projects, which is one of the main barriers to 
CDM participation, especially by the smaller, poorer developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil 
fuels and associated energy-intensive products; and land-locked and transit countries. 
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If adopted and properly implemented, this proposal can go some way in ensuring a more 
equitable distribution of projects, but this would depend on the measures adopted and the 
manner in which they are implemented. If for example, it is taken to mean that developed 
countries have to proactively seek projects in specific countries, this could help overcome the 
market barrier to equitable distribution.266 This is because developed countries might be 
obliged to overlook cost and risk, and invest in these countries anyway, despite the projects
being slightly more risky and costly, or less profitable. However, just as with the Nairobi 
Framework discussed above (in Section 5.2.2), without concrete action in support of the 
proposal, it will be ineffective in achieving its objective of promoting equitable distribution.
Regarding the possible effectiveness of this proposal, the proposal aims to target a wide 
group of countries with no real justification for targeting them in the context of the CDM. For 
example, as a group, SIDS are among the countries that are most vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change. This, however, does not qualify them for special attention in terms 
of the CDM because they are actually among those with the lowest GHG emission reduction 
potential. In addition, as a group, they are not the countries with the greatest need because 
some SIDS (such as Barbados and Singapore) are among the developing countries with the 
highest human development.267 In the context of the CDM therefore and considering the 
elements of equitable distribution identified in Chapter 3, there is no justification for singling 
out SIDS as requiring special attention or preferential treatment. This applies also to 
extending the preferential treatment to all countries with fewer than 10 registered CDM 
                                               
266 An example of such a measure could be that under the new European Union Directive on its Emission 
Trading Scheme, to the effect that only credits from projects in LDCs will be automatically eligible under the 
Scheme. See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF (Europa, 
21/04/2011), pages 68 and 77; and http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796
‘Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System’ (Europa, 21/04/2011), Question 20. 
267 See the classifications of countries according to need and potential, in Chapter 4. 
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projects. This is not in accordance with the objectives of the CDM and the elements of 
equitable distribution identified in Chapter 3, because the preferential treatment would be 
extended to all countries hosting fewer than 10 projects, regardless of their need and their 
emission reduction potential. The classification covers a wide variety of countries, from those 
with very low GHG emission reduction potential (such as Cape Verde and Maldives) to those 
with high potential (such as Iran and Egypt), and from those with very low need (such as 
Kuwait and Cyprus) to those with very high need (such as Togo and Ethiopia).268 This 
proposal would therefore probably be even more effective if limited to those countries with 
the greatest need, especially those which also have reasonable GHG emission reduction 
potential, as they are the ones that most need support to effectively participate in the CDM.269
In addition, the proposal is for voluntary action - it merely states that countries “in a position 
to do so” “should” take “reasonable” measures. This is qualifying language and does not 
actually mandate any action. However, the proposal also goes further to state that measures 
taken should be reported or listed, and that the CDM Executive Board should provide an 
update of such measures.270 This would at least make visible the actions being taken and 
make it possible to measure their sufficiency and effectiveness. The conclusion therefore is 
that it is difficult to accurately measure how effective this initiative will be, but that if 
properly implemented, it could go a long way in promoting a more equitable distribution of 
projects. 
                                               
268 See Chapter 4 for these classifications.
269 See Chapter 4 again for a classification of countries according to their CDM potential.
270 See Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, Chapter III, Paragraphs 12 and 13.
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5.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has examined the barriers to the equitable distribution of CDM projects, 
together with the various initiatives that have been adopted and those proposed to address the 
problem. All these barriers undermine both the “need” and “potential” factors for achieving 
equitable distribution. Lack of capacity, finance and cost-related issues, the market-based 
nature of the CDM and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects primarily undermine the 
“need” factor, but also affect the “potential” factor. The preference for large-scale projects 
mainly undermines the “potential” factor, but also affects the “need” factor.271
The overall conclusion reached in this chapter is that the main barriers to equitable 
distribution of CDM projects are: the market-based nature of the CDM market, in which cost-
effectiveness, risk minimisation and profit maximisation are key, and the sustainable 
development contributions of CDM projects are not monetised; and the dominance of 
unilateral CDM projects in the CDM market, the potential for which those countries with the 
greatest need do not have or are unable to access. These two barriers are not currently being 
addressed within the CDM regime.
The various efforts to address the lack of equitable distribution, such as efforts to reduce the 
transaction costs of smaller projects or introduce simplified modalities for such projects and 
the various capacity building initiatives, have not resulted in a more equitable distribution. 
This is primarily because these barriers are merely symptomatic of the real problem – the 
basic design of the CDM regime. Slightly lower transactions costs will not result in projects 
in smaller developing countries being as attractive as those in larger developing countries, as 
long as the only considerations remain market indicators. Likewise, as long as investors 
                                               
271 See the text at note 156 for a more detailed explanation of this.
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continue to have the option of simply buying CERs rather than investing in CDM projects, 
particularly since there is no added benefit or incentive to provide direct investment, larger 
developing countries with the necessary financial and technical capacity will continue to 
dominate the CDM market. 
Unless and until these two issues are addressed, the chances of achieving a truly equitable 
distribution of CDM projects are very slim. However, as noted above, the proposal for the 
post-2012 period regarding developed countries taking measures to increase the projects in 
certain countries, if properly implemented, can help achieve a more equitable distribution of 
projects than currently exists. 
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CHAPTER SIX
Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to address the issue of what can be done within the CDM 
regime to remove the barriers to equitable distribution and contribute to a more equitable 
distribution of CDM projects. 
Chapter 4 concluded that the current distribution of projects is inequitable because it is not 
compatible with the definition of equitable distribution provided in Chapter 3, and cannot be 
explained by countries’ GHG emission reduction potential or their need.1 Thereafter, Chapter 
5 identified the barriers to equitable distribution of CDM projects, as follows: lack of 
capacity and local expertise; finance and cost-related barriers; size of projects; the market-
based nature of CDM projects; and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM 
market. It determined, based on the review of literature and analysis of the barriers to 
equitable distribution, that the two main barriers are the market-based nature of the CDM 
regime and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM market. Some of these 
barriers are being addressed by the CDM regime.2 However, there are currently no initiatives 
within the CDM regime to address the two key barriers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some recommendations for addressing these barriers 
and for promoting a more equitable distribution of CDM projects. It also concludes as to 
                                               
1 Many countries with relatively high levels of GHG emissions are underperforming, whereas some countries 
with relatively low GHG emission levels are performing well under the CDM. Likewise, most of the countries 
with the highest need are underperforming, while some countries with the lowest levels of need are actually 
doing well under the CDM. See the discussion in Chapter 4, particularly the conclusions in Section 4.6. 
2 See Chapter 5 for the discussion of these barriers together with the various initiatives established to overcome 
them.
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whether considering the nature and structure of the CDM, an equitable distribution of projects 
can be achieved. This chapter answers the final two research sub-questions, which are: “what 
steps can be taken within the CDM regime to address the inequitable distribution of 
projects?” and “can the CDM regime achieve an equitable distribution of projects?”
6.2 Recommendations for Promoting Equitable Distribution in the CDM 
6.2.1 Capacity Building
To address the barrier of lack of capacity as identified in Chapter 5, there is firstly a need for
a comprehensive study to determine countries’ capacity, inter alia to enable targeted and 
effective capacity building. This comprehensive study will have two aims. Firstly, Chapter 5 
highlighted that one of the barriers to equitable distribution might be a perception of lack of 
capacity, rather than an actual lack of capacity. Such a comprehensive study will therefore 
help to dispel any uncertainty regarding countries’ capacity to participate in the CDM.
Secondly, the comprehensive study should identify which countries lack CDM capacity and 
in what areas they require capacity support (such as capacity to undergo the project 
registration process or technical capacity to develop and implement projects). This will
enable targeted capacity building support to be given to these countries. Without such a 
study, capacity building efforts may simply amount to “shots in the dark” as they will be 
taken without a real knowledge of the areas or issues on which such efforts are required.3
                                               
3 All UNFCCC Parties, including developing country Parties, are required to report on their implementation of 
the Convention. In these reports, called national communications, some developing countries also outline their 
capacity needs, including in relation to the CDM. However, not all do, as they are not required to do so. In 
addition, most of the submitted national communications are very outdated, with some of them having been 
submitted before the CDM became operational (for example, Micronesia submitted its national communication 
in 1997, Mauritius and Argentina in 1999, Bhutan in 2000 and Ghana in 2001). Some of the national 
communications, particularly the earlier ones, do not even refer to the CDM at all (such as those of Malaysia 
and Kiribati) or refer to the CDM in general terms but not for the purpose of identifying capacity needs (such as 
that of Ghana). As of 14 January 2011, 140 developing countries have submitted their first national 
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Chapter 5 outlines that some capacity building initiatives have been undertaken within the 
CDM regime and highlights the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of these initiatives. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that lack of capacity and local expertise remains a barrier to CDM 
participation by some countries, especially those with the lowest human development, more 
targeted capacity building is needed to help these countries improve their participation in the 
CDM. As highlighted in Chapter 5, most of the capacity building initiatives taken so far (with 
the exception of the Nairobi Framework) are not targeted – they are given to all developing 
countries generally. However, Chapter 3 concludes that certain countries, specifically those 
with the greatest need, require preferential treatment to enable their effective participation in 
the CDM and achievement of their CDM potential. What is required is capacity building that 
is targeted specifically at these countries (identified in Chapter 4) and that is designed to 
respond to specific capacity needs (such as those identified through a comprehensive study of 
countries’ capacity).
This research recognises that some developing countries, other than those developing 
countries with the greatest need, do lack sufficient capacity to effectively participate in the 
CDM. This research is not advocating depriving these countries of the opportunity to receive 
the required capacity building. However, because the countries with the greatest need are the 
ones least able to help themselves and most in need of external support, this research supports 
targeting them for capacity building support. Therefore, in addition to any general capacity 
building provided to all developing countries, targeted capacity building should be given to 
                                                                                                                                                 
communications, 40 have submitted their second, two have submitted their third and one has submitted its 
fourth. See http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2979.php ‘Non-Annex I national 
communications’ (UNFCCC, 31/01/2011) and http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-
annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/653.php ‘Submitted National Communications from non-Annex I 
Parties’ (UNFCCC, 31/01/2011) for more information about countries’ national communications. These national 
communications are therefore inadequate to rely on as a source of information about countries’ CDM capacity 
needs. 
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those countries with the greatest need, designed specifically to address their identified 
capacity needs.
In providing targeted capacity building to countries with the greatest need, it is also necessary 
to consider the GHG emission reduction potential of such countries. For example, there are 
several countries that have very low emission reduction potential. Although such countries 
should still receive some capacity building to help them fulfil this potential, care must be 
taken to ensure that they do not continue to receive capacity building to help them host CDM 
projects even when they no longer have the potential to host projects. That is why countries’ 
need and emission reduction potential must both be taken into consideration in efforts to 
address the problem of inequitable distribution. 
Some of the issues that should be determined when undertaking capacity building efforts 
include: whose capacity needs to be built (for example, project developers, financial 
institutions and industry representatives); what capacity needs to be built (for example, 
project origination, design, documentation and implementation capacity); and what form the 
capacity building should take (for example, training workshops, pilot programmes and 
awareness raising). Such issues can be determined through the comprehensive study 
suggested above. The nature of the capacity building efforts should depend on the specific 
capacity need being addressed (for instance, training programmes to address lack of technical 
capacity and pilot projects to address lack of project implementation experience).
6.2.2 Financial Assistance
Building on the decision to provide loans to all countries with fewer than 10 projects to pay 
for their project transaction costs, such loans should be limited to countries with the greatest 
need (identified in Chapter 4). This is because these are the countries that most need the 
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financial assistance and limiting the countries eligible for the loans will then increase the 
amount available to these countries. However, as discussed above, such loans are only 
intended to cover the project transaction costs, but this is not one of the key barriers to 
equitable distribution.4 The key barrier in terms of financing is lack of finance to implement 
the project itself, that is, lack of finance for the project implementation costs.5 To address this 
key barrier, a mechanism similar to the loans scheme could be established, but should help
finance the project implementation costs, rather than just project transaction costs. Such a 
mechanism should be limited to those countries with the greatest need. 
This latter proposal to provide access to underlying finance could be in the form of a proposal 
made by the CDM Executive Board to COP/MOP 5, which was eventually not adopted in its 
original form by the COP/MOP. The proposal was for the creation of a CDM project
development fund using part of the administrative proceeds of the CDM, as well as voluntary 
contributions from donors.6 This fund was only to cover project transaction costs and 
capacity building, and the decision regarding providing loans to countries was probably borne 
out of this proposal. The fund should be created, but rather than just providing loans for 
project transaction costs, should provide loans sufficient to cover the cost of implementing 
the CDM project. However, it is recognised that given the large amount of finance required 
for projects, this solution may not go a very long way in addressing this problem, unless 
enough voluntary donations are made to the fund.
One possible solution is to make donations to the fund mandatory, on the basis that the aim of 
equitable distribution might justify requiring mandatory contributions to the fund by some 
                                               
4 See the discussion in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See Annual report of the CDM Executive Board to COP/MOP 5 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16, 4 November 
2009), Annex III, paragraph 7(c). 
257
parties, particularly developed country parties. It is however unlikely that making financial 
contributions mandatory would be acceptable to parties, as within the climate change regime 
generally, the usual practice is to “encourage” or “invite” contributions, usually on a 
voluntary basis.7 Therefore, depending on the size of the fund and the amount of money 
available, it may be better for the fund to retain its original intention and be limited to funding 
transaction costs (that is, if there will not be enough money available in the fund to cover 
project implementation costs).
A second recommendation to address the barrier of lack of implementation costs is for the 
establishment of a “matchmaking” service, similar to the CDM Bazaar,8 but targeted 
specifically at matching potential investors with projects in the countries with the greatest 
need. The objective of such a service would be to ensure that available CDM investment 
funds (as opposed to monies for purchasing CERs) are directed at, or give preference to, 
projects in the countries with the greatest needs. In this regard, the service could maintain an 
up-to-date list of developed country entities seeking to invest directly in CDM projects 
(rather than merely seeking to purchase CERs) and link such entities to host country 
developers (in the countries with the greatest need) seeking financing for their projects. For 
example, the CDM Bazaar currently contains a list of projects, from different countries, 
seeking CER purchasers or investors (some of the projects are unilateral projects that have 
                                               
7 See for example, Decision 10/CP.7, Funding under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 
2002) and Decision 7/CP.7, Funding under the Convention (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002), which 
relate to the Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund and the LDC Fund, and under which developed 
countries (Annex II Parties and other Annex I Parties “in a position to do so”) are “invited” to contribute to 
these funds. See also Decision 3/CP.11, Further guidance for the operation of the Least Developed Countries 
Fund (FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1, 30 March 2006); and Decision 5/CP.15, Work of the Consultative Group of 
Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention 
(FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010), paragraph 8.
8 The CDM Bazaar is a web-based information platform that provides information on CDM buyers, sellers and 
service providers, including information about specific CDM projects and project ideas. See Section 5.2.2 above 
for more about the CDM Bazaar. 
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already been registered and are merely seeking purchasers for CERs generated). The Bazaar 
also contains a list of CER buyers wishing to buy CERs. The Bazaar however does not go 
beyond this – it is merely an information sharing tool, making CDM information readily 
available to interested stakeholders. 
A matchmaking service will go beyond this. It should seek both to actively source investment 
funds from developed country entities and also to actively match such potential investors 
with host country entities with CDM project ideas. For example, one of the project ideas 
listed on the CDM Bazaar is for a small-scale compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) distribution 
project to be hosted in Pakistan (which is classified as having “high need”). This project is 
listed as seeking buyers and project finance sources.9 A CDM matchmaking service would 
match this project developer with an investor seeking to invest directly in projects. 
Multilateral funds or investors with large portfolios (such as Ecosecurities, Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management Sweden and EDF Trading, which are the top 3 buyers) would be best 
placed to participate in such a service, due to the large number of projects they are involved 
in. They can allocate a specific percentage of their CDM funds to be used to invest directly in 
projects (through the matchmaking service), rather than simply to purchase CERs. But 
participation should not be restricted to such funds or investors, and all investors should be 
encouraged to go through the matchmaking service, in order to ensure that more countries are 
able to participate in the CDM, particularly those with the greatest need, in order to promote a 
more equitable distribution of projects. 
                                               
9 See http://www.cdmbazaar.net/repo/projects/project-85553406.1 ‘CDM Project’ (CDM Bazaar, 24/02/2011). 
The project was uploaded in February 2010, so it is unclear if it has obtained the required financing, but as of 
February 2011, it had not been registered as a CDM project, nor is it listed in the CDM pipeline (which lists 
projects at the validation and registration request stages). See CDM Pipeline, February 2011. 
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6.2.3 Market-based nature of the CDM
This thesis does not suggest that the CDM should no longer operate as a market mechanism. 
Rather, it recommends that the CDM should not operate only as a typical market, with the 
main considerations being risk, cost and profit. It should operate as a mechanism that was 
created to fulfil environmental objectives, not market objectives. Due consideration should 
therefore be given to its environmental objectives of reducing GHG emissions and 
contributing to sustainable development, and to achieving these objectives equitably among 
developing countries. Consequently, this thesis recommends that even as investors consider 
market factors such as risk and cost, they should also consider both of the CDM’s 
environmental objectives of achieving GHG emission reductions and sustainable 
development equitably among developing countries. 
This thesis noted above that market factors only contribute to achievement of reducing GHG 
emissions (albeit not equitably among developing countries).10 This is because when 
calculating the cost of, and profit from, CDM projects, the sole consideration is the GHG 
emission reductions achieved by projects, as the sustainable development benefits of the 
CDM currently do not have a market value. There is no market incentive to promote 
sustainable development. However, the need to achieve the sustainable development 
objective of the CDM, and the fact that this objective cannot be met through reliance solely 
on normal market forces, justifies intervention in the market. Consequently, it is 
recommended that investors be required to take countries’ sustainable development potential 
into consideration when selecting countries to invest in. 
                                               
10 See the discussion in Section 5.2.5. 
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This should go beyond considering the sustainable development potential of projects, as this 
could just lead to more sustainable projects in the same countries already dominating the 
market.11 Instead, in keeping with the factors to be considered for achieving an equitable 
distribution of projects,12 countries’ need should be considered and preference given to those 
countries with the greatest need. When investing in countries, investors should consider why 
that particular country is the most appropriate, given its human development level and need.
Currently, before a CDM project can be registered, the host country DNA must confirm that 
the project will contribute to its sustainable development.13 In addition, information is also 
provided in the project design documents (PDDs), outlining how the project contributes to the 
host country’s sustainable development. Generally, PDDs contain all information relevant to 
the project, such as information about how the project will result in reduced GHG emissions 
and the environmental impacts of the project, including transboundary impacts.14 Similarly, 
investors can be required to provide information on the reason for their choice of host country
(considering the country’s level of development) and explain how they have taken the 
country’s sustainable development potential into consideration. This information should be 
reported in the PDDs. 
This can be done on the basis of the proposal currently being considered by countries for the 
post-2012 CDM regime, to the effect that developed countries should take reasonable 
                                               
11 There is nothing wrong with this. The issue is that those countries that are underperforming should also have 
the chance to fulfil their CDM potential.
12 See Section 3.6 above. 
13 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 40(a). 
14 See PDD Form (Version 03 – in effect as of 28 July 2006) 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/PDDs/PDD_form04_v03_2.pdf www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 
23/11/2010); and Guidelines for completing the project design document and the proposed new baseline and 
monitoring methodologies (Annex 12, Report of 41st meeting of the CDM Executive Board) 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/pdd/PDD_guid04.pdf www.unfccc.int (UNFCCC, 23/11/2010). 
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measures to increase the number of project activities in certain developing countries.15 In 
selecting and implementing such measures, the focus should be on countries’ with the 
greatest need, rather than all LDCs, SIDS, African countries, countries with fewer than 10 
registered projects or countries defined in Convention Article 4.8, as is the current proposal. 
By doing this, developed countries will then be specifically considering the sustainable 
development objective of the CDM, rather than just normal market considerations.
Multilateral funds (such as the various carbon funds of the World Bank) or investors with 
large portfolios (such as Ecosecurities) are probably in the best position to invest in a spread 
of countries, because of the large number of projects they are involved in. These should be 
required or strongly encouraged to ensure their projects are spread equitably across many 
countries, rather than sticking to just a few countries (as some of them appear to).16
If investors are required to consider not only countries’ GHG emission reduction potentials, 
but also their sustainable development potentials, the question is how this would benefit 
investors. The benefit of considering the emission reduction potential is fairly obviously. A 
country with greater emission reduction potential will have more potential to generate large 
amounts of CERs and investors can, for example, take advantage of greater economies of 
scale. If this is combined with better capacity and institutions, then the investor would benefit 
from less risk and more profit. However, taking account of a country’s need will not produce 
any of these benefits. How then can this be made attractive for investors, particularly those 
that are in the CDM market to make profit (as many of the market participants appear to be)?
                                               
15 See the discussion in Section 5.4, pages 246-249, above. See Document FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, 
Chapter III, Paragraph 12. 
16 For example, Burkett notes that two-thirds (in value) of the CDM deals signed by the World Bank between 
January 2005 and March 2006 were with China. See M. Burkett, ‘Just solutions to climate change: a climate 
justice proposal for a domestic clean development mechanism’ (2008) 56 Buffalo L. Rev. 169, 211. Even if there 
was no other evidence to this effect, the fact that so few countries host so many projects, while many countries 
host no project at all, is evidence of the fact that investors keep returning to the same countries to invest in. 
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This research cannot come up with any feasible suggestion in this regard, other than the 
satisfaction of knowing that both objectives of the CDM are being fulfilled. 
Considering that there is no real benefit to investors of taking sustainable development 
potential into consideration, especially when this may necessitate investing in countries that 
can only produce less profitable projects, there is a risk that a requirement of this sort may 
drive investors away from the CDM market. This is particularly likely considering the fact 
that the biggest players in the CDM market are market traders who are in the market to make 
profit, not to comply with Kyoto Protocol commitments.17 This would be an undesirable 
outcome, as this would obviously not help achieve either objective of the CDM.  
The reason why this requirement (to take sustainable development potential into 
consideration) may drive investors away is because of the particular focus of this market – to 
make the most profit at the least cost (as is the case with many markets). However, having a 
market that has a different focus may result in a different outcome. Or to put it more 
accurately, the CDM market needs the right focus. It needs to focus, not on maximisation of 
profit (and minimisation of risk and cost), but on ensuring achievement of its environmental 
objectives of reducing GHG emissions and promoting sustainable development, which should 
be done equitably among developing countries. Although making profit and reducing risk and 
cost could be part of the focus of the market, it should not be, as it is now, the primary focus. 
One way of addressing this issue is by promoting the practice of socially-responsible 
investing (SRI) within the CDM. 
Although there is no generally-acceptable definition of SRI, socially-responsible investments 
can, for example, be said to refer to investments that incorporate social, environmental or 
                                               
17 See the text at Chapter 5, notes 184 and 185 above.
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ethical criteria with financial objectives.18 In addition to their desire to minimise cost and 
make profit (which desire is typical of most markets), socially-responsible investors also 
desire to, through their investments, make improvements, among other things, to the 
environment and social issues. Specifically, they aim to ensure that their investments do not 
conflict with their social, moral, ethical or other values.19 For these investors, making a return 
on their investments, though an important aim, is not the overriding concern.20 The situation 
with CDM investors should be similar – the overriding concern of CDM investors should not 
be making profit, but achieving the objectives of the CDM, which are to achieve GHG 
emission reductions and promote sustainable development, rather than to generate profit for 
investors. According to Sjöström and Welford, SRI “entails that investors complement 
financial analysis with environmental and social criteria in order to evaluate companies for 
possible inclusion in an investment portfolio.”21 Likewise, when including CDM projects in 
their CDM portfolio, CDM investors should not only use financial criteria (of minimising 
cost and maximising profit), but also the environmental criteria of reducing GHG emissions 
and promoting sustainable development equitably in developing countries. 
An example of SRI within the CDM could be said to be that facilitated by the CDM Gold 
Standard Foundation.22 The Gold Standard Foundation operates the Gold Standard 
certification scheme, which was established to ensure that CDM projects not only produce 
                                               
18 See P. Waring and T. Edwards, ‘Socially responsible investment: explaining its uneven development and 
human resource management consequences’ (2008) 16 Corporate Governance: An International Review 135, 
135.
19 See M. O’Brien Hylton, ‘Socially responsible” investing: doing good versus doing well in an inefficient 
market’ (1992-1993) 42 American University Law Review 1, 7; and M.S. Rapaport and J. Peebles, ‘Socially 
responsible investment’ (1992) 6 Probate and Property 58, 58. 
20 Waring and Edwards, supra note 18, at 135. 
21 E. Sjöström and R. Welford, ‘Facilitators and impediments for socially responsible investment: a study of 
Hong Kong’ (2009) 16 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 278, 278. 
22  This is a Swiss-based non-profit organisation backed by 51 NGOs and charitable organisations. See 
www.cdmgoldstandard.org. 
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cost-effective emission reductions, but also foster sustainable development in the host 
developing countries, thereby producing high quality projects. To achieve this, project 
developers are required to use Gold Standard method and tools, including a bottom-up and 
integrated approach that puts particular emphasis on incorporating feedback from local 
stakeholder consultations, and the Sustainable Development Matrix.23 Although the Gold 
Standard has a good objective and contributes to ensuring that the CDM achieves its 
sustainable development objective, its objectives do not necessarily including ensuring an 
equitable distribution of projects (although it does aim at ensuring “equality of access for all 
market participants”24). What is required within the CDM regime is more than this – there is 
a need for efforts not only to ensure that the CDM achieves its sustainable development 
objective, but that this is done equitably among all developing countries, including those with 
the greatest need, which have, to date, been mostly left out of the CDM market.25 The Gold 
Standard model can be improved upon to achieve this objective.  
Research shows SRI does not necessarily have a negative impact on investors’ financial 
returns. While not necessarily giving investors a better return for their money, SRI does not 
automatically result in under-performing investments.26 Other research has shown that SRI
can only be as financially profitable as traditional investing in an inefficient market.27
Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that for the CDM, the only consideration cannot 
be financial, as that is not the sole purpose of the CDM. In fact, some could say the purpose 
                                               
23 See http://cdmgoldstandard.org/What-we-stand-for.66.0.html ‘What we stand for’ and 
http://cdmgoldstandard.org/What-we-do.64.0.html ‘What we do’ (Gold Standard, 25/02/2011).  
24 See http://cdmgoldstandard.org/What-we-stand-for.66.0.html ‘What we stand for’ (Gold Standard, 
25/02/2011).
25 See the analysis of the distribution of CDM projects in Section 4.5, which concludes that countries with the 
greatest need are actually hosting the least number of projects, with most of them not hosting any project. 
26 See Rapaport and Peebles, supra note 19, at 59; B.F. Camey, ‘Socially responsible investing: is it successful?’ 
(November 1994), http://www.chausa.org/authorindex.aspx?year=1994, www.chausa.org (28/02/2011), 23; and 
S. Schueth, ‘Socially responsible investing in the United States’ (2003) 43 J. Bus. Ethics 189, 193. 
27 See, for example, O’Brien Hylton, supra note 19, at 35.
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of the CDM does not include profit-making, but that, in terms of cost, it only aims to help 
developed countries to reduce GHG emissions more cost-effectively than they can achieve 
domestically. Because investing in some of the countries currently under-performing could 
involve taking on greater risk and higher costs, it is possible that the overall financial 
profitability of projects in such countries may be lower than in the countries currently doing 
very well. But, as noted above, for socially-responsible investors, the financial returns are not 
the overriding concern, and should not be in the case of the CDM, which has other, non-
financial, objectives. 
There have been several attempts to promote SRI, both at the national and international 
levels, mainly through voluntary regulations, instruments or standards, particularly reporting 
requirements.28 For example, investors that claim to invest in a socially responsible manner 
have been required to disclose their SRI policies.29 In this case, investors may choose not to 
invest in a socially-responsible way, as long as they disclose this fact.30 This solution would 
be similar to that proposed above – requiring CDM investors to disclose the reasons for their 
choice of host country, considering the countries’ sustainable development potential and 
human development level.31 Noting the need for stronger regulation, Richardson proposes 
reforms such as redefining fiduciary duties for SRI and a variety of financial incentives to 
encourage SRI. He also recommends improving the quality of corporate environmental and 
social reporting. Fiduciary duties are not appropriate in the context of the CDM (Richardson 
was speaking mainly about financial institutions which invest on behalf of others, such as 
                                               
28 See B.J. Richardson, ‘Financing sustainability: the new transnational governance of socially responsible 
investment’ (2006) 17 YBIEL 73, for an overview of some of these regulations.
29 See B.J. Richardson, ‘Keeping ethical investment ethical: regulatory issues for investing for sustainability’ 
(2009) 87 J. Bus. Ethics 555, 559. Examples of such regulation are found in the UK (such as the UK’s 
Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations (No 3378), S.I. 2005/3378) and Australia (such as 
Australia’s Corporations Act, 2001). 
30 See Richardson, (2009), Ibid.
31 See pages 259-260 above.
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pension funds and mutual funds).32 In addition, as noted above, there are also no real 
financial incentives that can be provided to CDM investors, other than the CERs generated 
from projects, which investors will get from projects regardless of which countries they 
invest in. It appears therefore that the difficulty is the same – the most feasible [legal]
solution may be requiring investors to report on the reasons for their choices and hope that 
this reporting requirement will spur investors to choose countries based on their human 
development levels and sustainable development potential, rather than simply based on where 
they will bear the least cost or make the most profit.
In conclusion, if the concept of SRI is introduced into the CDM market, with an emphasis on 
effectively considering the sustainable development objective of the CDM and ensuring that
more countries are able to participate in the CDM, this could reduce the focus of the market 
on financial incentives and refocus the market more effectively on the CDM’s environmental 
objectives of promoting sustainable development (and GHG emission reductions) equitably 
among developing countries. Whereas there is possibly no legal solution to effectively ensure 
consideration of this, practical solutions include investors or groups taking the initiative to 
build on the CDM Gold Standard model, but specifically with the aim of ensuring that those 
countries that are underrepresented in the CDM, particularly those with the greatest need, are 
helped to increase their level of CDM participation. 
6.2.4 Prevalence of unilateral projects
The most obvious solution to this problem, which is one of the key barriers to the equitable 
distribution of projects, is requiring that a specific percentage of all registered projects must 
be bilateral in the real sense and, where the projects are multilateral, they should be funded by 
                                               
32 See generally G. Djurasovic, ‘The regulation of socially responsible mutual funds’ (1996-1997) 22 J. Corp.
Law 257 for an analysis of some of the regulatory issues relating to socially-responsible mutual funds.
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the multilateral investor, rather than by the host country entity itself.33 Essentially, this means 
requiring that in a specific percentage of registered projects, the developed country 
counterparty must invest directly in the underlying project, rather than simply purchasing 
CERs generated from the projects.
There are different ways this can be achieved. One way is requiring that x% of registered 
projects must be bilaterally-funded. This can be done, for example, by taking the average 
number of projects registered monthly or annually, and requiring that at least x% of this 
number must be bilaterally-funded. A second way is requiring that x% of CERs used by 
developed countries to fulfil their emission reduction objectives are obtained from bilaterally-
funded projects. This option is similar to, yet fundamentally different from, a proposal 
previously considered by countries. This proposal was to “require” or “encourage” developed 
countries to “take reasonable measures” to ensure that at least 10% of CERs used to comply 
with their reduction commitments are generated from projects in either LDCs and African 
countries, or in countries with fewer than 10 registered project activities.34 However, as noted 
already, this proposal would not effectively address the equitable distribution problem.35 This 
is because in implementing this proposal, the CERs used could be CERs generated from 
unilaterally-developed and funded projects – this proposal does not imply that these CERs 
must be from bilaterally-funded projects. What is therefore required is a way of ensuring that 
                                               
33 See Chapters 2 and 5 for an explanation of the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral CDM structures.
34 See Documentation to facilitate negotiations among Parties: Emissions trading and the project based 
mechanisms (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/6/Add.3, 29 April 2010), Paragraph 12. Many countries objected to this 
option. According to some, establishing a quota is not appropriate for a market-based mechanism. During the 
discussions of this issue at COP 15 in December 2009 (at which the author was present), Grenada expressed 
reservations to the appropriateness of establishing quotas within a market-based system. One country preferred 
the option of “encouraging” countries to take reasonable measures, and several countries opposed prescribing a 
specific percentage of CERs to be generated from countries with fewer than 10 registered projects. See 
generally, T. Akanle et al.,’ Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference’ (22 December 2009) 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf www.iisd.ca (29/04/2010), 20-21.
35 See the discussion in Chapter 5, Section 5.4 above.
268
more bilaterally-developed and funded projects enter into the CDM market than currently 
obtains. This proposal provides a third way of ensuring more bilateral projects – requiring 
that x% of CERs used by developed countries are from projects developed and financed by 
these countries themselves (rather than by host country entities) in the countries with the 
greatest need (identified in Chapter 4). 
This last option will indirectly ensure that there are more bilaterally-developed and funded 
projects in the CDM market and will in any event, directly improve the CDM participation of 
these countries and ensure a more equitable distribution of projects, which is the ultimate 
objective.
These three options (requiring that x% of registered projects must be bilaterally-funded;
requiring that x% of CERs used by developed countries to fulfil their emission reduction 
objectives are obtained from bilaterally-funded projects; and requiring that x% of CERs used 
by developed countries are generated from projects hosted in the countries with the greatest 
need) will greatly help to address the problem of inequitable distribution of projects, 
specifically by overcoming the barrier of the dominance of unilateral CDM projects in the 
CDM market.
The question is whether these options, or any of them, would be acceptable to countries. The 
first two options are probably the ones that can be designed in a way that would be most 
effective and most acceptable to countries. This is because firstly, these options are not 
directly prescriptive and do not directly contradict the market nature of the CDM. They do 
not directly provide that there must be a limit to the number of unilateral projects or unilateral 
CERs, or that developed countries must invest in certain developing countries (or restrain 
from investing in certain countries). Rather these options would require a certain minimum 
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number of bilateral projects or amount of bilateral CERs in the CDM market. Particularly 
considering that the CDM was originally intended as a mechanism under which projects 
would be bilaterally-developed and funded, these options do not appear to be very extreme or 
contrary to the intention or ethos of the mechanism. They would merely be to the effect that 
the CDM should operate more in the way it was originally intended to operate, than the way 
it currently operates.
These options however may not directly improve the participation of those countries with the 
greatest need, as developed countries, in complying with the options, may simply increase 
their investments in the countries already performing well under the CDM. There is a real 
chance of this happening and that is why these options should be used in conjunction with 
that proposed above, under the market-based nature of the CDM – requiring investors to 
consider countries’ sustainable development potential and need, to encourage them to 
increase their investments in those countries with the greatest need. 
The last option, that of requiring investment in certain countries, may be less appealing to 
investors, because of its more prescriptive nature. This option is a stronger version of that 
proposed in Section 6.2.3 above (relating to the market-based nature of the CDM), which is 
to the effect that developed countries should consider developing countries’ sustainable 
development potential when selecting countries to invest in. An outright prescriptive proposal 
may be less acceptable. This does not mean such an option should not be considered, as were 
it to be accepted, it would definitely go a long way in ensuring a more equitable distribution 
of projects than the current distribution.  
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6.3 Other Case Scenario
There does not appear to be very much that can be done to address the problems created by 
the market-based nature of the CDM: the emphasis on cost-effectiveness and lack of 
consideration of sustainable development. There is no real incentive that can be given to 
investors to make it really worth their while to take sustainable development into 
consideration and there is the risk that requiring them to do so may drive investors away from 
the market. Addressing the problem of unilateral CDM projects should go some way in 
correcting the skewed distribution of projects. There is however the very real possibility that 
if investors cannot purchase enough CERs and need to invest directly in projects, they will 
simply do this in the countries where it makes the best market sense. So the problem may not 
be solved at all. The questions that this thesis cannot run away from therefore are as follows: 
is there any point in continuing efforts to achieve equitable distribution, as these do not 
appear to be having much effect on the distribution of projects. Should the CDM continue to 
attempt to achieve sustainable development and GHG emission reductions equitably among 
countries? Or should it be streamlined to be simply a market mechanism to achieve cost-
effective emission reductions, with no significance attached to where the reductions are 
achieved?
As Boyd et al., noted, “it is logical that private investors focus their efforts on countries with 
low political and economic risks for their projects, and the CDM is no different in this regard 
from other forms of foreign investments.”36 They conclude that, “it may simply be too much 
                                               
36 Boyd et al., supra Chapter 5, note 28, at 28. 
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to ask of one mechanism to achieve such diverse goals simultaneously, and sustainable 
development goals might more appropriately be funded through different channels.”37
In reality, CERs are issued for emission reductions achieved in countries, and not for 
sustainable development contributions. This is how it has to be in order to maintain the 
environmental integrity of the CDM, considering that these CERs are then used to offset the 
emission reduction objectives of developed countries. Although it is possible to issue CERs 
for sustainable development contributions, these CERs cannot be used to offset emission 
reductions in developed countries (as such CERs would not be a result of emission reductions 
in developing countries) and they would not therefore be of value to developed countries 
(except, as already stated, possibly for public relations purposes). The final conclusion is that 
the CDM regime, given its market-based nature, may not be able to achieve a truly equitable 
distribution of projects, and that there is no legal solution to this problem.38 The only option 
would be to accept that the CDM cannot continue to operate as a simple market mechanism 
and to introduce regulations that are not really suitable for a typical market mechanism, but 
which would help the CDM to achieve its dual objectives. On the other hand, countries could 
simply accept that there will be no truly equitable distribution of projects and turn their 
attention elsewhere in efforts to contribute to sustainable development in developing 
countries.
                                               
37 Ibid. See also Sutter and Parreño, supra Chapter 5, note 179, at 89, where the authors identify a trade-off 
between the two objectives of the CDM in favour of the cost-efficient emission reductions goal. 
38 As noted above, there could be practical solutions, which could, for example, involve investors taking the lead 
to address investment in the countries with the greatest need, in the same way that charities and private 
companies have taken the lead in providing micro finance. This could be done by building on the CDM Gold 
Standard model. In addition, by promoting the practice of socially-responsible investing within the CDM could 
also ensure that investors take countries’ sustainable development potential into consideration when selecting 
countries to invest in. These are, however, not necessarily legal solutions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to ascertain whether the international CDM regime can support 
an equitable distribution of CDM projects. Specifically, this thesis sought to: determine 
whether the current distribution of CDM projects is equitable; if inequitable, identify the 
reasons for the inequitable distribution; and establish if the CDM regime can actually support 
an equitable distribution of projects, and provide recommendations for achieving this.  
Chapter 1 established the need for this research. It identified that although the CDM has been 
operating for close to 7 years, the distribution of projects across countries and regions is very 
uneven and apparently inequitable, despite the various initiatives that have been taken to 
address the apparent problem. The purpose of the research was to identify what is missing in 
terms of addressing the perceived problem, and to offer solutions.
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the CDM and its operation, so as to provide the 
background for the research and to explain the terms and institutions that would be referred to 
throughout the research. Very importantly also, the Chapter explained the need to have an 
equitable distribution of projects. It outlined three major reasons. The first reason is based on 
the objectives of the CDM, which are to contribute to GHG emission reductions and 
sustainable development in developing countries. As one of the key principles of sustainable 
development is equity, including in the distribution of resources, an equitable distribution of 
projects is required to truly achieve the sustainable development objective of the CDM. It 
would also give all developing countries the opportunity to enjoy the social and economic 
benefits of CDM projects, and also enable them to contribute to climate change mitigation 
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through the GHG emission reductions achieved by the projects. The second reason is that 
equity is one of the key principles of the climate change regime, and the CDM, as an 
instrument of this regime, was established to contribute to the objectives of the regime and 
must also follow the principles of the regime. The third reason for seeking a more equitable 
distribution of projects is that this is obviously important to countries, considering that at 
every meeting of the COP/MOP, countries adopt resolutions calling for equitable distribution. 
Having established that there is a need for equitable distribution of CDM projects, Chapter 3 
then went on to identify the meaning of equitable distribution in the context of the CDM. The 
need for this arose because despite all the decisions and actions that have been taken to 
promote a more equitable distribution of projects, the actual meaning of the term has never 
been defined nor have the contents of the goal been identified. This chapter answers the first 
and second research sub-questions: what is the meaning of equitable distribution of CDM 
projects; and what criteria should be applied to determine if a distribution is equitable and 
what factors should be used in efforts to achieve equitable distribution of CDM projects? It 
states that equitable distribution of CDM projects is the result of a process that takes certain 
elements into consideration. These elements are countries’ GHG emission reduction potential 
and sustainable development potential (need), which should both be considered when 
determining whether a distribution of projects is equitable. Efforts to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of projects should, in addition, be backed up with preferential 
treatment, which should be given to those countries with the greatest need.
To help determine the meaning of equitable distribution, this thesis examined general theories 
of distributive justice (egalitarianism, the difference principle and utilitarianism), as well as 
distributive justice in international law generally, and determined whether the approaches 
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taken are applicable to the CDM. It found that in international law, distributive justice does 
not have a specific outcome, but takes a “process-based” approach, in which all factors 
relevant to the particular issue are taken into consideration. There is therefore no “one-size-
fits-all” outcome, but rather, the outcome depends on the specific issues being considered.
This definition (of equitable distribution) is different from that drawn out from general 
theories of distributive justice. For example, egalitarianism requires an equal distribution of 
goods, irrespective of countries’ specific circumstances or the specific circumstances of the 
issue being considered. Under international law however, relevant factors or circumstances 
are required to be considered and these factors or circumstances would prevent the 
application of equal distribution where appropriate. The difference principle requires
consideration of countries’ specific circumstances, but then tries to compensate for those who 
are worse off in terms of these circumstances, whereas under international law, there is no 
such attempt to compensate for natural attributes (“natural attributes” in the CDM, for 
instance, equate to limited potential to generate CERs and in maritime boundary delimitation, 
refer to issues such as the length of countries’ coastlines). In addition, the difference principle 
would also try to maximise the potential of the worst off, to the detriment of those that are 
better off (there is no attempt to simultaneously improve the situation of all countries, except 
to the extent that improving the situation of the better off directly improves the situation of 
the worst off). Finally, the utilitarian theory requires maximisation of the “happiness” of 
society, which, in the context of the CDM, refers to ensuring that the largest number of 
countries hosts the largest number of projects possible. This theory would require individual 
countries, irrespective of their particular circumstances (such as their need), to sacrifice their 
hosting potential if this would increase the overall number of CDM projects possible. None 
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of these definitions is used in international law generally, and they also cannot be applied to 
the CDM without negatively impacting on the CDM’s ability to achieve its two objectives of 
reducing GHG emissions and contributing to sustainable development in developing 
countries.
Chapter 4 answered the next two research sub-questions, which are: what should an ideal 
distribution of projects be; and does the current distribution of CDM projects meet this ideal 
distribution of projects? To answer these questions, the chapter examined the current 
distribution of CDM projects to determine if it is equitable or inequitable. It first of all 
identified what the distribution of projects should be, based on countries’ emission reduction 
and sustainable development potentials, and compared this to the current distribution. 
Chapter 4 concluded that the current distribution of projects is, in fact, inequitable. 
Chapter 5 then went on to identify some of the reasons for this inequitable distribution, 
together with the solutions adopted within the CDM regime, therefore answering the next two 
research sub-questions: if the distribution of projects is deemed inequitable, what are the 
main reasons for the inequitable distribution of CDM projects; and are there are any barriers 
to equitable distribution being addressed within the CDM regime, and if so, how? It identified 
lack of capacity, the size of projects, as well as CDM transaction and implementation costs as 
some of the barriers to equitable distribution of projects, all of which affect and undermine 
both the emission reduction potential and need factors for achieving equitable distribution. It 
concluded that the two key barriers to equitable distribution are the market structure of the 
CDM and the prevalence of unilateral CDM projects in the CDM market, and highlights that 
these barriers, unlike the other barriers identified, are not being addressed by the CDM 
regime. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 answered the last two research sub-questions, which are: what steps can be 
taken within the CDM regime to address any inequitable distribution of projects; and can the 
CDM regime achieve an equitable distribution of projects? With regard to capacity building, 
this thesis proposed that a comprehensive study of countries’ CDM capacity and capacity 
needs should be undertaken and capacity building should be provided to those countries with 
the greatest need. Such capacity building should be designed specifically to address the 
identified capacity needs. Regarding the financial barrier, the proposal is that those countries 
with the greatest need should be given greater access to finance for the underlying CDM 
project itself, possibly through a CDM project development fund established for that purpose.
With regard to the two key barriers to equitable distribution – the market-based nature of the 
CDM and the prevalence of unilateral projects – the proposals are slightly more complicated. 
To address the barrier of the prevalence of unilateral projects, this thesis proposed that there 
should be a requirement that x% of all registered projects should be bilateral or that x% of 
CERs used by developed countries should be from bilateral projects. The third option, which 
is to require that x% of CERs should be generated from bilaterally-developed and funded 
projects in the countries with the greatest need, is likely to be less acceptable, because of its 
prescriptive nature. Nevertheless, this thesis recognised that even the first two options would 
still not properly address the problem, unless the issue of the market-based nature of the 
CDM is addressed. This is because if required to invest directly in developing countries 
(rather than simply buying unilateral CERs), developed country entities could simply increase 
their investments in the countries already doing well in the CDM, because of their greater 
investment attractiveness (less investment and country risk, and greater profit and technical 
experience and capacity). As there is no direct benefit to developed countries of taking 
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countries’ sustainable development potential into consideration and investing in countries 
with greater need rather than more attractive countries, there may be no real solution to the 
problem. The ultimate conclusion therefore is that the CDM may be unable to achieve a truly 
equitable distribution of projects, as long as it remains a market mechanism, where risk, cost 
and price are the only considerations that come with benefits attached. 
Enabling all countries to participate effectively in the CDM and helping those with the 
greatest need to increase their level of participation will contribute to achievement of both 
objectives of the CDM. It will not affect the GHG reduction objective, as even if the projects 
are small scale projects, the projects will still reduce GHG emissions in these countries.39 It 
will also contribute to the sustainable development objective, as it will result in more 
countries, particularly those that need it most, being able to participate in the CDM and enjoy 
its sustainable development benefits. However the CDM may not be able to achieve this in its 
current form. If countries want the CDM to actually achieve both GHG emission reductions 
and sustainable development, there might be a need to accept that a pure market mechanism 
may not be the best way to achieve this. Introducing some regulations that may not be 
suitable for a typical (free) market mechanism, but that are suitable for a market mechanism 
with these two objectives, may be necessary. Such regulations could include mandatory 
requirements for investors to spread their CDM portfolio more equitably among countries, 
ensuring that all eligible countries have the opportunity to participate in the CDM and 
requiring them to consider countries’ need when selecting host countries to invest in. 
                                               
39 As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4, small scale projects currently account for almost half of all CDM 
projects, but they are mostly situated in the same group of countries that have been dominating the CDM. 
Having smaller countries hosting more of this type of projects will not negatively impact on the GHG reduction 
objective of the CDM.
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Appendix A – List of Eligible Developing Countries
Eligible countries are those that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and established DNAs
Total – 123 (November 2010)
1. Albania
2. Algeria
3. Angola
4. Antigua and Barbuda
5. Argentina
6. Armenia
7. Azerbaijan
8. Bahamas
9. Bahrain
10. Bangladesh
11. Barbados
12. Belize
13. Benin
14. Bhutan
15. Bolivia
16. Botswana
17. Brazil
18. Burkina Faso
19. Burundi
20. Cambodia
21. Cameroon
22. Cape Verde
23. Chad
24. Chile
25. China
26. Colombia
27. Costa Rica
28. Côte d’Ivoire
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29. Cuba
30. Cyprus
31. Democratic Republic of the Congo
32. Djibouti
33. Dominican Republic
34. Ecuador
35. Egypt
36. El Salvador
37. Equatorial Guinea
38. Eritrea
39. Ethiopia
40. Fiji
41. Gabon
42. Gambia
43. Georgia
44. Ghana
45. Grenada
46. Guatemala
47. Guinea
48. Guinea-Bissau
49. Guyana
50. Honduras
51. India
52. Indonesia
53. Iran
54. Israel
55. Jamaica
56. Jordan
57. Kenya
58. Kuwait
59. Kyrgyzstan
60. Laos
61. Lebanon
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62. Lesotho
63. Liberia
64. Macedonia
65. Madagascar
66. Malawi
67. Malaysia
68. Maldives
69. Mali
70. Malta
71. Mauritania
72. Mauritius
73. Mexico
74. Moldova
75. Mongolia
76. Montenegro
77. Morocco
78. Mozambique
79. Myanmar
80. Namibia
81. Nepal
82. Nicaragua
83. Niger
84. Nigeria
85. North Korea
86. Oman
87. Pakistan
88. Panama
89. Papua New Guinea
90. Paraguay
91. Peru
92. Philippines
93. Qatar
94. Republic of Korea
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95. Rwanda
96. Saint Lucia
97. Samoa
98. Saudi Arabia
99. Senegal
100. Serbia
101. Sierra Leone
102. Singapore
103. South Africa
104. Sri Lanka
105. Sudan
106. Suriname
107. Swaziland
108. Syria
109. Tajikistan
110. Tanzania
111. Thailand
112. Togo
113. Trinidad and Tobago
114. Tunisia
115. Turkmenistan
116. Uganda
117. United Arab Emirates
118. Uruguay
119. Uzbekistan
120. Viet Nam
121. Yemen
122. Zambia
123. Zimbabwe
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Appendix B – Eligible Developing Countries and their 2005 Emissions
GHG emissions values of all CDM eligible developing countries, but Serbia and Montenegro 
calculated jointly not separately. 
Country GHG Emissions (2005)
1. China 7,187.00
2. Brazil 2,841.90
3. Indonesia 2,041.90
4. India 1,866.10
5. Mexico 683.4
6. Republic of Korea 568.7
7. Iran 555.9
8. Nigeria 455.3
9. South Africa 422.8
10. Saudi Arabia 376.6
11. Malaysia 358.4
12. Thailand 351.1
13. Argentina 349.5
14. Democratic Republic of the Congo 269.3
15. Myanmar 261.7
16. Pakistan 240
17. Egypt 222.8
18. Philippines 208.9
19. Bolivia 201.9
20. Uzbekistan 180.9
21. Vietnam [1] 177.8
22. Colombia [1] 176.8
23. Zambia [2] 157.5
24. United Arab Emirates [1] 156.9
25. Peru 145.7
26. Bangladesh [1] 142.2
27. Algeria [1] 137.2
28. Angola [1,2] 133.3
29. Ecuador 127.3
30. Sudan [1,2] 122.6
31. North Korea 118.4
32. Tanzania 109.9
33. Cambodia 106.8
34. Cameroon 106.7
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35. Turkmenistan 91.4
36. Guatemala 89.4
37. Kuwait [1] 88.2
38. Chile [1] 84
39. Israel [1] 81.7
40. Ethiopia [1] 73.5
41. Syria [1,2] 70.4
42. Zimbabwe [2] 65.6
43. Honduras [2] 62.9
44. Serbia & Montenegro [1,2] 62.9
45. Morocco [1,2] 60.8
46. Qatar [1,2] 58.9
47. Papua New Guinea [2] 52.6
48. Oman [1,2] 48.4
49. Singapore [1] 48.4
50. Azerbaijan [1] 47
51. Uruguay [1] 42
52. Kenya [1,2] 41.3
53. Cuba [1,2] 40.8
54. Nepal [1] 40.4
55. Trinidad & Tobago [1,2] 36.1
56. Tunisia [1,2] 33.5
57. Côte d’Ivoire [1,2] 31
58. Madagascar [1,2] 30.7
59. Uganda [1] 30.6
60. Mongolia [1] 30.3
61. Yemen [1,2] 29.3
62. Paraguay [1,2] 28.2
63. Dominican Republic [1,2] 26.8
64. Sri Lanka [1,2] 25.1
65. Mozambique [1,2] 24.4
66. Jordan [1] 22.6
67. Mali [1,2] 22.3
68. Senegal [1] 21.6
69. Ghana [1,2] 21.3
70. Bahrain [1,2] 21.3
71. Chad [1,2] 20.9
72. Lebanon [1,2] 19.6
73. Guinea [1,2] 19.2
74. Burkina Faso [1,2] 17.9
75. Laos [1] 17.3
76. Gabon [1,2] 14
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77. Nicaragua [1,2] 13.5
78. Moldova [1] 12.5
79. Jamaica [1,2] 11.9
80. Botswana [1,2] 11.7
81. Namibia [1,2] 11.6
82. Macedonia [1] 11.2
83. Benin [1,2] 10.9
84. El Salvador [1,2] 10.9
85. Panama [1,2] 10.5
86. Costa Rica [1,2] 10.2
87. Tajikistan [1] 9.8
88. Kyrgyzstan [1] 9.7
89. Equatorial Guinea [1,2] 9.3
90. Albania [1] 9.1
91. Georgia [1] 9
92. Mauritania [1,2] 8.9
93. Cyprus [1,2] 8.7
94. Armenia [1] 7.4
95. Niger [1,2] 7.3
96. Malawi [1,2] 6.9
97. Togo [1,2] 6
98. Guyana [1,2] 5.3
99. Eritrea [1,2] 4.2
100. Rwanda [1,2] 3.8
101. Mauritius [1,2] 3.8
102. Sierra Leone [1,2] 3.6
103. Suriname [1,2] 3.6
104. Malta [1,2] 2.8
105. Fiji [1,2] 2.7
106. Swaziland [1,2] 2.7
107. Burundi [1,2] 2.6
108. Bahamas [1,2] 2.3
109. Guinea-Bissau [1,2] 2
110. Liberia [1,2] 1.9
111. Bhutan [1,2] 1.7
112. Lesotho [1,2] 1.6
113. Barbados [1,2] 1.5
114. Gambia [1,2] 1.3
115. Djibouti [1,2] 1.2
116. Belize [1,2] 1.1
117. Maldives [1,2] 0.7
118. Cape Verde [1,2] 0.5
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119. Antigua & Barbuda [1,2] 0.5
120. Saint Lucia [1,2] 0.4
121. Samoa [1,2] 0.3
122. Grenada [1,2] 0.3
[1] Data from Land Use Change & Forestry not available. 
[2] PFC, HFC & SF6 data not available.
Source: CAIT, 2007
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Appendix C – Eligible Developing Countries and their 2007 HDI
HDI values of all eligible developing countries (except North Korea and Zimbabwe)40
Country HDI
1. Singapore 0.944
2. Republic of Korea 0.937
3. Israel 0.935
4. Kuwait 0.916
5. Cyprus 0.914
6. Qatar 0.910
7. United Arab Emirates 0.903
8. Barbados 0.903
9. Malta 0.902
10. Bahrain 0.895
11. Chile 0.878
12. Antigua and Barbuda 0.868
13. Argentina 0.866
14. Uruguay 0.865
15. Cuba 0.863
16. Bahamas 0.856
17. Mexico 0.854
18. Costa Rica 0.854
19. Saudi Arabia 0.843
20. Panama 0.840
21. Trinidad and Tobago 0.837
22. Montenegro 0.834
23. Malaysia 0.829
24. Serbia 0.826
25. Saint Lucia 0.821
26. Albania 0.818
27. Macedonia 0.817
28. Grenada 0.813
29. Brazil 0.813
30. Colombia 0.807
31. Peru 0.806
32. Ecuador 0.806
33. Mauritius 0.804
34. Lebanon 0.803
35. Armenia 0.798
36. Azerbaijan 0.787
                                               
40 The HDI of Zimbabwe and North Korea was not calculated (by UNDP) due to insufficient data. See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/faq/, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ ‘Frequently asked questions’ (UNDP, 27/10/2010).
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37. Thailand 0.783
38. Iran 0.782
39. Georgia 0.778
40. Dominican Republic 0.777
41. China 0.772
42. Belize 0.772
43. Samoa 0.771
44. Maldives 0.771
45. Jordan 0.770
46. Suriname 0.769
47. Tunisia 0.769
48. Jamaica 0.766
49. Paraguay 0.761
50. Sri Lanka 0.759
51. Gabon 0.755
52. Algeria 0.754
53. Philippines 0.751
54. El Salvador 0.747
55. Syria 0.742
56. Fiji 0.744
57. Turkmenistan 0.739
58. Indonesia 0.734
59. Honduras 0.732
60. Bolivia 0.729
61. Guyana 0.729
62. Mongolia 0.727
63. Viet Nam 0.725
64. Moldova 0.720
65. Equatorial Guinea 0.719
66. Uzbekistan 0.710
67. Kyrgyzstan 0.710
68. Cape Verde 0.708
69. Guatemala 0.704
70. Egypt 0.703
71. Nicaragua 0.699
72. Botswana 0.694
73. Tajikistan 0.688
74. Namibia 0.686
75. South Africa 0.683
76. Morocco 0.654
77. Bhutan 0.619
78. Laos 0.619
79. India 0.612
80. Cambodia 0.593
81. Myanmar 0.586
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82. Yemen 0.575
83. Pakistan 0.572
84. Swaziland 0.572
85. Angola 0.564
86. Nepal 0.553
87. Madagascar 0.543
88. Bangladesh 0.543
89. Kenya 0.541
90. Papua New Guinea 0.541
91. Sudan 0.531
92. Tanzania 0.530
93. Ghana 0.526
94. Cameroon 0.523
95. Mauritania 0.520
96. Djibouti 0.520
97. Lesotho 0.514
98. Uganda 0.514
99. Nigeria 0.511
100. Togo 0.499
101. Malawi 0.493
102. Benin 0.492
103. Côte d’Ivoire 0.484
104. Zambia 0.481
105. Eritrea 0.472
106. Senegal 0.464
107. Rwanda 0.460
108. Gambia 0.456
109. Liberia 0.442
110. Guinea 0.435
111. Ethiopia 0.414
112. Mozambique 0.402
113. Guinea-Bissau 0.396
114. Burundi 0.394
115. Chad 0.392
116. Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.389
117. Burkina Faso 0.389
118. Mali 0.371
119. Sierra Leone 0.365
120. Niger 0.340
Source: UNDP Human Development Index, 2007
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